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HENRY EDWARD,

CARDINAL ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

THIRD AMERICAN EDITION.

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

I.

ROMA ÆTERNA.

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ROMA ÆTERNA.

A Discourse before the Accademia of the Quiriti, in Rome, on the 2615th Anniversary of this City, April 21, 1863.

Colleagues of the Accademia of the Quiriti,— Your too great kindness has invited me, a stranger in blood, but not in faith nor in heart, to address you on this your great civic festival; and I should have more than hesitated to accept your bidding, if I had not remembered who it was that a little while ago pronounced from the Chair of S. Peter that Rome belongs to the Catholic world; or, as we should invert the words, that the Catholic world belongs to Rome. S. Augustin tells us, 'Gratissime atque humanissime factum est, ut omnes ad Romanum imperium pertinentes societatem acciperent civitatis et Romani cives essent, ac si esset omnium quod erat ante paucorum'[1] (*De Civ. Dei*, lib. v. cap. xvii. 1). Rome imposed its name on all its provinces; they were no longer *indigenes*, but Romans. The city denoted not so much the girdle of its walls and the splendour of its

[1] 'All who belonged to the Roman Empire were, by a most kind and courteous treatment, received into citizenship, and made Roman citizens, just as if that which formerly was the property of a few now belonged to all.'

streets and palaces, its Forum and its Capitol, as the order of civilised life which spread its circumference wheresoever Rome held sway. So it is now, and in a far higher and profounder sense. You did well, therefore, to bid one of another race and of another tongue to celebrate the birthday of the Eternal City. In the name of all who may be here of other races, and in my own, I disclaim the character of a stranger. We are here in our Father's house, where the nations forget their limits and their rivalries, and are conscious only of their unity in the kingdom of God. No more resplendent example of this truth was ever given to the world than in the venerable and sacred Senate by which the Sovereign Pontiff was surrounded on the last Festival of Pentecost; the whole Catholic world sent its representatives to the Throne of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. Nor was this truth ever more gracefully acknowledged than in the act of sovereign courtesy by which the Bishops here assembled were then admitted to the freedom and the rights of Roman citizens.

I perceive also the same large and Catholic spirit in the Accademia to which your kindness ascribed me last year. The cultivation of the intellect in science and art, and the multiplication of the means of that cultivation by professorial chairs, lectures, libraries, and correspondence, together with a wide-spread affiliation of members in all grades of the Hierarchy and in all parts of the Catholic Church,—this intellectual confederation, consecrated to the service of the Faith, is one of those instruments of Christian civilisation which the Holy See has alone known how to create. It is a fitting en-

terprise for such a body to undertake to write the *Acta Romanorum Pontificum* and the *History of the Catholic Episcopate*, in which the unity and the universality of Rome are expressed.

And now what shall I, born *inter divisos toto orbe Britannos*, venture to propose to you on this auspicious solemnity? Though Aristotle, in his *Rhetorica*, tells us that it is an easy task to praise Athens among the Athenians, I find it no easy task to celebrate Rome in the hearing of Romans. Of what shall I speak? Among the constellations of its glories, ancient, mediæval, and modern, both in the natural and the supernatural order, which shall I choose as my theme? and how shall I speak of it? How will the delicate Roman ear of such an auditory as I see before me endure the strangeness of our accents and of our thoughts in speaking of that which is so dear and so intimate to your hearts? Nevertheless, I must adventure as I may, confiding only in the largeness of your clemency.

I dare say we can all remember how, in our boyhood, the title 'the Eternal City' inspired us with awe and wonder; but how in after years, when the first antipathies of criticism began to work in us, we resented the use of such an epithet as a pagan apotheosis of the *Dea Roma*. And yet, as time goes on, and reflection becomes mature, we can perceive under it a truth so singular in its kind and so vast in its proportions as to render this great title, not a literal definition indeed, but a symbol of the greatest history the world has ever seen. It would be to say little if I were to compare the duration of Rome with the duration of any other city.

It would not be to say too much if I were to affirm that the only city which has not only overpassed the duration of all others, but has alone borne any proportion to the destinies of the whole human race, is the city of Rome.

In order to express this truth, I shall not need to clear away the sands which hide from the eyes of men the very sites of Nineve and of Babylon, nor to point to the cities of Central America, the outlines of which are marked to this day as the extinct craters which denote the volcanic activity of the past along the line of your Apennines. I shall not attempt to play the antiquary, nor to inquire into the date of Vaticanum or Saturnia, of Tarquinium or Romuria, or of the nine Romes which, as we are told, crowned the seven hills before Rome was. It will not help my theme to affirm, 'Roma ante Romulum fuit. Et ab ea nomen Romulus adquisivit.'[2] I am not now speaking of a mere duration of time,—of an antiquity numbered by years,—but of a duration of power and dominion, of beneficence and sovereignty, which, in the history of mankind, Rome has possessed and wielded beyond all other cities of the world. Let me, then, say a few words on this great title,—the Eternity of Rome.

I know of only one other city which can compare with it. Jerusalem of the Old Law,—the city of the Prophets, the cradle of the Messias who was yet to come,—for a thousand years grew and expanded, diffusing its light and its influence by the dispersion of

[2] 'Rome existed before Romulus; from her Romulus derived his name.'

its children, first among the nations of the East, and next among the nations of this world. But now for another thousand years it has been dethroned and in bondage. The glories of the city of David have passed to the Jerusalem of the New Law, the city of the Apostles and of the Messias already come, who by His Vicar reigns in it, and by it governs the supernatural order of the world. How much more emphatically fulfilled in our mouths are the words of the Prophet, 'Quomodo sedet sola civitas plena populo. Facta est quasi vidua domina gentium. Princeps provinciarum facta est sub tributo.'[3] It is as if Jerusalem had said, in the words of the Baptist, to the city which should take up the crown fallen from its head, 'She must increase, but I must decrease.' And to these two, the queens of the human race, the words of S. Paul may in very truth be applied: 'Jerusalem, which is in bondage with her children; but the Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our Mother' (Gal. iv. 25, 26).

I am well aware that in using this language I am speaking in a tongue which the men of the nineteenth century deride; but I know that it is the language of faith and of Rome. With the august example of our Holy Father shining as a light above us and around us, who will not be thankful and joyful to be allowed to share in the opposition which is his inheritance and his chalice?

I would affirm, then, that Rome would have been

[3] 'How doth the city sit solitary that was full of people. How is the mistress of the nations become as a widow. The princess of provinces is made tributary' (Lam. i. 1).

as transient as other cities built by man, if a higher life and a supernatural perpetuity had not descended upon it; that there is nothing great in Rome which is not derived from the Incarnation, nor anything little in Rome except that which is opposed to this supernatural greatness.

It took of old five hundred years to subdue the south of Italy to the sway of regal and republican Rome. And before another five hundred years had passed, Rome had subdued the world, mapped out its surface, traversed it by roads, organised it by legislation, taught it to speak its one language, and to obey its one will. And yet already the seeds of dissolution were sown in it, and it was doomed to die. As S. Augustin says, 'Si recedit Spiritus Dei, Spiritus hominis revolvitur in carnem.'[4] This mightiest structure of the human intelligence, and of the human will, which summed up in itself the accumulated traditions of civilisation and philosophy, of science and government, was no sooner ripe than it began to rot. It had its root in the powers of nature, and its stature, though lofty and majestic, did not rise above the natural order. If the Divine will had not interposed, Rome would have waned and passed away as Tyre and Sidon. The foxes would have barked upon the Aventine as when Belisarius rode through its desolation, and shepherds would have folded their flocks upon the Seven Hills as they do at this day upon the gardens of its mighty suburbs. Its natural life was well-nigh spent, and its hour to return

[4] 'If the Spirit of God departs, the spirit of man returns to flesh.'

into the dust was near at hand, when a Divine interposition came.

Rome was destined to receive a supernatural graft, and by this to live again, with a new and inextinguishable life. And yet before this it was doomed to die. The words of our Divine Master were to be fulfilled in it: 'Nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet.'[5] It was a perplexing and an irritating spectacle for the Roman people to behold the city which had ruled the world desolate, forsaken by its imperial master, spoiled for the adornment of a trading town upon the shores of the Bosphorus. Every day its splendour grew more dim, and the action of its will upon the provinces and the nations grew more feeble. No wonder the Pagans accused Christianity of the downfall of Rome. No wonder S. Augustin had to labour, to write a work in two-and-twenty books to show that Rome was perishing through its inbred corruptions in religion, in philosophy, in politics, and in morals, and could be saved only by accepting its vocation to be the Jerusalem of the New Law.

Rome had already governed the nations of the world by the power of natural prudence, and by the command of the natural will. It had subdued and controlled the strong by a strength greater than their own. It had endured for a longer time in the splendour of its sway than any other empire. Yet all this was mortal and transient. To live on, it must needs be elevated to another order in the works of God, in which alone per-

[5] 'Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone' (S. John xii. 24).

petuity can be found. And that is no other than the new creation, the order of the Incarnation. But like as Jerusalem little knew the presence of its Redeemer while He taught in its streets, and at evening withdrew from its inhospitable thresholds to pass the night in prayer upon the Mount of Olives, so Rome for centuries was unconscious of the supernatural Presence which was to redeem it from the law of death. S. Leo has has said: 'Hæc autem civitas, ignorans suæ provectionis auctorem, cum tunc omnibus dominaretur gentibus, omnium gentium serviebat erroribus.'[6] It had become the seat of the Word made Flesh, the centre of His kingdom, the throne of His power. While the frontiers of its former sway were giving way to the invasion of new and irresistible hordes, and its provinces were falling from their fidelity, and the conquered nations were rising against their Queen, and all the bonds which the wisdom and power of a thousand years had created were dissolving, new virtues were going out from it, powers not new alone, but of an order transcending all its former consciousness. Rome had been lifted to the supernatural order. It had become the source and the centre of influences, creative and divine. It was no longer a mere material architect of human civilisation, but a teacher and a guide, a legislator and an arbiter in the spiritual world. S. Leo defines this change with the majestic precision of his eloquence: 'Isti sunt viri per quos Evangelium Christi Romæ resplenduit, et quæ erat Magistra erroris, facta

[6] 'This city, ignorant of the author of its increase, when she was reigning over all nations, became enslaved to the errors of all nations.'

est discipula veritatis.' 'Isti sunt qui te ad hanc gloriam provexerint, ut gens sancta, populus electus, civitas sacerdotalis et regia, per sacram B. Petri sedem caput orbis effecta, latius præsideres religione divina, quam dominatione terrena.'[7]

It was but a small thing to impose its laws, and even its language, upon the nations subject to its sway. This was an exterior work which mere power might accomplish. A greater work was yet to be done. The nations of the world were to be inwardly changed and assimilated to the mind and will of Rome. It was to become the type and the standard of the intellectual, moral, spiritual, and social perfection to mankind.

And this could be effected by a spiritual power alone. It would be greatly out of time and place if I were to detain you by descanting upon the spiritual mission of Rome in converting the nations of the world. What all the power of Imperial Rome could not do Christian Rome accomplished. It illuminated its provinces with the knowledge of the true God, and cleansed them by the purities of His kingdom of grace. The apostolic mission grew and bound the races and people of all lands to the Apostolic See, and thereby to Rome. A new centripetal law redressed the centrifugal forces which were rapidly dissolving its imperial unity. What Rome of the kings, of the consuls, of the emperors,

[7] 'These are the men through whom the Gospel of Christ shone at Rome, and she who was the teacher of error became a learner of the truth.' 'These are those who raised thee to this glory, so that thou, a holy nation, a chosen people, a priestly and royal city, wast made, by the holy see of Blessed Peter, the capital of the world, obtaining wider sway by the power of religion than by earthly sovereignty.'

could not do, Rome of the Pontiffs accomplished. They could not win the will of those they subdued, or make them rejoice in their subjection. The name of Rome was detested by the very races who loved the Pontiffs as their Fathers in Christ. The love of Christian Rome prevailed over the traditional hatreds of mankind.

Such was the action of the faith illuminating the intelligence of the nations with the equable and steadfast light of the knowledge of God, and binding them in one family by the Sacraments of grace. Under the higher action of this spiritual influence, an intellectual culture and an intellectual unity has been propagated among the races of the Christian family. As all the scattered lights of what may be called the theology of nature were gathered and purified in the illumination of the one true faith so that all religions passed away before the religion of Jesus Christ, in like manner all philosophies were harmonised and absorbed into the one intellectual science of the Church, by which the revelation of supernatural truth was justified, illustrated, and defended. The human reason, which had fallen into innumerable and interminable errors by playing the critic, was elevated, strengthened, and enlarged by becoming the disciple of a Divine Teacher. The intellect of Christendom has ascended to a sphere of light and of philosophy unattainable without a revelation and a perpetual Divine authority. It is Rome which has presided over this intellectual development, and has sat as an arbiter of its discussions, and has given unity and perpetuity to its scientific traditions.

An inevitable consequence of the intellectual supe-

riority in the order of moral truth is what we call civilisation. I know of no point of view in which the glory of Rome is more conspicuous than in its civil mission to the races of the world. When the seat of empire was translated from Rome to Constantinople, all the culture and civilisation of Italy seemed to be carried away to enrich and to adorn the East. It seemed as if God had decreed to reveal to the world what His Church could do without the world, and what the world could not do without the Church. A more melancholy history than that of the Byzantine Empire is nowhere to be read. It is one long narrative of the usurpation and insolent dominion of the world over the Church, which, becoming schismatical and isolated, fell easily under its imperial masters. With all its barbaric splendour and its imperial power, what has Constantinople accomplished for the civilisation or the Christianity of the East? If the salt had kept its savour, it would not have been cast out and trodden under the feet of the Eastern Antichrist.

While this was accomplishing in the East, in the West a new world was rising, in order, unity, and fruitfulness, under the action of the Pontiffs. Even the hordes which inundated Italy were changed by them from the wildness of Nature to the life of Christian civilisation. From S. Leo to S. Gregory the Great, Christian Europe may be said not to exist. Rome stood alone under the rule of its Pontiffs, while as yet empires and kingdoms had no existence. Thus little by little, and one by one, the nations which now make up the unity of Christendom were created, trained, and

formed to political societies. First Lombardy, then Gaul, then Spain, then Germany, then Saxon England; then the first germs of lesser states began to appear. But to whom did they owe the laws, the principles, and the influences which made their existence possible coherent, and mature? It was to the Roman Pontiffs that they owed the first rudiments of their social and political order. It was the exposition of the Divine law by the lips of the Vicar of Jesus Christ that founded the Christian polity of the world.

This the Church has been able to do without the world, and even in spite of it. Nothing can be conceived more isolated, more feeble, or more encompassed with peril, than the line of the Roman Pontiffs; nevertheless they have maintained inviolate their independence, with their sacred deposit of faith and of jurisdiction, through all ages and through all conflicts, from the beginning to this hour. It seemed as if God willed to remove the first Christian emperor from Rome in the early fervour of his conversion, lest it should seem as if the sovereignty of the Church were in any way the creation of his power. God is jealous of His own kingdom, and will not suffer any unconsecrated hand to be laid upon His ark, even for its support.

The 'stone cut out without hands,' which became a great mountain and filled the whole earth, is typical not only of the expansion and universality of the Church, but of its mysterious and supernatural character. No human hand has accomplished its greatness. The hand of God alone could bring it to pass. What is there in the history of the world parallel to the Rome of the

Christians? The most warlike and imperial people of the world gave place to a people unarmed and without power. The pacific people arose from the Catacombs, and entered upon the possession of Rome as their inheritance. The existence of Christian Rome, both in its first formation, and next in its perpetuity, is a miracle of Divine power. God alone could give it to His people; God alone could preserve it to them, and them in it. What more wonderful sight than to see a Franciscan monk leading the Via Crucis in the Flavian Amphitheatre, or the Passionist missionaries conversing peacefully among the ilexes and the vaults where the wild beasts from Africa thirsted for the blood of Christians? Who has prevailed upon the world for 1500 years to fall back as Attila did from Christian Rome? Who has persuaded its will, and paralysed its ambitions and conflicting interests? Such were my thoughts the other day when the Sovereign Pontiff, surrounded by the Princes and Pastors of the Church, was celebrating the Festival of the Resurrection over the Confession of S. Peter. I thought of the ages past, when in the Amphitheatre of Nero, within which we stood, thousands of martyrs fell beneath the arms of the heathen. And now, the Rex Pacificus, the Vicar of the Prince of Peace, there holds his court, and offers over the tomb of the Apostle the unbloody Sacrifice of our redemption. The legions of Rome have given way before a people who have never lifted a hand in war. They have taken the city of the Cæsars, and hold it to this day. The more than Imperial Court which surrounded the Vicar of Jesus Christ surpassed the glories of the Empire. 'This is the victory which

overcometh the world, our Faith.' The noblest spectacle upon earth is an unarmed man, whom all the world cannot bend by favour or by fear. Such a man is essentially above all worldly powers. And such eminent among the inflexible is he, the Pontiff and King who, in the midst of the confusions and rebellions of the whole earth, bestowed that day his benediction upon the city and the world.

It is no wonder to me that Italians should believe in the Primacy of Italy. Italy has indeed a Primacy, but not that of which some have dreamed. The Primacy of Italy is the presence of Rome; and the Primacy of Rome is in its apostleship to the whole human race, in the science of God with which it has illuminated mankind, in its supreme and world-wide jurisdiction over souls, in its high tribunal of appeal from all the authorities on earth, in its inflexible exposition of the moral law, in its sacred diplomacy, by which it binds the nations of Christendom into a confederacy of order and of justice,—these are its true, supreme, and—because God so has willed—its inalienable and incommunicable primacy among the nations of the earth. Take these away, and Rome becomes less than Jerusalem, and Italy one among the nations, and not among the first. The world does not return upon its path, nor reproduce its past. Time was when Rome wielded an irresistible power by its legions and its armies throughout the world. The nations of Europe and of the East were then barbarous or unorganised, without cohesion, and without unity of will or power. Those uncivilised and dependent provinces are now kingdoms and empires,

wielding each a power, in peace and in war, mature and massive as the power of Rome in its ripest season. It is a delirium of the memory for Italy to dream now of empire and of supremacy in the order of nature, that is of war and conquest. The Primacy of Italy is Christian and Catholic, or it has none. Alas for your fair land and for your noble race, if, forgetting its true greatness, it covet false glory which is not its own. In that hour it abdicates its mission—the greatest a people ever had—and descends from its primacy among the nations of the world. A vocation lost is prelude to a fall. This is not to increase, but to decrease before God and man.

I do not remember in the history of the world any example of the permanent union of temporal splendour with spiritual fruitfulness and power. The sceptre had departed from Judah when the waters of eternal life flowed from Jerusalem throughout the world. Rome had ceased to be the seat of empire when it became the mother of Christian nations. When Constantinople became imperial, it began to fail in its witness for the Faith and Unity of Jesus Christ. The kingdoms and empires of Christian Europe have been faithful to the Holy See in their depression, and rebellious in their prosperity. The two nations most Catholic, most Christian, most filial in their love of the kingdom of God, are Ireland and Poland. Rome, I may say, because it is the seat of the Vicar of our crucified Lord, is supreme in the spiritual order, feeble in the natural and political. 'It always bears about in the body the mortification of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus may be manifested in its body.' Such is its normal

state. Let it be recognised as the law of its existence and of its sovereignty, lest the incantations of the tempter steal away the hearts of men with visions of unity and empire and splendour in this world. It is a severe vocation to be the cross-bearers in the procession of the Vicars of our crucified Master. But to this you are called. Romans, if you would renew your courage for this conflict, lift up your eyes to the cloud of witnesses which hover above your head; to the martyrs and confessors, the Pontiffs and Levites, the virgins and saints, who on this soil, by tears and by blood, have overcome the world, and are now before the throne. Look, too, at the Catholic unity upon earth, which but the other day flew hither on the wings of faith and love and filial devotion to surround the Vicar of Christ; look at the frontiers of the Holy Church, which are flowing outwards with ever-expanding force, conquering, and embracing the conquered in the unity of the true Fold; look at the circuit of the kingdom of God, which rests upon the sunrise and the sunset, upon the farthest north and upon the islands of the southern seas. It was never yet so vast or wide-spreading; never did the ends of the earth lift up their hands towards the Vicar of the Incarnate Word so universally as at this hour. In the moment of its anguish and its affliction, when the world believes it to be in feebleness and decline, the Holy See is putting forth mightier powers, and reigning over wider realms than ever till now.

But if this be not enough, learn of the world, of its miseries and its anguish. Rome laid the foundations of Christian Europe on the basis of a supernatural

unity; and, with all its revolutions and inundations of evil, it abides to this day. England laid the foundations of North America upon the basis of natural society; and the lifetime of one man is long enough to touch the beginning and the ending of its political unity. The unity of faith, and filial obedience to the unity of the Church in the person of its Head, in ages past fused the discordant races of England, France, and Spain, and made of them kingdoms and monarchies, which endure, in their massive consolidation and unity of mind and will, unto this hour. So God has ever brought social and political unity out of the chaos of disorder. They who begin by contending against the fountain and law of unity doom themselves to division and confusion. They are wrestling with necessity; and he who contends with necessity must fail: 'Whoso shall fall upon that stone shall be broken, and on whomsoever it shall fall it will grind him to powder.'

Bear with me yet a little if I say too much, my Colleagues of the Accademia; I so love your Eternal City as the head of the nations of the world, that I love it not at all as the capital of a nation. We are surfeited to sickness with national greatness and national pride. London, and Manchester, and Glasgow, and Dublin; Paris, and Lyons, and Madrid; St. Petersburg and New York,—are more than enough, with their gigantic enterprise, worldly splendour, gross material luxury, and low vulgarity of national egotism, to cure any man of the folly of exchanging the Mother and the Mistress of the people of the world for the handmaid and the servant of a nation. If we desire to be citizens of a

national capital, we should go elsewhere. Christian Rome is our mother. An Italian London has neither our admiration nor our love.

The eternity of Rome, then, if it be not an exact truth, is nevertheless no mere rhetorical exaggeration. It denotes the fact that Rome has been chosen of God as the centre of His kingdom, which is eternal, as the depository of His eternal truths, as the fountain of His graces which lead men to a higher life, as the witness and guardian of law and principles of which the sanctions and the fruit are eternal. Romans, you have a vocation and a mission, a trust and an account to give at the great day, to which none but you are called. You have inherited the birthright of Jerusalem, not in the supernatural order only, but even in the order of nature. This very city, and you that dwell in it, partake of the destinies and the glories of the Incarnation beyond all other cities and races. You are the sons and the servants, the Levites and the guardians, of the Vicar of the Incarnate Son of God. You are, as your own S. Leo called you of old, 'Gens sancta, populus electus, civitas sacerdotalis et regia.'[8] Your very existence is so interwoven with the Incarnation, that its sufferings are your sufferings, its victories your victoties, its glories your glories. Therefore you have lived in eighteen hundred years of combat; therefore you waded through three hundred years of persecution, and have stood as the *triarii* of your ancient legions, immovable through fifteen hundred years of interminable conflict. When all others gave way before the world,

[8] 'A holy nation, a chosen people, a city of kings and priests.'

Rome has ever restored the battle. And now once more the cry is heard, 'Res ad triarios perventum est.'[9] Bear with me if I venture to utter what we, in our weakness and isolation, hope for at your hands.

I shall say little if I say that on you, under God, we depend for the immutability, not only of the faith in all the radiance of its exposition and illustration, and of the Divine law in all its breadth, and purity, and perfection. You are also charged with the custody of other truths which descend from this great sphere of supernatural light, and with the application of those truths to the turbulent and unstable elements of human society.

You have to bear witness that God has a kingdom among men; that Christianity is not a mere school of speculation, a 'philosophia umbratilis,' an intellectual theory for unoccupied men, feeble, inert, and dependent upon the supremacy of human power; but a true and proper sovereignty over the wills of men and of races, of individuals and of empires; a kingdom not of this world, but in it, and because not of it, therefore superior to it; able to move it because not resting upon it; mighty to control it because it is the kingdom of eternal justice, whose law in the end will infallibly prevail. In all the Christian world save only here, this Divine truth has been enfeebled or betrayed; that is, in all separated countries the world is supreme. Jerusalem, Alexandria, Constantinople, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Canterbury, are witnesses of the judgment which falls on those who falter in their fidelity to the sovereignty of truth.

[9] 'The battle has reached to the rear-guard.'

In Catholic countries where the national egotism is strong, the action of truth is weak because the sovereignty and independence of the Church are crossed and shackled. With you alone it is in the plenitude of its freedom. Rome is sovereign because it is independent; it is independent because it has no master upon earth. The Vicar of Jesus Christ is the source of its liberty and the guardian of its sovereignty. Call it temporal power if you will, the thing is the same,—the freedom, the independence, the sovereignty of the kingdom of God on earth, in all the world and over all mankind, resting upon its centre in the patrimony of the Church, within which the shadow of no other sovereignty can intrude without a violation of the supernatural order of grace. Because it is the only spot of ground on which the Vicar of Christ can set the sole of his foot in freedom, therefore they who would drive the Incarnation off the face of the earth hover about it to wrest it from his hands. For this, then, you are witnesses and guardians. You are set in an age when the material civilisation of the world has been piled up to a gigantic height, to testify that there is an order higher still; that as the soul is more than the body, and eternity than time, so the moral order is above the material; that justice is above power; that justice may suffer long, but must reign at last; that power is not right; that no wrongs can be sanctified by success; nor can the immutable laws of right and wrong be confounded. You are the heirs of those who renewed the face of the world, and created the Christian civilisation of Europe. You are the depositories of truths and principles which

are indestructible in their vitality. Though buried like the ear of corn in the Pyramids of Egypt, they strike root and spring into fruit when their hour is come. Truths and principles are divine; they govern the world; to suffer for them is the greatest glory of man. 'Non mors sed causa mortis facit martyrem.'[10] So long as Rome is grafted upon the Incarnation, it is the head of the world. If it were possible to cut it out from its Divine root, it would fall from its primacy among mankind. But this cannot be. He who chose it for His own, has kept it to this hour. He who has kept it until now, will keep it unto the end. Be worthy of your high destiny for His sake, who has called you to it; for our sakes, who look up to you as, under God, our light and our strength.

[10] 'Not death, but the cause of death, makes the martyr.'

II.

THE WORK AND THE WANTS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ENGLAND.

THE WORK AND THE WANTS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ENGLAND.

(*Dublin Review*, July 1863.)

An Account of the State of the Roman Catholic Religion throughout the World. Written for the use of Pope Innocent XI. by Monsignor Cerri, Secretary of the Congregation de Propoganda Fide. Now first translated from an authentick Italian MS. never published. To which is added a Discourse concerning the State of Religion in England; written in French in the time of King Charles I., and now first translated. With a large Dedication to the present Pope, giving him a very particular Account of the State of Religion amongst Protestants; and of several other matters of importance relating to Great Britain. By Sir Richard Steele. (London: printed for J. Roberts, near the Oxford Arms, in Warwick-lane, MDCCXV.)

More than a generation of men has passed away since the emancipation of the Catholic Church in Great Britain from the persecution of the penal laws; and nearly half a generation since the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy. We have reached, therefore, a time when we may review the condition of the Church in this country. The silent and gradual expansion of a tree may escape the eye from moment to moment, but in a series of years its breadth of shadow and its rising stature reveal the accumulation of its life and

power. So with the Church in England. After a series of vicissitudes more rapid, abrupt, and various than Christianity has ever known in any other land, the Catholic Church goes forth once more to evangelise the English people. England has been Pagan and Christian; then Pagan and Christian again; then Catholic in all the docility of childlike obedience; then, though Catholic still, indocile in all the pretensions of its national pride; then reformed (so called), with all the alternations of action and reaction from Continental Protestantism to Hierarchical Anglicanism, from Latitudinarianism to Pietism, from an imitative Catholicism to a thorough Rationalism, which is now spreading on all sides under the foundations of English society. Meanwhile the Church has been twice all but extinct, and twice restored in power.

For the purpose of bringing out more clearly these facts of Divine Providence, we have prefixed to this article the title of a work which was published in the last century. It presents us with one of those historical pictures which read like a fiction. To the Catholics of this day, and even to our Protestant antagonists, it will seem hardly credible that the account of the Roman Catholic religion in England, which now would fill a volume, should be despatched in about a dozen octavo pages; and even of these, three-fourths at least are occupied with an account of the schism under Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth, and of the appointment of first an Archpriest, and then of a Vicar-Apostolic for the whole of England. The description of the actual state of religion in England is contained

in a few sentences: 'I shall only say, in general, that there are many Catholics in the country at this present time; but that their number is not very considerable if compared with that of the heretics, who are divided into Church of England men, Presbyterians, Quakers, Anabaptists, Independents, and several other sects. The exercise of the Catholic religion is wholly prohibited both in public and in private. The Catholics meet together in some few places to perform Divine worship, but they do so with the utmost secrecy, and not without great danger.' It seems incredible that such should have been our state only two centuries ago. What we purpose in this article, then, is to take a slight survey, by way of contrast, of our present condition, and that rather with a practical view, and for the sake of stimulating zeal and activity, than as a matter of mere literary speculation.

The history of England exhibits in a wonderful way the action of the Church upon the world, and their irreconcilable conflict. It was the Church that civilised England, united its races, founded and consecrated its monarchy. The Church has a twofold work to do for mankind. Its first and primary, indeed, is to save souls, to lead men to eternal life. Its second, but no less true, is to ripen and to elevate the social and political life of men by its influences of morality and of law. As the Church is not a mere school of opinion for the enlightenment of the intellect, but a true kingdom for the government of the will, so its mission is not only to direct the conscience and the will of individuals as units, but of fathers as the heads of

households, and of princes or governors as the rulers of peoples and of nations. Hence, by the Divine law of its mission to mankind, arises what is called the social and political *status* of the Church.

The Holy See, in creating Christian Europe, contracted social and political relations with the civil society which it had called into existence. The Church in England formed an integral and vital part of the social and political order of the Saxon races,—permeating its whole structure and life: it anointed their princes, legislated in their parliaments, judged in their tribunals; and being thus intimately united with the whole public life and social order of the people, the Church accomplished more pervadingly and more uniformly its spiritual mission in guiding men to eternal life. The theory of unconsecrated civil powers, occupied only with the temporal welfare of the people, was unknown to our Saxon forefathers, and would have been rejected by them as an impiety and a folly. True, indeed, it is that civil society has no Divine mission to the souls of men, no custody of revealed truths or laws, no supernatural discernment of what is for the eternal welfare of its members, no faculties to apply itself to the care of souls, nor any authority to direct the conscience. Nevertheless, a State has higher duties than that of conferring purely temporal benefits; and the Church, in consecrating the civil order by the grace of Christianity, enables it to promote the welfare of its people by a discernment and by means which are above its own. Such was eminently the state of Saxon England.

The Anglo-Saxon monarchy belongs to a Christian

and patriarchal period, and hardly enters into the text of modern history. It is, like the source of the Nile, hidden, but prolific ; a mighty and productive cause, but withdrawn from sight. From it descend the unwritten laws, traditions, customs, and characteristic spirit of England in all its ages and in its full maturity. The Norman period, if it be more historical, and more within the range of our cognisance and our criticism, is, nevertheless, a time of culmination and of decline. The English monarchy grew strong; the English Church grew weak. The Saxon period expired in S. Edward, King and Confessor, who symbolised the spirit of that most beautiful age ; the Norman reached its full development in Henry VIII., the offspring and the representative of its anti-Catholic spirit and traditions. Nevertheless, in the five centuries of the Norman-English rule, the Church created for itself a vast, mature, and powerful organisation for the discharge of its civil mission to the people of England. It participated in all the political life and action, the domestic and foreign policy, the legislative and judicial power of the monarchy. It had a rich inheritance of ecclesiastical endowments, it accumulated a vast multitude of eleemosynary foundations, it formed and directed a noble and abundant system of education in all its branches and for all classes of the people. The grammar schools of England, the higher, or, as we call them, the public schools, and the two Universities of Oxford and Cambridge were an ample and worthy provision for the education of a people less than three millions in number.

Now of all these the Reformation robbed the Catholic Church at one blow. It was simply exiled from political power, and put out of the sphere of the social life of England. Its pastors were driven from the councils of State. They were excluded from all share in the legislation and the government of the realm. Its charitable institutions were taken away, and its schools and universities turned against itself. It is not possible to conceive the state of privation and of poverty to which the Church was reduced. In France the Protestants were a small minority, who withdrew from the institutions and culture of a Catholic nation. All the accumulated resources of spiritual and intellectual cultivation possessed by the Church of France remained with it still, because the French nation continued faithful. In England all was the reverse—the Catholics were the minority. They were spoiled of all that their fathers had created and accumulated. All the culture, maturity, and intellectual development of the English people, with all the instruments and means of its progress and expansion, remained in the hands of the anti-Catholic majority. It would be difficult to overstate the effects of this spoliation. The Emperor Julian showed the true instinct of an apostate in closing the Christian schools; and the Tudor princess manifested the same subtilty in robbing the Catholics of England of the means of intellectual culture. The true way to weaken an antagonist is to despoil him of the means of knowledge and cultivation.

The prudence and the providence of the great Catholic men of those times was signally shown in the

foundation of colleges in Paris, Douai, Lisbon, Valladolid, Rome, and elsewhere, which for three centuries have returned into England a perpetual though scanty stream of educated priests. Nor have these colleges even now, in our better days, exhausted their mission. It is of great moment to the Catholic Church that its priests should possess as little as possible of the *idola specûs* of nationalism, and as much as possible of the culture of other Catholic nations; so that, even when hereafter, as we hope, the whole circle of our Catholic education is completed, there will always be an office of high importance for these colleges to discharge — namely, to contribute the culture of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France to the culture of England in the members of our priesthood.

It would be wearisome and out of place to enter here into the details of the depression under which the Catholics of England have laboured during the last three hundred years, or to trace out the continual diminution of their numbers and the continual decrease of their strength. For a long time great numbers of the aristocracy and of the landed commonalty maintained their fidelity. In some counties of England a large proportion of the country gentlemen and their families were Catholic. Now they form a proportion almost inappreciably small. To give an idea of the effect of penal laws, we may state that we have heard, on good authority, that in Ireland, between the years 1750 and 1775, five thousand persons, some with their whole families, apostatised from the faith. Many English families continued Catholic down to the last generation. It

was the fathers or the grandfathers of many of the men of the present day who, as it is styled, conformed to the Established Church. But these times of oppression were to have an end ; and the religious reaction caused by the impieties of the first French Revolution came in like a spring-tide upon England and Ireland. We have little doubt that this was among the remote causes of Catholic emancipation, and of the wonderful religious phenomena which have arisen since the year 1830 : such as the revival of religious earnestness ; the profuse church-building throughout England and Ireland ; the vast efforts for educating the people ; the Anglo-Catholic movement, as it is called, of which the analysis has yet to be made, and the intellectual history to be appreciated; and, lastly, the wonderful simulations of Catholic faith, ritual, and devotion, which sprang up simultaneously and in parallel lines within the Established Church of England and the Established Church of Scotland — namely, what are called Puseyism and Irvingism. All these seem to us to be nothing more than the irregular and impetuous motions of earnest minds driven onward before the irresistible stream of ideas and sympathies which agitated the whole of Christian Europe in its recoil from unbelief and its return towards the sources of supernatural faith.

But we cannot pursue these thoughts further, tempting as they are. We must turn back to the position of the Catholic Church at the time of its emancipation. It found itself stripped of everything, incapable of holding property, of executing a legal trust, of purchasing land for its churches and schools. A few of its churches

still remain, spectacles of abject and miserable poverty; such, for instance, as the old Catholic church at Brompton, near Chatham—a structure of planking for walls, with sash windows, and galleries covering half the area, steeped in and squalid with the dirt of years. Great was the faith of those who through all this degradation still beheld and adored the Divine Presence.

But the time was come for a new age to set in. In the reign of William IV. statutes were passed enabling Catholics to make legal trusts for religious and charitable purposes, to purchase land for churches and schools, and to provide endowments for Divine worship and education, and for the maintenance of clergy and school-teachers. By an oversight, or by an absurd and oppressive anomaly, while the Catholic worship was legalised, the celebration of the Mass for the departed —which is a part of that worship—was still held to be a superstitious use. Nevertheless, the position was greatly ameliorated, and Catholics began to enter once more into the social and political life of England. We can remember the fear and dislike with which the first Catholic members were received in the House of Commons, and the abuse with which they were daily treated by the newspapers of this country. We can recollect also with what astonishment and aversion Mr. O'Connell was seen ascending the stairs to a *levée* at Buckingham Palace, in the robes and chain of Lord Mayor of Dublin. These were portents in the State,—as when seven moons were seen at once, or when oxen spake and statues sweated blood. Nevertheless, Catholics arose and multiplied on every side. It seemed like the exuberant life

of Nature. Turn up the soil where you will with a spade, and the surface next the sun will spring with new forms of life. All over England Catholics manifested themselves, and churches and schools created new and visible centres of influence where the Catholic worship had never yet been seen.

Another cause which gave prominence to Catholics was the vehement endeavour of the Protestant Dissenters to reduce the status of the Established Church, by abolishing church-rates and throwing open the Universities. The Established Church weathered the storm, and in many ways became more active and enterprising; but its traditional dignity was marred, and its exclusive superiority has ever since declined. It is now little more than the richest and most numerous among many sects. The country does not regard it as the representative and the expression of its religious convictions, or of its religious affections. This, again, has given to the Catholic Church a new relative position in the social state of England.

Another cause, too remarkable to be passed over, is the change which took place in two of the most important of our colonies—Canada and Australia. In Canada the Catholic Church was always strong, highly respected, and possessed of great social influence. This was much increased by political changes in the colony, and by the diminution of the exclusive privileges of the Established Churches. In Australia, by the wise and equitable government of Sir Richard Bourke, the Catholic Church and the two Establishments were alike admitted, *pro rata*, to participate in the public revenues.

This has given to the Catholic Church in Australia a position and a pre-eminence which it does not possess elsewhere. We mention these two instances because they have undoubtedly reacted upon the mother country, and the stream of legislation has for these thirty years steadily set towards placing the Catholic Church in England on the same footing as in the colonies.

But all these were only preludes to an act which needed a higher hand. The Supreme Pontiff, by the Apostolical Letters, *Universalis Ecclesia,* created in England a third epoch of its spiritual history. We are too near the great event to be fully conscious of its magnitude. They who shall be removed from it by a century will perceive its full proportions and see the outline of its results. Perhaps there has hardly been in the history of the Church a more timely and visibly providential event than the restoration of the Hierarchy at the special moment when it occurred. The whole Established Church had been in agitation on the subject of baptism. But the excitement on this special doctrine had been merged in a deeper and more primary question respecting the authority of the Anglican Church in matters of doctrine, and the authority of the Crown as the ultimate judge of ecclesiastical appeals. Every other subject gave way to a discussion of the royal supremacy. The press groaned with pamphlets and protests, replies and rejoinders, upon the subject of the supremacy of the Crown. It was boldly vindicated by the Erastian party; it was impatiently borne by the High Establishment school; it was cavilled at by some, and utterly denied by others. It was denounced

by many as an usurpation upon the office of the Church, as a bondage to the civil power, as a violation of the apostolical authority of the Episcopate. Except a few thorough-going Erastians, nobody defended it. Almost everybody lamented it as an excessive claim of the Tudors, and a perpetual danger to the Church of England. Eighteen hundred Anglican clergymen joined in a public protest against it. Just at this moment, in the midst of this agitation, controversy, and awakening of reason and conscience to the true character of the royal supremacy, the shadow of a Divine hand fell upon men, and another supremacy was seen to assert itself in England. The English people beheld a hierarchy of thirteen sees, under a metropolitan, a prince of the Church, rise like an exhalation from the ground, or descend as if from heaven. The calm power, majesty, and might of the Divine supremacy of the Vicar of Jesus Christ revealed more than ever by contrast the impotence and the unlawfulness of any human supremacy over the spiritual mission of the Church. It seemed that the very moment had been chosen which should exhibit in the strongest light this contrast of the true and the false. Then began one of the greatest religious tumults of our days. The Parliament, the municipal cities, the universities, the counties, the Anglican bishops, the clergy of the Establishment, and we know not who besides, were all in a frenzy of excitement, protesting with one voice against Pius IX. for doing what S. Gregory I. had done before. The storm blew furiously. The Protestants threatened a re-enactment of penal laws. Some Catholics blamed

everybody who had a hand in the measure, not sparing the Holy See. Croakers croaked. The wise and the prudent were oracular. The timid were frightened; some good men even were carried away by the alarm. It was said that Catholicism was put back in England by a century; that conversions were stopped; that the peaceful relations between Catholics and Protestants were broken; old antipathies revived; and all the gains since the Emancipation, and even the Emancipation itself, endangered.

Now we have always been of those who believed none of these things; but who rather believe, and that most firmly and profoundly, the direct reverse of all these things. We have ever believed that the Hierarchy was the greatest boon that the Vicar of our Lord could have bestowed upon England; that without it Catholicism would have languished; that its efforts would have wanted unity and permanence; that its productiveness would have been only partially developed; that the very gains of the Emancipation would have become dangerous to us; that if vicars-apostolic suffice for a people under penal laws, nothing less than an ordered and perfect Hierarchy will suffice for a Catholic people restored to freedom; that from the moment of its re-establishment date both the full re-organisation of the Church by the restoration of its old Catholic elements, and the immense development of ecclesiastical order and spiritual fruitfulness which we now behold. All the noise and heat and vehemence we regard as a cheap price for such a gift; nay, even as conducive to its confirmation. It is held by canonists

that pontifical acts need only publication to oblige the conscience. The uproar published the Papal decree. The English people became the *cursores* and apparitors of the Sovereign Pontiff. They made the ears of every man to tingle with the clamorous proclamation, that the supremacy of the Vicar of our Lord had reasserted itself in England, and claimed of all men submission to its direction. The royal supremacy paled before the splendour of the head of the Church of all nations upon earth.

Through all the storm of this conflict one name stands out with a clearness which almost isolated him from all others among the pastors and faithful who bore a foremost part in that great contest. A Jesuit in Rome once asked an English Catholic what he thought of the restoration of the Hierarchy in England. He answered by saying that he believed it to be a Divine providence of the most evident kind, adding that it was visibly '*digitus Dei*.' The Jesuit answered, with true Italian felicity, '*Coll' anello di Pio Nono*.' We may further add that the hand to which the execution of the Apostolic Letters, under the seal of the Fisherman, was committed, was the hand of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. It is well known that his friends thought his life in peril; that they endeavoured to prevail on him to continue abroad, saying that his landing in England would be dangerous to him; that they advised him not to appear in the streets, and even to leave the country. And it was generally known that he refused to do any of these things; and that the firmness and calmness of his carriage not only sup-

ported the courage of other men, but chiefly prevailed to gain the signal victory which was then achieved.

For many years after this event, both in England and abroad, and even in Rome, Catholics were still found to repeat that the restoration of the Hierarchy and the uproar which it excited, had put back Catholicism for generations; that the tide of conversion had been arrested; that the growth of all the works of the Church had been indefinitely retarded. During those years these used to be the first questions proposed by the Catholics of France on meeting their English brethren. The same representations were urged in high quarters, even in Rome itself, where the subject was made matter of formal inquiry. It is impossible for us to do more in this article than to mark in outline the true refutation of all these assertions.

And, first of all, we are at a loss to conceive how the restoration of the Hierarchy, which gives back to a mutilated part of the Church its full ecclesiastical perfection, can be an obstacle to the progress of the Catholic religion. Nor, again, how the more public and conspicuous action of the Church, by means of a Hierarchy governing with an open exercise of its prerogative, can hinder the conversion of a people. Nor, again, how the personal influence and action of thirteen Bishops, in the government and organisation of their dioceses, can fail to produce a result both on the mass of the people and on individuals incomparably beyond the effect produced by eight vicars-apostolic. But, in fact, the very reverse is true. We may affirm that the great expansion of the Church dates from the restora-

tion of the Hierarchy; that it marked the commencement of a new period of which it was itself the instrumental cause. We can only give, in the most rapid way, a few statistics; but they will suffice.

Referring to the Catholic Directories, we find the number of churches and priests in England stated as follows:

	Churches.	Priests.
1830	410	—
1840	457	542
1850	587	788
1862	824	1215

To take the vicariate of London alone, we have—

			Religious Houses:	
	Churches.	Priests.	Men.	Women.
1850	104	168	2	17

At this time the vicariate was divided into the dioceses of Westminster and Southwark. In Westminster alone we have—

			Religious Houses:	
	Churches.	Priests.	Men.	Women.
1862	80	184	12	28

Thus the increase in Westminster alone is such that, in every particular except churches, it exceeds the return of the whole vicariate before the division. Other dioceses, such as Birmingham, Salford, and Liverpool, would no doubt present the same result; but we have not the statistics at hand.

Such is the expansion and multiplication of the Church since the restoration of the Hierarchy, as certified by statistics. But these afford only a superficial test. If we would take a more adequate measure, we

must look to something more than figures. The Hierarchy ingrafted the Catholic Church in England upon the Episcopate of the world; and the influx of the universal Church came into it once more with the full tide of life and vigour. The result was dioceses, cathedrals, chapters, missionary parishes. Then councils provincial and diocesan; then the provisions and traditions of the canon law, adjusted by the Holy See to the condition of our country. Then an intimate union of action and counsel with Rome, such as before had not been attainable. Every Bishop in the Hierarchy became a channel of the spirit and mind of the Holy See to his diocese, with a fulness and a minuteness not possible in the vast vicariates of other days. Hence has come an elevation and a deepening of the ecclesiastical and sacerdotal life, and an activity and a diffusion of Catholic devotion never known before.

The inevitable result of this great expansion of the Church is to multiply its wants, and to expose its members to special social dangers; and of these we will say a few words, or, at least, of the chief of them.

We will begin by briefly noting some of the principal needs of the Church in England.

First, and before all, are needed proper diocesan seminaries, according to the decrees of the Council of Trent, for the education of the priesthood. As yet such do not exist. As yet such could hardly be formed. The vicars-apostolic of other days had done well in forming ecclesiastical colleges, in which clerical and lay students should be educated together. Out of their poverty they could do no more. And the mixture with

ecclesiastical students, if less advantageous to them, was very advantageous to the lay students. But the decrees of Trent are express, and remain to be executed. They provide that to every cathedral church, and to all greater churches, such as the metropolitan, primatial, patriarchal, there shall be attached a school of tonsured clerics of whom there is reasonable hope that they will persevere in the ecclesiastical life. They provide also, that if any diocese, by reason of poverty, be unable to maintain such a seminary, the metropolitan in the provincial council, or with two of his senior suffragans, shall take measures for the establishment of a seminary common to two or more dioceses. The metropolitan has a *conscientia onerata* to see to the execution of this decree. Until lately dioceses have not existed in England, and the decree has had no application. With the Hierarchy it began to oblige; and now we may trust that the time of its execution is come. In some of the larger of our dioceses, means will not be wanting for a lesser and a greater seminary. In the smaller dioceses, perhaps, a lesser seminary only could for a time be formed. But in all a beginning could be made; and the beginning is half the work. It may seem paradoxical to say that a seminary is even more needful in the smaller than in the larger dioceses. But it is true; for a small clergy has greater need of some centre of ecclesiastical spirit, and of the influence of example and theological help, than a large one, which possesses in itself more resources and a more vigorous life. Moreover, a seminary would certainly multiply the number of such a clergy, by inspiring a desire for the priest-

hood and generating vocations among the youths and even the boys of the diocese. The chief and acknowledged difficulty is the want of professors, but these may be supplied by a little foresight, and the English College in Rome seems providentially formed to meet this want. One or two picked men from each diocese would return home in four or five years capable of making at least a sufficient beginning.

But it is not our object nor our duty to enter further into this great subject, which, as we know, has long engaged the most serious thoughts of our Bishops and of other persons.

A second want is an adequate system of education for the poor and the middle classes. In the Report of the Poor-School Committee of 1853 it is stated that the Catholic schools in England and Wales amount to more than 500. In the Report of the Assistant Commissioner to the Privy Council in 1861 the number is stated at over 700. The number of Catholic children in England and Wales requiring education is put at 160,000. The number under education, as given by the Assistant Commissioner, is over 80,000. If in London alone there be 200,000 Catholics, there will be one-fifth between the ages of five and fifteen, or 40,000 needing education. Suppose 10,000 to be an excess, and 12,000 to be at school, as the diocesan returns show, there will be 18,000 or 20,000 Catholic children for whom, after all the efforts which have been made out of our poverty, schools have yet to be provided. To find funds sufficient for this purpose a system is needed which will not only gather or ask alms of Catholics, but so address

the intellect, heart, and will of the faithful as to move them to deny themselves for the accomplishment of this great and vital work. We have a full belief that such a system of appeal, if made vigorously and maintained perseveringly, would in a generation adequately provide for our Catholic children.

Another great want is that of a higher literary and scientific education for our laymen—analogous, in fact, to that furnished by the Protestant universities.

And this leads at once to a question of the highest importance, a solution of which must be promptly made, or it will solve itself by drifting beyond all control. It is well known that Catholics have been admitted for a long period of years to reside and study in Cambridge, but not to take degrees. Until 1854 they were absolutely excluded from Oxford. By a recent change, sanctioned by Act of Parliament, Catholics may reside and study in the colleges and halls of Oxford, and proceed to the degree of Bachelor of Arts. In Cambridge the degree of Master of Arts is also open to them. In the course of the nine years since 1854 it is said that twenty Catholics have passed through Oxford; and it is likely that others will enter. Now two questions arise —first, whether it be expedient that Catholics should avail themselves of the liberty thus granted to them to study at the two Universities? and, secondly, if so, whether it be expedient that they should reside one by one within the walls of the existing colleges and halls, or that a Catholic college and hall be founded to receive them.

We will endeavour to state with the fullest force the reasons alleged on either side.

First. It is urged that inasmuch as, by the repeal of the penal laws, Catholics are already admitted into the social life and political power of the English people, it is consequent and most advantageous that they should re-enter also into the tradition of intellectual culture and development. If they cannot regain the Universities which the Church created, at least they are no longer excluded from partaking of the benefits they confer.

Secondly. It is undeniable that the exclusive possession of the Universities gives to the Protestant Englishman an advantage over his Catholic fellow-countrymen; and that in order to cope or to compete with Protestants in public and private life, Catholics must be armed with their weapons, and share in the cultivation which constitutes their superiority.

Thirdly. The two Universities, especially Oxford, retain in a high degree their mediæval if not Catholic character; and it is safer for Catholics to study there than in Paris, in Pisa, or other continental cities.

Fourthly. Inasmuch as Catholics are admitted into the private and public life of England, it is of great importance that they should enter while young into relations with the men whom afterwards they must consort with in all branches of the public service, and in most of the relations of private life. The time of our exile being over, it is well that our rising generation should take their place in English society.

Fifthly. It is certain that we can in no other way

obtain the advantages of so high a culture in literature and science. The long traditional maturity and accumulated knowledge of the two Universities leave Catholics without a hope of competing with Protestants in these fields.

Sixthly. Inasmuch as Catholics must be mixed up with Protestants in every walk and state of life, and that more and more as the religious animosities of the past are mitigated by the gradual fusion and blending of families and classes, there cannot be any special danger in their beginning early to learn how to carry themselves towards their Protestant fellow-citizens; or rather it would be far safer for them to acquire betimes such habits of mind as will fit them for their future contact with anti-Catholic opinions and practices in after-life.

Seventhly. The question is, after all, hardly under control, for already many Catholics have availed themselves of the admission to Oxford and Cambridge, and many more will do so. We must accept the fact, and deal with it as best we may. Now it is obvious that a Catholic youth, isolated in a Protestant college, without chapel, or director, or religious instruction, or the example of Catholic companions, must be less able to resist the influences of the anti-Catholic atmosphere to which he is exposed all day long from the whole system and action of the college. Place him in a hall or college founded for Catholics only, under the government of a Catholic president and fellows, with Catholic discipline and instruction, and all the helps of the spiritual life—daily Mass, confession, communion, fasts

and festivals—such a youth would be sustained and raised above himself, and a Catholic public opinion would be created within the walls, which would resist the contagion and infection of the surrounding intellectual and moral evils. It seems evident that the establishment of such a hall is rendered necessary by facts beyond our control, be our wishes what they may.

Eighthly. Such a hall would be an example of Catholic education and discipline which could not fail powerfully to affect the Universities, and to show by contrast that the alleged inferiority of intellectual culture is more than compensated by spiritual advantages, not only greater in degree, but of a higher order.

Lastly. Such a hall might exercise a powerful influence in counteracting the downward tendency of our modern University education, and the development of a license of opinion which is not only anti-Catholic, but anti-Christian.

Such we believe to be a fair statement, in outline at least, of the arguments of those who are in favour of the proposal to establish Catholic halls in Oxford and Cambridge, and to complete the education of our youth in the two national Universities.

On the other hand, the reasons of those who oppose it are as follows:

First. They neither undervalue the importance of intellectual culture, nor overrate the present intellectual standard among the youths or the professors of our Catholic colleges; but they are of opinion that it is the mission and the duty of the Church to provide such intellectual culture within its own unity. The Univer-

sities of Oxford and Cambridge were creations of the Catholic Church, and what it has created once it may create again. We are well aware that the Church in England cannot now create for itself a system of education which shall possess the traditional maturity and extension of our Universities. But '*nullum tempus occurrit Ecclesiæ.*' We may begin in this day as they first began who came to the schools of S. Frideswide. The Church of the first ages used the schools of Athens and Alexandria so long as it had none of its own. But the first moment it could form true Christian and Catholic schools the Church withdrew its sons from all contact with an anti-Catholic, or even an un-Catholic, teaching.

Secondly. They are of opinion that the anti-Catholic atmosphere of Oxford and Cambridge cannot fail to be secretly and deeply injurious to the faith and morals of the Catholic students. It is a known fact that, of the Catholics who have studied at Trinity College, Dublin, few have escaped without more or less of injury, not only to piety, but to faith. And yet the Catholic student there has the advantage of living in one of the most energetically Catholic cities in the world, and of possessing in abundance all the means of his own sanctification and perseverance. They have the best evidence for knowing that Catholics have lost their faith in Trinity College. Hundreds, it is said, could be easily counted up—two of them a dean and a bishop in the Irish Establishment. And even those who do not lose their faith are generally but little attached to their religion, and do not regularly frequent the Sacra-

ments. A Catholic Bishop who studied there has been heard to say that his preservation from perdition amidst so many dangers was as great a miracle as the preservation of Daniel in the lions' den. The same prelate is always anxious to keep young men from Trinity College. Such is known to be the judgment of the highest ecclesiastical authorities in Ireland.

If such has been the effect of Trinity College upon those who have every help to resist it, what would be the effect of Oxford and Cambridge upon the handful of Catholics who might study there? Hardly is there to be found any atmosphere more powerful to transform and to assimilate those who live in it to its own properties. What takes place in Dublin, with almost every check to counteract it, may be reasonably predicted of Oxford and Cambridge, where everything is intensely anti-Catholic, and the anti-Catholic spirit dominant and, in a manner, irresistible.

Thirdly. They believe that even the discipline and spirit of a Catholic hall would not suffice against the powerful allurements and subtil fascinations, intellectual and worldly, of our English Universities. It is not intended that the members of a Catholic hall at Oxford or at Cambridge should live as hermits or as exiles from academical society. The making of friendships, and the entering into relations with Protestants who will be their companions and colleagues in after-life, is part of the argument in favour of such a system. They who oppose this view believe that such contact and society, which in our Universities is very free and irresponsible, would be most dangerous to those who as

yet are immature in mind and character. They think that there is evidence enough of the injurious effects of English Protestant society upon the Catholics who court it or live much in it. They believe that the fidelity of Catholics showed more brightly a generation ago, through the darkness of the penal laws and of social exile, than now when the sun shines upon them. They are not anxious, therefore, to see the rising Catholic youth brought under those influences, which dazzle and unman their elders, at an age when they are least able to discern and to resist them. They believe that a thorough and hardy training in Catholic faith and morality, and in science and literature read in their light, with the practices and instincts of Catholic devotion, is a better preparation for the conflict which awaits them in the world, and the only safeguard against its fascinations. They would rather see them trained and cultivated by a higher literary and scientific discipline, from the age of eighteen to twenty-two, at Oscott or Ushaw, than see Oscott or Ushaw transferred to Oxford and Cambridge. They believe that Oscott and Ushaw transferred to Oxford and Cambridge would become more or less acclimatised, and that they would lose their high Catholic spirit and power to mould the character of their youths.

Fourthly. They believe that the whole argument so elaborately and eloquently developed by Dr. Newman, in his Lectures on University Education, applies with direct force to this subject. They believe that not only would all history and philosophy be anti-Catholic as delivered from the chairs of Anglican professors, but

that it would not be worthy of the name of history or philosophy if withdrawn from the light and guidance of Catholic theology. Whatsoever, then, be the lectures delivered within the walls of the Catholic hall, the teaching of the University and the examinations of the University, which in the end determine the course of study, would inevitably penetrate into the college, and prevail over any individual teacher. Count de Maistre said that history since the Reformation has been in conspiracy against the Catholic Church. We may say that philosophy since Descartes has to a wider extent than is suspected joined in the conspiracy. And yet these are essentially the history and philosophy delivered at the English Universities.

Fifthly. They cannot find any ground for the sanguine hope that a Catholic hall would teach the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge how to live, or leaven the life and spirit of the Universities. When they see what is the action and power of the whole Hierarchy and priesthood, with all its ecclesiastical organisation, aided by the examples of the faithful, upon English society at large, they have little reason to believe that a Catholic hall will do the work of an evangelist in Oxford and Cambridge. The Church acts as a solid and compact body upon the loose and dissolving classes of English society; and yet, though in one sense how great, in another how little, is the impression it makes. But the intellectual and spiritual antagonism at the Universities is compact, disciplined, and tenacious to the highest conceivable degree. The shadow of Peter might, indeed, work a miracle upon it.

But there is little reason to believe that the shadow of Peter would be cast by a Catholic hall. They are not without fear that the effect might be diametrically the reverse. Much more would be expected of a Catholic hall than perhaps any institution could fulfil; and one Catholic scandal would undo the influence of ten Catholic examples of good.

Sixthly. They are of opinion that the power the Catholic Church exercises over the people of England comes precisely from the fact that it is separate from it, not mingled with it or dependent upon it. They are ready to believe that a Catholic University in England would powerfully affect both Oxford and Cambridge by its more perfect order and discipline; and that men who desire the welfare of their sons would be strongly attracted to a University of which Ushaw and Oscott may be taken as the preludes. They are the living witnesses of what mediæval Oxford and Cambridge were. And we know that even Protestants, who are anxious to save their sons from the squandering and vice of our Universities, have of late years contemplated the sending them to a Catholic college.

Seventhly. They believe that the risk to a number of individuals is not to be weighed against the danger of committing the Church to a false position. Much as we must deplore that any should be exposed to the occasion of losing either faith or piety, still even this must be endured rather than implicate the Church in relations which involve false principles; for the loss of individuals is an evil to be measured, but the admission of a false principle is a fountain of evils of which no

measure can be conceived. It would be a sad but safer alternative to endure the loss of any number of individuals than to place the Church in the condition it occupies in the Universities of Germany. Syncretism has borne, and will bear, its bitter fruits there as a warning to us.

Eighthly. The founding of such a hall would be a public and authoritative sanction, and even invitation to Catholics to send their sons to Protestant Universities. The Church itself would be giving the impulse in that direction.

Ninthly. Such a course would indefinitely postpone all efforts towards founding purely Catholic colleges for higher lay education; a work absolutely needed already, and becoming every day more urgently and vitally necessary as the Catholic Church expands its own system, and multiplies its members among the middle and higher classes.

Tenthly. They submit that the question of founding a hall in the Anglican Universities, so as to participate in a common secular education, reserving the particular religious instruction, is no longer open. It seems rather to involve a concession of the whole principle for which we have been so long and so earnestly contending. This alleged separateness of secular and religious teaching was the basis of Mr. Stanley's Irish education scheme, against which the Catholic Church in Ireland so firmly opposed itself; and from which, under the sanction of the Holy See, it is now extricating itself. This also is the basis of the godless colleges, which the Holy See has declared to be '*intrinsecè peri-*

culosa,' and to which the Synod of Thurles warns the faithful not to send their sons. It forbids also any priest to teach in them. This also was the motive for founding the Catholic University, so expressly approved by Rome and so cherished by the Episcopate and people of Ireland. This, again, is the scheme of secular and general education which, when proposed by the Government, caused the great educational movement of the last five-and-twenty years. Against this it was that the Catholics of England also protested, and from which they so jealously and successfully protected themselves by the agreement embodied in the Minutes of the Privy Council in 1847. It would seem, therefore, to be a departure from the whole of our past conduct, and a giving up of the principles for which we have so strongly contended. How shall we refuse a common secular education for our poor children if we court and catch at it for the children of the rich?

Eleventhly. It would seem also that this is the worst moment for making such a compromise. If it was permissible for the Catholics in Ireland to submit to the National Education Board, and to avail themselves of the only education possible to them by reason of their poverty, certainly the rich families of England can find no such excuse for seeking admission to our Protestant Universities. They have abundant means of educating their children; and if the standard of intellectual cultivation in our Catholic colleges be not so high as at Oxford and Cambridge, no amount of intellectual culture or social advantage can be weighed in the scale against the least measure of fidelity to the

Catholic faith and Catholic morality. It is to be always remembered that the Irish national education, if it was un-Catholic, was at least not anti-Catholic. If it was deprived of positive Catholic teaching and influence, it was not guided nor impelled by an anti-Catholic spirit. But with our Universities this is not so. They are formally, essentially, traditionally, and, so far as any influence Catholics can exert upon them, immutably anti-Catholic. The English schism and the Protestant heresy have penetrated to the bone, and poisoned the life-blood of Oxford and Cambridge, the great schools of Anglicanism—which they will never cease to be, except by exchanging the partial rationalism of the Reformation for that fuller rationalism which is its legitimate development. And this greatly strengthens their argument, and confirms their opposition to such a scheme of united education for Catholics and Protestants. They would have objected to the sending of our Catholic youths to Oxford and Cambridge at any period since the Reformation, when the Universities were at their highest point of Christian belief, while as yet the inspiration and integrity of Holy Scripture were held sacred, and Rationalism had as yet found no formal entrance into them. How much more, then, at this time when the modern spirit of cultivated unbelief, in the form of criticism and philosophy, has not only entered but established itself, so as to be the predominant intellectual tendency of the more studious members of the Universities. The Protestant Bishops of Winchester and London have confessed what Dr. Colenso has repeated—that the graduates of Oxford

and Cambridge are turning away from Anglican orders. The *Times* may try to persuade men that this is because the clergy are underpaid. They who are acquainted with the Universities and public opinion know that the true reason is an intellectual departure from the traditional Christianity of England. And is it at such a moment as this that Catholics will forsake the strongholds, which have protected them these three hundred years, to venture into the midst of the occasions of unbelief presented by the Rationalism which gains head day by day? The Catholic Church in Ireland no sooner begins to feel its freedom, and with freedom the return of strength, than it begins at once to liberate itself from the un-Catholic system of national education. It is no time, therefore, for the Catholics in England to make a step so retrograde, and so utterly at variance with the whole march and extension of the Catholic Church in this country. We have already noticed the wonderful unfoldings of the Church—how the Catholics who lay scattered and hid in the millions of the English people have been drawn and knit together by the Hierarchy into a visible body, which every year increases in bulk and vigour and fruitfulness. The Church is reproducing its past with an exuberance of life and a precision of action which leaves us nothing to desire but patience and fidelity to the immutable principles and the supernatural instincts of the faith. If in the times of their poverty the vicars-apostolic could found and raise three such colleges as S. Edmund's, Oscott, and Ushaw, why should not the united Catholic Hierarchy of England found a University? They did it when

Catholics were few, scattered, and poor in the extreme. We live in days when Catholics are numerous, united, and conscious of their union, and, if not rich, yet possessed of wealth as compared with the poverty of the past. If the Catholics of the penal laws could do such things, why should not the free Catholics of to-day do greater things, if only they have the zeal, the fidelity, the high Catholic instincts, and the unbending integrity of Catholic principles which, as we have said, were luxuriant in our darker days. God forbid that these virtues should droop and fade in our days of peace.

Twelfthly. Nor is it to be thought that the founding of a Catholic University in England is a dream of Utopia. A body which has in one day founded thirteen dioceses and developed them, as we have shown above, need shrink from no enterprise. It possesses already all the elements of a University. Its seven colleges of Sedgley Park, Mount S. Mary's, S. Edward's, Downside, Ratcliffe, Beaumont Lodge, Ampleforth, and its four greater colleges of Stonyhurst, Oscott, Old Hall, and Ushaw, naturally lead up to and demand a University for their completion, as an arch demands its keystone. Neither is there lack of materials for such a work. The Church of all nations can draw upon the nationality of all nations for its institutions. The Society of Jesus alone contains in itself men capable of holding professors' chairs in all the chief faculties of arts, literature, and science. For classical literature and Oriental languages, Germany is open to us; for theology, Italy; for science, history, modern languages, and literature, all Catholic nations—for if

Protestantism possesses the culture of England, the culture of other nations is Catholic. The founding of a Catholic University in England is therefore a thing not only to be desired, but to be achieved with no greater difficulty than besets all great enterprises; and all the enterprises of the Catholic Church are great, and none are difficult, because it is the Church which for eighteen hundred years has accomplished greater works in a Power above its own.[1]

But here we must leave this subject We have done no more than enumerate the arguments *per summa capita*, reserving to ourselves, if need be, a fuller and more adequate treatment of it.

Another want is greater practical efficiency and more public experience in our laymen. The social exile in which they have lived, and their exclusion, if not by statute, yet by traditional prejudice, from public and even private employments, have seriously diminished our capacities of usefulness. No English Catholic has any chance of being returned by an English constituency. The only Catholic member for an English seat is returned by the legitimate influence of a Catholic family. But in time this evil would correct itself, if in our larger towns Catholics were found with capacities for public business—we will not say up to the measure of the late Frederick Lucas, but the same in kind—we mean manly good sense, with a thorough mastery of their subject. If among the Catholic members there were men who would thoroughly study, each

[1] This was written before the directions of the Holy See decided the question.

one branch of the public service—finance, poor law, colonies, trade in its details, and the like—they would certainly command the ear of the House at all times, and where any subject of the Catholic Church is concerned would be listened to with respect. The English people are easily conciliated by any public usefulness or power of beneficence.

The only other want we will notice is that hitherto the Catholic Church of England has no organ or provision whatever for foreign missions. It may be said that England is itself a missionary country, and could hardly be expected to undertake missions to other lands, or to give to others what it hardly possesses itself. But this does not seem to us to be true. England is a special debtor to the world—first to its own colonies, next to the nations and races which are opened to it by its commerce. It would be a shame and a rebuke to us if, while Protestant England acknowledges this duty, and sends its missionaries abroad at the cost of nearly half a million a year, Catholic England should do nothing. Such was not the temper of the faithful who lived under the heathen empire of Rome. They regarded the world-wide structure of its power, with all the activity of its material life, as the means and conditions by which they might traverse its vast circuit, and bear the light of salvation to the most distant races of mankind. The time is come for us to recognise this duty—we may say this providential call; and in obeying it we shall obtain great and specific blessings. It is well known that no congregation in France obtains more or better vocations than the Congrégation des

Missions Etrangères. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church; and the Salle des Martyrs inspires vocations in the generous youth of France. So it would be with England. We believe that a College of Foreign Missions, worthily directed, would elevate the ecclesiastical spirit and multiply vocations even for the Church at home. But we can only touch by the way a question which demands a direct and ample treatment.

So much in few words of our chief wants; of those at least which we think it within our province to notice. It may be well, perhaps, to add also a few on our dangers.

One copious and manifold source of danger is the anti-Catholic atmosphere—the Germans would call it the time-spirit—or the dominant current of thought and action which pervades the age and society in which we are born. No one wholly escapes its influence; most are deeply penetrated with it. We doubt whether it was so dangerous to Catholics before the Emancipation as it is now. In those days the direct action of persecuting laws ground down or bore down the courage of multitudes. But the allurements of English society and English public opinion had little power. They were hostile, harassing, and repulsive. Now they are far more perilous; being bland, insidious, and seducing. Public opinion is Protestant, and Protestantism is formally opposed to the idea of a Church divinely constituted and endowed. The first principles and maxims of Catholic education—such as submission to a teaching authority, fear of error, mistrust of our own judgments—are extinct. This spirit begins in our

schools, pervades our Universities, and animates the whole of English society. We cannot draw breath without inhaling it; and the effect of it is visible upon men who do not suspect themselves of any want of Catholic instincts. It has become unconscious; and what strikes and offends foreign Catholics is hardly, or not at all, perceived by those who are born into this atmosphere.

Another serious danger, which might also have been treated as a want, proceeds from the absence of a Catholic literature. As we have said, the culture of the English people passed into the hands of the men of the Reformation, leaving the Catholic remnant stripped of everything. The first race of Catholics, such as Stapleton and Harding, had received their cultivation before the schism. Many of those who immediately succeeded, such as Parsons and Baker, had been educated in the Universities. With them the English Catholic literature ceased until the reign of James II. At that time a few controversial octavos, without name of the author, and printed either abroad or at the private printing-press in Oxford, were published; but a literature—that is, works on history, biography, science physical and moral, or of general information, poetry, or fiction — by Catholic hands has never existed. The Catholics of England have been compelled either to read foreign Catholic works, which are accessible only to a few, or the books of anti-Catholic writers, or, as with the great majority, to be deprived of the wholesome culture and information on which the development of the intelligence depends. We can never forget the

passage in Lord Macaulay's *History of England*[2] in which he indulges in a misplaced satire upon the English written by Catholics in the time of James II. It was assuredly bad enough. Those days are happily past, and Catholics can speak and write their mother English with no inferiority to their anti-Catholic fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, a Catholic literature is yet to be formed; and its non-existence entails on our youth disadvantages, the extent and perilous character of which it is difficult to estimate.

But a still graver danger seems to us to be one which many least suspect. We are less afraid of any evils *ab extra*, howsoever grave or imminent, than of any evil, howsoever light it may appear, which penetrates the interior spirit of what we may call the Catholic society of England. We have said once and again that the old days of storm were rough, but safer for us. We have much more fear of the sunshine. When Xenophon's soldiers beheld the sea, they fell on their knees and worshipped. When Linnæus first saw the common furze in full bloom we are told that he knelt down and bared his head. Whether these ecstasies be historical or not, we will not stop to inquire; but they illustrate the fascination of things long hoped for, found at last, and the proneness of man to pay a superstitious adoration, like the Athenians, to the unknown God. We should be gravely alarmed if there appeared, among other signs of the times, a world-worship among Catholics; and above all if that world were the English world, which has only just begun to tolerate the faith

[2] Vol. ii. pp. 110, 111.

and the persons of Catholics. The polity of England as it exists in statutes is indeed changed, but the policy of Government lags behind the letter of the law. The anti-Catholic spirit of English society controls the public administration, from the patronage of the Crown to the votes of the parish vestry. So likewise in what is called 'society,' that is, in the customs and intercourse of the richer families of the higher and middle classes. In the last thirty years Catholics have penetrated into this sanctuary, as adventurous travellers into S. Sophia. Too often, we fear, they have put off their shoes upon the threshold, and even, like our adventurous Captain Burton at Mecca, have entered as sound Mahometans. Now it seems to us that any gratuitous conformity on the part of Catholics to the rubrics of worldliness, and still more any simulation of the tone of an un-Catholic society, even by the concealment of their own faith, much more by their wearing the vestments of another religion, would be not only an infidelity towards God, but what some people may think much worse—a signal imprudence towards the world they desire to propitiate by their worship. English society, with all its vices, does, after all, represent the English character. There is something downright, manly, and decided in it; and it respects the same—that is, its own—qualities in others as much as it despises and ridicules all servile or petty eagerness to court its favour. Downright, masculine, and decided Catholics—more Roman than Rome, and more ultramontane than the Pope himself—may enter English society and be treated with goodwill and respect every-

where, if only they hold their own with self-respect and a delicate consideration of what is due to others. It is this very boldness which inspires both respect and confidence. It is the pledge of sincerity, and sincerity is respected by everybody worthy of the name of Englishman. No greater blunder could be committed than to try to propitiate Englishmen or English society by a tame, diluted, timid, or worldly Catholicism.

But it is not our purpose to write a homily, and our pages warn us to draw to an end. A few words, and no more, we may add on the remedies we need. Philosophers divide forces into mechanical and dynamical; and we would say that what we need is not so much in the mechanical order as in that of the interior forces of will and character, both natural and supernatural. We have great works to do, and at first sight little material out of which to create them. But it is His work who chooses 'things that are not, that He may bring to nought the things that are.' And it is the paradox and the glory of the Church, as verified in its history, to do the greatest works with the slenderest means. At every turn we are met by the same objection. At the commencement of every great work we are asked, But where are the men, and where is the money? It is not in impatience, but in pure conviction, we would answer, Vigour creates men and coins money. If we had only vigour, as our Lord said of faith, all things in His service would be easy to us. We are in an age of enterprise, and are busied with all manner of schemes for works of piety and charity. Even our amusements have taken a pious turn. We have concerts, theatricals,

balls, excursions, and the like, for religious ends. The world, itself, it seems, is becoming pious. 'All things to me are lawful.' But this is only on the surface. We have a deeper service of the Spirit to learn and to practise; a mightier power is needed wherewith to achieve the important works we have to do. Amphion built cities, but concerts will not remove mountains; and the Church in England has mountains in its path. We do not wish to disquiet the conscience of any one taking a harmless interest in innocent things; but there is a harder service yet to be done, and when begun, these softer things will go over the horizon as the thistledown is blown away from a field of battle. There is a sharper note in the trumpet which gives no uncertain sound; and it is calling us to higher paths than to Willis's Rooms. Catholics have taught the world to build and endow churches, colleges, monasteries—out of their own sole inheritance, for the love of Jesus and of the souls for whom He died. Catholics have taught the world to sell all and follow Christ; that His words are to be taken to the letter now as in the beginning, in England as in Palestine. Catholics have taught the world the law of almsgiving—that it ought to be proportionate, and not out of superfluity, or of that which costs us nothing. And we are bound to bear our witness that the world has in some degree profited by the lesson. Noble examples in the last twenty years have been and are among our brethren of the separation. And we pray God to bless their generosity with the reward of a perfect faith. But they who have done these noble deeds have not done them by

the above-named means. They have not learned these means of us. We rather have learned them of the world, against which it behoved us always to bear witness to the highest wisdom and the highest good, which not only condemns evil, but gently discountenances the innocent but less-expedient way of serving our Master. Let every one enjoy his Christian liberty, but do not let us mistake the soft and the easy ways of charity for the spirit of the Church. In us it would be a degeneracy. And here we would leave the matter. We have an unlimited confidence in the charity which first measures the work to be done in the light of the Blessed Sacrament, and then its own means of doing it with crucifix in hand; and in the doing conceals itself so that the left hand knows not what the right hand doeth. On this we rely and to this we appeal, leaving all other forms of modern charity to drop off as the toys and gauds of infancy. 'When I was a child I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man I put away the things of a child.'[3]

And now, to sum up all we have said of our dangers, we would repeat that what we most fear is that Catholics may cast themselves willingly, or be drawn unconsciously, into the stream which is evidently carrying English society every year more and more decidedly and perceptibly towards worldliness and Rationalism. The growth of worldliness in every form, the appearance of moral evils in our domestic life, the

[3] 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

breaking down of the barriers which guarded the last generation; the lower, laxer, freer habits, not only of men but of women, not only of mature age but of the young, both before and after marriage; the growth and multiplication of forms of social corruption never known before, or, at least, never so systematically practised and so habitually connived at; the abdication of authority by parents, and the derision of authority by children;—all these and many more signs are abroad to warn us that a dangerous future is before us, and to awaken Catholics to a redoubled vigilance over themselves and their children, and a greater fidelity to the Church which, with a gentle austerity, restrains them from many points of contact with the anti-Catholic society of England. If any one desire a signal example of our meaning, let him read a recent article in the *Saturday Review*, misnamed, we think, by an unseasonable jocularity, 'Frisky Matrons.' We see nothing to laugh at in an evil which, like the head-disease called *plica polonica*, seems light and superficial, but really eats into the blood and bone. This is not the atmosphere to which we desire our Catholic women to be acclimatised, or in which we wish their daughters to be reared. The readers of the *Times* will not need us to remind them of the articles on 'Pretty Horsebreakers,' and on the growing infrequency of marriage among the young men of the higher classes of society. But we will not pursue these subjects further. This is not the atmosphere in which the Catholics of the penal laws would have desired to immerse their sons and daughters; and we trust that

the Catholics of this day will be faithful to the high moral discernment and traditions of their fathers.

As to the other danger which lies before us from the development of Rationalism, it is impossible to do more than make a passing allusion to it. We are firmly convinced that in twenty years Rationalism will inundate England. In every century since the Reformation England has sunk lower and lower in formal rejection of revealed doctrine. It has passed through the two phases which have appeared in Germany, and it is entering upon the third. The period of Protestant dogmatism has given place to Protestant pietism, and this is now passing off into Protestant Rationalism—the prelude of philosophical Rationalism in the educated, and rude unbelief in the people. The school of Hooker, Andrews, and Laud numbers now but a handful of the population. It is an esoteric literature, not a living power. The school of Cecil, Venn, and Simeon has issued in a multitude of dissolving forms of opinion. The school of rationalistic Christianity is numerous and growing, and possesses many high places of trust and influence. Dr. Colenso is a fair sample of the actual and dominant tendency of religious belief among us. There can be little question that if the majority of the Anglican clergy be against him, the great majority of the Anglican laity would be with him. His common-sense scepticism is the true Anglican layman's faith. And we cannot doubt that every year this unbelief will be more widely spread, and that the two Universities will be thoroughly pervaded by it. Instead, therefore, of implicating ourselves in a sinking wreck, it is the

prudence of common sense, as well as the obligation of Catholic duty, to keep ourselves free, not only from all entanglements with it, but as far as possible from the vortex which it makes in going down. We earnestly hope that Catholics, while they manifest to their fellow countrymen the largest social charity and the truest public fidelity, will keep themselves from all contact with the traditions of anti-Catholic society and education. We repeat again, that an education deprived of the light of faith and the guidance of the Church is essentially anti-Catholic. Here there can be no neutrality: 'He that is not for Me is against Me.' There is but one safety for us: '*Sentire cum Ecclesia*,' in the whole extent of faith, discipline, worship, custom, and instincts—the most intimate and filial fidelity of intellect, heart, and will to the living voice of the Church of God.

III.

ON THE SUBJECTS PROPER TO THE ACADEMIA.

ON

THE SUBJECTS PROPER TO THE ACADEMIA.

SESSION 1863-4.

THE office of addressing you to-day at the opening of the third year of the Academia, through a cause which we all deeply regret and earnestly hope may soon pass away, has fallen unexpectedly to me. And though I could wish it in other hands, above all in his who but for illness would have addressed you, I will do as best I can.

When the other day I heard the Congress of Malines recommend the establishment of Academias such as this, as one of the most efficacious means of counteracting the false and anti-Catholic principles abroad at this day, it was not without a lively satisfaction that I remembered that we in England, who are but in the rudiments of our Catholic organisation, have nevertheless for two years had our Academia of the Catholic religion. And on reviewing the subjects which have been treated by its members, we may congratulate ourselves, not only on the excellence of many of the discourses addressed to us, considered in themselves, but also on the timeliness and applicability of those discourses in relation to the errors of the days and

of the country in which we live. And this leads me to offer a few remarks, not on any specific thesis, but, as the custom is in Rome at the opening of each year, on an *argomento libero*—a wider and freer subject. I will therefore speak of the nature and intention of the Academia and of the subjects proper for its sessions. Its main intention, as you are well aware, is to exhibit the truths and principles of the Catholic faith and Church, not only in themselves, but in their relations to the world and to the age, to philosophy, to science, and to politics; and that not too only *absolutè*, but especially in the bearing of these truths and principles upon the errors of the time. The Academia in Rome was instituted, as you well know, in the beginning of this century, to combat the Voltairian infidelity and the anti-Catholic revolution, which from France began at that time to descend upon Italy. It is therefore what the Germans would call the *time-spirit* that we have to appreciate, and, so far as it is hostile to truth, to combat and, by God's help, to counteract.

With a view to such an appreciation, and to mark out in some degree the subjects proper to be treated, I would ask leave to make a few remarks upon the times in which we live.

It is, I know, a common illusion to imagine that our days are exceptional for good or for evil, and that they surpass in importance the times of our fathers. A slight event before our eyes is more vivid, real, and exciting than the great actions of past history. It needs a calm judgment, and a wide comparative survey of the events both of the past and of the present, not to be

carried away by this illusion. Shall I seem to incur this censure, if I say that the times in which we live are exceptionally great, and pregnant beyond most other times gone by with certain mature consequences of past events? Let me, then, endeavour to shelter myself from this fault and from the recoil of my own censure. It would seem to me that the age in which we live, that is the lifetime of our contemporaries, is marked by a crisis of exceptional magnitude and importance.

1. And first, the Protestant Reformation has reached its three hundredth year. It has run the career which is usually permitted to a heresy. Pelagianism and its *reliquiæ* infested Africa, Gaul, and Britain for less than three hundred years. Donatism ran out in three hundred years. Arianism and its offsets possessed first the political power of the Lower Empire, then the Gothic races, then Lombardy and Spain for about three hundred years. Where is Pelagianism? where is Donatism? and where is Arianism? S. Gregory the Great lived when Arianism was dying out. His pontificate inaugurated the beginning of a new period of Catholic faith and unity. In our day Protestantism has reached its term. As a religion it may be said hardly to exist, for its transformations are such, that the forms of fragmentary Christianity which pass under its name would be disowned by the Protestant Reformers. It has ceased to be a definite and intelligible form of spiritual conviction or of intellectual thought. It exists as a form of politics, as a plea for social hostility to the Catholic religion, and for revolutionary diplomacy against the

Catholic Church. It is a fact pointed out by Lord Macaulay in his earlier years, when as yet the asperity of the partisan had not soured and warped the candour of the historian, that in every instance Protestantism was established by the civil power; that when the civil power ceased to propagate it, Protestantism ceased to spread; that there is no example of a country becoming Protestant since the first outbreak of the sixteenth century; that there are Protestant countries which have become Catholic again, but no Catholic country which has become Protestant; that whatsoever in the confusions of the last three hundred years has been lost to Catholicism has been lost to Christianity; that whatsoever has been gained to Christianity has been gained to Catholicism.[1]

Now, as a form of religion or of intellectual thought, it is certain that Protestantism has not been able to perpetuate, much less to propagate, itself. In Germany it has passed off into partial or into complete Neology; in Switzerland and France, extensively into Socinianism; in England into a congeries of irreconcilable heterodoxies, which are in a perpetual flux.

Perhaps, in Scotland the original Protestantism retains its character with greater tenacity, partly from the persistent spirit of the Scottish religionists, and partly from its isolation and remoteness from the Catholic nations which by contact powerfully affect other Protestant countries. It is certain, nevertheless, that both speculative unbelief and practical infidelity have made great ravages in Scotland. My object, how-

[1] Essay on Ranke's *History of the Popes*, vol. iii. p. 253.

ever, is not to enter into farther detail than is necessary for the justification of the assertion which I have made, that is, that Protestantism as a religion is dead. It has departed from its own type. It has generated a multitude of new and erroneous religions, and in them it has lost its identity, and therefore as a religion its existence. What number of professing Christians at this day are intellectually represented by the Helvetic Confession, the Augsburg Confession, the Westminster Catechism, and the Thirty-nine Articles? These things are now what the Thalia of Arius, or the creeds of Sirmium, Ancyra, and Seleucia were in the times of S. Gregory the Great.

But I must narrow the ground of our subject, and confine myself to England, alone with which we have chiefly to do.

There are, then, certain signs upon the Established Protestantism of England which mark its advanced decay.

First, its singular isolation. It is out of the unity of the Catholic Church, and therefore of the great Christian society of the world. It is rejected by the Greek Church, with which it endeavours in vain to hold communion. It has no union with the Protestant Churches of Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, or France. It is repudiated by the Established Church of Scotland. It is abandoned or rejected by 58 per cent of the population of England. Of the remaining 42 per cent much continues in it by mere nominal, traditional, social, political adhesion. Anglican Protestantism is not only struck with sterility in propa-

gation, but with an incapacity to retain even its own hereditary members. It is remarkable that this is the state of the Establishment, after an unprecedented stir and exertion, in which it must be said that great natural energy and generosity has been manifested during a quarter of a century. But it is evident to all who stand upon the shore, that nothing can save the Established Protestant or Anglican religion from sinking. Its seams are gaping wide, and the waters of dissension, indifference, and rationalism must inevitably draw it under.

Now this, though it be no new fact, is more advanced and more evident than it was thirty years ago. Until then the Anglican Establishment was girded and underpinned by its exclusive social and political privileges. Three hundred years of regal supremacy and legal primacy and religious monopoly had given to it an apparent and fictitious superiority.

The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and the Catholic Emancipation threw the Anglican Establishment upon its own centre for support. It could no longer rest upon the legal repression of those who disbelieved or rejected its claims. It had to go alone, to depend upon its own spiritual and intellectual resources. With what result the last thirty years will show. It is true that what is called freedom of action has brought forth much zeal from its members; but it has also brought out their antagonisms; if it has multiplied its churches and its ministers, it has multiplied its contentions and its divisions. For three hundred years its bond of coherence was mechanical and external, not

internal and dynamical. It was not the unity of thought and will, because it had neither unity of faith, nor even the principle of Divine faith for its centre. When the outward bonds which swathed it were taken off, it began to separate every way. All its internal repulsions began to exhibit themselves in a more developed activity, and to reach a farther point of divergence; for instance, the two schools which are now dominant in their activity are the Rationalistic and what I must call the Romanising. They are drawing to themselves the vigour, zeal, generosity, and earnestness of the Establishment, and in their vehement departure from each other they are rending the Establishment asunder. And yet thirty years ago these two schools existed only in germ. They who moved the University of Oxford with such a vehemence of alarm to condemn Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures never dreamed that in that very place in a few years Professor Powell would deny the whole supernatural order, and explicit Rationalists would be tutors and heads of houses. They, too, who contended for Tract 90, as if for the body of Patroclus, never dreamed that Anglican clergymen would now be not only burning incense, or writing tracts about Low Masses, but would be forming sisterhoods and professing to believe the infallibility of the Church.

These things, which are thought to be signs of life, are rather signs of the acute excitement which precedes dissolution. They are like the mental over-activity of men dying of consumption. They rise fitfully above themselves, and then sink by exhaustion. That

Anglican Protestantism will ever become one in mind, or opinion, or doctrine, is intrinsically impossible. The law of internal divergence which distracts it, is irresistible and multiplying in its force, and its intellectual antagonisms are becoming every ten years more and more intensely developed. That any one form of thought should prevail over all the others and cast them out is equally impossible. That the Romanising school should ever prevail, no Catholic who knows what an act of Divine faith is can for a moment imagine; nor any one who knows how deep and violent is the hostility of the English laity towards these fanciful imitations of the Popery which they hate.

I cannot fail here to notice, in passing, an error which unhappily has found among Catholics a few to countenance it. I mean the notion that the duty of Anglicans is to remain where they are with a view to spreading their opinions in the Established Church: in other words, that individuals may postpone, or even refuse, to submit to the Church in the hope of bringng about what I may call a corporate union of the Churches. Such a theory, to make the best excuse I can for any Catholic who holds it, must rest upon the erroneous assumption that the Anglican Establishment is as truly a Church as the schismatical Greek Church, that it possesses valid orders, succession, sacraments, jurisdiction to absolve, and truth of doctrine, *i.e.* the principle of Divine faith. How any Catholic can hold this view without unsoundness, I do not see. If all the pretensions of the Establishment were as undoubted as the orders and sacraments of the Greek Church, still no

Catholic could maintain such a theory. Every several Greek is bound to submit to the Catholic Church, one by one, without question or thought as to what others may or may not do. Salvation is the first law of conscience, and to hasten out of a state of even material schism or material heresy is an absolute duty. To remain in it *sciens et prudens* would make the heresy or the schism to be formal. If any one wish to see an example of the error I allude to, let him look at a journal called the *Union Review;* a singular example of arrogant and pharisaical patronising of Catholics and the Catholic Church, with much petty and malevolent gossip, picked up it is to be feared in Catholic houses, and from Catholics who lend the countenance or their sympathy and, I fear, of their name to this mischievous delusion. But to return. It has always appeared to me that this intellectual movement towards the Catholic Church was providentially intended to restore the line of continuity between the intelligence of the English people and the intelligence of the universal Church. The Reformation had utterly dissolved it, and the breach was kept open by every means, as by change of language and of terminology, and even change of pronunciation in both Latin and Greek, whereby we have become 'barbarians' to all nations, and all nations 'barbarians unto us.' England was so cut out from the faith, the language, the spiritual and intellectual context and communion of the Catholic world, that it ceased to receive from abroad the influences of other races, or to make itself understood by them. Nothing but this can explain the strange ignorance of the

English respecting the Catholic Church and faith. I do not mean only among the poor—who in a part of England known to me, call their Catholic neighbours Romans, believing them to be the posterity of Julius Cæsar—but among educated and cultivated men. This solution of continuity between the English intelligence and the Catholic intelligence brings with it also a like separation and variance of all the sympathies and instincts which spring from unity of intellectual judgment and belief. Now nothing, humanly speaking, could have restored this continuity except a line of minds advancing like skirmishers towards the Catholic Church, or like a pontoon bridge gradually thrown across the gulf which the Reformation opened. It is also to be noted that almost at the same moment there sprang up in the Presbyterian Establishment a movement on which the name of Irving has been fixed. This movement has developed into a servile imitation of Catholic doctrine and worship, together with the most fanatical enmity against the Catholic Church. These two parallel movements are not permitted without design, nor will they fail to bear their fruits.

One consequence is already seen. The Catholic doctrines and practices, which, twenty years ago, were defended controversially by our preachers and writers, are now for the most part adopted, preached, and defended by a numerous body among our opponents. They are in mutiny, and have fallen into contention among themselves about our Catholic theology. We may save the time which controversy wastes, and, instead of going out into the battle-field, we may go

into the harvest-field to reap and to bind, and to gather our sheaves into the garner.

This, then, is one point in which our times are more critical than those of our fathers.

Another remarkable and unprecedented sign of decay upon Anglican Protestantism is the fact that the young men of cultivation and vigour of mind are turning away from its ministry. It is not enough to say that worldly callings present easier and higher prizes, and that the poverty of the clergy repels young men from ordination. This is not true of the Catholic Church, and that too in our great poverty. The Catholic priests in England certainly do not receive on an average the wages of upper servants. But the sons of our best families, and the highest and best for intellect and cultivation among their sons, give themselves joyously, but humbly and with fear of their own unworthiness, to the priesthood of the Church. It is not poverty which causes this repugnance to Anglican orders. It is the doubt, the uncertainty, and the bondage of an incoherent and untenable position which repels them. On the other hand, it is the living consciousness of the apostolic power and jurisdiction, the certainty and freedom of Divine faith, which draws our youth to the narrow and self-denying path of a priest's life.

The true cause, then, of this ominous desertion of the young men is to be found in their unwillingness to bind themselves by subscription to incoherent and untenable formularies. There have been, indeed, attempts made at other times to abolish subscription to the Articles; but with this difference. In 1688, it was a movement in

order to comprehend nonconformists; in 1774, it was a feeble attempt got up by a few Socinianising clergymen. But now it is far more widely demanded. The Rationalistic school, as a body, and the Romanising school, as a body, desire to be free from the Articles. The laity are forward in asking that their pastors should enjoy the same liberty as themselves. No layman holds himself in any way bound by the Thirty-nine Articles. He rejoices in the liberty of thinking and criticising, believing and disbelieving, as he likes. And he asks the same liberty for his teachers.

In proof of this I will quote an authority which must carry no little weight. Professor Stanley, in a letter to Dr. Tait, says:

'The intelligent, thoughtful, highly-educated young men, who twenty or thirty years ago were to be found in every ordination, are gradually withheld from the service of the Church, and from the profession to which their tastes, their characters, and their gifts best fit them. For this great calamity, the greatest that threatens the permanence and the usefulness of the Church of England, there are, no doubt, many causes at work—some transitory, some beyond the power of any legislative enactment to reach. But there can be no question that one cause is the reluctance, the increasing reluctance of young men of the kind just described to entangle themselves in obligations with which they cannot heartily sympathise, and which may hereafter be brought against them to the ruin of their peace and of their professional usefulness.'[2]

[2] *A Letter to the Lord Bishop of London on the State of Subscrip-*

Again he adds: 'I have been told on good authority that of nineteen young men, within the acquaintance of a single individual, who were within the last few years known to have gone to Cambridge with the intention of becoming clergymen, every one has since relinquished his intention, chiefly on the ground of the present state of subscription. Similar statistics to a larger extent, although of a less definite form, might be produced at Oxford.'[3]

This, again, is a new sign of these times, and one which is full of consequences. It has been well said that the opinions of the young men are a prophecy of the future. And certainly a system from which the young men turn away has the sentence of death in itself.

Finally, the rationalism which lay hid in the Anglican Reformation has at last reached its legitimate development. After rejecting the Divine authority of the Church, the tradition of dogma, the Catholic interpretation of Holy Scripture, it is ending by a denial of the inspiration and authenticity of the sacred books. I notice this, not to dwell upon it, but because it is the most signal evidence of the failure of Anglicanism. Its 'Articulus stantis aut cadentis Ecclesiæ' is the sixth Article, which affirms the sufficiency of Scripture, and rests its authenticity and canonicity upon the testimony of the Church. It is precisely here that the last blow has been struck at the Anglican system; and the

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tion in the Church of England and in the University of Oxford. By Arthur P. Stanley, D.D.

[3] *Ibid.* note, p. 31.

rationalistic infidelity which has robbed Protestant Germany of its belief in Holy Scripture is beginning to gather and to descend from high places upon England. The Sixth Article has been tried and found wanting; and Anglicanism, which has based itself upon the Scriptures, has generated a spirit of unbelief which has undermined the Scriptures on which it professed to rest. Whatsoever may tend to the exposure and extinction of error must be a cause of thankfulness to Catholics; and yet we cannot but view with sorrow and with alarm the gradual decay and dying out of the fragmentary truths of Christianity which survived the Reformation. A belief in the revelation of Christianity and in the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures may be said to have been universal in England. But it is this which is now giving way in the educated classes and in the masses of the English people.

I might add many more reasons for the belief that Protestantism in general, and Anglicanism in particular, has reached the term of its pretensions, and that we are at the crisis of its decline, but time forbids.

2. Another reason for regarding these times as critical and of singular importance is the condition of the Catholic Church both in the East and in the West. In the East there is a disposition among the populations separated from it to return to its unity, of which movement Russia may be considered as the centre; in the West a similar movement is in progress, of which England is visibly the centre. The missionaries of the Church are penetrating the East with a vigour and success never known since the missions of S. Francis

Xavier; and the Church in the West is renewing its strength and its action upon the old Catholic countries of Europe with an energy never seen since the Council of Trent. Neither is it without a significance that the other day the tercentenary of that great council was solemnly celebrated in the presence of a prince of the Church, delegated from the Holy See, in the ancient city of Trent. For three hundred years its decrees *de Reformatione* have been working deeply and surely in the universal Church. The civil powers have distracted its operations by their jealous maintenance of old abuses of prerogatives and customs; but revolutions have come as the scourges of God to sweep them clean away. After these reigns of terror the Church has renewed itself in a purity, majesty, and expansion exceeding all its past. Witness the Church in France, the Church in Holland, and now the Church in Ireland and the Church in England. After three hundred years of penal laws, to which the fabulous cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition are merciful, the Church in England is once more free. I shall not touch even in outline the well-known events of the last thirty years—the Emancipation, the Hierarchy, the expansion of the Catholic Church in England. These three words are enough to show that our days are exceptional: that we are witnesses of one of those miracles of grace, of those resurrections of the Church after generations of death, by which God manifests His presence and His sovereignty. But it is a wonderful and almost articulate Providence that the same event which liberated the

Catholic Church to use the freedom of its power should have driven the Anglican Establishment upon the infirmities of its own internal incoherence; that when the State ceased to persecute the Church and to protect the Establishment Protestantism should have begun to dissolve and Catholicism to expand itself; nothing has held the Church under for three hundred years but the whole weight of a penal code; and nothing has held the Establishment up but the favour and force of the civil power.

Divine Providence has seemed to watch its opportunities to exhibit the office and action of the Church by diametrical contrasts. When the Royal Supremacy becomes visibly intolerable in its pretensions, the Supremacy of Rome enters in its calmness and power. When an article of the Apostles' Creed disappears from the religion of the Anglicans, the definition of the Immaculate Conception is promulgated; while the Established religion is visibly losing its social and political influence in England, the revolutions of Europe in fifteen years of sedition, intrigue, and warfare cannot overthrow the temporal power of the Vicar of Jesus Christ; when the Protestants of Germany and England by the aid of their pastors are denying the inspiration of Holy Scripture and undermining the authenticity of its books, the Catholic Church, the mother of unwritten traditions, against whom they have been perpetually clamoring, stands sole as the pillar and ground of the Truth, the witness and keeper of Holy Writ. 'Hæc non sine numine.' They are like the chips of

wood which under the childish hands of Hildebrand, *manum pueri ductante numine*, fell into legible forms and prophesied of the future.

It was, then, in such a time as this that the Academia of the Catholic religion was founded in London. Its object, as we know, was to form a centre to which Catholics, both priests and laymen, who desire to serve the Truth and the Church may be drawn: as a means of communication and correspondence: and as a mutual help for the study and solution of questions which affect the Catholic religion, that is both the Faith and the Church, and that both in speculation and in practice. And, first, we have to be thankful for its existence and for its continuance, and for the discourses which have been addressed to us, especially for some of them. Nevertheless, we have not as yet recognised as much as we may the direct and practical uses for which it may be employed. And with a view to this I would endeavour to suggest the subjects which appear to be proper to this Academia.

They may, I think, be stated as follows:

1. First, all such arguments as exhibit the relation of reason to Revelation, of reason to the Church, of the Church to the Scriptures, of reason to the Scriptures. These subjects are especially forced upon us by the intellectual condition of England, by the dissolution of Protestantism, and by the influence of these two causes upon many among our own people. It is much to be desired that certain men would subdivide these subjects among themselves, and engage to produce papers upon each of them, to be read before the Academia.

From such, a volume most useful and needful at this moment might easily be formed. We must all desire that the Catholic Church should be seen by all men to stand foremost in the defence of the Word of God, unwritten and written, in these days of unbelief.

2. Next, the relation of the Church to politics requires a new and careful restatement. The great Catholic writers, such as S. Thomas, Suarez, and Bellarmine, treated of these subjects in the abstract, and in their bearing upon the forms of political society known in their day. But the last centuries have changed the whole aspect and application of their principles. The political society of the last three hundred years is a new phase of Christian civilisation. The inevitable divorce of the ecclesiastical and civil powers, which is everywhere accomplishing, and the separation of the nations, as such, from the unity of the faith, which brings with it the desecration of the corporate life and action of society—that is, of the civil power—is a new and unprecedented fact of a portentous character, charged with a future which we can only contemplate with submission to the will of God and confidence in His care of His Church and people. A multitude of subjects are at once forced upon us. What is the relation of the Church to the civil society of the world? Has it any duty towards it, or direction over it? Do politics enter into morals, and has the Church any jurisdiction within the sphere of politics? Can politics be separated from the faith, and Christian society from the Church? Is civilisation dependent on or independent of Christianity, and therefore of the Church? Was the concurrent

action of the spiritual and civil powers in past ages for good or for evil? Is their present divorce an advance or a retrogression in Christian civilisation?

I need not point out that these questions are inevitable; they are forced upon us; they underlie the whole continental revolution against the Holy See; they are mixed up in the foreign policy of every government; they are ventilated in every newspaper; Catholics cannot meet in a congress without being overtaken by them as by a spring-tide; they enter into the duties of every Englishman who possesses the trust of a vote or the responsibility of influence; they are the fine wedges which are rending us asunder, and throwing many, who are otherwise sound in faith, upon a stream which will carry them not only away from the spirit of the Church, but, at last, into opposition to the Holy See. Do not think I exaggerate, or speak as a theorist. Every parish priest will know that the subtilest form of political sedition is at this moment being propagated among our Catholics in England by brotherhoods, secret societies, and obscure newspapers. For all this we must prepare ourselves. If we need a last reason to attract us to these studies, we may find it in the allocution of the Holy Father at the canonisation in 1862, in which all the faithful of every nation and people were warned to beware of the anti-social and anti-Christian principles of modern political theories.

3. Once more, the relation of philosophy to faith lies at the foundation of the chief intellectual problems of the day. Without a clear decision on this subject there can be no sufficient treatment of the first truths

of theology. The most lamentable aberrations of these later years may in some cases be traced to a single philosophical error, which, like a morbid particle in the blood, will produce death.

A certain class of modern metaphysical philosophers has been well subdivided into objective and subjective atheists, and yet these writers are read both without and within the Church in England without scruple or hesitation. Happily many men are not consequent, and many have no conception of the character and reach of the books they read. Inconsequence and unconsciousness preserve them from the evil of the anti-Catholic and anti-Christian philosophy by which they are surrounded.

A still more urgent subject is the relation of Faith and the Church to Science. It would seem to be too trivial to go on repeating, that between revelation and science there can be no opposition; that the works of God are His words, and the words of God are His works, and that both are in absolute harmony. In the Divine mind they are one truth: in the Divine action they may be only partially and successively developed. They may for a time seem to be diverse, and to involve discrepancies of signification; but ultimately and essentially they must be one, even as God is one. 'Deus scientiarum Tu es.' God is the fountain of all sciences. For this cause Catholics have no fear of science, scientifically elaborated and scientifically treated. They have no fear of any accumulation of facts and phenomena, truly such, nor of any induction or conclusion scientifically established. They fear only science un-

scientifically handled, superficial observations, hasty generalisations, reckless opposition to revelation, and undissembled readiness to reject revelation rather than doubt of a modern theory about flint instruments and hyena's bones. It is, indeed, true that Catholics have an intense dislike and hostility to such science as this, and to all its modifications. They hold it to be guilty, not only of *lèse majesté* against the Christian revelation, but against the truth and dignity of science itself. They abhor—and I accuse myself of being a ringleader in this abhorrence—the science now in fashion, which I take leave to call 'the brutal philosophy,' to wit, there is no God, and the ape is our Adam.

How necessary it is for Catholics to prepare themselves on the relation of society and of science to the Church, may be seen by what passed the other day: as at Malines, so at Munich. Catholics cannot meet without being forced into the time-spirit. We do not live in an exhausted receiver. The Middle Ages are passed. There is no zone of calms for us. We are in the modern world—in the trade winds of the nineteenth century, and we must brace ourselves to lay hold of the world as it grapples with us, and to meet it intellect to intellect, culture to culture, science to science.

For in these last centuries, first politics and now science have fallen away from the faith. This is the paradisiacal state according to some. To others it is the dissolution of the Christian society of the world carried out to its last consequence. Now it will be a subject very proper to the sessions of the Academia to discuss whether Science has any dependence upon

Faith, or whether it be independent in a province of its own; whether it be scientific to threaten the received chronology with a jaw-bone found at Amiens, or with cities submerged in lakes, or with formations arbitrarily assumed to be slow in their accretion and the like; or whether it be not the part of Science to proceed with the docility of a learner, and the patience of an interrogator, waiting for the answers of Nature, who will not be rudely or contemptuously questioned, but demands of its disciples the reverence and the piety of sons to its great Creator.

Lastly—for I must not trespass longer upon your patience—under the name of Science is included not only Metaphysics and Physics, but also the scientific treatment of Theology, Philosophy, and History in its relation to theological science. In this sense it goes to the root of faith. I cannot better illustrate my meaning than by quoting the words of a Swiss theologian, Gügler, whose works I do not pretend to know beyond the passage which I have met in quotation. Either that passage does adequately represent the mind of the writer, or it does not. With this I have less to do than with its inevitable effect on the mind of the reader. 'We are to believe,' says the author to his antagonists, 'the voice of the Church, you say, without seeking to understand; but where do we hear this voice? Not in your mouths, certainly, or with the ears of the body; it must be sought for in history, and in the written records of the Church. We must examine each document historically in order to know whether it is the authentic expression of the mind of the Church without

interpolation; only then does faith begin.' 'Embrace reason and science, become what you ought to be; and your kingdom will rise again from the dead.'[4]

First, I would wish to know who *we* are who are bound to examine each document historically? and next, what documents? and lastly, for the establishment of what doctrines? Does it signify that the faithful are to receive the articles of their Baptismal Creed from documents historically examined by each one for himself, and not from the voice of the Church? Or the interpretation of those articles, or the interpretation of Scripture? And is it only after examination of each document historically that faith begins? Have they no faith before baptism, nor after baptism, till they become historical critics?

If by these high-sounding phrases be meant only that we must know *what* we believe, and *why* we believe, before we believe it, or that reason is the preamble of faith, there is no need of such imposing phraseology, nor of any discovery. We may answer with S. Augustin, 'Absit ut ideo credamus ne rationem accipiamus, sive quæramus, quum etiam credere non possemus nisi rationabiles animas haberemus.'[5] But if it be meant that science precedes faith, and that the unscientific have no faith, I would leave the writer to reconcile himself with the Prophet who says, 'Nisi credideritis non intelligetis,' and with S. Augustin, who with the principle transfixes the pretensions of the Manichees. We are

[4] *Home and Foreign Review*, July 1863, p. 194.
[5] S. Aug. Epist. cxx. 3, tom. ii. p. 347.

no lovers of darkness, nor of the kingdom of the dead, and we have, I hope, as ardent a love of science and reason as any men of our time; but we have learned in the school of those doctors and saints who teach that faith is a rational act, and that to believe is the condition of understanding, and understanding the reward of faith. 'Si a me,' says S. Augustin, 'aut a quolibet alio doctore non irrationabiliter flagitas, ut quod credis intelligas, corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea, quæ fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias. . . . Et ideo rationabiliter dictum est per Prophetam, "nisi credideritis non intelligetis."'

Again he says: 'Sed prius Sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritatibus colla subdenda sunt, ut ad intellectum per fidem quisque perveniat.'[6]

And once more, for the principle pervades the works of S. Augustin from beginning to end:

'*Sed sunt quidam*, inquit, *in vobis qui non credunt.* Non dicit, sunt quidam in vobis qui non intelligunt: sed causam dixit, quare non intelligant. *Sunt enim quidam in vobis qui non credunt:* et ideo non intelligunt, quia non credunt. Propheta enim dixit, *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.* Per fidem copulamur, per intellectum vivificamur. Prius hæreamus per fidem, ut sit quod vivificetur per intellectum. Nam qui non hæret, resistit: qui resistit, non credit. Nam qui resistit, quomodo vivificatur? Adversarius est radio lucis, quo penetrandus est: non avertit aciem, sed

[6] *De Peccatorum Meritis*, cap. xxi. 16 D. tom. x. p. 16.

claudit mentem. *Sunt* ergo *quidam qui non credunt.* Credant et aperiant, aperiant et illuminabuntur.'[7]

In a word, it is not science which generates faith, but faith which generates science by the aid of the reason illuminated by revelation.

In what I have hitherto said, I have assumed one truth as undeniable and axiomatic, namely, that God has revealed Himself; that He hath committed this revelation to His Church; and that He preserves both His revelation and His Church in all ages by His own presence and assistance from all error in faith and morals. Now inasmuch as certain primary truths—which may be naturally known of God and the soul, and of the relations of the soul with God, and of man with man, that is, certain truths discoverable also in the order of nature by reason or by philosophy—are taken up into and incorporated with the revelation of God, the Church possesses the first principles of rational philosophy and of natural ethics both for individuals and for society. And inasmuch as these principles are the great regulating truths of philosophy and natural morality, including natural politics, the Church has a voice, a testimony, and a jurisdiction within these provinces of natural knowledge. I do not affirm the Church to be a philosophical authority, but I may affirm it to be a witness in philosophy. Much more when we come to treat of Christian philosophy or the Theodicea, or Christian morals and Christian politics; for these are no more than the truths of nature grafted upon the stock of revelation and elevated to a super-

[7] *In Joan. Evang.* cap. vi. tract. xxvii. tom. iii. p. 504.

natural perfection. To exclude the discernment and voice of the Church from philosophy and politics is to degrade both by reducing them to the natural order. First it pollards them, and next it deprives them of the corroboration of a higher evidence. Against this the whole array of Catholic theologians and philosophers has always contended. They have maintained that the tradition of theological and ethical knowledge is divinely preserved, and has a unity in itself; that there is a true traditive philosophy running down in the same channel with the divine tradition of faith, recognised by faith as true by the light of nature, and guarded by the circle of supernatural truths by which faith has surrounded it. In saying this I am not extending the infallibility of the Church to philosophical or political questions apart from their contact with revelation; but affirming only that the radical truths of the natural order have become rooted in the substance of faith, and are guaranteed to us by the witness and custody of the Church. So likewise, as the laws of Christian civilisation are the laws of natural morality elevated by the Christian law, which is expounded and applied by the Church, there is a tradition both of private and public ethics, or in other words of morality and jurisprudence, which forms the basis of all personal duty and of all political justice. In this again the Church has a discernment, and therefore a voice. A distribution of labour in the cultivation of all provinces of truth is prudent and intelligible: a division of authority and an exclusion of the Church from science is not only a dismemberment of the kingdom of truth, but

a forcible rending of vital truths from their highest evidence. Witness the treatment of the question whether the existence of God can be proved, and whether God can be known by natural reason, in the hands of those who turn their backs upon the tradition of evidence in the universal Church. Unless revelation be an illusion, the voice of the Church must be heard in these higher provinces of human knowledge. Newton, as Dr. Newman says, 'cannot dispense with the metaphysician, nor the metaphysician with us.' Into cosmogony the Church must enter by the doctrine of creation; into natural theology by the doctrine of the existence and perfections of God; into ethics by the doctrine of the cardinal virtues; into politics by the indissolubility of marriage, the root of human society, as divorce is its dissolution. And by this interpenetration and interweaving of its teaching, the Church binds all sciences to itself. They meet in it as in their proper centre. As the sovereign power which runs into all provinces unites them in one Empire, so the voice and witness of the Church unite, and bind all sciences in one.

It is the parcelling and morselling out of science, and the disintegration of the tradition of truth, which has reduced the intellectual culture of England to its present fragmentary and contentious state. Not only errors are generated, but truths are set in opposition; science and revelation are supposed to be at variance, and revelation to be the weaker side of human knowledge.

The Church has an infallible knowledge of the original revelation. Its definitions of Divine faith fall

within this limit. But its infallible judgments reach beyond it. The Church possesses a knowledge of truth which belongs also to the natural order. The existence of God — His power, goodness, and perfections — the moral law written in the conscience—are truths of the natural order which are declared also by revelation, and recorded in Holy Scripture. These truths the Church knows by a twofold light—by the supernatural light of revelation, and by the natural light which all men possess. In the Church this natural light is concentrated as in a focus. The great endowment of common sense—that is, the *generis humani communis sensus*—the maximum of light and evidence for certain truths of the natural order, resides eminently in the collective intelligence of the Church, that is to say, in the intelligence of the faithful, which is the seat of its passive infallibility, and in the intelligence of the pastors, or the *Magisterium Ecclesiæ*, which is the organ of its active infallibility. That two and two make four is not more evident to the Catholic Church than to the rest of mankind, to S. Thomas or S. Bonaventura than to Spinoza and Comte. But that God exists, and that man is responsible, because free, are moral truths, and for the perception of moral truths even of the natural order a moral discernment is needed; and the moral discernment of the Church, even of natural truths, is, I maintain, incomparably higher than the moral discernment of the mass of mankind, by virtue of its elevation to greater purity and closer conformity to the laws of nature.

The highest object of human science is God; and

theology, properly so called, is the science of His nature and perfections, the radiance which surrounds 'the Father of light, in whom is no change, neither shadow of vicissitude.' Springing from this central science flow the sciences of the works of God, in nature and in grace; and under the former fall not only the physical sciences, but those also which relate to man and to his action—as morals, politics, and history. Now the revelation God has given us rests for its centre upon God Himself, but in its course describes a circumference within which many truths of the natural order relating both to the world and to man are included. These the Church knows not only by natural light, but by Divine revelation, and declares by Divine assistance. But these primary truths of the natural order are axioms and principles of the sciences within which they properly fall. And these truths of philosophy belong also to the domain of faith. The same truths are the objects of faith and of science; they are the links which couple these sciences to revelation. How, then, can these sciences be separated from their relation to revealed truth without a false procedure? No Catholic could so separate them; for these truths enter within the dogma of faith. No Christian who believes in Holy Scripture could do so; for they are included in Holy Writ. No mere philosopher could do so; for thereby he would discard and perhaps place himself in opposition and discord with the maximum of evidence which is attainable on these primary verities, and therefore with the common sense not only of Christendom, but of mankind. In this I am not advocating a mixture or

confusion of religion and philosophy, which, as Lord Bacon says, in his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, 'will undoubtedly make an heretical religion and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy,' but affirming that certain primary truths of both physical and ethical philosophy are delivered to us by revelation, and that we cannot neglect them as our starting-points in such sciences without a false procedure and a palpable forfeiture of truth. Such verities are, for instance, the existence of God, the creation of the world, the freedom of the will, the moral office of the conscience, and the like. Lord Bacon says, again: 'There may be veins and lines, but not sections or separations,' in the great continent of Truth. All truths alike are susceptible of scientific method, and all of a religious treatment. The father of modern philosophy, as men of our day call him, so severe and imperious in maintaining the distinct province and process of science, is not the less peremptory and absolute as to the unity of all truth and the vital relation of all true science to the Divine philosophy of revelation.

In confirmation of what I have said, I will use better words than my own. In the second of the well-known Lectures on University Education,[8] Dr. Newman, treating of the relation of theology to other sciences, speaks as follows: 'Summing up, gentlemen, what I have said, I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject-matter is one; for the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit

[8] *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education*, J. H. Newman, Disc. II.

together that we cannot separate off portion from portion, and operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction; and then, again, as to its Creator, though He, of course, in His own Being, is infinitely separated from it, yet He has so implicated Himself with it, and taken it into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His providence over it, His impressions upon it, and His influences through it, that we cannot truly or fully contemplate it without contemplating Him. Next, sciences are the results of that mental abstraction which I have spoken of, being the logical record of this or that aspect of the whole subject-matter of knowledge. As they all belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and all connected together; as they are but aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other. And further, the comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation, and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another—this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by philosophy, in the true sense of the word.'

Further on he says: 'What theology gives, it has a right to take; or rather the interests of truth oblige it to take. If we would not be beguiled by dreams, if we would ascertain facts as they are, then, granting theology as a real science, we cannot exclude it, and

still call ourselves philosophers. I have asserted nothing as yet as to the pre-eminent dignity of religious truth; I only say, if there be religious truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it without prejudice to truth of every kind, physical, metaphysical, historical, and moral: for it bears upon all truth. And thus I answer the objection with which I opened this discourse. I supposed the question put to me by a philosopher of the day, "Why cannot you go your way, and let us go ours?" I answer, in the name of theology, "When Newton can dispense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense with us." . . .

'Man, with his motives and works, his languages, his propagation, his diffusion, is from Him [God]. Agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life are His gift. Society, laws, government—He is their sanction. The pageant of earthly royalty has the semblance and the benediction of the Eternal King. Peace and civilisation, commerce and adventure, wars when just, conquest when humane and necessary, have His co-operation and His blessing upon them. The course of events, the revolution of empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras, the progresses and the retrogressions of the world's history, not indeed the incidental sin, over-abundant as it is, but the great outlines and the issues of human affairs, are from His disposition. The elements, and types, and seminal principles, and constructive powers of the moral world, in ruins though it be, are to be referred to Him. He "enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world." . . .

'If this be a sketch, accurate in substance, and, as

far as it goes, of the doctrines proper to theology, and especially of the doctrine of a particular Providence, which is the portion of it most on a level with human sciences, I cannot understand at all how, supposing it to be true, it can fail, considered as knowledge, to exert a powerful influence on philosophy, literature, and every intellectual creation or discovery whatever. I cannot understand how it is possible, as the phrase goes, to blink the question of its truth or falsehood. It meets us with a profession and a proffer of the highest truths of which the human mind is capable; it embraces a range of subjects the most diversified and distant from each other. What science will not find one part or other of its province traversed by its path? What results of philosophic speculation are unquestionable, if they have been gained without inquiry as to what theology had to say to them? Does it cast no light upon history? Has it no influence upon the principles of ethics? Is it without any sort of bearing on physics, metaphysics, and political science? Can we drop it out of the circle of knowledge, without allowing either that that circle is thereby mutilated, or, on the other hand, that theology is no science?'

Such being the essential unity of all truth, and such the mind and instinct of the Church, it is no wonder that humble and pious minds not largely cultivated beyond their Catechism should turn with fear and suspicion from the pursuit of science. It is deplorable, but not wonderful, that they should be thereby set against the progress of scientific knowledge. But on whom rests the blame? Without question, on us, who

profess to know better, if we so use our better knowledge as to offend and to affright our weaker brethren. Life is short, and at longest there is little time for the pursuit of knowledge. Better to use it for science silently and humbly. There is as little fear of our modern philosophers being burnt for magic, or even accused of it by their ignorant contemporaries, as of our attaining the intellectual superiority of Sylvester II. or Nicolas of Cusa. Nothing is gained to science, still less to charity, by a tone of pretentious menace; such as, 'If the facts of geology are contrary to the Catholic faith, let the Catholic faith look to it.' We need no such admonitions, be they threats or warnings. It would inspire us with more confidence in their science and humility, if our geologists said: 'If the facts of geology are contrary to the Catholic faith, let geology look to its facts.' It is much easier to trumpet about facts than to fix them. Even in our own short lifetime we have seen the facts of geology to be made, unmade, remade, and made over again, I know not how many times. The nature and origin of man has been so often fixed and unfixed that I am in doubt whether I am descended, as I said, from Adam or from an ape, or from a jelly, or from a capsule, or whether I am created at all, or am a transient manifestation of an uncreated whole, that is, whether I am man or Pan, whom I revered in boyhood, but never aspired to be. And this is science. Truly the Catholic faith has not much need to fear it, save only for the half-learned, vain-glorious, pretentious, and unbelieving. But they are many.

To illustrate my meaning from a high authority not

to be suspected of partiality to us, I will quote the words of Mr. Lewes, the hierophant or archimandrite of Comtism, or as I have ventured to call it in respect to theology, the Brutal Philosophy. After a review in four volumes of the triumph and progress of philosophy along the *via sacra* of ages from the seven friends of our boyhood, Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, &c., through Anaximenes, Anaximander, to Spinoza, Locke, Reid, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, to Auguste Comte, he sums up the pæan in this melancholy strophe which closes his last volume: 'Modern philosophy opens with a method —Bacon; and ends with a method—Comte; and in each case this method leads to positive science, and sets metaphysics aside. Within these limits we have witnessed various efforts to solve the problems of philosophy; and all these efforts have ended in scepticism.'[9]

It sounds like the voice of the buffoon in the chariot reminding Cæsar that he is but a man.

The mission, then, of the Catholic Church in England at this moment is a noble and beneficent work, that of calling home, first, truths to their proper centre, and then men to those truths.

It has first to reorganise the elements of Christian belief which lie scattered in fragments around its unity. And this it is already doing beyond all hope: even error is working with it, revealing its own incoherence. It is certain that as the Catholic Church stands at this hour in England the only witness for unity of faith, so in ten years it will be recognised as the only Divine

[9] Vol. iv. p. 263.

evidence, and therefore the only certain authority, for the inspiration and canon of Holy Scripture.

It is the duty, therefore, of Catholics to prepare themselves for the future which is before them. They little thought thirty years ago to be as they are now.

They little thought ten years ago of the majestic expansion of the Catholic Church at this hour, and of its dignified attitude of calm in the midst of the religious confusion and dissolution which is around it. Still less can we anticipate what the next ten years may bring. The advance of the Church is in geometrical progression.

And in proportion as it regains the intelligence of the English people the hearts of men will turn to it *sicut torrens in austro*. It will be seen to be in England also what it ever has been in the civilised world—the mother and nurse of all intellectual culture. The people of England are already beginning to hear its voice and to recognise it as the pleading of truth, charity, and common sense.

IV.

FATHER FABER.

FATHER FABER.

(*Dublin Review*, January 1864.)

In this brief notice we do not pretend to write a biography of Father Faber, or to review his works. But we feel that when any one who for fifteen years has filled so large a place in the thoughts and affections of Catholics is called away to his rest, it is a grateful duty to record his name in our pages.

F. Faber died as a pastor ought to die, amidst the tears and prayers of a multitude of souls brought by him to the foot of the Cross; and, we must add, amidst the petty malevolence of those who hate the Church. No one can have been present on the day of his requiem without a desire to die as he did. And no one can have read the comments of the *Saturday Review* on that spectacle without a new conception of the littleness and implacableness of a certain class of minds. Until the rise of the spirit of petty personal detraction which stains our anonymous literature, we should have thought it impossible, not that any Christian, but that any man, could be found to write in cold blood, over a grave hardly closed, those words of ungenerous detraction and effeminate spite. They who in that article are held up by the writer as 'a desert

of unfulfilled promise, blighted powers, and wasted life,' may well thank God that they have been saved from a greater desolation—that of sharing the heart and mind of the reviewer. Better to be all he describes than a Pharisee without a faith, and a man without a heart.

We confess that when we first read the article, the ill-natured gossip and unmanly raking up of early failings, supposing them to be true—or the reckless wickedness of publishing such detraction, supposing them to be false—excited in us no little indignation,—until we remembered that so it must be. If such a mind could appreciate F. Faber, F. Faber would not be what he was. We remembered that some writer of French gossip describes S. Vincent of Paul, the father of the Lazarist missionaries, of the Sisters of Charity, and of modern beneficence, as a man fond of cards, and not over-scrupulous in his play. This somewhat allayed our feelings ; but one more thought turned it into thankfulness. A *Saturday* Reviewer in France has lately written a life of our Divine Lord, describing Him as the 'handsome enthusiast, the fascinating preacher, and the favourite of effeminate minds.' A Renan in England has described F. Faber almost in the same words. 'The disciple is not above his Master, nor the servant above his Lord.' We know no greater honour than to be calumniated together with our Divine Redeemer. The animosity and injustice of the writer, happily without a name, are signally betrayed in the selection from F. Faber's poetry of two sets of verses, certainly of no high excellence. But will the critic, as a man of honour, pretend that those poems are a

sample of F. Faber's poetical writings? In the very volume from which they are taken there are sonnets which would bear comparison with the poems of those who are accepted as the highest poets of our day. But it would not serve the purpose of detraction to quote them. It was more to the mind of the critic to pick out the few things which may be censured among the many things which are to be commended. The poems are criticised also for a tone of servility to friends. Has the critic ever read Shakespeare's Sonnets? But an Anglican of great gifts, who has committed the unpardonable sin of submitting to the Catholic Church, thereby disturbing and shaming many, who had the same lights and responsibilities, but not the same fidelity or force of character, must be run down, derided, and damaged, lest men should believe in him.

Our first recollection of F. Faber is of a graceful and intelligent boy just launched into a great public school; and next, as a young man who had lately won for himself a high place in honours at Oxford. No one could have known him in those days without being attracted by a grace of person and mind rarely to be met with. But with his early career we have little to do. He is known to us in a character which effaces all antecedents. The only Frederick Faber we can now present to ourselves is the priest, the preacher, the guide of souls, the spiritual writer, and the head of a great community; and in these offices he has in fifteen years fulfilled the works of a long life.

As a priest we may say that few men of our day have given a higher example of the ecclesiastical and

sacerdotal spirit, of entire devotion to the priestly life; detached from the world, in which he never set a foot, and immersed in everything which is most in harmony with the priesthood. The accuser of the *Saturday Review* industriously collects against him the charges of tuft-hunting and the like. If so, then the change which his faith and piety had made in him was all the more meritorious and supernatural; for undoubtedly, of all our contemporaries few can be found who more entirely and consistently withdrew from the world. 'He lived with himself,' as S. Gregory says of S. Benedict,—*habitabat secum*. He was so buried in the four walls of the Oratory that he never even visited his friends. They sought him, not he them; and those who did not come to him, be they who they might, he never saw.

As a preacher he possessed certain gifts beyond any one we remember to have heard. He had a facility and flexibility of mind and voice, a vividness of apprehension and of imagination, a beauty of conception and of expression,—a beauty, that is, to the eye and to the ear,—with a brightness of confidence, as of a man who lived in the light and the peace of God, and a longing desire to make others possess the happiness he enjoyed, which we have hardly seen united in the same degree. We have heard others who have spoken with more power, more mastery of intellect, more reserve of force, more commanding strength of word and of will, but we have seldom, if ever, heard any preacher who so seemed to speak from a personal consciousness of the beauty and sweetness of a life of union with Jesus, with

His Saints, and with His Church. F. Faber's preaching was not a discourse elaborately worked out and delivered with a sensible or conscious effort, but the overflow of a mind perpetually fed from its own inward sources, and pouring forth with an exuberance of which we have known no example. With most men to preach seems to be an effort; with him it seemed to be a relief, as if his mind were so overburdened by the consciousness of the things of God and of the soul, that to pour them out in a continuous stream was as great a refreshment to himself as to the multitude who hung upon his lips.

As a guide of souls it would hardly be in place for us here to speak of him; but there was about F. Faber one quality which we must not omit to note. He had a thorough mistrust and dislike of all low views and compromises in serving God. He aspired, both for himself and for others, to the highest—not out of any rigour or moroseness, nor out of any vainglorious affectation of sanctity, but from a deep and consistent desire after the nearest union with God. No one was more large in permitting all that was innocent or lawful; none more high-minded in encouraging, inviting, urging men up the narrow path. He had a kindly but most caustic raillery for the vanities and singularities of silly pietism, which reminds us of S. Philip's counsels about ruffs and high heels. Certainly no one could hear him speak of the love and service of God without being attracted to it. It has been well said that to make men love their country the rulers must make it lovely; and it may be said of

religion, that to make men love it, spiritual guides must make it lovely; and this F. Faber did in a singular degree.

Of F. Faber as a spiritual writer it would be impossible here to speak. It would require a large analysis and appreciation of his many and various works, which we may hereafter attempt. All we can do is to point out one feature by which F. Faber's writings are eminently distinguished. His first work of Catholic piety was entitled *All for Jesus*, and this may be said to be the key-note of all that followed. They are all one strain, and all as harmonies elaborated out of this octave; the first few simple notes giving forth a flood of sound, rich, intricate, and sweet. Year after year, with a wonderful rapidity, his works came forth. In such an abundance of matter it might be easy to criticise; but it would be hard to find any mind or hand which has bestowed so large a gift on the Catholics of England—and not only of England, but wheresoever the English tongue is spoken—and not only in our tongue, but in German, in French, and in other languages. In France many of his books are now in the fourth, sixth, and tenth editions. The Catholics of other countries have recognised in F. Faber the quality and the flavour of mystical and ascetical piety familiar to them in the tradition of the Church. To them it was a gift, but not the supply of a need, as it was to us. The Church in England has hitherto been as poor in writers as in endowments. The Catholics of other countries had already their doctrinal works: we had hardly any; and it must be said that, excellent as are

those we possessed, there was still a want to be supplied. Gother, Challoner, and Hay, with all their deep and solid instruction, do not fulfil the mission of S. Francis of Sales, or Lallemant, or Segneri. There was still a strain of the spiritual life to be uttered. To this F. Faber applied himself; first by the translation of the series of the *Lives of the Saints*, and next by his own writings. The former work was, as it were, a novitiate for the latter. Now it is well known how great an opposition was made by good and excellent men to the series of Lives. The chief opponent afterwards, with a true Christian's humility, withdrew his censures. But this fact is enough to show that there was a need to be supplied. The Lives in question are chiefly those which were prepared for the processes of canonisation, or at least derived from the evidence taken in those processes. We feel sure that both for the series of the Saints' Lives, and for his own writings, we are greatly his debtors. We know of no one man who has done more to make the men of his day love God and aspire to a higher path of the interior life; and we know no man who so nearly represents to us the mind and the preaching of S. Bernard and of S. Bernardine of Sienna, in the tenderness and beauty with which he has surrounded the names of Jesus and Mary.

And here we cannot omit to mention his devotional hymns, among which are to be found some of the purest simplest strains of high and elevating devotion. They have been a consolation to multitudes, and are daily in the mouths of thousands of our children; and

they have entered deeply into the training of many hearts in the love of God, of piety, and of the Church.

It only remains to us to say the fewest words of F. Faber as the head of the London Oratory. No one can have followed the career of the Oratorians, from their entrance upon the miserable room which served for a church in King William-street, Strand, to the day when F. Faber's bier, in their spacious church at Brompton, was surrounded by more than a hundred priests, representing the reverence and affection of the diocese, and a great multitude of mourners, representing the love of his spiritual children, without recognising both the vastness of the work which has been done, and the pre-eminence of the one mind which animated and guided it. This is neither the time nor the place to enter into the reasons which make this work so significantly great. F. Faber has had the happy lot to be called to labour for the Catholic Church in England and in London at a moment pregnant with critical events; and nobly he has done so,—as 'a workman that needeth not to be ashamed;' as a voice that never faltered; as a man that was always found upon the right side—always for the higher truth and for the better choice. It is the property of greater minds to assimilate others to themselves; and this F. Faber did with a remarkable power. His spirit pervaded the community over which he presided, and he lived to see it multiplied to some two-and-twenty priests, and expanding itself with a singular fruitfulness of spiritual works. It is hardly credible that among us there

should be found a man—and he must be also an Oxford man, we fear, and perhaps once a friend—who could describe such a man and such a life as one 'who would have made his fortune as a pocket-handkerchief preacher in a fashionable chapel,' and whose proper sphere was amongst choristers and effeminate minds. Perhaps it was necessary that while the aspersory sprinkled upon his bier the tokens of divine absolution, the frivolous and the malicious should sprinkle it with vinegar and gall. Such is the destiny and the dignity of the servants of God; and this thought gives us an additional feeling of joy in laying upon his grave our too slight testimony of reverence and love.

V.

THE VISIT OF GARIBALDI TO ENGLAND.

THE VISIT OF GARIBALDI TO ENGLAND.

A Letter to the Right Hon. Edward Cardwell, M.P., &c. &c.

Sir,—I alone am responsible for the contents of this Letter, and for the fact of its being addressed to you. I have not asked your permission, because I do not think that I am bound to do so. I write to you as one of her Majesty's Privy Councillors who have not waited upon General Garibaldi. My first impulse was to pour out the feeling which has been aroused in me by recent events to one of your colleagues, but to my sorrow I saw that he was conspicuous in his attendance on General Garibaldi. Disappointed in this, I turn to you. I have ever believed you and found you to be just and even in your judgments and actions towards those who differ from you, and though large and generous in your popular sympathies, yet wise and firm. You have held a high office in Ireland, which will enable you to estimate the full breadth and critical delicacy of the subject on which I address you. You can be in no way responsible for anything I may write. I do not know how far you may or may not agree in what I say. I know that in some things of the gravest

moment we must differ; but in many things the love of our country and the instincts of Englishmen must, I hope, draw our judgments together. I have waited in the hope that some one better able than I am should break silence: as no one has done so, I will.

As an Englishman, then, I will say at once I have looked on with no little sorrow and indignation at much which has attended the reception of General Garibaldi. What my political opinions may be can be of no manner of importance. It does not matter what such as I may be. But it may matter not a little to fair play that I should say what I am not. It is an easy thing to raise a prejudice against what I may say by describing me as a partisan of reaction, of brigandage, of absolutism, and the like. For this reason, and for this reason only, I will say that I am no lover of absolutism nor of despotism. If I have any politics they are popular, learned in the school which teaches that princes are for the people, not the people for princes. This principle I accept from my heart with all its consequences and corollaries. A desire for the welfare of the people in the largest sense, which eliminates the party politics of classes and of sectional interests, and above all, the dictates of a higher order of truths, would incline me to view with sympathy whatsoever is for the welfare of the people.

But believing that civil society is a Divine creation, and that its authority is from God, I have no sympathy with revolutions which are licentious, unjust, or without a moral necessity, still less with those which are associated with public and private immorality.

Thus much I have thought it well to say at the outset, lest what I add should be thought to flow from political bigotry or religious prejudice.

I will, then, in as few words as I can, state the purport of this Letter.

From the public newspapers I learn that the reception of General Garibaldi has been attended by such multitudes as have never welcomed even royal personages on their arrival in England. We are told that the arrival of the Princess of Wales elicited no such demonstrations. Ministers of the Crown, peers of the realm, Anglican prelates, members of parliament, magistrates of high dignity, ex-Chancellors, Privy Councillors, merchants, gentlemen of all conditions, and, very conspicuously, peeresses and ladies of every class, made court for General Garibaldi. The Prime Minister, her Majesty's Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and others in high place, we are told, threw open their houses to honour General Garibaldi. His movements were chronicled as by a Court newsman. At certain houses the red cloth was spread to honour his entry; the Mayor of Southampton, having fallen into a strain of poetry or of prophecy, named him the 'uncrowned king;' London rose up to meet him; the City presented its freedom with a box enriched with diamonds. That some whom I have named received him with singular demonstrations affords me no surprise: the presence of others I can account for by nothing but a momentary aberration of their habital prudence—shall I add, of their habitual dignity? That you, sir, were not of the

number I could have foretold, and I have not been disappointed.

The day will I hope come, and before long, when, the fumes of this intoxication having evaporated, we shall be able to appreciate what has been done. Already the evidence of such a return to sobriety is to be perceived, and the time is not far off when people will be able to review what they have been doing in the light of certain facts, which I would ask leave briefly to enumerate.

1. First, then, I pass over what has already in these last days occupied the public attention, and drawn from the *Times* newspaper a graceful *amende* to a distinguished personage.[1]

2. In the *Evening Standard* of April 20 I read a report of the following words, spoken by General Garibaldi at the house of a Mr. Herzen at Teddington:

'I am about to make a declaration which I ought to have made long ago. There is a man amongst us here who has rendered the greatest services to our country, and to the cause of liberty. When I was a young man, having naught but aspirations towards the good, I sought for one able to act as the guide and counsellor of my young years. I sought such a man even as he who is athirst seeketh the spring. I found this man. He alone watched when all around him slept. He alone fed the sacred flame. He has ever remained my friend—ever as full of love for his country and of devotion to the cause of liberty. This man is Joseph Mazzini. To my friend and teacher!'

Let us appreciate this declaration by weighing it in the words of Joseph Mazzini.

[1] The *Quarterly Review*, No. clxix. p. 237, has a curious article on a pamphlet of the late Lord Beaumont, which bears directly on the subject of late events, especially in pp. 236, 237

The *Guardian* newspaper of October 8, 1862, writes as follows:

'In a proclamation dated last month Mazzini announces to the world the definite termination of his truce with monarchy in Italy. "The royal bullet that entered Garibaldi," he says, "has torn the last line of the contract entered into by us republicans with monarchy. Freeing myself in May from every obligation towards the Government in all that related to action in favour of Rome and Venice, I said: 'It is not now a question of republic or monarchy; it is a question of action or inertia—of unity or dismemberment—of having the foreigner in Italy or expelling him.' In my own name, and in the name of my friends, I cancel to-day those lines—the last warning given to the Government—and I declare exhausted for us is every attempt at concord; dead every hope of concession or of true Italian work from an institution which, impotent to guide, is only able to repress brutally and tyrannically the holiest and most legitimate aspirations of a people which demands its own monarchy; will not, cannot create the nation: impelled by a sentiment of its approaching doom, it dissolves rapidly that portion of the nation created by the toil of others.

"History will say that we were loyal and patient. Despite the stupid calumnies of a corrupt and venal press, history will record that out of reverence to the sentence of the people, erring though it was, out of love of Joseph Garibaldi, in order not to neglect a single chance of concord, we brought to the feet of a monarchy—noted only for deceptions, greed, and persecutions—plans, hopes, presentiments, memories, our power for agitation, the good-will to Italy created by us in Europe, our influence over the working classes, and over thousands of youths, believers in our doctrines. History will record that when, after the shameful peace of Villafranca, monarchy, terrified or guilty, abandoned Venice, offered to come to terms with the Bourbon of Naples, and, in obedience to the man of the 2d of December, renounced Italy, we, all people, volunteers, writers, continued the interrupted work; provoked the annexations of Central Italy; provoked the Sicilian insurrection; provoked agitation in Naples; accepted, calumniated and insulted though we were, Garibaldi's programme; applauded the *plébiscite*, which gave to the trembling sluggish monarchy millions of men, freed not by it, but by their own and Garibaldi's hand.

"The people of Italy is misled by a lie.

"A country cannot be liberated without a principle, without the courage to deduce thence the natural consequences. Monarchy is not a principle with us; it is a calculation of opportunity erroneous according to us. Men have no faith therein; they regard it as an obstacle in their path, but dare not affront it deliberately; but, deceiving themselves and others, hope to use it as a lever."'

From the same paper, of the same date, I also extract the following portion of the address of General Garibaldi to the English nation:

'I owe you gratitude, O English nation! and I feel it as much as my soul is capable of feeling it. You were my friend in my good fortune, and you will continue your precious friendship to me in my adversity. May God bless you! My gratitude is all the more intense, O kind nation! that it rises high above all individual feeling, and becomes sublime in the universal sentiment towards nations of which you represent the progress. Yes, you deserve the gratitude of the world, because you offer a safe shelter to the unfortunate, from whatever side they may come, and you identify yourself with the misfortunes of others you pity and help. The French or Neapolitan exile finds refuge in your bosom against tyranny. He finds sympathy and aid because he is an exile, because he is unfortunate. The Haynaus, the iron executioners of autocrats, will not be supported by the soil of your free country; they will fly from the tyrannicidal anger of your generous sons.

And what should we be in Europe without your generous behaviour? Autocracy can strike her exiled ones in other countries, where only a bastard freedom is enjoyed—where freedom is but a lie. But let one seek for it on the sacred ground of Albion. I, like so many others, seeing the cause of justice oppressed in so many parts of the world, despair of all human progress. But when I turn my thoughts to you, I find tranquillity from your steady and fearless advancement towards that end to which the human race seems to be called by Providence.

Follow your path undisturbed, O unconquered nation! and be not backward in calling sister nations on the road of human progress. Call the French nation to co-operate with you. You are both worthy to walk hand in hand in the front rank of human improvement. But call her. In all your meetings let the words

of concord of the two great sisters resound. Call her! Call her in every way with your own voice and with that of her great exiles—with that of her Victor Hugo, the hierophant of sacred brotherhood. Tell her that conquests are to-day an aberration, the emanation of insane minds. And why should we conquer foreign lands, when we must all be brothers? Call her, and do not care if she is for the moment under the dominion of the Spirit of Evil. She will answer in due time; if not to-day, to-morrow; and if not to-morrow, she will later answer to the sound of your generous and regenerating words. Call, and at once, Helvetia's strong sons, and clasp them for ever to your heart. The warrior sons of the Alps—the Vestals of the sacred fire of freedom in the European continent—they will be yours! And what allies! Call the great American Republic. She is, after all, your daughter, risen from your bosom; and, however she may go to work, she is struggling to-day for the abolition of slavery so generously proclaimed by you. Aid her to come out from the terrible struggle in which she is involved by the traffickers in human flesh. Help her, and then make her sit by your side in the great assembly of nations, the final work of human reason. Call unto you such nations as possess free will, and do not delay a day. The initiative that to-day belongs to you might not be yours to-morrow. May God avert this!'

I will not trespass upon you by referring to the late revelations in Mr. Stansfeld's case in the House of Commons. I use this fact to establish from the lips of General Garibaldi his acceptance of the principles and animus of his master or guide, the representative of the Socialist revolution of Italy and of theories which I need not describe.

Whatsoever may be thought of the monarchy of Turin, I trust that they who love the monarchy of England, the monarchy of Alfred and of the Edwards, the monarchy of a thousand years of splendour and power, are not likely to lend themselves as tools to overthrow even the monarchy of Victor Emmanuel for the republic of Mazzini and Garibaldi. Sometimes,

indeed, in this paradoxical and inverted world, 'the noblest things find vilest using,' and vile indeed would be the use to which England would be lowered if it should listen to the adulation of these men, and consent to serve their purposes.

3. I have nothing now to do with what may be called the theology of Garibaldi. It has already been sufficiently discussed. Nevertheless I would commend it to the reflections of the Archbishop of Canterbury, whose honoured name I read with sorrow at the reception of General Garibaldi. I would commend it also to the conscience of the Anglican prelate who is reported to the world as making himself conspicuous by hastening to shake hands with General Garibaldi at the bar of the House of Lords.[2] I would commend also the following, especially to the members of the Anglican Church:

'General Garibaldi and the Evangelical Continental Society.—A deputation from the above Society, consisting of the secretary, the Rev. John Shedlock, M.A.; the sub-treasurer, Eusebius Pye Smith, Esq.; the Rev. W. Tiddy; Frederick Tomkins, Esq., M.A., D.C.L., barrister-at-law; Dr. Camps; H. Mayo, Esq.; Ferdinand Ehrenzeller, Esq.; and Mr. Arthur Smith, had an audience with General Garibaldi yesterday morning, at the residence of Charles Seely, Esq., M.P., Princes-gate, Knightsbridge. The General received the deputation most cordially, shaking hands with each gentleman. They presented to him an address. In reply to the address General Garibaldi said: "You are the true friends of progress, and I am glad to see you. In Italy the moral influence of the Papacy is extinct, and if the French were withdrawn from Rome the Papacy would cease to exist in Italy. I do not say that I am Protestant, for if I did the priests would raise the cry of heretic against me and my influence would be gone. We are sons of the same God."

[2] *Guardian* newspaper, October 8, 1862.

Upon the Rev. J. Shedlock explaining that the object of the Society's operations was not political, not to make proselytes to Protestantism, but to give the people of Italy the Holy Scriptures, to teach the people, and to instruct the young, the General exclaimed again, "You are the true friends of progress; you are right, and I wish you all success in your efforts on behalf of Italy." H. Mayo, Esq., referred to the distinguished position to which the General had attained, and added that he wished the General eternal glory. Eusebius Pye Smith, Esq., presented the General with a copy of Vinet's *Convictions Religieuses*, in the French language, adding that we all desired a united Italy, and that he should be glad if the General could find time to peruse the volume presented at his leisure in Caprera; to which the General assented. After cordially shaking hands with each gentleman, the deputation withdrew.'[3]

These seem to me, at least, to be deplorable exhibitions, in which the indecorous and the ludicrous are provokingly mixed together.

4. Further, General Garibaldi declared at the Crystal Palace on April 17, that without the aid of her Majesty's Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, her Majesty's Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Earl Russell, and others of her Majesty's Privy Council, and Admiral Mundy, who has since denied the statement, it would have been impossible for him to have accomplished what he did in Sicily and Naples, or even to pass the Straits of Messina. General Garibaldi was then on his way to the Dictatorship illustrated by the decree in praise of Agesilao Milano. His words are reported as follows:

'England has helped us in evil times as well as in good times. The English people assisted us in our war with Southern Italy, and even now the hospitals of Naples are supplied from the abundance sent to us from this country. I speak from what

[3] *Standard* newspaper, April 21, 1864.

I know, that the Queen and the Government of England, represented by Lord Palmerston (great cheers), Lord Russell, and Mr. Gladstone, have done a wonderful deal for our native Italy (cheers). If it had not been for this country we should still have been under the yoke of the Bourbons at Naples. If it had not been for Admiral Mundy I should never have been permitted to pass the Straits of Messina (cheers).'[4]

5. Lastly, I read in the Farewell Address of Garibaldi to the English people the following words:

'But in face of the great principle of the solidarity of peoples, proclaimed and sanctioned by universal conscience, I cannot speak of Italy alone, still less at a time when the omen and promise of this true holy alliance has been irrevocably confirmed, when lately I pressed the hands of proscribed men from every part of Europe.

On quitting this hospitable shore I can no longer conceal the secret wish of my heart in recommending the cause of oppressed peoples to the most generous and sagacious of nations. Since their arising is certain and their triumph fated, England will know how to spread over them the powerful shield of her name, and to sustain them, if need be, with her strong arm.'

From the facts and documents above cited I gather,

1. That he identifies himself with the Socialist revolution of Italy, in the person of Mazzini, his master and guide.

2. That he thankfully ascribes his successes in Sicily and Naples to her Majesty's Government.

3. That he invites the English people to assume the mission and office held by France in 1789, of which he deems the French people to be now unworthy,—that is, of stimulating and assisting the seditious and Socialist revolutions which at this moment threaten every Government, absolute or constitutional, throughout Europe.

[4] *Times*, April 18, 1864.

It was therefore without surprise that I read yesterday in the public papers the following report of what passed in the Parliament of Turin:

'ITALY.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND GARIBALDI.

Turin, Wednesday Evening.

In the Chamber of Deputies to-day, the Minister of the Interior, in reply to speeches from several members of the Opposition, stated that it was not for the Government to declare its intentions respecting General Garibaldi and his party, but that it was, above all, necessary to know how the General and his party intended to act. The Minister defended the policy of the Government, and proved the necessity of seizing the arms and money in order to prevent painful occurrences. After the journey of Garibaldi to London, after the eulogy bestowed by Garibaldi on English institutions, and the respect paid by the English nation to the Queen and the laws, the Minister hoped that nobody, apart from the King and the Government, would speak in the name of the country, or pursue a policy different from that of the Government and in opposition to the constitution.'[5]

I am anxious to know whether the English Government be in diplomatic relations with the Government of Turin, or with the party of Garibaldi in Italy.

And now, sir, I would beg leave to say a few words on these new principles of public morality preached by General Garibaldi to the English people amid the clouds of incense in which peers and peeresses enveloped him.

As to the Milano decree and the Goddess of Reason, I leave it to Lord Shaftesbury, Mr. Arthur Kinnaird, to the Evangelical Continental Society, and to the

[5] *Standard*, May 7, 1864.

Anglican prelates who waited on him, to reconcile it with the purity of the Gospel. Of this I am sure: there is in England a Christian moral sense which will, sooner or later, rise indignantly upon the abuse which has been passed upon its unsuspecting generosity.

My object, however, is not to discuss these pure theologies, but to ask two practical questions. First, Is it the fact that the success of Garibaldi in Sicily and Naples is to be ascribed to her Majesty's Government? Secondly, Is the country to be entangled, excited, and driven onward by the intrigues of foreign seditions until it places itself at the head of the revolutions of Europe — that is, assume to itself the mission of France under the Directory, of which Garibaldi judges the France of to-day to be unworthy?

It is time that we should know whither we are being led, while as yet we have the power to use our free will and our discretion. If this be our policy, it ought to be clearly enunciated. A league with the revolutions of the Continent had its counterpart in a coalition of the nations of the Continent. The issue is written in history. The capitals of all Europe were for a time tormented by domestic seditions, but their sovereigns met in Paris. Are we to renew the cycle, and is England to be its centre? Such, if it mean anything, is the meaning of General Garibaldi's most opportune garrulity. It reminds me of words with which you, sir, are, I doubt not, more familiar than I can be: 'We are at war with a system which,

by its essence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war as peace and war may best contribute to their subversion. It is with an *armed doctrine* that we are at war. It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm in every country. To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our Channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil. Thus advantaged, if it can at all exist, it must finally prevail. Nothing can so completely ruin any of the old Governments, ours in particular, as the acknowledgment, directly or by implication, of any kind of superiority in this new power.' This power is described: 'Instead of the religion and the law by which they were in a great politic communion with the Christian world, they have constructed their republic on three bases all fundamentally opposite to those on which the communities of Europe are built. Its foundation is laid in regicide, in Jacobinism, and in atheism; and it has joined to those principles a body of systematic manners which secures their operation.' 'The State, in its essence, must be moral and just; and it may be so though a tyrant or usurper should be accidentally at the head of it. This is a thing to be lamented; but this notwithstanding, the body of the commonwealth may remain in all its integrity, and be perfectly sound in its composition. The present case is different. It is not a revolution in Government. It is not the victory of party over party. It is a destruction and decomposition of the whole society; which can never be made of right by any faction, however powerful, nor

without terrible consequences to all about it, both in the act and in the example. This pretended republic is founded in crimes, and exists by wrong and robbery; and wrong and robbery, far from a title to anything, is war with mankind. To be at peace with robbery is to be an accomplice with it.'[6] But it is this 'armed doctrine,' spreading throughout the nations of Europe, and rising against all Governments, which we have been feasting, glorifying, incensing with receptions, addresses, snuff-boxes, civic liberties, proposals of yachts, landed estates, rifled muskets, and English money. Was his Grace the Duke of Sutherland aware, when, as I hear, he touched at Caprera in the Undine, that he was inviting the principles of '89 to England, and to Stafford House? It is not grateful to me, as an Englishman, to read that the Government of Turin has been compelled to seize both money and arms. Who knows what image and superscription may be upon the money, and what brands may be upon the rifles? Are these the relations of public amity in the commonwealth of nations? We have naturally an antipathy to hear the name of a foreign power breathed in our domestic questions. It is more unconstitutional than the introduction of the name of the Sovereign in the debates of Parliament. No wonder the people rose with indignation at the name of the Emperor of the French, and at the thought of foreign dictation. But the Turin Government is not likely to dictate to Great Britain. Yet it has read us a lesson, and a very sharp and humbling lesson too: the more

[6] Burke's *First Letter on a Regicide Peace*, pp. 24, 96, 118.

humbling and sharp, because we have deserved it. It was a position false and indecorous for our high and proud aristocracy, our chief statesmen, our first magistrates—to say no more—to be feasting and, I must say with shame, flattering a man who was stimulating the English people with the promise to carry the sword they gave him to Venice and to Rome. No wonder the police had to seize and to secrete banners with the words 'Rome or death!' upon them. Are these exalted and responsible personages prepared to accept the new world which they have been creating, and round which they have sung together, and in the praise of its maker shouted for joy? Are they prepared to lay their Georges and their Garters, together with their titles and their rent-rolls, on the altar of the country? The Emperor of the French, from whom we may learn, though we need not fear him, said well the other day that it was strange to see men just escaped from the storm invoking the tempest. It is, perhaps, because we have never yet encountered the storm that we are so foolhardy in invoking it, and so reckless in letting it loose upon our neighbours. It seems to me to be cruel and criminal to instigate, even by a word, the social dangers of continental nations, trusting in the security of our four seas. It is this insular selfishness which, as my own ears can bear witness, brings upon us the mistrust and just censure of foreign nations. I was witness, in 1848, of the career of Lord Minto in Italy and Rome; a large part of the last twelve years I have passed in that country, and I know the indignation, worthily aroused in my

judgment, against the irresponsible meddling, not of England, but of individuals who bear the English name. I say, not of England, because I believe the mass of Englishmen—not only the people, but the middle class, and even the highest—from their insular position, their traditional habits of thought, and their very slight knowledge of foreign countries and their condition, have entered very little and very indifferently into most questions of foreign policy. And in the hour in which they come to see that 'the party of action,' as it calls itself, is the re-appearance of the Mountain, and that 1789 is invoked as the type and tutelary power of 1864, they will fall back with indignation from the first shadow of a revolution with its Triumvirates and Conventions and Dictatorships.

The more reflecting among us began to see that we had entered upon a career of public danger. I do not pretend to know why General Garibaldi left England. Men whom I respect as intelligent and sincere persevere in affirming that it was on account of his health. Certainly he did not believe it himself; but his anxious friends say that he did not know the extent of his own maladies. Perhaps not: nor his Italian physician, and others so near to him that it would be unfeeling to alarm them with the whole truth. There are those who believe this. Be it so. There are men who believe nothing about it. Witness the working men at Primrose Hill, and Mr. Shaen, who spoke as an oracle, and promised revelations. These revelations will, I fear, be more widely believed than the explanations which they have elicited.

However, this is of little moment. One thing is certain. Not two years ago the peace of London was broken for weeks by heated language and riots in the public parks for the name of Garibaldi. Happily at this greater provocation all passed off in quiet. But London is not Manchester, and Manchester is not Liverpool, and Liverpool is not Glasgow. The follies of the last month may pass off quietly in London, where the minority to be goaded and insulted is as one in twenty; not so where they are one in four, or one in three. It is well known that desperate resolutions were already forming among those whom these foolish ovations would have driven to deplorable excesses. Without doubt the material force in England would in the end prevail: but it would be a victory dearer than a defeat. Mr. Scully asked in the House of Commons a question which nobody has answered—'What will Ireland think of these things?' I will venture to answer it. Ireland will be divided in opinion. Almost the whole people of Ireland will look upon the royal honours paid to the man who has once held Rome against the chief of their religion, and has sworn to drive him from Rome again, as the most refined and deadliest insult which could be directed against all that they cherish as holiest upon earth, and dearer than life itself. Of the rest, a large number will rejoice that the cause of independence and of the resurrection of oppressed nationalities should be preached and illuminated by the statesmen and peers and Ministers and Privy Councillors of England. They will accept it as a godsend. The sympathy of America and the patriotic effusions of the Fenians were old

stock; but who would have hoped for the enthusiastic nationalism of the English aristocracy and of the City of London? I believe, sir, we have been on the verge of lighting up the trains of political and of religious strife in every town and province of the United Kingdom. And this conflagration would be somewhat too costly for the sake of welcoming the guest even of his Grace the Duke of Sutherland. I do not pretend to say that this was among the reasons why General Garibaldi was so promptly and so splendidly conveyed out of England. But I will be bold to say that it ought to have been, not only one of them, but the first and chief, and, had there been no other, alone the sufficient reason. We have no need to invite General Garibaldi to England to sow discord among us; nor shall we, I hope, inscribe over his triumphal entry, as, I am told, some blasphemous hand did at Naples, I.N.R.I.—Joseph of Nice, the Redeemer of Italy. We disbelieve in this redemption. There has been bloodshed indeed, for we are told, and do not doubt it, that 13,000 persons have been shot by martial law in the kingdom of Naples; but of the redemption we find no sign. Government officials there, the other day, admitted to an English gentleman, from whom I heard it within a few days after the statement was made, that the political prisoners on the mainland in Naples amount to 80,000. I was credibly informed that in Sicily they amount to 20,000 more. These are the successes which General Garibaldi tells us 'without my faithful English soldiers,' without 'English men, money, and arms,' and 'without the aid of her Majesty's Ministers,' would have been impossible.

But, sir, I may not trespass longer upon your patience. Still, I must add a few words.

I am fully convinced that of the multitudes who were assembled 'the greater part knew not for what cause they were come together.' They heard it run from mouth to mouth that there was coming a hero, a conqueror, a man of courage, a man of many fights, a man of the people, a protector of the weak against the strong, of nations against despots. One, even the least, of these titles would have been enough to move an Englishman's heart to a generous sympathy, or at least to curiosity. Little knew they whom or what they were receiving. And the day will come when they will, without losing a shadow of their large-hearted and generous love of the public weal, draw back from the example 'of France in '89.' I observe, too, with joy—for I took pains to note and care to count the names—that not fifty of the near four hundred houses which represent the traditional nobility of England were presented at this new court. The newspapers, indeed, were loud in their panegyrics, almost without exception; but in the two Houses of Parliament there was a wonderful silence, as of men who are conscious of what they do not wish to put in words. The City of London presented its freedom, but the great merchant princes and the lords of the Exchange did not appear. A few commoners were in attendance, but the great commonalty of England, the lords of the soil, the sons of those who represent the untitled nobility and the heart and strength of England, were not there. It was a narrow circle after all, which, in its perpetual motion, returned always

into itself, bringing round the same gamut of names in every key and combination, strange social discords which have for once met face to face, never to meet again until General Garibaldi shall have transplanted the present confusions of Italy into the social order of England, before which, to borrow his farewell words to us, may England 'disappear under our ocean.'

There remains but one other topic, lighter, indeed, in its intrinsic gravity, but not light to those to whom the name of England and the grace and dignity of our countrymen and countrywomen are dear. I have before me many things I could write, but I will not. We have been in times past regarded by foreign nations as stately and severe in our bearing towards foreigners, especially to such as come among us with dubious antecedents and the vague reputation of adventurers. A *prisca virtus*, a kind of antique gravity, was supposed to encircle our homes and their inmates. We have not been liable to the excesses of the emotional natures which we are wont, with somewhat of supercilious compassion, to ascribe to other races. But there are those among us who are of opinion that we have of late outdone the most demonstrative, dramatic, and unguarded people among the nations of Europe.

In the midst of all these new developments of our traditional reserve, it is a consolation to turn our thoughts to the calm and perspicacious judgment of one who is the centre of all chivalrous loyalty,—the luminous example of the matronly dignity of England. What was for a while forgotten elsewhere was to be

found there still in its ascendent; tranquil, discerning, and full of forbearance, though justly incensed. But I forbear to write what crowds upon me. I wish to forget it: I wish it may be forgotten by others.

And, lastly, bear with me if I say that I trust the late events will have at least one good result. The people of England have come to the knowledge of many things. And while they desire the foreign policy of England to be large, generous, and sympathising with the weak, the suffering, and the oppressed, they will desire that it shall be open, loyal, and avowed; that it be no longer, if it has ever been, if not, that it never shall be, secret, intriguing, and seditious; that if it desire to promote the unity of any people, it shall not begin by encouraging the overthrow of thrones and governments, by demolition and disorder, which pulls down all things, and builds nothing stable or lasting in its place. England, Spain, and France, the three greatest national unities in the world, arose from their original divisions by a process slow, progressive, and mature, brought about by just laws, natural changes, and the glad acceptance of the people. I see in Italy no counterpart to those providential laws and processes in the empirical and sanguinary disorders of the last fifteen years. Moreover, I see that the whole movement has involved itself in a direct conflict with the providential order by which Christendom has been sustained for these thousand years. I do not believe in its success: I believe firmly in its failure. It may be that we shall have to suffer the same miseries as our fathers suffered in the first fifteen years of this century; that all Europe

will be tormented and afflicted again, until the order of the Christian world shall once more prevail.

It is to be hoped that no flatteries of our national pride will lead the people of England to accept the mission which Garibaldi holds before us; that England will not end the nineteenth century as France began it—by a career of offences against the rights of neighbourhood which, by the law of nations, bind the commonwealth of the civilised world together.

I have a better hope in the justice of England, in its calm sense, its tardy action, its traditional love of order, its instinctive hatred of anarchy.

But, sir, I have trespassed upon you too long, and I am entering too far into a subject which it is not my calling to treat of. I believe that the visit of General Garibaldi has opened the eyes of many to the mischievous action of her Majesty's Government in Italy; and that a calm and firm return to higher and nobler principles of international law will be the result. In this I should rejoice, not more for the welfare of Italy than for the honour of the people and of the crown of England.

Thus much I felt bound to say: not from a desire to wound, or from an intention to kindle strife, but from a sorrow at the acts of many whom I have respected, many whom I love as friends, and for the sake of my country, which I love better than any friends. For I fear that the acts of a few have for a moment tarnished the splendour of its name. I am thankful that they are few; and I trust that when others shall speak out who have of late been silent,

all England and all the world will know that the great English monarchy is not the aider, nor the abettor, nor the accomplice, either before or after the fact — still less the dupe or the tool—of Mazzini or Garibaldi.

I have the honour to be, sir,

Your obedient servant,

HENRY EDWARD MANNING

London, May 10, 1864.

VI.

CARDINAL WISEMAN.

CARDINAL WISEMAN.

(*Dublin Review*, April 1865.)

A TWOFOLD debt of filial piety forbids our opening this number with any other topic than that which will long be uppermost in the minds of the Catholics of England. The greatest event since the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy has in these last days fallen upon us. Nicholas Wiseman, the first Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, has passed to his eternal rest. His departure closes a period which will ever be associated with his name.

We say a debt of filial piety, because he was the chief pastor and spiritual father of the whole flock in England; and we say a twofold debt, because, in addition to the relation all alike owed to him as Catholics, we, who have endeavoured to sustain the *Dublin Review*, of which he was a joint founder, and from its outset conspicuously the ablest and most illustrious supporter, owe to his memory a kind of domestic piety, a special reverence and affection. It is a joy to us to remember that our last number closed, as if by a presentiment, with a slight outline of his mission in England. In the present we shall refer only to his relation to the *Dublin Review*, and to the circum-

stances which have made his death and burial a worthy and proportionate end to such a mission.

And first of the *Dublin Review*. The purposes for which it was founded have been so beautifully and so modestly set forth by the Cardinal's own hand, that we cannot refrain from quoting at length:

'It was in 1836 that the idea of commencing a Catholic quarterly was first conceived by the late learned and excellent Mr. Quin, who applied to the illustrious O'Connell and myself to join in the undertaking. I was in England only for a short time, and saw the difficulty of connecting myself with an enterprise so far removed from my permanent residence in Rome. Still I saw the importance of such an organ of Catholic principles and sentiment and gladly consented to become a member of this little association. The first number appeared in May 1836, before I left this country. The two gentlemen with whom I was associated were laymen: the one living in the very whirlpool of existing politics; the other a man of letters, with a prospect, I believe, of receiving an important foreign employment from Government; both were sincerely attached to their faith and Church. I considered myself as associated to represent the theological and religious elements in the journal, and to secure to its pages soundness of doctrine. It was understood to be a condition of this association that no extreme political views should be introduced into the Review; and this condition has, in most trying times, been faithfully observed.

A few years of separation virtually, and afterwards death most really, sundered this bond; and I find myself the only survivor of those who began an undertaking that has grown to some magnitude—looking back through thirty-three volumes, or sixty-seven numbers, of a periodical work, undertaken for a great purpose, and having to account for my share of responsibility in it, and answer whether I have remained faithful to its first principles and steady to its object.

While obeying the suggestions of others, by preparing the present publication, I have had ample opportunity of examining this question; and I trust I may be indulged if I make such observations upon it as may throw light upon the papers here reprinted.

The moment when I was invited to join in this new Review

appeared to me most critical and interesting. Three years before had begun to manifest themselves the germs of that wonderful movement which, originating at Oxford, was destined to pervade and agitate the Anglican Establishment, till it should give up many of its most loving and gifted sons to the Catholic Church; peculiar circumstances, allusion to which will be found in a note in vol. ii. pp. 93 and 102, had made me at Rome previously acquainted with the rise and progress of this great religious revolution; and I had been surprised, on visiting England in 1835, to find how little attention it had yet excited among Catholics, though many *Tracts for the Times* had already appeared, and Dr. Whately had sung out to their writers, "*Tendimus in Latium.*" It was, indeed, impossible for any one to foresee what might be the final results of so new and strange a commotion in the hitherto stagnant element of the State religion. Even now, after twenty years, and notwithstanding the many great consequences which have already issued from it, its activity is not exhausted. The impulse given by the first Tract still urges on the body which it struck; and it will roll forward for a long time to come, while fragments detach themselves, and run before it, towards the goal which we pray it may all attain. But even in that first bud of the rising power it was impossible for a calm and hopeful eye not to see new signs in the religious firmament, which it became a duty to observe, unless one wished to incur the Divine reproach, addressed to those who note not the providential warnings and friendly omens of the spiritual heavens. For Catholics to have overlooked all this, and allowed the wonderful phenomenon to pass by, not turned to any useful purpose, but gazed at, till it died out, would have been more than stupidity, it would have been wickedness. To watch its progress, to observe its phases, to influence, if possible, its direction, to move it gently towards complete attainment of its unconscious aims; and, moreover, to protest against its errors, to warn against its dangers, to provide arguments against its new mode of attack, and to keep lifted up the mask of beauty under which it had, in sincerity, covered the ghastly and soulless features of Protestantism,—these were the duties which the new Review undertook to perform, or which, in no small degree, it was expressly created to discharge. And the necessity of attending to these new duties formed the strongest inducement to myself to undertake its theological direction.

At the same time, Catholics had begun to recover from that first torpor which benumbs, for a time, the limbs just freed from

fetters. Signs of a more active circulation had shown themselves: communities were springing up; schools were beginning to be multiplied; new missions were opened; churches, upon a scale of size and of embellishment previously unknown, were contemplated or begun; and the people were evidently manifesting more interest in our religion, and a more fair disposition to hear and judge it justly. It seemed the favourable moment to strike another chord, and stir up a spirit yet slumbering, but ready to awake.

The Catholic religion as she is in the fulness of her growth, with the grandeur of her ritual, the beauty of her devotions, the variety of her institutions, required to be made more known to many who had never seen her other than she had been reduced by three hundred years of barbarous persecution.

It was therefore with a strong desire, and a sincere determination, to make the *Dublin Review* the organ and the promoter of Catholic progress, within and without; it was with a conscientious resolution that its theology should belong to the present day—that is, should treat of living questions and existing controversies—should grapple with real antagonists, wrestle with tangible errors, that I agreed to turn from studies long pursued and ardently cherished to the anxious care and desultory occupation involved in the direction of such a publication. Works not only long contemplated, but for which materials had been gathered with diligence, were given up at this period, in consequence of time and attention being more required for passing events and current literature.

I cannot, indeed, without ingratitude, reject the consolations received from effects attributed to them; for I fear that my readers will wonder sometimes at finding wants mentioned now so well supplied, and feelings suggested long become so familiar, that the very memory of our deficiencies has faded away. More than half a generation has passed by since those passages were written which now describe an unknown state of things. And if their words had some influence in producing the change, their power lay in this alone—that they were sincere, cordial, and affectionate descriptions of realities often witnessed by the writer, deeply admired and tenderly loved; they were words of truth and of charity, which ever bear with them their own evidences and convictions, straight to the minds of all.

That the many imperfections of so miscellaneous a collection may be elaborately investigated and severely handled, I am fully prepared to expect. I have long ceased to anticipate fair dealing

from those who look upon me as an enemy, and think it their duty to treat me as such. Custom, however, inures us to this; and I trust I shall have patience to bear it to the end. And nothing helps one more to this than a consciousness that no bitterness of thought, or personal rancour, or desire to wound, has guided one's own pen or intentions. Should any words of mine suggest a different impression, I shall sincerely regret it.

With these words of peace, I take leave of my courteous reader; wishing him from above all grace and blessing, as I bid him to implore for me all mercy and forgiveness.

Easter MDCCCLIII.'

But it is not our purpose now to say more of this special bond which binds us to his memory. We do so only out of veneration and gratitude, and of a deep sense of the service rendered in these last thirty years to the Catholic Church in England by the *Dublin Review*, and therefore by him who was by far its chief ornament and strength. In the last two years since it passed into other hands the declining health of our lamented Cardinal compelled him to postpone again and again the kind and encouraging promises he made to us of contributions from his pen. No line written by him has therefore appeared in it; and though most kindly watched and approved by him, this Review has had no other relation to or dependence on our most eminent pastor. And here we leave this subject, adding only one word. If at the end of our labours the second series of the *Dublin Review* should yield from all the hands which may contribute to it three volumes of essays worthy to stand afar off by those of Cardinal Wiseman for beauty, variety, learning, freshness, originality, and, above all, for pure solid Catholic doctrine and high filial devotion to Rome, we shall hope that

we have not failed in the trust which he has bequeathed to us.

We have said that the withdrawal from us not only of the foremost man of the Catholic Hierarchy in England, but one of the chief lights of the Sacred College, and therefore of the Church throughout the world, is an event which closes a period. It does so. The man chosen for the restoration of the Hierarchy, and its first organic development, is gone.

The Hierarchy now passes under the ordinary condition of the Church in all other lands. The pastors who rule over it will be surely and wisely chosen for its guidance; but the period of its restoration, with all its throes and trials, is past.

This eventful period of fifteen years both opened and closed with a popular movement, exceptional in its character and extent. It opened with a tempest; it closed with a great mourning. It is strange that the same man should have been the object and the centre of both. Fifteen years of open manly bearing, fifteen years of unspotted life and of high Christian virtues, have sufficed to win the confidence, admiration, and sympathy of the English people. Conspicuous as he was in the dignity of his name, he was almost unseen by his personal retirement and quietness of life. Except in the ecclesiastical acts which compelled him to speak or appear as Archbishop and Metropolitan, no man ever lived more unobtrusively, or less exposed himself to public gaze. When invited to any act which would instruct or give pleasure to the English people, no man was ever more prompt and kindly.

And yet this is the man who, from 1850 to 1860, was described habitually by many who never saw him, or never heard so much as a word from his lips, in terms and titles which, if we could, we would not reproduce. We shall freely use our privilege to say that if the leading articles of the chief newspapers which in those ten years described his Eminence the late Cardinal—his opinions, his pastorals, his pretensions, his aims, and we know not what—were reprinted in parallel columns with the leading articles of those same papers during the last six weeks, we should have before us a strange memorial of human infirmity, but no strange example of English honesty and truth.

It would be no unkindly admonition to anonymous writers if we were to reprint them, and many would be wiser men for it. We remember a case in point. During the excitement of the Papal aggression, all the bishops of the Establishment in succession denounced the Catholic Hierarchy. A quiet person with scissors cut out and pasted together the chief flowers and formulas of episcopal vituperation. They were then distributed into categories, and graduated according to their intensity. They were something like the gamut—a slender provision of few notes, but capable of almost endless combination. 'Unwarranted, aggressive, usurping;' 'insolent, intolerable, anti-Christian;' 'anti-Christian, usurping, and insolent;' 'insolent, intolerable, and aggressive.' It began like a symphony of Beethoven, with a single deep note; then two, then one again, then a chord, then a complication and a volume of sound. When once printed in order, and set before educated

men, no comment was needed. The experiment has not been tried again. So we believe it was with the late illustrious Cardinal. He was a Roman Catholic; he was a Cardinal; he came from the Pope of Rome; he was born in Spain; he was Irish by race; he was an Archbishop in England without our leave, and head of an Episcopate not known to the Crown. He must be designing, crafty, overbearing, superstitious, un-English, covetous, grasping, ambitious, ignorant of England, an alien—the paid envoy of a foreign sovereign. It needed no proof, no evidence, no sign: all was certain as day. So for ten years men wrote of him in public, spoke of him in private, and, worst of all, believed of him, without caring or wishing to know better. What has wrought the change? From time to time he was seen and heard. Here and there, first one, then another, came across him. Kindly sympathising words were caught up from his lips; charitable and secret actions got abroad. It was felt, and therefore found, that the man had a heart, and could feel for others as well as be wounded—could show kindness as well as suffer unkindness.

Then came a period which conciliated for him much generous feeling—the last five years of almost continual suffering. It was well known that a mortal malady had struck him; and much sympathy from all parts of England, and from the least likely persons, was manifested towards him. Men of all religious opinions—clergymen of the Church of England, Dissenting ministers—wrote to him or to his friends, enclosing prescriptions, and expressing their kindly regard. A great ap-

preciation was shown for the life which ten years before was threatened by public danger. It was during these five years of declining strength, and while those about him advised that he should unbend his mind in all possible ways, that he gave the lectures on art, on industry, on self-cultivation, on architecture, and the like, which have made his name and the memory of his presence dear to a multitude in London, and in many of our larger towns, where a few years ago he was carried about in effigy. Highly honourable all this to the great heart and mind of Cardinal Wiseman, and honourable also to the English people. Englishmen may misunderstand each other for a time—perhaps for a long time; but we hardly know an example in which the most violent antipathies and animosities have not been at last lived down. Sometimes men who have been railed upon and assaulted on every side for years have won to themselves an equal respect and benevolence in their latter days. The only exception we know to this is where the popular odium is just, and the man worthy of it. And yet even in this extreme case there is about the people of England a natural compassion, and a readiness to condone or to be blind to faults which sometimes absolves even the unworthy. But in the case of great men and good men, who suffer for fidelity to their principles, without, perhaps, yielding a shade of opposition to their principles, Englishmen, at least, are just and kindly. They give and take; and as they claim to think for themselves in religion, so they granted willingly to our great and large-hearted Cardinal the unmolested profession of his Tridentine and Ultramon-

tane principles. We say this was honourable on both sides, because we do not venture to argue from the change of feeling towards the late lamented Cardinal that English public opinion has approximated to his tenets; and all the world is witness how, as one of the public notices of him truly said, 'he had never changed the colour of one feather in his Ultramontanism.' First, then, we would remark upon the almost unanimous expression of admiration, respect, and sympathy, and we must say of English national pride, which has shown itself in the last two months around the closing days of this great man.

We pass over the exceptions, and very few they are, from this veneration to his greatness, on which such nameless aspersions cannot cast so much as a momentary shade. We should dishonour him by defending him.

Still less shall we notice expressions here and there, well intended so far as good-will, but neither true nor just. We forget the mistakes for the sake of the intention.

But of the great majority of the notices which have appeared in the public papers we can but have one feeling. They were honourable both to the subject and to the writers; and they give proof that the people of England can respect and even love sincerity, reality, and consistency in those who are most opposed to their opinions.

We read in this fact certain great counsels very wholesome to us all, most of all to those who, being still young, have the happiness of a long life before them, in which to serve God and His Church in England.

The life and death of Cardinal Wiseman may teach us that compromise is not the way to win the English people. Englishmen do not understand compromise. They do not understand a man being in earnest except for what he believes to be true. And they still less understand his playing fast and loose with what he affirms that he believes. They perfectly understand his fighting for it. To give and take hard knocks for it is logic to them. There is philosophy and theology in honest manly fight. It is to most of us, if not a proof that our adversary is right, at least a pledge that he is sincere.

Again, the respect and affection which have surrounded the last days of the Cardinal are a proof that the highest and strongest principles in faith may be combined with the most kindly and benevolent bearing. We believe we may say that among the English Protestants he has not left an enemy. We can confidently say from our own personal knowledge of facts that he has left a multitude of friends and friendly hearts.

His great career, beginning in storm and ending in so much calm, teaches us all this sure and salutary lesson, that unpopular truth always in the end prevails over popular illusions; and they who have the courage to stand for it, and are not afraid when they enter into the cloud, shall assuredly come forth from it before the end, as the sun which is over their heads.

But even these spontaneous expressions of respect and benevolence did not prepare us for the events which passed from the 15th to the 23d of February last.

As soon as it was known that all that remained to

us of our great Cardinal Archbishop lay arrayed in his pontifical vestments in the humble and modest dwelling where his latter years were passed, immediately a multitude of people began to assemble. For days the crowd was so great that many, after long waiting, went away without so much as entering the door of the house. Not only Catholics, who were drawn by faith and by charity once more into the presence of the form which they knew so well, but many of those who are unhappily 'not of this fold,' asked admittance with the greatest desire and respect. We doubt whether there has been any 'lying in state' which has awakened such heartfelt sorrow, or drawn together a greater concourse through so many days.

But this public mourning was only in its beginning. On the evening before the day of the burial the solemn dirge was to be sung in the pro-cathedral of S. Mary's, Moorfields. The coffin was then removed to that place. It is said that thirty thousand persons on that day went through the church by the bier, passing out by the door of the house attached to the cathedral. The multitudes were so great that it was impossible to allow them to kneel or to linger. Persons were placed by the bier to touch the coffin with their rosaries and the like, and to press them onwards. But even this did not prepare for the next day. We have no powers of description; and the subject has been already exhausted. The outline, and even the minutest detail, of that great day of public mourning has been recorded by the Protestant papers of England. The Mass of solemn requiem, none who saw and heard it will ever forget. It was in

solemnity, grandeur, and pathos all that the burial of a great pastor and prince of the Church of God ought to be.

Then began the strangest sight which England has seen for three hundred years—a funeral procession which seemed endless in length; the whole Catholic Hierarchy of England, with some hundreds of the priesthood, conducting the remains of their Archbishop and Metropolitan to the grave. Along the whole line of road from the cathedral, for four or five miles, a crowd of people of every class and condition stood closely together on either side of the street. The greatest order, silence, and respect prevailed. As the funeral car passed all heads were bared. The multitude at the cemetery was still more dense. Without doubt the desire to see a great and strange pageant brought many there that day. Among the crowds there must have been many who had no special feeling of sympathy and condolence with the mourning of that funeral. Nevertheless, after all this has been said, there remains a fact which nothing can diminish, which no one has affected to explain away, which even the hostile witnesses have recorded, that such a funeral has never been seen except in royal burials, nor in our days since the funeral of the Duke of Wellington. We do not know that any form of speech could be found to go beyond this, or to fix more vividly the facts of that day. We should not have ventured to use them. Had we done so, we should have been held up to ridicule for the exaggeration and grandiloquence of a handful aping the proportions and talking the language of a people.

But the fact was so. Date the days when any personage in England was borne forth to burial with such manifestation of—call it what you will—mourning, sympathy, respect, or bare recognition. In our lifetime an Anglican Bishop of London, who had been publicly known to the population of that city during a longer incumbency than the eighteen years' episcopate of Cardinal Wiseman, was carried to his grave. He was a learned, cultivated, eloquent, benevolent, exceedingly laborious, large-minded, and warm-hearted man. He was surrounded by all the traditions and circumstances with which the Church and State of England could invest him. He deserved at their hands a great and noble manifestation of affection and respect; he had served them so as we remember no other to have done. He wore himself out in their service. His last years were especially touching. Broken with faithful toil for the Anglican Church in London, he withdrew to await his end in feebleness and out of sight. We are glad in passing to bear this testimony to one whose personal memory is, and ever will be, dear to many who were parted from him. And yet when he passed to his grave the stir and business of London held on its way. He deserved another response, but it was not in the millions of London to give it. Again, two Archbishops of Canterbury have been borne to their burial. Did London rise up to meet them? Were the roads lined for miles? Were there thousands and tens of thousands for days before Lambeth Palace?

There have been many men of great popularity, rank, and name buried in Westminster Abbey in these last

twenty years. What one man has awakened—kindled, we may say—such a wide-spread sense of his death, and of his burial, as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster?

We may now appreciate the exquisite delicacy and felicity of the following words from the leading article of the *Morning Post*, February 24:

'Against Roman Cardinals, Westminster and Canterbury and Lambeth are apparently closed for ever; and amid all the pomp which has characterised the present obsequies, nothing can have thrown a greater chill upon the ceremonial than the remembrance that those great shrines which were once in Catholic hands are uniformly closed, in death as in life, to the priestly emissaries of the Church of Rome. The pageant of yesterday, with all its imposing ceremonial, was the pageant of an ostracised religion.'

Why, S. Paul's and Canterbury and Westminster Abbey all together have not been able to produce, except for one great soldier, such a public mourning, which extended over ten days. The Holy Mass was, indeed, offered in an obscure Catholic cathedral, but hundreds of thousands followed all the way to a green burial-ground, hardly known by name to the upper classes of London. We say the admonition is delicate, because, translated, it means, 'Remember, we have even the graves of your fathers. You shall not even rest by them after death.' There is something intimately bland, generous, and human in this.

And it is as signally felicitous in the mouth of those who, with all the glories of the Catholic Church in their hands, cannot surround their great, or noble, or splendid dead with a tithe of the reverence which carried the pall of the first Archbishop of Westminster.

Men may build sepulchres in Westminster Abbey, but they cannot touch the heart of a populace. It needs a higher power to do this. The same paper already quoted has unconsciously, and by an amusing inversion of its intention, exactly touched the point. It said: 'The present effort was certainly a great one for an unrecognised Church.'

For an 'unrecognised Church'? Why, surely the Anglican Church is recognised in England, and yet it has never produced such a demonstration. But, perhaps, the Catholic Church is a recognised body after all, and for that reason did and can always produce a demonstration proportionate to the facts and circumstances of the event. The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster was a person recognised throughout Christendom, even where the name of no Archbishop of Canterbury has been recognised for three centuries. The Catholic nations of the world knew him by name and by form, and recognised him as the chief pastor of the scattered flock in England. They recognised too the province over which he presided as the Catholic Church in these realms, with which they have conscious unity of heart, mind, will, fortunes, sorrows, and joys. It was this world-wide recognition of the Catholic Church in England which told upon London and upon England, whether they would or no. A Catholic Archbishop and a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church may be legislated against, legally exiled, ignored, extinguished. *Mergas profundo, pulchrior evenit.* The world knows him, and knows nobody else in his place. His titles are ineffaceable, because his character is indelible. All

the legal recognition upon earth could not create another Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. There are two other kinds of recognition, wider and truer than the recognition of legislatures, springing from a higher and from a deeper fountain—the one is of the Church throughout the world; the other is the public consciousness of a people even in its hostility; and these two unite in the recognition of the Catholic Church and Hierarchy in England. Nevertheless, the critic was partly in the right. That day of public mourning was a wonderful event, springing from no adequate material cause. It was not got up by vote of Parliament, nor by an act of prerogative, nor by the organisation of public agencies and public funds. It was the simple act of the metropolitan chapter and clergy of Westminster, out of their poverty, giving burial to their Archbishop. Even the dignity of Cardinal added hardly an appreciable element in the provision and order of that day. They carried him out to burial with all simplicity. The funeral array was majestic for its vastness and continuity, not for any display of unusual costliness. The car was not like the stupendous funeral throne which now lies buried under the dome of S. Paul's. It was simple, open, slender, bare; and was criticised by the *Times* for its meanness. We are so much the better pleased. The majesty of that burial train was altogether such as became a pastor, and a great pastor, of the Church. And as it went along it carried the hearts of a hierarchy, a priesthood, and a flock along with it. And a multitude of the English people, to whom the Catholic Church in England is as

much a recognised fact as the Anglican Establishment —we refrain now willingly from saying much more which crowds upon us—stood by, or followed in kindly and reverent sympathy. There were doubtless there many who are far from us in their religious convictions, yet they have learned to recognise and to respect manliness, zeal, hard work for souls and for the poor, industry in duty, fidelity to conscience. They too could look on with kindliness. Many were there who, though not even near to the Catholic Church, have been long healed of the blindness which once made them hate or fear it. Many too whose hearts feel kindly to it as the Church of the poor; and in London eminently the Church which makes itself seen, known, felt, and trusted by multitudes of the most destitute and suffering of our people. All these, and many other classes of minds which we cannot stay to enumerate, were to be found in the great concourse which streamed along those miles of streets.

But there was, as we believe, still another sense awakened. One who passed through the crowd as a mourner said truly, 'I was convinced that, whether they knew it or not, multitudes felt that day, as they looked upon the funeral procession, "This was the old religion of England: this was once the religion of our fathers."' They who had read the history of their country could recall memories of Pole, Wolsey, and Langton. They who were simplest saw before them the living presence of the great Catholic Church which once filled the land. The English poor have it as a proverb, 'The Catholic religion was

the first religion, and it will be the last.' Its reappearance on that day in such wide-spread sympathy of men of every class preached to them on that homely prophecy. What Nicholas Wiseman had prayed, laboured, and suffered to do, he did that day more powerfully and more persuasively than ever before. He had spent his life to make the people of England know and love once more the Church of their fathers. That day was the noblest and worthiest close to such a life.

And thus we leave him, with the tribute of our grateful and loving veneration, as the dusk of evening made more purely bright the tapers around his grave: greater in its humility than all the glories of Westminster as it now is, where S. Edward, whom he loved so well, still holds his own for God and for the future. So we leave him while the *Miserere* is ascending to heaven, like the voice of many waters, sweet, plaintive, but strong, as the hope of the Church in England, as the truths he has taught us, and as his prayers, which ascend for us before the eternal Throne.

VII.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

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Session 1866-7.

This is the first time it has fallen to me to address the Academia since its lamented founder was taken from us. Last year it would have been my duty to open its proceedings, but I was out of England at the time of its first meeting.

I well remember the moment when, in his great illness in Rome, the Cardinal gave me commission to begin this work; and with what interest he watched over it, even when declining strength hindered his taking part in its acts. The importance of the Academia as a centre round which we may unite, and as a help to the formation and spread of sound Catholic opinion, becomes every year more evident; and I trust that we shall all do our utmost to sustain it and to promote its efficiency.

In opening the sixth year, it might seem needless to speak of the end for which the Academia was instituted, and of the subjects which are proper to it. I have indeed already once before endeavoured so to do. Nevertheless it appears to me that an opening address ought to be directed rather to the Academia itself than any particular topic. Its aim is not so much to treat

any subject as to excite others to write, and to suggest such matters as the circumstances of our times seem to require. Such I take to be my present office:

> 'Ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum
> Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi.'

I hope that other members of the Academia, who have more resources and more leisure, will, for our future meetings, make a special study of such particular topics as bear upon our present religious and intellectual tendencies.

The end of the Academia is the maintenance and defence of the Catholic religion, both positively in itself, and in its relation to all other truth; and polemically, as against all forms of erroneous doctrines, principles, and thought. It is within its scope, therefore, to keep a note of the state of floating opinion, and of the contemporaneous intellectual movements both within and without the Church. I would suggest to the members to take some of the following topics for our future sessions:

1. The present state and tendencies of religious thought among the Protestant Dissenters of England and Scotland.
2. The progress of Rationalism among English Protestants, noting their published writings.
3. The points of opposition between the philosophy of Hamilton, Mill, and Mansell, and the philosophy of the Church.
4. A Catholic criticism of Buckle's book on civilisation, of Froude's history of Henry VIII., and of Macaulay's account of James II., in its bearing upon the Catholic Church and the acts of the Holy See.
5. An examination of the principles of 1789, and especially of the pretended sovereignty of the people.
6. The political aspect of the Temporal Power of the Pope;

its foundations in political right, and the public order of nations.

7. The office of the Temporal Power as the providential condition, not of the spiritual power, as some foolishly impute to us, but of the freedom of the spiritual office of the Pontiffs.
8. An exposure of the pretended donations of the Temporal Power by Constantine, Pepin, Charlemagne.
9. A treatment of the proposition that, 'Given the Christian world, the Temporal Power of the Pontiffs is the legitimate expression of the supremacy of the Christian law in both the spiritual and temporal order.'
10. The freedom of the Church in its Head as the condition of its purity in doctrine and discipline, illustrated by the heresies and schisms of the Greeks and the Protestants.
11. The propositions of the Syllabus.
12. The Baconian Philosophy in its relation to Catholic dogma.
13. Examination and refutation of the modern objections to the historical narratives of Holy Scripture.
14. The rise, formation, and characteristics of the Canon law, and its relation to the interior life of the Church.
15. The ancient Canon law of England, and its relation to the common and statute law of the realm in Catholic ages.
16. The rise, growth, and final outbreak of the rebellion against the authority of the Holy See from the Conquest to the Reformation.
17. The perpetual expansion of the Church proved by the history of the Catholic missions.

For the present, all I can do is to touch generally upon one point in the crisis of religious thought through which the Anglican religion is now passing, and on our duties towards it.

The three hundred years since the separation of England from the Catholic unity present two very remarkable tendencies in religious thought. Let us take as a starting-point the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, for until then the Anglican Reformation had

not obtained its last form. From that time till the early part of the last century, the positive doctrines of Christianity which survived in the Anglican religion were steadily declining. Notwithstanding the hierarchical development from the time of Bilson to the time of Laud, the recognition of episcopacy as of Divine institution was gradually but surely departing from the English people. The Revolution of 1688 greatly weakened its hold. It lived on for a while in the narrow body of the Nonjurors, and with them the higher and more spiritual perceptions of the Episcopal order passed away. A curious proof may be seen in a leading article of the *Times* newspaper, which describes the Archbishop of Canterbury in Scotland as a Dissenter. The same decline is to be traced in the doctrine of sacramental grace, and of the operations of the Holy Spirit. The lowest time in the religious thought of England may be put at about the middle of the last century. The perfect outline of Faith had been broken at the time of the separation ; but many doctrines, more or less truly understood and professed, still survived, not only in the books but in the minds of men, through the end of the sixteenth and the whole of the seventeenth century. But after that time the warmth had departed from the body. There was a continual downward tendency until the pietistic revival which arose both in Germany and in England in the last hundred years ; then came a reaction.

From the middle of the last century the truths which had been lost began one by one to return. Religious belief began to reascend. It was like the first rising

of the sap after the winter; and the new life has continued to expand to this day. This resurrection of religious thought, and the return of Catholicism to England in our day, had its beginning in causes far beyond our time and country. It is the effect of no individual mind and of no isolated event, but of a current which, like the Gulf Stream, has forced its way through the colder waters. The free-thinkers of George I. and George II.'s time called forth a host of defences of Christianity; these were followed by defences of the inspiration and truth of Holy Scripture; these again by proofs of the doctrines of redemption and of grace; next, from 1790 to 1820, came the doctrines of justification and of regeneration; afterwards, from 1820 to 1830, the doctrine of baptism; next, from 1830 to this day, the apostolical succession; then of episcopacy, of tradition, of the Real Presence, of absolution; then of unity and authority in the Church; then of seven sacraments, of purgatory, of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, of the religious life; then of vestments and of ritual. I might go still further into detail, but this is enough. Bishop Warburton, in writing the *Divine Legation of Moses*, little thought that in a century men would be reading the *Eirenicon;* nor, when, as Dean of Durham, he threw off the copes which are there still shown in glass cases, that at this time a Church Congress at York would be exhibiting chasubles upon lay figures for the use of the Anglican clergy. I do not indeed believe that this current is a flood, but only a stream; it is not the sweep of the ocean, but only of a path in the waters. The popula-

tion of England is steadily setting away from these things, but there is a broad movement of men's minds towards a more perfect faith and worship. It seems contradictory to say that, with this return towards the truth, the hold of faith over the people has grown continually less; but it is most certainly true. The masses are moving away, but individuals in great numbers are returning upwards to the light of faith.

No one can have watched this, year by year, without a strong sympathy with those who are disengaging themselves from error, and trying to lift the Anglican system towards the truth. Their zeal and self-denial can be ascribed to no human power. Nothing but the Spirit of God can produce such a steadfast and uniform return towards the light. And though it is not possible to sympathise in many of their imitations of Catholic doctrine and worship, still less in their language and attitude towards the Catholic Church, we cannot but recognise in these strange and unprecedented phenomena the working of the Spirit of Truth, drawing men, step by step, out of the illusions and falsehoods of the Anglican separation into the unity of the only Church.

I can well remember how, at the time of Catholic Emancipation, it was thought impossible that the Catholic Faith should ever regain its hold in England. Men used then, as I well recollect, to say, the superstition of Romanism cannot revive in the light of the nineteenth century. This was the sincere belief of the majority of Protestants. They were so sure of their own position, the Catholic controversy had been for centuries so powerless, the number of Catholics had

been so thinned by penal laws, that the Emancipation was conceded to Ireland for fear of civil war, to England for pity upon a helpless and pitiable handful, whom nobody cared to persecute because nobody thought of fearing. In those days it was believed that Romanism had nothing more to say for itself; that the great Anglican controversialists, whose works are to be found embalmed and forgotten in Gibson's *Tracts*, had swept it away by overwhelming proofs of antiquity, Scripture, and reason. It was believed to be superstitious in its premises, and inconsequent in its logic. Protestants were as confident against Catholics as Christians are against Mahometans. The Anglican Church described itself always as 'pure and apostolical,' and the Thirty-nine Articles were a mild form of the daily language used by preachers against the Church of Rome.

It was of no use then for a Catholic to write in defence of his faith. Nobody paid any attention; nobody would buy his book; nobody would read it, or, if read it, believe it. The clearness of it was only speciousness; the difficulty of answering it was only proof positive of deceit. The whole world in England had settled that Protestantism was right, Catholicism wrong; and every house and all ears were closed against it.

Another remarkable feature of those times—not more than thirty years ago—was that the Catholic Church was hardly anywhere to be seen. It existed in a few old families, and was represented by their chaplains. The mountain that filled the whole earth

was here under a cloud. No man saw it, as now, rising above his head.

We can hardly conceive a more complete annihilation than the state to which three hundred years of penal laws had reduced the Church in England. It was neither visible nor audible. It had no literature, no influence on public opinion, no hold upon the legislature, no recognition in the country. It was tolerated because it was powerless, and permitted to go at large only because it was despised.

A more wonderful and visibly supernatural change than that which these thirty years have produced can hardly be found in history.

The Church in France was destroyed seventy years ago, and has risen again with an increase of vigorous life; but then the French people were a Catholic people; the traditions of the Catholic faith pervaded the whole population; and the Government by its public action restored the Church and its worship; and that too within a period so near to the original overthrow that the life had never been extinct. It was rather the passing of a delirium than a resurrection from death.

Not so in England. The Church had disappeared for three hundred years. The whole weight of the Tudor supremacy had crushed it, and still lay upon it. Some nine generations of Protestantism, with strange vicissitudes of terrible penal laws, had, as it is the fashion now to say, stamped it out.

Now, in estimating the present position of the Catholic religion among us, I make no parallel between the

universality and visibleness of the Church in France and of the Church in England. In France it overspreads and contains, or claims at least, almost the whole population. In England it counts but one million upon twenty, and that million for the most part not of English blood.

The Hierarchy and the Priesthood are withdrawn from the public, and even the private, life of England; the churches are few and scattered, and with the exception of a small number, are obscure and out of sight. Certainly nothing can be less imposing or less sensible than the Catholic Church in England. Its 'bodily presence is weak,' but its speech is not 'contemptible.' It has engaged the ear, if it does not fill the eye of English society. It has an influence upon public opinion, and upon private life, which cannot be shaken off. It is like a small garrison which will hold a city, or a column of occupation which retains its grasp upon a territory, not by a material presence everywhere, but by a moral force which reaches far beyond its cantonments.

Thirty years ago any one who introduced religion into conversation caused a silence. He was a methodist, or a madman, or both. Nowadays there is hardly a private house in which it is not uppermost, or any occasion on which it is not introduced. I will not say that art, literature, and poetry are become religious; but I may say that religious art, religious literature, and religious poetry, still more that all these in their highest Catholic forms, are to be found throughout England. In families where a Catholic priest has never

entered, Catholic books find their way; in others where Catholic books have never entered, Catholic engravings precede the faith. Even the newspapers have taken the infection. Eldad and Medad prophesy in the camp; Saul also is among the prophets. They describe all our doings; and thousands who would not for the world set foot in a Romish church read photographic descriptions of High Masses and Requiems, and consecrations, and openings of churches, processions at Boulogne, pilgrimages in the Pyrenees, canonisations in S. Peter's. The air is full of it. Call it a plague of frogs, of flies, or of boils. It is upon man and beast. Throw ashes into the air, they come down Popery.

I do not think I am exaggerating. Certainly I am not describing this as the achievement or the work of any individuals, nor even of the Bishops and priests of the Catholic Church in England. Such a change in the intellectual and religious habits of society, and that too in spite of such inveterate prejudices of the intellect and persistence of the will, can be ascribed to nothing less than to an influence of the Holy Spirit of truth and peace, which is, after so long a time, cleansing again the eyes that were filmed, and opening the ears that were shut up. The intellectual and spiritual sight of men is once more fixing itself clearly and calmly upon the illumination of faith. The disproportionate influence exercised by the Catholic Church in England upon society, when compared with the narrow material presence of the Church and its signal disadvantages of poverty and obscurity, can be in no

way accounted for but by the working of a Divine agency casting up the way by which the truth shall hereafter advance. It is like the warmth of spring coming before the summer — the harbinger of its approach.

And this sensible change which has passed over the surface of our country is only the early indication of a far deeper change which has passed upon a smaller number of minds, but with a greater depth. I have already said that the tendency to unbelief is wide and extending. Nevertheless the reaction towards faith is also steady and constant. There was never a moment when, notwithstanding all contrary symptoms, the Dissenters were more inclined towards the Establishment, and never a moment when the Establishment was more inclined towards the Church. I speak of it as an inclination; for I neither expect that Dissenters will be absorbed by Anglicanism, nor Anglicanism by the Catholic Church. The tide, however, is in that direction; and it is a tide of which no law of sufficient force can be found except a momentum of the will and grace of God.

But the return of Catholic truth is not confined to this vague, popular, superficial, and æsthetic fashion of men's minds. It has taken a more definite and energetic form. In the last thirty years there has sprung up in the Anglican Establishment an extensive rejection of Protestantism, and a sincere desire and claim to be Catholic. Ever since the Reformation, indeed, the writers of the Anglican Church have claimed to be Catholic, but none that I know disclaimed to be

Protestant. They assumed that a Protesting Christian was *ipso facto* a Primitive Catholic. Not so now. Protestantism is recognised as a thing intrinsically untenable and irreconcilable with the Catholic faith. The school of which I speak claim to be Catholic because they reject Protestantism with all its heterodoxies. In this school are to be found many Catholic doctrines, not exactly or fully expressed or believed—for such are not to be found either full or exact out of the Catholic Church—but more or less near to truth. For instance, the Church of England forbids the use of the term transubstantiation by declaring the doctrine to be an error. The doctrine of the Real Presence, less transubstantiation, is like the doctrine of one God in three Persons, less the doctrine of the Trinity. Not only is the term rejected, but the conception is correspondingly inaccurate. This runs through all the Catholic doctrines which are professed out of the unity of the Church, and apart from the traditions of its sacred terminology. It is under this limitation that I go on to say that at this time the doctrine of the sacraments, their nature, number, and grace; the intercession and invocation of saints; the power of the priesthood in sacrifice and absolution; the excellence and obligations of the religious life,—are all held and taught by clergymen of the Church of England. Add to this, that the practice of confession, and of works of temporal and spiritual mercy, in form and by rule borrowed from the Catholic Church, are all to be found among those who are still within the Anglican communion. I must also add the latest and strangest phenomenon of this

movement—the adoption of an elaborate ritual, with its vestments borrowed from the Catholic Church.

On all these things I trust a blessing may descend. I see in them many things. First, they are a testimony in favour of the Catholic Church, which has always unchangeably taught and practised these things; secondly, a testimony against the Anglican Reformation, which has always rejected and cast them out. I joyfully recognise the zeal and piety of those (excepting, I fear, a few) who promote them. I believe for the most part they are sincere, and that multitudes are in an ignorance which is invincible. I can say with the Apostle: 'Some, indeed, even out of envy and contention; but some also for good-will preach Christ: some out of charity, . . . and some out of contention preach Christ, not sincerely. . . . But what then? So that every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ be preached, in this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.'[1]

I do not include in this, as I have already said, those—few in number, I believe—who use these things as a stumbling-block to keep back souls from the truth, and imitate the Catholic Church with a formal servility, that they may pass themselves off as Catholics even to our Catholic poor. For such men we can have no sympathy and little hope. Every parish priest happily knows how empty and foolish is the boast they make of keeping souls from conversion. The public facts of every day refute it. They may keep back the handful who surround them, and hide the truth from their own hearts; but the steady current of return to the

[1] Phil. i. 15-18.

Catholic and Roman Church throughout the whole of England is no more to be affected by them than the rising of the tide by the palms of their hands. Against their will, certainly, and perhaps without their knowledge, they are sending on numberless souls into the truth, which they probably will never enter. But the number of those whose good faith is doubtful is not great. The multitude of those who are drawn by a natural and simple reverence to clothe what they sincerely believe with a becoming ritual, and who worship piously and humbly in churches which might almost be mistaken for ours—if it were not for the one great blank, the absence of life, which is like a beautiful countenance without sight—is very great, and is perhaps continually increasing. They are coming up to the very threshold of the Church. They have learned to lean upon it as the centre of Christendom, from which they sprang, and upon which their own Church is supposed to rest. They use our devotions, our books, our pictures of piety; they are taught to believe the whole Catholic doctrine, and to receive the whole Council of Trent, not indeed in its own true meaning, but in a meaning invented by their teachers. This cannot last long. Such teachers are, as Fuller quaintly and truly says, like unskilful horsemen. They so open gates as to shut themselves out in letting others through.

Now no one can have watched this wonderful movement, especially if he has ever been borne along by it himself, without a profound sympathy, and a desire to cherish and to direct it with tenderness and fidelity.

He will not indeed sympathise with it as a superficial imitation of the profound and internal adoration of the Church of God, still less as a means of supplanting the Church, and deceiving the people to their hurt. All this is intrinsically evil. But dismissing this very restricted abuse, the movement as a whole can be regarded no otherwise than as an impulse of the Spirit of God, preparing the hearts of men beforehand for the advance of His Church.

And now, what attitude ought we to assume towards this aspect of the religion of England?

First, that of hope and kindness: of hope, that it may lead on to better things; and of kindness, lest we should throw back those who are moving upwards and onwards painfully and doubtfully towards a perfect knowledge of the truth. It seems to me that souls are in more peril now than thirty, or twenty, or even ten years ago. They were then in a state of which we might presume that their ignorance was invincible. The great masses of the English people were either physically or morally unable to find the true faith and the true Church. The same may be said still of the poor, of children, and of those who, being under a domestic control and seclusion, are unable to obtain books or teachers, or in any way to come in contact with the truth. But such is no longer the case of the educated who have none to control them. No physical or moral impossibility keeps them from the truth. They are in contact with the Church, with its priests, with its writings. They oppose it face to face, and therefore can plead no ignorance which is not in itself vincible.

The rise and expansion of the Church, the restoration of the Hierarchy, old friendships with those who have submitted to the Church, the conversion of kinsmen, even of children, and of brothers and sisters,—all these things bring the Church home to their dwellings, to their every-day life, and to their conscience. Every year the doctrine of invincible ignorance has a narrower application to the people of England; and for that reason we have need to be all the more patient, tender, and considerate. Thousands around us are in a crisis of life and death. If anything on our part ruffle or disturb the calmness of heart on which candour depends, we should have much to answer for. Sarcasm and ridicule are dangerous tools; they may make us feared, and win a literary name, but they do not draw souls to the truth. Jesus and His disciples never used these weapons. Let the use of them, together with all personalities, be with your adversaries. They are like the Carthaginian elephants, fatal to the ranks of those who use them. And in this I think a great advance has been made—the controversies of the day are direct and hand to hand; but they are less personal and more courteous. Here and there an exception, sadly conspicuous, may be seen—there must be a Thersites in every camp—but these exceptions would not be so conspicuous if they did not stand almost alone. Our office is to help, to uphold, to fill up and to perfect the fragmentary faith of those who are out of the truth; and that is not to be done by a *theologia destructiva*, by controversial or polemical theology, but by a calm, a charitable exposition of the perfect

truth which tells by its own light, and is its own evidence to sincere and humble minds.

2. But of this charity one high part is to be precise and clear in the full enunciation of Catholic truth. There can be no more pernicious mistake than the theory that truth is to be spread by fusion or accommodation. Truth only needs to be stated; but it demands to be stated in full. Anything less than its full outline is a suppression of truth, and *suppressio veri* is *suggestio falsi*. We have, moreover, the guidance of a Pontiff who has gone before us in every controversy of the day. What is there in respect to the sanctity, the dignity, or the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God, the temporal power of the Holy See, his own prerogatives as teacher of the faithful, the relation of faith to science and to society, which Pius IX. has not gone before and beyond us in asserting? Has any one enunciated on any of these topics anything which Pius IX. has not first declared? The most ultramontane assertions among us fall within the range, and therefore under the shelter, of authoritative documents emanating from the Holy See. It is remarkable that such critics as the *Times* newspaper and *Blackwood's Magazine* clearly perceive the identity of what is denounced as ultramontanism and the teaching of the Sovereign Pontiff. The attempt to distinguish between the declarations of the Holy See and the mind of the Church is the animus of heresy. If England is ever to be reunited to Christendom it is by submission to the living authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The first tep of its return must be obedience to his voice, as

rebellion against his authority was the first step of its departure. In dealing with souls the same is the only sure and solid method. We have had for a twelvemonth before us a saddening example of vacillations, of alternate acceptance and rejection of the Council of Trent. At one time, Trent as the basis of unity; at another, not all its decrees, but Trent less the indissoluble unity of the Church, and the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Then Trent with interpretations; that is, explanations which explain it away: anything but childlike submission. All our anxious and charitable hope is that the author of these private fancies may find them to be illusions in the noonday light of the infallible Church of God. But we cannot fail to note with fear the eccentric movements of the private spirit which is carrying him, and those who hang upon him, visibly back again into the old anti-Catholic attitude and spirit. To believe the whole Council of Trent with interpretations and glosses of private judgment will not bring a soul into the Catholic unity.

Now I have made these remarks as a ground for the assertion with which I shall conclude. The return to faith which we have traced from the middle of the last century—that is, for now about a hundred years—steadily ascending, doctrine after doctrine, first within the Anglican Establishment, then reaching beyond it into the regions of antiquity and of Catholic truth, has now received its complement in the full re-entrance of the Catholic Church, and the authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is no longer a question of fragmentary doctrines or isolated truths, of a little more or

a little less of this devotion or that opinion, but of the whole Catholic faith upon the principle of Divine certainty and of Divine authority through the Church and in its head. And it is visibly providential that at this moment the supremacy of the Crown, which is the Reformation *in concreto*, has literally come to nought. From the beginning, Ireland would never submit to it. Scotland rejected it. In half a century after its usurpation England began to cast it off. Half the people of England formally reject it at this day. Of the other half the great majority know nothing of it; of the remaining minority the most enlightened only tolerate it as an obsolete law, explain it away, limit it on every side, write against it, speak evil of it, or reject it altogether. Still worse than this, its own lawyers curtail its pretensions; and worst of all, it has lately pronounced its own acts to be invalid in a large field of its supposed jurisdiction—that is, it has died by *felo de se*. The providence of God has poured shame and confusion on the Tudor statutes. The royal supremacy has perished by the law of mortality which consumes all earthly things. And at this period of our history the supremacy of the Vicar of Jesus Christ re-enters as full of life as when Henry VIII. resisted Clement VII., and Elizabeth withstood S. Pius V. The undying authority of the Holy See is once more an active power in England; the shadow of Peter has fallen again upon it. The people of England are as conscious—nay, more conscious—of the presence of the Catholic Church among them than of the Anglican Establishment. The last thirty years have wrought a change of which

human agencies can give no adequate cause. The expansion of the Church and the penetrating spread of the faith in the last fifteen years has been in geometrical progression. What the next thirty years may bring forth if the same forces and the same velocities continue to multiply, no one can venture to foretell. But one thing is evident. 'Sapientia ædificavit sibi domum;' the Son of God has been again building His temple, and we shall best complete His work by following the order of His own procedure; and we shall best learn the plans of the Master-builder from the declarations of His Vicar upon earth.

VIII.

FRENCH INFIDELITY.

FRENCH INFIDELITY.

Read before the Academia, May 19, 1867.

The close contact, during a peace of half a century, between England and France has established in the two countries a continuity of sympathy, intelligence, and language; and this fact by itself is enough to make it our duty to observe with vigilance the intellectual tendencies of French literature. For good or for evil it must powerfully affect our educated classes; and the rise of certain intellectual maladies in France may be taken as premonitory symptoms of evils which will in the end attack ourselves. More than twenty years ago Neander, in his sketch of the late Dr. Arnold's life, described him as the herald of the critical treatment of Holy Scripture, which had already swept over Germany, and would sooner or later pass over England. We see this prophecy fulfilling in our days. In like manner it is certain that the intellectual aberrations described in this work will sooner or later arise among ourselves. Indeed, we shall presently see that they are already silently, at least in sporadic cases, working in the midst of us.

The Bishop of Orleans, in his work entitled *L'Athéisme et le Péril Social*, has abundantly and powerfully justified his assertion that the peril of France at this time is Atheism. He does not by this intend that the French people are Atheists, or that the Christianity and faith of France is not vigorous and dominant, but that there exists in France a school of writers able, cultivated, restless, and incessant in their endeavours to drive the idea of God out of the reason, conscience, science, morals, of society; that their anti-Christian conspiracy against God and the Christian order of the world is organised, extensive, and extending; that it commands a large number of public organs and controls a large proportion of the press; that its effects are appreciable upon the educated classes; and that its influences readily descend among the people. The Bishop affirms that during the last ten years many journals which defended religion in France have been suppressed, and very many authorised, of which, with rare exceptions, almost all are (*hautement antichrétiens*) openly anti-Christian. He names especially the *Siècle*, the *Débats*, the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, the *Opinion Nationale*, the *Avenir National*, the *Temps*, the *Indépendance Belge*, as propagating without scruple Atheism, Materialism, Pantheism, and anti-Christianism.[1] He adds that, besides these, there are journals expressly founded as organs of Atheism, such as the *Revue Germanique*, the *Morale Indépendante*, the *Courrier Français*, the *Libre Conscience*, the *Alliance Religieuse Universelle*, the *Libre Pensée*, and the *Revue*

[1] p. 98.

du Progrès.[2] He adds that an official report of the Minister of the Interior in 1852 showed that of nine millions of books sold in the towns and villages of France eight millions were immoral.

To any one who desires to appreciate the character of this school I would earnestly recommend Père Gratry's work, *Les Sophistes et la Critique*, which, for intellectual power and transparent clearness, is a very attractive book. He says: 'There is at this time in Europe a society of minds which, if they are not unmasked and subdued by public attention, are leading us back into barbarism. In this second half of the nineteenth century, we have before our eyes in France a psychological phenomenon very rare and very new. It is the existence of an intellectual monstrosity which appears for the second time in the history of the human intelligence.'[3] 'I affirm, then, that there exists at this day in France a school of writers who merit the name of Sophists, because they deny the first axioms of the reason—a very strange event in our age; for since Aristotle and Plato, who destroyed the Sophists of Greece, there has never been in the Greek or Roman world another attempt to revive the Sophists.' He further adds: 'We have before our eyes a sect of Atheists and Sophists. Such is the fact. I desire to mark the fact: I am bound to say, a sect of Atheists and Sophists. . . . The Sophists are those who do not admit, either in speculation or in practice, the fundamental and necessary axiom of the reason, namely, that it is impossible to affirm and to

[2] p. 99. [3] *Les Sophistes*, &c. pp. 10, 11.

deny the same thing at the same time, in the same sense, and under the same relations. This axiom is evidence in itself. The contrary is the proper formula of absurdity.'[4] The following is the application of this philosophy: 'Everything reveals, affirms, and demonstrates God; a straw as well as the world.' 'But if God be only an idea, the existence of God hangs on the existence of a thinking being. Suppress humanity, God exists no longer. . . . Why deny it? You see clearly enough now in these questions to be no longer dupes of words.'[5]

Such is the school which the Bishop of Orleans has exposed with copious evidence to a just reprobation. I shall not, therefore, attempt to reproduce the matter of the Bishop's pages except to give a brief outline of the tenets of this sect, so as to identify the existence of the same forms of error already appearing among ourselves. He distinguishes the atheistic school into three kinds—Positivism, Pantheism, and Materialism. And of each the following are samples:

Positivism rejects as unphilosophical and false all theology, including God and the soul as superstitions; and all metaphysics, such as law, cause, effect, &c., as imaginations; confining science to facts and phenomena, or, in other words, to the sphere of sense.

Comte, the founder of this intellectual monstrosity, declared in 1851, 'in the name of the past and of the future, all those who believe in God to be irrevocably excluded from the direction of affairs, as being behindhand and hinderers, whether Catholics, Protestants, and

[4] *Les Sophistes*, &c. pp. 17-41. [5] Ibid. p. 83.

Deists.' As to the God of the past, he says 'that He has rendered provisional services. But there is an end of it. Humanity takes the place of God.' 'Humanity alone must compensate for the impotence of God.' 'The idea of God has become in these days anarchical and retrograde.' But M. Comte held that man could not live without a religion, nor a religion exist without a worship, nor a worship without an object. But as there was an end of the 'God of the past,' the first step was to create the Divinity. And that Divinity could be no other than the 'Great Being' who has taken the place of God, namely, Humanity. Not indeed this or that particular man, nor mankind as it exists now in this mortal state, nor as it will exist in immortality, because, as there is no God, so there is no soul; but 'the Great Being is the assemblage of beings, past, present, and future;'[6] and yet not all such enter into the composition of the 'Grand Etre,' but only those who freely co-operate towards the perfection of the 'Universal Being.' Such are the 'Etres convergents,' the convergent beings; and Positivism defines humanity 'the continuous assemblage of convergent beings.' Such is the object of worship, for which he proposed to set apart the Church of S. Geneviève; that is, as he says, to 'consecrate the Pantheon to its true destination.' He proceeds to re-christen the months of the year and the days of the week, and to frame a calendar of feasts in which all states of humanity should be worshipped, with one omission—unmarried women, who have deserved well of humanity, to whom, as an after-thought, he assigns

[6] *Catechism of Positive Religion*, pp. 63-74.

the odd day in Leap Year. There are in the Positive religion ten sacraments, of which one is retirement from public life, to be administered and received at the age of sixty. A worshipper of this religion wrote to the French newspapers, dating by the calendar, Paris, 17 Shakespeare 78; that is, to us who are lying in darkness, September 24, 1866. In that letter he describes the spread of Positivism in France, America, and England. Of the last fact we have proof in a sermon published some four or five years ago in London, and dated 17 Moses 72; that is, as I learn, our January seventy-two years after the great world-epoch of the advent of M. Comte among men. It is hard to say whether folly or impiety predominate in this delirium.

As for Pantheism, the following samples will suffice: 'God, Providence, soul, immortality,—good old words; a little heavy perhaps, which Philosophy will interpret in senses more and more refined.'[7]

'For my part, I do not think that there is in the universe an intelligence superior to that of man.' 'On a certain day, in virtue of natural laws which had before presided over the development of things, without intervention from without, the thinking being appeared.' 'This strange phenomenon, in virtue of which an animal species (that is man) assumed a decisive superiority over the others.' By a *coup d'état*, we must suppose. 'Absolute perfection, to treat things in rigour, would be non-existence.' 'The infinite exists only where it puts on a finite form.' 'Absolute justice and reason re-

[7] M. Renan's *Etudes d'Histoire Religieuse*, p. 419. *Péril Social*, p. 75.

garded out of humanity is an abstraction; regarded in humanity is a reality.' When humanity has become perfect, '*Dieu sera complet*,'—'God will be completed.' This is the M. Renan whose *Life of Jesus* competes in editions with Voltaire, and is read by unsuspecting simple hearts in England.

Lastly, as to Materialism: a few samples will complete their *Summa Theologica impietatis*.

The first proposition we meet with is, 'There is nothing real but the body.' God and the soul are 'metaphysical entities, bubbles of soap.' 'We may well be the fruit of successive modifications, wrought upon ancestors far less perfect than we are, and even next in order to great apes.' Investigations are *en chasse* 'to find' the man-ape, 'the animal which according to them must have been the transition between apes and man.' 'God, banished from science, took refuge in metaphysics. . . The idea of God is already well shaken. We must still give it the last blow.' 'The name soul must be reserved for the assemblage of faculties of the central nervous system taken as a whole.' 'Thought is inherent in the substance of the brain only as it is nourished, like the contractile power of the muscles, &c.' 'An idea is the product of a combination analogous to formic acid; thought depends on the phosphorus contained in the substance of the brain; virtue, devotedness, and courage are organic currents of electricity.' 'Virtue and vice are products, like sugar and vitriol.' Perhaps this is enough. And yet it may be well to give a *résumé* in the words of a M. Moleschott, who appears for the regeneration of Italy to have been

honoured with a professor's chair at Turin. He says, with a gravity worthy of Molière's doctor of physic, 'The will is the necessary expression of a state of the brain produced by external influences. There is no such thing as a free will. A crime is the logical result, direct and inevitable, of the passion which animates us. Without phosphorus, no thought,—*Sans phosphore point de pensée*. . . . Thought is a movement of matter.' 'Conscience is also a property of matter.' It is, I imagine, of this M. Moleschott and his impieties that an author in Turin wrote as follows: 'Si preconizza dalle Cattedre . . . l' uomo bestia, la Materia Dio, il fato-providenza, il fosforo-pensiero, l' autorita chimera, la fede impostura.' One more passage must suffice. M. Renan says, 'No limit can be traced for the mind of man. . . . Nothing is above the reach of man.' He thinks that some day there will be found 'a predestined chemist who will transform all things; an omniscient biologist who will finally make himself master of life itself.' 'Who knows,' he says, 'in a word, whether infinite science will not bring with it infinite power?' 'We may affirm that the final resurrection will be accomplished by science.' What wonder that to M. Renan our Divine Lord should appear as 'an interesting enthusiast'?

The Bishop of Orleans then gives an outline of the activity and organisation of the sect. It already has the 'Sociétés des Affranchis et des Solidaires;' and still more recently an international society has been founded in Germany, the members of which bind themselves to receive no sacrament of any religion, neither baptism

nor marriage, nor at the hour of death; and to give directions to others to hinder their families from giving them Christian burial.

Such may be called the dogmatic theology of this school. Now for the moral. It is called *la morale indépendante;* that is to say, 'morality has no existence but in humanity.' It does not come from God; for there is no God. It is not the law of His will, nor the transcript of His perfection. We have seen already that 'conscience is a movement of matter.' 'Virtue and vice are products, like sugar and vitriol.' If so, it is hardly worth while to say that Christian morality is 'arbitrary, because it has not been freely sanctioned by man, which sanction is necessary in order to bind man towards God;' and that 'it is impossible that God should judge and punish a creature who has not sanctioned the altogether arbitrary law which God has been pleased to impose upon him.' I will not stain these pages by transferring to them the immoralities of this literature. It is more than enough to read them for once in the eloquent and indignant context of Mgr. Dupanloup. The immediate bearing of all this upon the personal morality of individuals and the collective morals of society is self-evident. 'We are engaged,' say these guides of men, 'on the subject of morality; that is, the restoration of the flesh to its estate in a moral point of view.' It is healthy and consoling after all to read such words as the following passage, dictated by the unerring instinct of anti-Christian libertinage and enmity against the morality of the Christian Church: 'Take care, Messieurs les Cléricaux; . . . we shall know how, if need

be, to confound you; we shall be able, if the slow work of science is not enough, to inscribe upon our standards, and to put in execution, the great idea of the last century, "Ecrasons l'infâme." '

Such is the first part of Monseigneur Dupanloup's work. The second, on the social peril, is an application of the first. He says truly, 'Free thought brings free morality; will not free morality bring free practice and revolution? To this there is no limit but law and society.' But it is especially this which is now being sapped and corrupted at its base by the propagation of these anti-Christian and anti-social impieties. M. Renan says, 'The future of humanity is entirely a question of doctrine. Philosophy alone can solve it. The really efficacious revolution which will give form to the future will be a revolution in religion and morals. The work is passing more and more into the hands of men of thought.' 'In politics, as in philosophy, the younger school of Hegel professed the most radical doctrines. The year 1848 came, and the extreme left of the Hegelians became the extreme left of the revolution—Atheism and Socialism joined hands.' And this revolution is not that of the people, but of the 'thinkers.' Even universal suffrage is to be put aside as *suspect*. France is the field of predilection; but France is not to be polled, but only Paris. And Paris has already once before terrified and deluged France with blood under the sway of a handful of 'thinkers,' varying in age from twenty-two to thirty-five years—Sophists and Atheists—men of the independent morality, of vitriol, sugar, and blood. And

to this the people of France are invited once more, 'through transformations still more radical than those of '89.' 'Socialism is the religion of the disinherited classes.' But into this part of the subject I will not now enter. I would only commend to the careful attention of the reader the chapter in which the Bishop sketches the preludes and the course of the first French revolution; the facility with which these materialist and atheistic doctrines may become popular, and their direct tendency to become political. Any one who has watched the state of this country in the last five years, and the close international organisation which is growing up between certain classes which, both in England and on the Continent, are most exposed to the action of social and political discontent, will find reason to reflect with anxiety upon the future of our own country. But into this it is impossible now to enter. I will however, before I conclude, add a few words on the symptoms which have already appeared among us of the same intellectual aberrations.

During the last ten or fifteen years the doctrines of M. Comte have attracted the attention of a small number of our English metaphysicians. But he had hardly so much as one thorough disciple among us—certainly not a school. Several writers, such as Mr. Lewis and Mr. Mill, have treated of Positivism; but neither appear to adopt it as a whole. Nevertheless the tendency of both metaphysics and science in England is to eliminate the supernatural and to limit the basis of philosophy to the span of sense and of experiment. We have some Positivism among us, little or

no Pantheism, but abundance of Materialism. The English mind is positive by nature, not indeed scientifically, but by its immersion in material interests and material production. We are so practically material that scientific materialism makes little way with us. The Germans are speculative, the French logical, the English as a people are neither. We are thoroughly traditional and insular, and we hold out obstinately against all invasions whether of armies or of philosophies. Nevertheless ideas penetrate subtilely; and one by one, an idea deposited in the mind of a people is like a seed wafted by the wind or dropped by a bird. It will spring up and reproduce itself. For this reason we have need to watch carefully over a part of our national education, which perhaps more than any other is left without direction, that is, mental philosophy. Christendom has a tradition of philosophy as well as of Faith; and in that tradition truth, both natural and supernatural, is combined in perfect unity, symmetry, and harmony. Philosophy and theology are the upper and the nether springs of truth. Philosophy may be called the theology of reason; theology the philosophy of revelation. They belong respectively to the natural and supernatural worlds, and they belong also to each other as integral parts of one perfect whole. In the confusion of these later centuries they have been divorced from each other, and set in opposition to each other. Philosophy has taken up an attitude of defiance to theology; and theology, in condemning a false philosophy, has been thought to be unphilosophical. The existence of God, the spirituality of the

soul, the laws of morals, are truths of philosophy; and yet modern philosophy has confounded them with theology, and rejected them with disdain. Materialism and independent morality are the direct product of that rejection. Again, philosophy teaches that the nature of man is composed of soul and body, reason and sense; and that in the knowledge and discovery of truth the whole nature, with its faculties and sensations, discovers by a single intelligent activity. Modern philosophy has disintegrated the nature of man, and placed the criterion of truth either in the reason generally or in the sense, from which have come two distinct philosophies, both false because both partial—the rationalism which in Germany has generated Pantheism, and the sensuous which in England and Scotland has generated not complete Materialism, but a philosophy which is sense-bound and mutilated as to the higher truths of the intellectual order. The propositions—that the existence of God cannot be proved by reason; that God is not an object of knowledge; that morality in us is diverse from the moral perfection of God; that our knowledge of things is not proper but relative and arbitrary; that the will is not free, and the like—are intellectual aberrations from which the traditional philosophy of the Christian Church and of the Christian world would have preserved us.

But these questions are too speculative to become popular, and among us are confined to so small a class of literary men that their action on society is both limited and superficial. It would seem as if the atmosphere of England were unfavourable to the growth

of abstractions, whether false or true. A remarkable instance of this is the sudden popularity and as sudden oblivion of a book which represents more systematically perhaps than any other in a popular form, some of the worst errors of the positive and material philosophy, Buckle's *History of Civilisation*. The author is no longer among us, and I am informed by his friends that he was of an estimable nature. I would not wound his memory, but I cannot spare the book. If I rightly understand it, the theory on which it is based is as follows: The actions of men are determined by the motives which prompt them. If we knew the motives we could predict the actions of any individual. Society is made up of individuals. If we knew the motives of each individual, we could predict the collective action of society. Statistics prove the same. We find every year so many suicides in such a population; and of suicides, so many by drowning, so many by laying violent hands on themselves. Again, the number of letters put into the post without direction, bears a proportion to the population; and so on in various examples. From this he infers that the laws or motives which govern individuals are fixed and proportionate, and that society has a fixed and predetermined course or evolution. The writer adds, with much simplicity, that he knows of only two objections to this theory—the one, Divine Providence; the other, the freedom of the human will. The idea of Providence he dismisses as a superstition of the infant state of man. The savage goes out to the hunting fields, one day he finds game, another day he finds none. Chance becomes Providence, and

Providence the benign action of a Divine Being. The freedom of the will is a 'sensation' having no higher basis than our consciousness. But what higher certainty there can be for the ultimate facts of the human mind, or what greater evidence can be found for our personal identity, he does not tell us. This dreary, mechanical, and superficial philosophy of society is but Positivism applied to Sociology. It fell dead; and the book has disappeared.

Thus far our social peril would not seem to be from speculative Positivism, Pantheism, or Materialism. Nevertheless we are perhaps practically the most material of nations, and the influence of the supernatural over the society of England is becoming feebler year by year. The only safety for our country is in those old words, which may be a little heavy perhaps, 'but living and powerful'—God, the soul, and immortality. These are the salt of the earth. Whosoever shall reinvigorate and extend their influence over the minds and wills of our people will do the highest work of a Christian and of a citizen, and promote not only the stability of our social order, but the eternal welfare of mankind. We are in a century of revolutions. The principles of 1789 have pervaded Europe, and have laid the seed of revolution in every country. The year 1848 exhibited a revolution in every capital of Europe, hardly subdued in some, dominant in others. In the last eighteen years these local revolutions have become confluent, and the revolution now is not many but one. In the future the social peril of one country will be the social peril of all; and we, though the last to yield to

the contagion, will, unless God in His mercy avert it, be involved in the movements which are visibly converging on the Continent to a vast and wide-spread conflict of Socialism against the Christian order of the world.

IX.

IRELAND.

IRELAND.

A Letter to Earl Grey, 1868.

My Lord,—The justice with which you, as a Peer of Parliament, have always spoken of Ireland and of the Catholic Church gives me confidence that you will bear with me if I express my mind upon these subjects. I venture to address myself to you because your Lordship has long stood aloof from the two great parties in the State; and in what I write I desire to hold myself neutral between opposing sides. I make an appeal for justice, not to one side or the other, but to both. I have refrained from asking your Lordship's permission to inscribe your name upon this letter because I wish you to be absolutely free from all responsibility as to any opinions I may express, and as to the prudence of my expressing them. That responsibility lies wholly on myself; and I have not hesitated to make this public declaration of my convictions because it is evident that upon the future of Ireland hangs the future of the British Empire; and even the least may ask to be heard.

Let me anticipate a criticism by saying that I do not recognise any incompatibility between the sacred office I bear and the public treatment of these topics.

It is not our belief that ecclesiastics cease to be citizens, or that anything affecting the common weal of our country is remote from our duty. This alone would suffice for my justification; but I may offer also other pleas for speaking publicly on subjects affecting Ireland. As an Englishman, I can speak to Englishmen without suspicion of a national bias; or, rather, with the national bias on the side of England. I may at least claim to be impartial. Again, the duties of many years and the work of every day have brought me into such direct and intimate contact with Ireland and the Irish people, that I cannot be mistaken as to the gravity of the present crisis. I do not believe that it can be overrated. It is the disposition to underrate it, and the readiness to relapse into an untimely reassurance at every momentary lull of public anxiety, which fill me with most fear. It is true that we have had times of greater violence and of more immediate dangers than now threaten us; more fearful atrocities, both against the law and by the law, have been perpetrated, of which your Lordship has full memory; but there never yet was a moment in which such widespread and irresistible powers of change were in action upon the union of Great Britain and Ireland. It is enough to refer to the international organisations which unite Ireland with the continent of Europe, and to the intimate and vital bond which links Ireland with America. This is of a graver, deeper, mightier, and more permanent character than the risings of 1798 or of 1803. It is gradually assimilating and changing an integral part of the United Kingdom into a type which

will hardly combine with ours, or consolidate the unity of these realms.

And now, my Lord, the subjects on which I will take the liberty to speak are, in my belief, still within the power of Parliament to control. But the power of controlling them is becoming less and less as they are continually postponed. They may all be summed up in two general heads, Religious Equality and an equitable Land-law.

There is, however, one preliminary step to the pacification of Ireland—so easy in itself that we shall be gravely responsible if we do not at once take it—namely, that we in England should govern ourselves when we speak of Ireland, as we should expect Irishmen to govern themselves when they speak of us. Nay, I will further say that the memory of the last three hundred years ought to make us all the more watchful, as those three centuries of suffering have made them all the more sensitive. I do not think Englishmen are enough aware of the harm some among us do by a contemptuous, satirical, disrespectful, defiant language in speaking of Ireland and the Irish people. A manly, generous, respectful tone would soon dispose many wounds to heal which are now kept open and fester rankly.

Your Lordship's treatment of these subjects has always been distinguished by a respectful and sympathetic manner towards Ireland; but I have been at a loss to conceive what certain of our public writers could hope to effect by the cynical sarcastic disdain with which they treat that noble-hearted people. One

of the most recent and melancholy examples of this, which I must call a public crime, may be found in the last article of the January number of the *Quarterly Review*. In that article, a writer of no ordinary abilities has exhibited, I hope as a warning to us all, how bitter, narrow, and unjust the spirit of party can make even a powerful mind. I call this a public crime because it does more to create bad blood between the two countries than even graver wrongs. The grievances of a people may produce discontent, but a tone of imperial contempt goads high-spirited men to madness.

What is to be thought of an author's fairness who can deliberately write as follows?[1]—'As regards the Irish Church, for instance, a large majority of the representatives of Ireland are in favour of retaining it; and yet its destruction is constantly put forward as the means of appeasing Irish discontent.'

Does this 'large majority' of Protestant members, returned by Protestant influence, represent the views of the Irish Catholic people as to the advantages of maintaining a Protestant Establishment over their heads? If so, how is it that the remaining thirty Irish, but Catholic, members are, to a man, against it? Does Ireland speak by the majority or by the minority? The majority of the Irish members represent the minority of the Irish people. Lord Aberdeen's 'conundrum' is here proposed in a still more paradoxical form. So long as the majority of the Irish members are in favour of maintaining the Protestant

[1] p. 262.

Establishment, the majority of the Irish people are not represented. Is not this enough to explain and to justify popular discontent?

Again.[2] 'So long as any considerable body of Irishmen seize greedily on every opportunity of parading their undying irreconcilable hostility to the English connection, so long as we are to be opposed and thwarted—not because we are wrong, not because we are tyrannical, not because we are unjust, but because we are Englishmen—we must, on the simplest and plainest principles of self-defence, endeavour to satisfy and retain on our side that portion of the community that is friendly to British connection.'

Why should Englishmen be thwarted in Ireland, and why should English rule be thought 'wrong,' 'tyrannical,' 'unjust'? This is the very evil to be removed. It is both easy and politic for the wrongdoer to proclaim oblivion of the past; but the sufferer of wrong can hardly be expected to be so pliant and forgetful. To our own hurt, we have made the English name hateful in the past, and we must bear the penalty till we have repaired the wrong: 'Delicta majorum immeritus lues.' But is it not a reiteration of hard-hearted and hard-faced wrong to affect the manner of an innocent and injured party? Such a tone makes us partakers in the guilt of the past. To deny the justice of the prejudice attaching to us is to deny the injustice of the acts which caused it. We thereby justify the animosity of which we complain.

Again. 'Whatsoever be the merits of land-reform

[2] p. 264.

or of church-destruction, they have nothing to do with Fenianism.' Has Fenianism any other cause than animosity against England? Has that animosity nothing to do with the three confiscations of almost every acre of land in Ireland, and the folly of striving for three hundred years to force Protestantism on a Catholic people?

Once more. 'It has been the pleasure of Ireland to pass upon herself a sentence of perpetual poverty.' Did Ireland suicidally strip itself of all its lands, reduce itself to mud-cabins, potato-diet, and evictions, fever, and famine? Would this have been the state of Ireland if it had been left to mature its own social order and civilisation as England, Scotland, France and Spain? Who checked its agriculture, its cattle-trade, its fisheries, and its manufactures by Acts of Parliament? If poverty was ever inflicted by one nation on another, it has been inflicted on Ireland by England.

One more example. 'As for laws and administration, Ireland is on the same footing with England; and where there is a difference, Ireland will be found to be better cared for than England.' Let the endowments of the Church of England be transferred to the English Catholic Bishops and clergy; let the Anglican Archbishops and Bishops be liable to fine for assuming their ecclesiastical titles; let the land in England be held by absentee Irish landlords by title of past confiscations, and let their soil be tilled by tenants at will, who may at any hour be evicted, and I shall then think that Ireland and England are on the same footing.

There is yet one thing wanting. Let some Irish statesman reproach the English for their unreasoning and unrelenting animosity, their self-chosen poverty, their insensibility of the dignity and benefits of being thus treated by a superior race. But, my Lord, enough of this, which can have no other effect than to heat, blind, and distort the minds of men on both sides, and to come, like Erinnys, between the contending hosts, to drive them to madness and mutual destruction.

There is, however, one last point in which, as the writer condescends to reason, I will ask leave to meet him in detail.

We are told that Ireland has one, and one only, grievance—not that its lands were confiscated; not that the heirs of old estates are now day-labourers upon them; not that its people have died by hundreds and by thousands, or have been driven away by millions; not that its sacred revenues, its old parish churches, its cathedrals, dear for the memory of its saints and forefathers, have been taken away: all these things are as nothing. But there is one great grievance. The Irish people have to pay for their own religion. We have here the measure of this writer's breadth. Such is the knowledge, discernment, experience, compass, and trustworthiness of the guide who professes to teach the Imperial Parliament its duties towards Ireland, and Ireland its true condition.

Bear with me, my Lord, while I draw out to the full this new portentous wrong. To pay our own clergy is a grievance not to be found, I suppose, in England or Scotland. Why, half the people of England

are Dissenters, and half the people of Scotland are Free-Kirk men. They all alike pay their own ministers. But, then, nobody wishes to detach them from their flocks, or their flocks from them; or to buy their influence, or to destroy it, as of men that have been bought. We are further told: 'No position can be more cruel or painful than that of a Roman Catholic priest in Ireland really anxious to do his duty to his flock as a good pastor and to the State as a good citizen. He must live on their contributions; they love him because they benefit him, and he must be no little of "a demagogue." He dare not appear loyal.' 'He is of the people,' and not only leads, 'but is led by sympathy, by the desire of popularity, and, it must be admitted, by pecuniary interest.' 'Few men can come out of such an ordeal without some loss of self-respect,' 'some compliances,' 'some "economies" of truth which they cannot look back upon without regret, and perhaps shame.' 'When we reflect on the vast power possessed by the priest,' 'we cannot sufficiently regret that the Government' 'has not drawn' them '*within the circle of its legitimate influence*.' 'We cannot *afford*' to increase their 'influence by fixing upon the people the duty of maintaining' their clergy 'side by side with the Episcopalian and Protestant Establishments,' &c. In plain English: We must pay them, but we must make the people believe that we do so solely to relieve them of their only grievance. We must get them in hand like the ministers of the Establishment, and so lessen their power over their flocks.

Do you now wonder, my Lord, that the Catholic

clergy spurn the stipends of the English Government, and that the Catholic people of Ireland have a joy and pride in fulfilling the precept of the Apostle in maintaining their pastors? I thank the writer in the *Quarterly*. There is no danger of mistake in this matter.

But even this is not all. As if this professed compassion for the Irish people, oppressed by the grievance of giving gladly to their pastors, were not transparent enough, the writer goes on to add precautions against two dangers, namely, that the priests may refuse to take the Government pay, and that the people may persevere in giving to them. To effect these necessary precautions the writer gives two counsels. The one: 'The salary should be paid into a bank,' and 'made seizable in execution for debt.' The other: 'Care must be taken to make known to the peasantry of Ireland that the State has taken upon itself the maintenance of the Roman Catholic clergy.' This done, 'We think that a priest questing for his support would meet with but little success,' &c. Bear with me, my Lord, if I translate this also into plain English: 'The priests are a greedy lot. They refuse the State money against their will. They are dying for it. All they want is a shadow of excuse. Pay it to their account in the bank. This will be enough for most of them. If any appear to hold out, make it seizable for debt. Let their butchers and bakers seize it. They will have touched the Queen's money, at least in kind. They could not go back if they would; and we know well enough that they would not go back if they could. But

they must affect to be above being paid. Give the men excuse, and they will take it fast enough.' My Lord, the Catholic priesthood of Ireland and of England will not fail to appreciate this exalted estimate of their sincerity, and the refined skill of this plot against their independence. For the other counsel, let all public men be well assured that, when the proclamation is made to the Irish people that the State has endeavoured to buy their pastors, there are no men living who will rise in greater indignation than the peasantry of Ireland. Without 'questing,' every priest in Ireland would find the free-will offerings of his people to be doubled: to let all men know that it is neither by questing nor by constraint, nor by undue influence, spiritual or personal, but for the love of God and of His Church, of their own souls; and of the souls of their children; and, I will be bold enough to add, for the love of their priests—their faithful, warm-hearted, unwearied friends, guardians, and guides in life and in death—that the Catholic people in Ireland, and the Catholic Irish in England, in Canada, in Australia, in the United States, throughout the world, joyfully, gratefully, generously, with filial love, cherish and support their clergy. The love of a Catholic Irishman for his priest is known only to those who have the happiness to labour among them. I can bear witness, and the Catholic clergy of England will bear witness with me, that no questing, or shearing, or spiritual terrorism, would be possible — if we were capable of an offence so base and hateful — and that such coercion is as needless as it would be impossible. There can hardly be found in Great Britain a population

poorer than those who are driven by poverty from Ireland, and in England can hardly find employment except in the lowest forms of industry. Nevertheless, in all parts of England the same spirit of generosity and of piety, in everything which relates to the Church and the clergy, is to be found. The Irish people love both, because they know that no human power and no worldly interest separate their Church and their clergy from themselves. This independence is the pledge that they have a sole and exclusive right in both. To a State-paid Church and clergy the Catholics in England and Ireland would give neither their money nor their hearts.

I cannot but be sorry, my Lord, to read in a late pamphlet a reference to supposed levies and exactions of priests upon their people. Such things here and there may have happened; for what nation is without its evils? but this is no sample of the Irish priesthood. Major O'Reilly, than whom few men better knew Ireland, estimates the outlay on churches, schools, convents, and other charitable institutions in Ireland since 1800 at 5,500,000*l*. Mr. Maguire, in his book on the *Irish in America*, gives examples of the same Christian generosity in our North American colonies, and throughout the United States. The cathedral in the city of St. John's, Newfoundland, was built by them at a cost of 120,000*l*. The same profuse devotion to their faith is to be found wheresoever they are. The grandest cathedrals of these days have been raised by their alms.

But proofs are endless. Only let English statesmen once for all lay aside the illusion that the people of

Ireland give because they are coerced; or that they would accept the relief of a State payment for their clergy; or that their clergy would acknowledge the account to which the counsel of Achitophel has carried the money to insnare them. Both clergy and people would rather hunger and thirst together than dissolve the bond of Christian charity and Christian confidence which binds them indissolubly to each other.

The writer in the *Quarterly* must forgive me if I wrong him, but his quotation from Sydney Smith reveals the source of his inspiration. This scheme of State policy is a plagiarism, but the humour of the original has evaporated. 'The first thing to be done is to pay the priests, and after a little while they will take the money. One man wants to repair his cottage; another wants a buggy; a third cannot shut his eyes to the dilapidation of a cassock. The draft is payable at sight in Dublin, or by agents in the next market-town, dependent upon the commission in Dublin. The housekeeper of the holy man is importunate for money, and if it be not procured by drawing for the salary, it must be extorted by curses and comminations from the ragged worshippers slowly, sorrowfully, and sadly. There will be some opposition at first; but the facility of getting the salary without the violence they are now forced to use, and the difficulties to which they are exposed in procuring the payment of those emoluments to which they are fairly entitled, will in the end overcome all obstacles. And if it do not succeed, what harm is done by the attempt?' 'The Roman Catholic priest could not refuse to draw his salary from the State without incurring the indigna-

tion of his flock. Why are you to come upon us for all this money when you can ride over to Sligo or Belfast and draw a draft upon Government for the amount? It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to this to a shrewd man who is starving to death.'[3] The Irish people, both clergy and laity, well knew the genial and friendly humour of the Canon of St. Paul's, and laughed heartily at both him and his scheme; but they will read with a very different heart this old joke in the earnest bitterness of the plagiarist.

It is a relief to turn to the words of a statesman who knew Ireland better: 'My inference from the matter is this, that, if the Castle-ascendency could bribe the whole body of the Roman Catholic clergy (a thing not very likely) into a treacherous conduct towards three millions of their laity—that not anything else would result from it than this, that they would never attend on the ministry of one of these corrupt and silly creatures. They would call them the *Castleick* clergy. They would have other priests; and though this might add a little to the confusions of the country and to the public expenses (the great object next to the job to which they have reduced the public interests), they might be sure it would not lessen by one the number of those who contend for justice on the tenor of the good old common law of England, and the principles of the English constitution.'[4]

A very estimable member of the House of Commons

[3] *Works of Sydney Smith*, p. 681 (Longmans, 1850).

[4] Letter of Edmund Burke to his son Richard Burke, June 1792; *Correspondence*, vol. iv. p. 15.

said to me the other day, 'The priest in Ireland is our enemy. I wish to have him as my friend.' The priests will be so when we deal justly with their faith and with their people, and cease to treat them as if they could be bought.

Let me now take leave of the Quarterly Reviewer, and his one only grievance amidst the exuberant prosperities of thankless and intractable Ireland.

We ought to respect the sensitiveness kept alive in a noble people by the memory of religious persecutions which England desires to erase from its records, and by natural resentments kindled by repeated and terrible confiscations. I am not now about to recite the wrongs of the past, nor to rekindle the fires which have been, happily, dying down. We shall rejoice to forget the past; but on one condition. Let us hear no more of 'sentimental grievances,' no heartless assertions that Ireland has now nothing to complain of; that the reign of Astræa is supreme in Ireland; that the Irish do not know their own golden prosperity, created by English and Scottish industry, while they will do nothing but saunter and look on with folded arms. Let us have no more of this unjust and dangerous language, and we shall carefully refrain from raking up the embers of history. It needs little stirring to raise a flame. We Englishmen can be cool and calm in this matter, but we must not forget that the accumulated animosity of the past is born in the blood of Irishmen. My surprise is not that they control it so little, but that they control it so much. The social and political inequalities, the religious persecu-

tions, and the cruel confiscations of the past, might be more easily forgotten if they were not still embodied, visibly and grievously before their eyes, in the ascendency of the Protestant Establishment and of a minority. This is the recapitulation and representative of the policy of Elizabeth, James, and Cromwell, still living, powerful, and dominant. I will not, however, revive these bitter topics. We Englishmen ought, indeed, to be calm and to control ourselves. But can we wonder if no Irishman be as cold-blooded as we are? It is this unreasonable, I was about to say this unnatural, mood of mind which renders the language of Englishmen so irritating to Ireland. 'As vinegar upon nitre, so is one that singeth songs to a heavy heart.' Such are the hymns to Irish prosperity in the ears of a population a century behind the national maturity which is their right. Society which springs from the soil, and forms itself by the tillage of the land, training its people to thrift and industry, and unfolding its steady growth in homes, hamlets, villages, towns, and cities,—ripening by centuries of time, and binding all orders and inequalities of rich and poor, master and servant, together in mutual dependence, mutual justice, mutual charity, making even the idle to be thrifty, and the powerful to be compassionate: this growth of human happiness and social order, which in England and Scotland is so symmetrical and mature, in Ireland has been checked at the root. The centuries which have ripened England and Scotland with flower and fruit have swept over Ireland in withering and desolation. We are beginning in the nineteenth century to undo

the miseries of the seventeenth and the eighteenth. But let us not excuse ourselves by alleging the faults of national character. If our Irish brethren have faults, they are, for the most part, what England has made them. Englishmen, with a like treatment, would have been the same.

It would be blindness not to see, and madness to deny, that we have entered into another crisis in the relations of England and Ireland, of which '98, '28, and '48 were precursors. In '98, '28, '48, the revolutionary movements of the Continent powerfully acted upon this country. In 1868 not the Continent only, but America, is in direct and hostile action upon all the elements of disorder, and, what is more dangerous, upon all the causes of just discontent in this country. My Lord, if just discontent were removed, disorder would bring no danger. The public moral sense of the United Kingdom would reduce all disorders to submission, if justice were on our side. I do not deny that for the last fifty years the Legislature of this country has desired to deal justly with Ireland. But I must altogether deny that the Legislature has as yet done its duty by Ireland, or that the causes of just discontent in Ireland have been removed.

So much for the first reason of disunion among us. Let us now go on to the other causes of, what I must persist in calling, just discontent.

So long as there exists upon the statute-book any penal enactment against the Catholic religion; so long as the Catholic people of Ireland are deprived of a *bonâ fide* Catholic education; so long as a Protestant Church

Establishment is maintained by law over the face of Catholic Ireland; and so long as the people of Ireland fail to derive from the land such a subsistence as the labourers and farmers of England and Scotland derive from the soil: there must be a just discontent, which will be the misery of Ireland and the danger of England.

Here, then, are four distinct heads of a discontent which is just. Two of them, as I venture to say, may be removed to-morrow if Parliament have the will to do it; two of them are more complex and difficult, and may require time for eradication. But even these can be removed; and, if the peace and welfare of these kingdoms are to be preserved, they must be removed, and that as speedily as can be.

The two remedies which can at once be applied are these: The first, an Act of Parliament, summed up in one clause, which would recite and repeal all penal enactments against the Catholic Church and religion still lingering in the statutes of these realms. No people can see without resentment the stigma of legal ignominy branded upon their pastors and their faith; no government can command the confidence of those whom it deliberately wounds in that which is dearer than life itself. These penal statutes gall, irritate, outrage the noblest and deepest instincts of pastor and people. And what has the Government of our country gained by such fatal laws? Has it repressed Catholicism? Has it propagated the Reformation? What has it produced but the profound mistrust and resentment in a whole people, which is now one of our chief dangers, because it elevates all other griefs with

the higher character of religious persecution? The day is past for legislation against religious faith: it is two hundred years after date. If Ireland is to be justly pacified, the Church of the people must be placed upon the perfect equality which it enjoys in Canada and Australia. So long as Parliament shall legislate for Catholic Ireland in compliance with the religious prejudices of England and Scotland, Ireland will have a just cause of discontent. Is it consistent with the dignity of the Imperial Parliament to pass laws which the Christian world ignores? We cannot legislate for the Gulf Stream, or change the course of the trade winds, by Act of Parliament. If these statutes were consistent with wisdom when the framers believed that they could be executed, they are no longer wise when time has fought against them and shown them to be powerless.

The other measure of pressing importance to Ireland, which may be passed at once if any Government have the will to do so, is such a modification of the National Education Board as shall make the existing schools *bonâ fide* denominational schools of the Catholic and of the Protestant populations respectively. It is a keen irony to call a system of education National where the religion of the nation may neither be taught nor exhibited in its schools. If the people of Ireland had been consulted at its foundation, it would never have come into existence. If they were polled now, it would not survive a day. It is not a National but a Government education, distasteful to almost the whole population of Ireland, to Catholics and to Protestants alike.

Both would be glad to see it resolved into denominational education. It would promote peace, contentment, and good-will to give over the schools in each place to the majority, be it Catholic or Protestant. The Catholic minority would gladly provide its own Catholic school. The Protestant minority would be easily provided for out of the wealth of the Protestant clergy and landlords.

Let it be borne in mind that the National system in Ireland, though called a mixed one, is to a great extent not so in fact.

1. There are 2454 schools, containing 373,756 Catholic children, with not a Protestant child.

2. There are 2483 schools, having 321,641 Catholic children, with only 24,381 Protestant children.

That is, in 4937 — nearly 5000—schools, with 695,397 Catholic children, there are no more than 24,381 Protestant.

Nevertheless, in these 4937 schools containing 695,397 Catholic children, it is not permitted to teach publicly the Catholic religion, to use Catholic books, or to put up a crucifix. This is no ' sentimental grievance,' but a real and grave interference, which paralyses the Catholic education of the Irish people. And yet they have as good right to their own national education as England or Scotland, and for the same reasons. The National system of England is Anglican, the National system of Scotland is Presbyterian, the National system of Ireland is not Catholic. Why should the National system of Ireland be deprived of its national religion ? Even in England, the Catholic Church has

its denominational schools. The Catholic Church in Ireland is deprived of them in deference to a small number of Protestants. The Catholic population in Ireland, as compared with the Protestant, is four to one. In three of the provinces, namely, Munster, Leinster, and Connaught, almost eight-tenths of the schools are exclusively Catholic. In the one province of Ulster alone are the schools to any extent mixed; many are exclusively Catholic; and even in Ulster the Catholics outnumber the Protestants. On what principle, then, of common justice can a Catholic denominational education be refused to the Catholic people in Ireland? In England it could not be refused to the Catholics in 1847, because the Protestants of England demanded it for themselves. In Ireland it was refused to the Catholics, and the whole education of Ireland was stripped of its Catholic character for the sake of a minority of Protestants, who were, in 1835, not even one-sixth of the population. And yet this system has not pleased even the Protestants. So strongly marked is the aversion of both Catholics and Protestants for this mixed education that, when they can separate, they do so. In Dublin there are sixty National schools taught by Catholic teachers, containing 24,355 children on the roll. Of these, only six are Protestants, and four are Jews. But in parts of Ireland where there is no such alternative, a still greater grievance arises. It is shown by a parliamentary return, obtained by Major O'Reilly, that in National schools of which Presbyterians have control, thousands of Catholic children are obliged to attend. In these schools they received reli-

gious instruction from Protestant masters, learned Protestant Catechisms, and read the Protestant version of the Bible.

Can we be surprised that the Irish people resent this as an injustice and as a penal enactment? The whole population in Ireland would rejoice in the resolution of the National system into *bonâ fide* denominational schools. The Protestants would be as thankful as the Catholics. What is gained by tying them together in an unwilling alliance, distasteful to Protestants and penal upon Catholics? Surely Government has no need to create new Irish difficulties: nor to keep alive for a day, a grievance which might be taken away by Act of Parliament, as I have said, in one clause.

When the Irish ask for a Parliament in Dublin, they are reminded that it would reduce them from the dignity of an integral part of the mother country to the level of a colony. But England treats its colonies, in education as well as in religious equality, better than it treats Ireland. If the dignity of belonging to the mother country is to be purchased by the grievance of religious inequality, and of education stripped of the national religion, Ireland may be forgiven for asking for the portion of a daughter, and to be treated as a colony. The British Government has chartered and endowed colleges at Sydney and Melbourne, in Australia, and a Catholic University in Canada. But in Ireland the Catholic University has neither charter nor endowment. Three mixed colleges, which I must call by the Christian name Sir Robert Inglis gave them—Godless—

are offered to four millions of Catholics in Ireland; whilst the million of Protestants possess Trinity College, Dublin, endowed with 190,000 acres of land and a revenue of upwards of 30,000*l.* a year. These things the British Government has done for the Catholics of Canada, who are 1,200,000, and for the Catholics of Australia, who are some hundred thousands; but for the Catholic population of 4,500,000 in Ireland, neither charter nor endowment has been given. Is it strange that Ireland is not sufficiently sensible of the benefit of being called a part of the mother country? It is not thus that the mother country treats itself.

I come now to the two other subjects which demand more time for their settlement. They are both, however, within the control of Parliament, and both lie deep in the discontent of Ireland.

The first is the Established Church. It is long since I have heard any man argue for it. The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, calls it 'the garrison;' and that perhaps is the most and the best, perhaps also the worst, that friend and foe could say of it. England tried for a century to force Episcopacy upon Scotland. It has tried for three to force Protestantism upon Ireland. England had the timely wisdom to leave Scotland to its own religion. Let it have the tardy wisdom to leave Ireland to its faith. It may as well try to change the saltness of the sea as to make the Irish people Protestants. They have multiplied from the remnant of Connaught to a people which outnumbers fourfold their Protestant brethren, and overspreads in its dispersion the colonies of Great Britain and the United

States of America. The dream of conversion is long since dispelled for ever. There does not remain a shadow of reason or of justice for the hostile Church which for three hundred years has overspread the whole Catholic people of Ireland. Nay, more than this: it has become a danger to the Empire, and a reproach to England in the eyes of the whole Christian and civilised world.[5]

The Bishops of Ireland assembled in October last year, and made a noble and a Christian declaration. After affirming that the existence of a State Protestant Church spread all over Catholic Ireland is 'the fountain head of bitterness which poisons the relations of life, and estranges Protestants and Catholics, who ought to be an united people,' the document goes on to say that the Bishops and clergy will never accept endowment at the hands of the State out of the property and revenues once the possession of the Catholic Church, now held by the Protestant Establishment.

I do not pretend to represent those most reverend

[5] Mr. Burke did not consider the Protestant Establishment in Ireland 'a sentimental grievance.' His language in 1792 is happily, to a great extent, inapplicable to these times. But the following words are valuable, as showing that, in his judgment, it was the religious ascendency which produced and perpetuated the miseries of Ireland:

'I can never persuade myself that anything in our Thirty-nine Articles which differs from their Articles is worth making three millions of people slaves, to secure its teaching at the public expense; and I think he must be a strange man, a strange Christian, and a strange Englishman, who would not rather see Ireland a free, flourishing, happy *Catholic* country, though not *one* Protestant existed in it, than an enslaved, beggared, insulted, degraded Catholic country, as it is, with some Protestants here and there scattered through it, for the purpose, not of instructing the people, but of rendering them miserable.'—Letter of March 23, 1792, to Richard Burke jun.; *Correspondence*, vol. iii. p. 452.

prelates, but I seem to see the highest and most self-evident reasons for this resolution.

First. It is not difficult to imagine what would be the imputations heaped upon them if they had allowed the State to suppose that, in demanding the disendowment of the Establishment, they were willing to accept its revenues. A storm of popular abuse and of refined contempt would have pursued them as greedy, covetous, and grasping.

Secondly. If the revenues of the Establishment were transferred to the Catholic Church, a cause of deadly and intense heart-burning would at once spring up. The Protestants of Ireland would be excited to a sevenfold greater animosity against their Catholic fellow-subjects. A new and bitter hatred would have heated the furnace sevenfold. In this the Bishops have consulted, not only as Christians, but as statesmen, for the peace of the country, and even for the welfare of their adversaries.

Thirdly. In the last three centuries of its poverty, the Church in Ireland has been once more supplied by the Divine Providence with sufficient revenues. Once it possessed fixed endowments: now it is endowed with the free-will offerings of the people. Burke, in one of his letters, had this in view when he described the Catholic Church in Ireland, some few points excepted, as 'an image of a primitive Catholic Church.'[6] They

[6] 'I very much wish to see, before my death, an image of a primitive Christian Church. With little improvements, I think the Roman Catholic Church of Ireland very capable of exhibiting that state of things. I should not, by force or fraud or rapine, have ever reduced them to their present state. God forbid! But being in it, I conceive

who serve the altar in Ireland live of the altar. The highest exercise of mutual charity is reciprocally manifested by the pastors and their flocks. The old Church property has been desecrated, a new endowment has been found. When an old chalice has been stolen, a new one is consecrated. If the old one were restored, as it has been desecrated, melt it down, and give the silver to the poor. A new one has been provided, the old one is no longer needed. So with the old endowments. They belonged once to God. They have been taken away, and He has provided in another form for the service of His altar. They ought indeed to be restored; and let the restitution be fully made. But let it be made to Him in the hands of His poor. They are His representatives. Therefore it is that the Bishops declare that, 'by appropriating the ecclesiastical property of Ireland for the benefit of the poor, the Legislature would realise one of the purposes for which it was originally destined, and to which it was applied in Catholic times.' By this, the Bishops do not mean that it should be applied to relieve the landlords of the poor-rates, or the Government of the cost of education, but in other ways for which there is no provision.

There are many works of piety and charity, much needed in Ireland, which would absorb much. The rest

that much may be made of it, to the glory of religion, and the good of the State. If the other was willing to hear of any melioration, it might, without any strong perceivable change, be rendered much more useful. But prosperity is not apt to receive good lessons, nor always to give them; re-baptism you won't allow, but truly it would not be amiss for the Christian world to be re-christened.'—Letter to Rev. Dr. Hussey, February 27, 1795; *Correspondence*, vol. iv. p. 284.

would go direct to the poor if it were applied to such a settlement of the land as would lift the families of the poor by giving them an interest in the soil.

But the question of applying the proceeds, be it easy or difficult of solution, in no way bears upon the absolute duty of withdrawing from Catholic Ireland the ubiquitous offence and challenge of a Protestant Establishment in every diocese and in every parish, where sometimes the whole population is exclusively Catholic. Perfect religious equality, as in Canada and Australia, is the sole way of peace and justice between England and Ireland.

And now, my Lord, I will not shrink from venturing even upon the land question, because it is the chief and paramount condition on which the peace of Ireland depends. In comparison with this question, all others are light. It is the question of the people and of the poor; of social peace or agrarian war; of life or of death to millions. Until lately we have been led to believe that no one could understand it. We have been persuaded by the confident assertions of men to shut our mouths before it, as if it had some special and infallible difficulty; as if it were a problem that statesmen could not unravel, of which political economists could render no account. Foreign nations are not of this opinion: they see no exceptional difficulty or complexity about it; and there are some general truths and governing axioms connected with it about which there can be no reasonable doubt. To these I shall confine myself, and they will be enough to show the inevitable necessity of legislation on the relation of the Irish people to the land.

I will begin, then, by affirming that there is a natural and divine law, anterior and superior to all human and civil law, by which every people has a right to live of the fruits of the soil on which they are born, and in which they are buried. This is a right older and higher than any personal right. It is the intrinsic right of the whole people and society, out of which all private rights to the soil and its fruits are created, and by which those created rights must always be controlled. A starving man commits no theft if he saves his life by eating of his neighbour's bread so much as is necessary for the support of his existence. The civil law yields before the higher jurisdiction of the divine, as the positive divine law yields before the natural law of God. Even the 'shewbread' might be eaten to save life. If at any time the civil laws shall so define the property of private persons as to damage the public weal, the supreme civil power has both the power and the duty so to modify those private rights as to reconcile them with the public good. No better example can be found than in the Act of Elizabeth, whereby the land in England was charged with the relief of the poor. The Law of Settlement is a modified right to the soil—a right to live on it and of it. The poor are joint owners of the usufruct. The land being a fixed quantity, and the people an extending quantity, it is inevitable that the preoccupation of the whole area of the country by a small number of landlords must have the effect of excluding or disinheriting the greater part of the people from all possession of the soil. The poor law, therefore, charged the general estate with a rent-charge for

the younger children of the realm. Nothing can be conceived more just; and yet, when it was proposed in 1838 for Ireland, it was called 'confiscation.' For three hundred years the landlords in England had clearly recognised it as a just law; Irish landlords resisted it as a violation of the rights of property. It is to be doubted if the land laws of England would have lasted till this date if the Act of Elizabeth had not made their exclusiveness tolerable to the mass of the people. Here, then, is a wise and just modification of private rights by a higher law—'Salus populi suprema lex.' It is a law as conservative as it is just. Without it, where would be now the great estates of England? The late Sir Robert Peel said to a friend, from whom I heard it, that by the repeal of the corn laws he had saved the landlords against their will. The same will, I trust, be true of the land laws in Ireland.

I need not recite what all men know, that there is no right of private property which is not modified, not only by those higher laws, but also by a multitude of positive enactments, based only on public utility. What are the forced sales of all kinds of property, even the most valuable to the owners, ancestral estates, and cherished homes, if a line of railway be required? In building our own dwelling-houses, we are limited and controlled in endless ways, as to frontages, and lights, and construction. We cannot use our own land except under limitations which take from its extent. We cannot do what we will with our own. We cannot even let in the light of heaven, which is *res nullius*, and

therefore the universal property of all men, except under conditions which protect our neighbour, not in life and limb, but in convenience and comfort. We may not set up mills or works upon a river which may cause the stream to alter its course, and to damage our neighbour down the stream. We may not bank our own side of the river so as to make it eat away the shore of the opposite owner. Our whole law is full of wise, equitable, merciful limitations upon the absolute right of private property. The notion that we may do what we will with our own—that is, that we have no limit to our use but our own will—is false every way, immoral, and contrary to all laws civil, natural, and divine. In the use and employment of our private rights, we are subject to the public good. If we respect the public good, the Legislature has no need to intervene. If we use our extreme rights to our neighbour's hurt, the law will justly come in to protect him, and to limit our freedom. In England the traditions of centuries, the steady growth of our mature social order, the ripening of our agriculture and of our industry, the even distribution and increase of wealth, has reduced the relation of landlord and tenant to a fixed, though it be an unwritten, law, by which the rights of both are protected. There may be in England no need of land laws. Our land customs may be enforced in the courts, and thereby have the force of law. English landlords, as a rule, live on their estates. Their lands are their homes. English tenants are protected by the mightiest power that ever ruled a Christian country—a power which controls the Legislature, dictates the laws, and guides even the sovereignty of the

Crown—the force of a vigilant, watchful, ubiquitous, public opinion.

But in Ireland none of these things are so. In one-fourth of Ireland there are land laws, or, rather, land customs, which protect the tenant. In three-fourths of Ireland there are neither laws nor customs. The tenants are tenants at will. Over a vast proportion of Ireland the landlords are absentees. The mitigating and restraining influences of the lords of the soil, which in England, and in every civilised country, do more to correct the excesses of agents, speculators, and traffickers, and to temper legal rights with equity and moderation, are hardly to be found. The substantial improvements upon farms, and the buildings necessary for agriculture, are made, not by the landlord, as in England, but by the tenant in Ireland. Is this to be found in any other country of Europe? The tenant has no security that his outlay is his own, or that he shall ever reap the benefit of it. Whatever goes into the soil, whatever is built upon it, 'fructificat domino.' The landlord may raise his rent at will, and give him notice to quit at will. The tenant at will may be put out for any cause; not only for non-payment of rent, or waste of his land, or bad farming, or breach of covenant, if such can be supposed to exist, all of which would bear a colour of justice; but for the personal advantage of the landlord arising from the tenant's improvements; for political influence; for caprice, for any passing reason, or no reason, assigned, or not assignable, which can arise in minds conscious of absolute and irresponsible power. This is an evil state. Abso-

lute and irresponsible power is too great for man. Even supreme civil rulers do not possess it; but the rights of property, as they are claimed in Ireland, in respect to the amount of rent and the eviction of tenants, are absolute and irresponsible. The very term 'tenant at will' is there of dangerous sound. If the events which have passed in Ireland since 1810 had passed in England, the public opinion of this country would have imperiously compelled the Legislature to turn our land customs into Acts of Parliament. If any sensible proportion of the people of the English counties were to be seen moving down upon the Thames for embarkation to America, and dropping by the roadside from hunger and fever, and it had been heard by the wayside that they were 'tenants at will,' evicted for any cause whatsoever, the public opinion of the country would have risen to render impossible the repetition of such absolute and irresponsible exercise of legal rights. It would erect tribunals to judge between landlords and tenants; it would reduce to open and legal process the exercise of these imperial rights claimed by private citizens. If five millions, that is a fourth of the English people, had either emigrated in a mass, by reason of discontent, misery, or eviction, or had died by fever and by famine since the year 1848, the whole land system of England would have been modified so as to render the return of such a national danger impossible for ever. But both these suppositions have been verified in Ireland.

Whole counties have been sensibly drained of their population; the public ways have been choked by

departing trains of emigrants; one-fourth of the population of Ireland fled from it, or died of hunger and fever, and yet the Legislature still maintains the land laws under which these things are possible. Parliament did, indeed, fifteen years ago, solemnly recognise the right of tenants, but that recognition lies dead on the record. This, too, adds bitterness to those who suffer. Their right has been acknowledged, but its protection has for fifteen years been delayed. Of this, however, it will be better to speak hereafter. That I may not seem to use exaggeration, I will give one or two statements from an authority I cannot mistrust. In the year 1849, more than 50,000 evictions took place; more than 50,000 families were turned out of their dwellings without pity and without refuge. 'If we assume that the evictions of one year, 1849, admitting it to be an exceptional one, represented a fifth of those which occurred in twenty years, our calculation would be below and not above the truth. Give only four individuals to each evicted family, and we have, on a moderate estimate, one million of human beings driven by force from their homes.'[7] This is softly called a 'clearance.' Mr. Butt, from whom I quote these statements, goes on to say: 'Let us estimate impartially—calmly, if we can—the character of these evictions. They were not the ordinary transactions in which the owner of property reclaims it from persons in whose hands he does not wish it to remain; they were in many instances clearances of estates, that is, the dispossession of a whole population from their

[7] *Land Tenure in Ireland*, by Isaac Butt, Esq., p. 34.

ancestral homes. These people were cottiers, it is true. Their existence had become inconvenient to the great lord to whose ancestors Oliver Cromwell's grant had given the ownership of the land. From generation to generation, they and their forefathers had lived as cottiers upon that land under a system tolerated by law. The hope of gain, the dread of a poor-rate, the desire for large farms, had prompted the edict which commanded that the whole condition of life in an entire district shall be changed. By what name shall we call a wholesale extermination that followed such an edict as this? It is vain to disguise it as the exercise of any right of civilised property.'[8]

The same author adds two other instances. 'I could tell of another estate, on which the landlord's agent has laid down the rule that, under no circumstances, shall two families be permitted to live in the same house. An aged widow invited her daughter, who had lost her husband, to take share of her house. For this crime, although occupying a respectable position—the mother of a Roman Catholic priest—she is actually evicted from a farm where she had lived for nearly fifty years. She is given her choice to leave that home or send away her daughter.'

One other instance, and it is the last. 'A townland in one of the midland counties was inhabited by a prosperous and contented community. An estate of about five hundred acres was divided into thirteen farms; thirteen thriving families occupied the ground, a happy and contented tenantry, numbering thirteen

[8] *Land Tenure in Ireland*, p. 34.

families. They paid as rent the full value of their farms. They paid that rent punctually. The families of some had occupied for centuries the same farms. The industry of themselves and their forefathers had given fertility to the soil. Crime was unknown among them. Disputes with their landlord they had none.

'It suited the convenience of their landlord to sell his interest in this estate. The purchaser was buying it to traffic in it, and he believed it would be more marketable if it were freed from the encumbrance of human beings. To effectuate this object, the seller covenanted to clear the estate. The tenants, who had paid up every penny of their rent, were all served with notice to quit; they were all evicted. Thirteen human habitations were levelled, the inmates turned out upon the world, reduced at once from comfort to absolute beggary. It so happened that, in this instance, the landlord adopted a course which enabled a jury to strain the law, and award these poor tenants ample compensation. But for the awkwardness with which the proceeding was carried out, it might all have been done without the power of any human tribunal to take cognisance of the wrong. An accidental blunder in the process put it in the power of a jury of landlords, by the damages they awarded, to mark their sense of the moral character of the act.'[9]

I doubt not, my Lord, that these things already are well known to you. But I believe they are unknown to the English people at large. I do not believe they would rest a day without crying out to be

[9] *Land Tenure in Ireland*, p. 40.

delivered from the shame of partaking, even by silence, in such atrocities. When a writer like Mr. Mill affirms that the conscience of Europe condemns us for our treatment of Ireland, there are critics among us who deride his words. But his words are measured and true. I have talked freely for many years with men of most countries in Europe. I have found everywhere a profound sympathy with Ireland, in no way flattering to England. Our insularity keeps these things from our ears, and we therefore soothe ourselves with the notion of our own superiority to other men. But such an abuse of the rights of property is without parallel, at least in this century, on the continent of Europe. Our self-respect should lead us to give up the illusion that our office in the civilised world is to 'teach the nations how to live.' We may learn of Prussia, France, Switzerland, and Tuscany, even of Canada and Prince Edward's Island, all of which are in advance of England in the solution of what is called the 'land question' in Ireland.

How is it to be expected that a people will be industrious who have no security that they will not be swept off the land they till? How will they improve it if they have no security that they shall retain the benefit of that improvement? How shall justice be done to the land unless it be improved by advancing cultivation? How shall cultivation advance if improvements be visited by a rise in the rent, and the increased rent be enforced by notice to quit? How shall the land so treated fail to breed famine and fever, and a people so harassed restrain themselves from

a wild discontent and bitter retaliation? The same would be the state of England if custom, which is the 'mother of quietness,' and therefore of plenty, did not protect the tenant from arbitrary rents and arbitrary evictions.

It is sometimes over-boldly said that landlords in Ireland are not guilty of these abuses of extreme rights. If so, then they would not be in any way wronged if the Legislature, by statute, should make such abuses to be for ever impossible. The bare possibility of such acts of arbitrary power destroys confidence, and ought to be legally extinguished. What just landlord would complain if he were so limited by law as to be unable to commit three wrongs—first, the wrong of abusing his right by arbitrary eviction; secondly, by exacting an exorbitant rent; thirdly, by appropriating to his own use the improvements effected by the industry of his tenants? A merciful man would not only not resent such a law, but would gladly preclude the possibility that any owner of land should blot the fair name of landlord, and embitter the hearts of men against his whole class by such injustice. It has been well said, 'A whole people must not hold their position in the country upon the chances of individual character. In a country like Ireland, to give the power of doing such things is to insure that they will be done.'[10] And none would be more glad of such merciful laws as would prevent their being done than they who now mercifully use their arbitrary rights, and refrain from doing them.

[10] *Land Tenure in Ireland*, p. 40.

But it is not my intention to enter into any detailed plans or schemes for such a purpose. I do not pretend to draft a land bill, or even to give the heads. But any one may lay down the principles which ought to govern this question, and may do so without hesitation, and upon the highest authority. In the year 1852, the Government of Lord Derby introduced a Bill affirming the great principle of equity, 'That the property created by the industry of the tenant belongs of right and in justice to himself, and that it is the duty of the Legislature to protect it by law.'[11]

This Bill was accepted and supported by the Government of Lord Aberdeen, which succeeded in 1853. It was supported by all the three great political parties in the State. It was urged upon Parliament by the first statesmen and lawyers of the day; by Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, Sir George Grey, Sir George Lewis, by Sir Richard Bethell, Mr. Cairns, Mr. Napier, Mr. Whiteside, now four of the highest authorities of the law in Great Britain and Ireland. The Bill was passed by large majorities, but never became law. In 1855 it was revived in the House of Commons, and lost. But majorities, though they make laws, cannot unmake rights. The great right of equity, once so clearly seen and so authoritatively enunciated, remains as a witness of justice, and a warning of the danger which will never pass away till justice be done. I say justice without fear, because legal right is not always just. The highest legal right is sometimes the greatest wrong. Human law is but an imperfect expression of

[11] *Land Tenure in Ireland*, p. 85.

the natural and divine right which is anterior and superior to all legislation. There are axioms and principles which restrain, modify, and suspend the action of law, and become a higher law of supreme jurisdiction. What is the High Court of Equity but a tribunal above the law, dispensing justice often against the letter of the law, of which it may be truly said, 'The letter killeth, the spirit giveth life'? And what is the High Court of Parliament but a tribunal higher even than the Court of Chancery? And to this tribunal the Irish people come, as Sicily came of old for redress of wrongs to the Imperial Senate. Ireland prays that it may be declared by the Sovereign Justice of the Empire that the property in the soil which the industry and enterprise of the tillers and tenants of the soil have created, though by law it belongs to the landlord, nevertheless, by moral right, higher than all other law, belongs to those who have created it. Of this supreme right of natural and divine justice, it is that they claim the protection of the highest tribunal of the realm. Scotland and England already possess this security by customs. Why should it be denied to Ireland? Where these customs exist, they ought to be made into law; where they do not exist, they ought by law to be created.

It may be thought that I have ventured to speak upon a subject which is beyond both my capacity and my duty. But I have done so from the profound conviction that the deepest and sorest cause of the discontent and unrest of Ireland is the land question. I am day by day in contact with an impoverished race driven

from home by the land question. I see it daily in the destitution of my flock. The religious inequality does indeed keenly wound and excite the Irish people. Peace and good-will can never reign in Ireland until every stigma is effaced from the Catholic Church and faith, and the galling injustice of religious inequality shall have been redressed. This, indeed, is true. But the 'Land Question,' as we call it, by a somewhat heartless euphemism, means hunger, thirst, nakedness, notice to quit, labour spent in vain, the toil of years seized upon, the breaking up of homes, the miseries, sicknesses, deaths of parents, children, wives; the despair and wildness which spring up in the hearts of the poor when legal force, like a sharp harrow, goes over the most sensitive and vital rights of mankind. All this is contained in the land question. It is this which spreads through the people in three-fourths of Ireland with an all-pervading and thrilling intensity. It is this intolerable grief which has driven hundreds of thousands to America, there to bide the time of return. No greater self-deception could we practise on ourselves than to imagine that Fenianism is the folly of a few apprentices and shop-boys. Fenianism could not have survived for a year if it were not sustained by the traditional and just discontent of almost a whole people. Such acts of rashness and violence as have marked the last twelve months may be the work of a few, and those of no high or formidable classes; but they would never have been perpetrated, they would never have been possible, if it were not for the profound estrangement of a large part of the people from British

laws and from British Government. This feeling is to be found nowhere more calm, deep, and inflexible than among those who are in immediate contact with the 'land question;' that is, in the occupiers and tenants, and in the labourers, whose lot is better or worse as the occupiers and tenants prosper or are impoverished. These are neither apprentices nor shop-boys; neither are they a handful, but a population; and a population in close kindred and living sympathy with millions who have tasted the civil and religious equality, and are thriving under the land laws, of the United States. Let us not deceive ourselves. Ireland is between two great assimilating powers, England and America. The play and action of America upon England, if it be seven days slower in reaching Ireland than that of England, is sevenfold more penetrating and powerful upon the whole population. It is estimated that in the last twenty-five years 24,000,000*l.* have been sent over by the Irish in America for the relief or for the emigration of their kindred and friends. The perfect unity of heart, will, and purpose which unites the Irish on either side of the Atlantic cannot be more complete. Add to this, that the assimilating power of England, which has overcome the resistance of Scotland, and absorbed it into itself, is met by a stern repulsion in Ireland, which keeps the two races asunder. Add again, that the assimilating power of America is met and welcomed with gratitude, sympathy, aspiration; that the attitude of Ireland has long been, as Sir Robert Peel said in Parliament five-and-twenty years ago:

'With her back turned to England, and her face to the west.'

Four millions and a half of Irish in Ireland turn instinctively to five millions of Irish in America.

It is this that every statesman and citizen ought to weigh; and the first condition to estimating the gravity of the danger is to put away the childish shallowness with which some of our public papers have treated Fenianism. For nearly three hundred years, the same diseases in Ireland have produced the same perils. In the seventeenth century, the men who should have been our strength were in the armies of Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Poland, and the Low Countries. In the eighteenth century, according to the records of the War Office in France, 450,000 are stated to have died between 1690 and 1745 in the French service; and as many more, it is believed, between 1745 and the beginning of this century. Is this imperial wisdom or imperial strength? My Lord, I will not pursue these thoughts. I cannot think that the statesman who will not staunch this ebbing of our life-blood will deserve well of his country. And I do not think that any man who cannot, at least in some measure, do so is a statesman. It needs little wisdom or capacity to see that the constitution which fitted England in its childhood, when it was bounded by Berwick Castle and the Cinque Ports, is a garment too narrow to cover the limbs of three kingdoms. The Tudor Statutes will not even clothe Great Britain. Presbyterian Scotland has indignantly cast off the English Constitution in Church and State. Great Britain and Ireland cannot any longer be straitened in the Penal Statutes of Crom-

well and the Revolution. We have outgrown not only our swaddling clothes and the gear of our childhood: we have become an empire of many races, and of many religions; and the worst enemy of our civil and religious peace could devise no surer policy of discord, and no more fatal device of ruin, than the attempt to keep alive the ascendency of race over race, of religion over religion, of church over church. A policy of absolute equality in religion is alone imperial, and, I will add, if the empire is to hold together, is alone possible. It is already, with few and slight lingering imperfections, realised in our colonies: Canada and Australia have led the way, and are teaching the mother country how to live. I trust we shall not be too proud to learn our lesson. As one who towards the end of life can look back without discerning a deed or word at variance with the heartfelt loyalty of an Englishman, and as one who next after that which is not of this world desires earnestly to see maintained the unity, solidity, and prosperity of the British Empire, I implore all who are near the springs of sovereign power, and are able to guide by their wisdom the course of legislation, to take no rest until they shall have raised Ireland to an absolute equality, social, political, and religious, with England and Scotland, and shall have won back the love and fidelity of the noble-hearted, generous, heroic people of Catholic Ireland. Sir John Davies, Attorney-General in Ireland in 1613, no soft judge by nature or by office of the Irish nation, has left on record his opinion, formed on the experience of many years, 'That there is no nation of people under the sun that doth

love equal and indifferent justice better than the Irish, or will rest better satisfied with the executions thereof, although it be against themselves, so that they may have the protection and benefits of the law when upon just cause they do desire it.'

Let 'equal and indifferent justice' be done even now, and the heart of Ireland may yet be won.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your obedient servant,

✠ H. E. Manning.

March 12, 1868.

X.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Session 1868-9.

In opening our proceedings of the year before last, I made certain observations on the state and tendency of religious thought in England, and on the temper and spirit in which we ought to meet it. And now, in addressing you at the outset of our eighth year, I do not know that I can do better than to take up the same subject where I left off. In the conclusion of the paper I then read were these words,—'The royal supremacy has perished by the law of mortality which consumes all earthly things.' I need hardly guard my words by saying that I spoke only of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown. The civil and political supremacy was never contested. The power of the Crown, if less absolute in its mode of procedure, was never more supreme, and never so widely spread as now. Its indefeasible prerogatives in the order of civil Government have become more evident and irresistible in proportion as it has disengaged itself from the monstrous pretensions of Henry VIII. The theory of established Churches demands an ecclesiastical supremacy in the civil power. The two come and go together; and when the ecclesiastical supremacy is declining, the days of

establishments are numbered. In the year before last, I pointed out the fact that the Tudor Statutes have almost passed away. The greater part are actually erased from the statute-book. Those that remain are almost equally dead. The mind of the country is against them. In Ireland all the tyranny of Tudors and Stuarts failed to impose the royal supremacy upon a Catholic people. Penal laws could not accomplish it. The Established Church has not only utterly failed to conciliate the people of Ireland to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown, but it has rendered the name and thing more than ever intolerable.[1] In Scotland the whole people rose against it. In England half the population has gradually rejected it. The remaining half of the people passively endure it; but in the Established Church itself a large class profess to limit the jurisdiction of the Crown in ecclesiastical matters to the temporal accessories of spiritual things, denying altogether its competence to touch any matter purely spiritual, and rejecting all royal acts exceeding these limits, as abuses or excesses of power. Now, though this theory is manifestly not the law of the land, it is nevertheless worthy of our sympathy and respect. It is an additional evidence of the cancelling of the Tudor supremacy from many of the best and highest minds in the Established Church. They who hold this theory protest against all such judgments as that in the case of Mr. Gorham and of the *Essays and Reviews*. They treat them as tyrannical acts of the State, external to

[1] Since this was written the Established Church in Ireland has ceased to exist.

the Church of England. They contend that the Church of England is persecuted, but not committed by such acts of the Crown. The facts are not so; but it is a hopeful sign that the members of the Established Church have come to reject these pretensions of the Tudor supremacy. It is equivalent to an admission that the Catholics were right in refusing it from the first; that their instincts are justified by the event. I note this because it is an evidence of the direction in which the stream is running; and both charity and generosity require of us to forward these tendencies with all good-will, and without a word of unkindly comment.

To those whose memories can reach back to the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and to the emancipation of Catholics, it is evident that the changes we now see hurrying onwards like the race of a tide have been long preparing. The Church of England was morally disestablished by the change in our polity which placed its destinies in the hands of a constituency and a legislature in which Dissenters from the State religion form a very powerful element. From that day the Church of England began to appeal to its own spiritual authority and to exert its own internal energies. It became a voluntary body in three distinct ways,—in the multiplication of churches dependent on voluntary offerings, in the founding of schools without endowments, and in the multiplication of colonial bishoprics. Twenty years and more ago those who watched the voluntary churches formed in our colonies foresaw that the colonies would react upon the mother

country, and that the unestablished churches of Canada and Australia would insure and hasten the disestablishment of their mother church. But no one, I think, foresaw how soon or how rapidly the question would be raised. They who can remember the political events from 1830 to 1840 will recollect how violent were the outcries against the Established Church, and the demands for the removal of the Bishops from the House of Lords. The Establishment was formidably threatened, but it was not as yet in much danger. The old political and social traditions were too strong: the power of the Establishment in Parliament was paramount. It was confident of its own strength, and defiant of its adversaries. The time of reforming abuses was come, because the time of disestablishment was not yet. As now the time of reforming abuses in the Irish Church is past, because the time of disestablishing is come. But since 1840 irresistible currents of change have been working within the Church Establishment. It has been parting asunder by the repulsion of two schools, each tending to their ultimate analysis, the Anglo-Catholic and the Critical, or, to use not offensively, but only for clearness-sake, two other terms, the Romanising and the Rationalistic Schools. These two forms of thought and these two intellectual tendencies are so fully launched into activity that nothing can restrain them from reaching their natural points of rest. The Church of England is incapable of controlling or of holding them together. It cannot do so by authority, for both reject it; the one as incompetent, the other as inadmissible. It cannot do so by intel-

lectual control, for both alike regard the Anglican reformation as intellectually incoherent. It cannot do so by spiritual suasion, for both alike regard it as unattractive in its influences. Still less can it do so by its coercive judgments, for both alike appeal from them to their own standards of Catholicity or of Reason. This development of two counter and divergent movements has now been in operation for thirty years, and every successive decade has revealed that for the Church of England to return upon its past, or to retain its present attitude towards its own members, towards the country, towards the Catholic Church, is impossible. It is to be observed that the noted controversies on baptism and inspiration had no sooner ended with the decision of the Crown in Council than a new class of questions was forced upon the supreme tribunal of appeal. The appeals in causes of doctrine had revealed the true pretensions of the royal supremacy in matters of belief. This rendered the royal supremacy intolerable at home. The appeals in matters of jurisdiction from Natal revealed the pretensions, but also the incompetence, of the Crown in matters of authority, and this rendered the royal supremacy intolerable in the colonies. Some of the best and most capable minds in the colonies are demanding freedom, which means disestablishment for their Church, and that demand is supported at least for the colonies, and sometimes for even more, by a powerful sympathy at home. Some also of the best and most capable minds in England are prophesying that the Church of England must be disestablished, and are not only preparing for the event,

but not obscurely invoking it as a release from the burden of a civil supremacy in matters of conscience.

The Church of England has come to see that the supremacy of Kings has passed into the supremacy of Parliaments. The change in our political constitution is by itself effacing the whole theory of the Tudor supremacy. It is now resolved into the supremacy of the popular will. It was already intolerable to have an appellate jurisdiction in the Crown. It is still more intolerable to have it vested in the electoral constituency. This is powerfully and rapidly estranging men's minds from the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown. While, on the one hand, those who reject it are fashioning to themselves theories more or less near to the Catholic doctrine, on the other, writers of note are fashioning a new theory of a National Church and of the royal supremacy. Dean Stanley and the *Pall Mall Gazette* may be taken to represent this new school of pure Erastianism. Dean Stanley is tolerant, comprehensive, and patient of endless contradictions within the communion of the National Church. If the nation be divided in religious opinion, so must, or rather ought to be, the National Church. The *Pall Mall Gazette* is peremptory in erecting the popular will, exercised through the Government and tribunals of the country, into the ultimate judge and disposer of the National religion. The supremacy of Cæsarism is past. The supremacy of the democracy will be the next form of ecclesiastical authority. So long as there is an Establishment, this supreme control will be claimed; but the claim is in itself intolerable, and nothing can more

powerfully alienate men from the idea of an Establishment.

There are only the five following conclusions or theories possible:

First, that the Church and the State should stand in relations of mutual recognition, amity, and co-operation, under the supreme direction of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, Pontiff and King; or,

Secondly, that the Church be established, and thereby subjected to the State, as in Constantinople after the schism, in England by Henry VIII., and in Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; or,

Thirdly, that the State should establish and endow all communions alike, and assume a supreme control over them all.

Fourthly, that the State, holding itself aloof from all contact with religion and religious communions, shall nevertheless exercise a supreme control over them all.

Fifthly, that all religious communions in a country be disestablished, that is, tolerated, but not incorporated in the public laws, the State ceasing to interfere in any way with them.

The first is the ecclesiastical supremacy for which S. Thomas and Sir Thomas More laid down their lives.

The second is the royal supremacy of Henry VIII.

The third has been proposed by many English statesmen, and is recommended now by many for Ireland.

The fourth is the theory to which the rationalistic liberalism of this country is tending.

The fifth is the state to which a power higher than

theory, the irresistible current of events, is carrying us. They who promote it may be adversaries of the Church, but the Church will know how to use it for its own liberty and mission to the world.

It may be not unreasonable to examine these several theories, because with surprise and regret I have observed that even among Catholics the true relations of the Church and the State have been so imperfectly defined, that some confound the union or concord of Church and State with what is called the Establishment of the Church.

It is the more remarkable that such an illusion should have existed, because in the Syllabus of 1864 Pius IX. has condemned the proposition 'that it is lawful to constitute National Churches separate from the Roman Pontiff.'[2] This alone is enough to show that, in condemning the proposition 'that the Church ought to be separate from the State and the State from the Church,' the Holy Father had no intention to recognise in any sense as the Church the national bodies whose very existence he had condemned already.

In order to illustrate what is the union of Church and State which the Holy Father sanctions in the act of condemning the theory of separation, I will take the history of the Church in England, and I do so the more willingly because I have lately had often to speak on the same topic; but the report of my words has in every case omitted the chief evidence on which the whole argument depends.

The earliest historical document in which the

[2] Syllabus of Pius IX., prop. 37.

Church in its corporate character is recognised by the public law of England is a canon of the Council of Berghamstede or Barsted in Kent under Withred, king of Kent, in the year 697, that is, a century after S. Augustin. There are three versions of the canon. The first is given by Sir Henry Spelman as follows: 'Let the Church be free, and enjoy its judgments, and revenues, and pensions. Let prayers be made for the King, and let men obey his laws, not by coercion of necessity, but of free will.'[3] The second version is given by Wilkins: 'Let the Church enjoy immunity and tributes, and let prayer be made for the King, and let him be honoured, not by coercion, but of free will.'[4] The third in Johnson's *Canons* runs: 'A freedom from taxes belongs to the Church, and let men pray for the King, and honour him of their own accord, without any compulsory law.'[5]

Now in all these three versions alike the Church is recognised as a body or corporation, or, to use a later language, as a moral person, and is so treated with by the public law of the land. Secondly, it was declared to have a liberty or an immunity of its own, which the public law respected and preserved. Thirdly, it had its judgments, that is, its tribunals, jurisdictions, and sentences. Fourthly, it had its revenues, pensions, and tributes, which were held by the Church, and recognised by the State. Lastly, in its prayers for the King it made intercession, not by any royal command, but by the instinct of Christian piety.

[3] Spelman's *Councils*, tom. i. p. 194.
[4] Wilkins' *Concilia*, vol. i. p. 60.
[5] Johnson's *Canons*, vol. i. sub anno DCXCVI.

This corporate character the Church has from its Divine Founder, with the powers of government, legislation, and judicial authority committed to it. The word 'body' was first applied to a multitude of persons taken collectively by S. Paul. This Church is 'the Body of Christ.' It is therefore a corporation by the same metaphor. From this main and primary idea of a corporate existence, the term 'corporation' was communicated in after ages to the integral parts of the Church, such as Bishops, Chapters, Parochial Churches, and the like. They were called corporations, sole and aggregate, because they represent the Church, its powers and rights. Such is the true order of this subject, and not as a pretentious critic, replying to my words, would have it. After a conceited contempt of others, he tells us that the Church is not a corporation, but only its integral parts, such as I have before cited. But the truth is that their corporate character is communicated to them by the Church in behalf of which they hold property and exercise jurisdiction. The parish priest is *persona ecclesiæ*, the representative of the Church, so also the Bishop in a higher sense; but neither would ever have received the title of 'corporation,' if the Church had not been first recognised as a body divinely founded and incorporated. This one canon therefore is enough to show the relation of the Church to the State. It was one of legal recognition, union, amity, and protection. It was a corporation independent, self-sufficing, the sole fountain of its own jurisdiction, endowed with supernatural liberty, holding its own consecrated goods, exercising juris-

diction, both legislative and judicial. Its immunity from civil laws arose from its sovereign rights derived from its Divine Head. This sovereignty within its own sphere included the election of its own pastors, the judgment of its own members, its union with the visible Head of the Church on earth. In the centuries which followed, the Church became largely endowed, its Bishops became important civil personages. The laws of the land recognised its immunity and its jurisdiction. In the Saxon Councils the Church and the State met, each legislating in its own sphere, and each recognising and accepting the other's laws. Johnson, in his preface to the collection of canons, says, 'That it is hard to say whether those assemblies were synods or parliaments.' In fact they were both, but neither crossed the legislation of the other. What the Church decreed as canons, the Parliament enacted as laws. In the administration of justice the King's thane and the world's thane, that is, the Bishop and the Earl, sat together. In all this the Church was recognised as an independent, and, in many things, as a superior, power and jurisdiction. The union of the Church and State in this sense has the sanction of the Catholic Church in all ages. The dissolution or divorce of this union is condemned by Pius IX. as an error.

This state of the law of England continued with occasional violations down to the time of Henry VIII.

This state of the law was confirmed by the unbroken course of legislation down to the Council of Clarendon. It had been confirmed also by the oaths of Danish, Saxon, and Norman kings. William the

Conqueror swore by his royal oath to observe these liberties; so did his successors, as William Rufus, who persecuted S. Anselm, and Henry II., who martyred S. Thomas. It is true, nevertheless, that both the Saxon and the Norman kings gradually usurped upon the freedom of the Church by customs; that is, by personal and royal influences over persons in the matter of its elections, and over its possessions. The influence of the King was often too great to leave much liberty of election to the Chapters. And this, before the Conquest, was all the more likely to occur from the close union and co-operation of the two powers. The Councils were also Parliaments, and in the County Courts the two jurisdictions ran together. It is therefore undoubtedly true that even the Saxon kings promoted their favourites to bishoprics, and thereby violated the freedom of election; and also that the royal influence drew to itself the decision of mixed questions, which belonged strictly to the ecclesiastical tribunal. It is, nevertheless, certain that by both the canons of the Church and by the laws of England the Church possessed its immunities or liberties in elections, judgments, appeals to Rome, and in the freehold of its revenues, lands, and goods. This state of the law was confirmed by William the Conqueror on oath, and violated by him more systematically than by any of the Saxon kings. What they had been used to attempt, he claimed as *customs* of the realm. They were avowedly, *præter legem*, at variance with the law. They in effect suspended the law without rescinding it. The law required that the Church should be free;

the customs of the Crown deprived it of its freedom. Just as at this day a *congé d'élire* is attended by a letter of nomination, and the Anglican Chapters choose the man whom they are unable to reject. This is a fair sample of custom overruling law.

This state of the law, then, continued down to the 24 of Henry VIII. It was vindicated by S. Anselm and by S. Thomas; it was incorporated in the first article of Magna Charta, the words of which are almost a transcript of the Canon of Berghamstede. The King says, 'First, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her whole rights and her liberties unhurt.' The charter goes on to specify in particular the freedom of elections. I have dwelt upon this in order to make clear that no amount of precedents or historical examples of royal influences in contravention of the liberties of the Church during the Saxon or early Norman period affects the assertion that those liberties were recognised and incorporated in the laws of the land, and that the contrary customs were abuses and excesses of royal power, not only not warranted by law, but in direct violation of the same. It is certain, indeed, that from the time of Richard II. (13 and 16 Ric. II.) the statutes of Provisors and other anti-papal Acts of Parliament began to incorporate these customs in the statutes of the realm; and that, finally, the customs claimed by Henry II. were incorporated in the 24, 25, and 26 of Henry VIII. But I will not anticipate. For the present, I wish only to show that the liberties of the Church were the laws of the land, and the violations of these liberties were not by law

but against law, and had no warrant but the alleged customs of kings. In order to place this beyond doubt, I might quote the contemporary lives of S. Thomas, by Edward Grim, Roger of Pontigny, John of Salisbury, Alan of Tewkesbury, William of Canterbury, Henry and Roger of Croyland, and others; but I prefer to make shorter work of it, and to recite a few passages which are decisive. They shall be taken from the letters of S. Thomas to Pope Alexander III.; from the narrative of those who were present at the conflicts between the Archbishop and the King; and, finally, from the Retractation of the Archbishop of York and of the King himself. I need not do more than remind you that the constitutions of Clarendon were drawn up by the order of Henry II., and are the mind of the King expressed in his own words. The 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12 of those constitutions violate the liberties of the Church, in the immunity of the clergy and of its goods, the freedom of its tribunals, elections, and appeals. They made the King's courts and the King's appellate jurisdiction superior to the Archbishop, and final. The sum of the whole contest between Henry II. and S. Thomas, cannot be better expressed than in two lines from an old chronicle:

> 'That the King be in the Pope's stede,
> And amend the Archbishop's dede.'

Writing to the Pope, S. Thomas says, 'Be pleased to read over the Bill of those reprobate usages which he claims against the Church, and on account of which I am banished; and your Holiness will see clearly that, before I made any stand, he had, by these same usages,

stopped the mouths of all who would appeal to your court; prohibited all ecclesiastical persons from crossing the sea till an oath had been exacted from them; suffocated the rights of elections; drawn all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, before his own courts; and run his dagger into every liberty of the Church.'

S. Thomas here enumerates four liberties: that is, 1. of appeal; 2. of access to Rome; 3. of election; 4. of tribunals. 'I choose rather,' he adds, 'to be an outcast from the palace, to be exiled, proscribed, and to finish my life in the last wretchedness, than to seal the Church's liberty, and to prefer the iniquitous traditions of men to the law of God.'[6]

John of Salisbury, who was present at the conference between S. Thomas and Henry II., in the presence of the King of France at Montreuil, gives the appeal of Henry II. as follows: 'My Lord King, and you, O holy men and nobles, I declare to you I require nothing more from the Archbishop than the observance of certain usages which his five immediate predecessors (some of whom are Saints and have performed miracles) all observed' (how false this is, the conflict of S. Anselm on investitures is enough to show), 'and to which he himself has pledged himself. Let him again pledge himself to those in your Lordship's presence, without any mental reservation and subterfuge. This is the sole cause of disagreement between myself and his Lordship.'[7] Let it be here observed that the King does not venture to call these

[6] *S. Thom. Cant.*, ed. Giles, tom. iii. p. 53.
[7] Froude's *Remains*, second part, vol. ii. p. 376.

usages, laws, or statutes. He knew, as all men knew, that they had no letter or particle of law for their support. They were customs in violation of express laws, as the custom of bribery or undue influence is a violation of the purity and freedom of parliamentary election, and of the statutes made to protect it.

S. Thomas, writing to the Pope an account of the same conference, says, 'Certain it is that if the usages he demands obtain force, the authority of the Apostolic See in England will either vanish altogether, or be reduced to a minimum, as indeed it would have been long since, if we may trust the memory of this generation, and the writings of the past, unless princes had been checked by the Church of Canterbury.'[8]

In like manner the Archbishop, writing to William of Pavia, says, 'Would that your Lordship had allowed yourself to believe from the first what is now known by our persecutors' own testimony; for lately, in the face of the most Christian King, the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, nobles, and all present, he publicly declared that the only cause of our exile and proscription was our refusal to observe the usages.' 'And because we do not absolutely pledge ourselves to usages, some of which void the authority of the Apostolic See, and extinguish the liberty of the Church, the King departed without concluding peace.'[9]

These passages might be multiplied almost without number. I have marked eighteen or twenty equally strong and explicit in which the claim of the King is uniformly made on the ground, not of law, but of *custom*.

[8] Froude's *Remains*, &c. p. 384. [9] Ibid. p. 392.

To prove this by final and decisive evidence, we may take the retractations of the Archbishop of York, and of Henry II. after the martyrdom of S. Thomas. Roger, Archbishop of York, was compelled to declare, 'that he had never confirmed, by writing or by oath, the hereditary *customs* respecting which the controversy between the King and the Archbishop turned.'[10] The King in a public document revoked his claim in the following words: 'We, Henry, by the grace of God, King of England, &c., publicly and openly revoke, abdicate, renounce, and resign all those evil customs, at variance with the ancient liberties of the Church in England, sinfully introduced by us, and we altogether renounce, for ourselves and for our heirs, all and every one of them, for which blessed Thomas, late Archbishop of Canterbury, contended even unto death;' 'and we grant, for us and our heirs, that the Church of Canterbury, and all other Churches in England, be free, and have all liberties inviolate as they were used before our coronation.'[11]

I have dwelt the more fully upon this point because, when of late I made these assertions, I was met by contradictions and criticisms so confident but so evidently shallow, that I have thought it worth while to justify my assertions by the evidence of the Archbishop and the King. I may add that, in wiser and less pretentious times, the 'Summa causæ inter Regem et Thomam' was thoroughly appreciated even by Protestants. Godwin, in his History of the Archbishops of England, says, 'The King in order to repress the license of the

[10] *Vita S. Thomæ*, vol. ii. p. 268, ed. Giles. [11] Ibid. p. 267.

prelates and clergy, and to distinguish the rights of the royal from the sacerdotal power, resolved to promulgate certain *customs* of the realm of England *drawn up* by Henry I. his grandfather, *but never yet made public*.'[12]

It is therefore beyond a doubt that the conflict of S. Thomas was precisely in behalf of the true and legitimate union of Church and State, in which the independence, integrity, and liberty of the Church are preserved inviolate, in contact but in harmony with the public authority and laws of the State. 'The Jerusalem which is from above is free, which is our mother.' The Church readily unites itself to the greatest of God's works next after itself, the natural and civil society of mankind. It elevates, directs, sanctifies, and consolidates the civil order which we call the State. It readily co-operates in all its action, in legislation, and in government; but it holds itself absolutely independent, and free in the exercise of all its prerogatives. The ultimate appeal in all things pertaining to its own office, authority, doctrines, elections, and jurisdiction must fall within its own sphere—that is, must be to its own Head. This liberty is more vital than life itself. S. Thomas died for it, as the Roman Pontiffs have died before. Throughout the world at this moment the Catholic Church preserves and transmits the same liberties inviolate. Various and complex as are its relations to the civil powers in such countries as France, Austria, Prussia, and the like, nowhere has it ever yielded the liberty, and therefore the purity, of its

[12] Godwin, *De Præsulibus Angliæ*, pp. 73, 74.

elections, its spiritual judgments and appeals. Such is the Catholic Church, *recognised* indeed by human law, but refusing to be established: independent of all authorities, and sustaining the civil order of the world.

This, then, is the union of the Church and State which the Holy Father by the Syllabus confirms. We will now go on to show how little application this has to Established Churches.

The first example of what may be called an Established Church would be in Constantinople, under the Arian Emperors, and finally after the completion of the Greek schism. Beveridge in his *Synodicon*, or Councils of the Greek Church, shows from Balsamon and Zonaras that the Emperors became masters of the Greek Church as soon as it fell from Rome. They made the Patriarchs, and deposed them; they suspended the action of the Synods; they interpreted, modified, and annulled all canons; they decided all cases in appeal. The Greek Church became a National Church separated from the Roman Pontiffs, and for that cause fell under the local civil power. It accepted its position, and became established. How completely the Greek Church has been struck with sterility, how intensely excited by national jealousy, how estranged from the Holy See and the whole Christian world, every Catholic knows. And yet the Church in Constantinople has a hierarchy, a priesthood, and traditions, which sustained it in some degree against the secular influences of the Imperial power.

In England, even then, in every reign the liberties of the Church were expressly declared and confirmed by

statutes of Parliament. To show the full force of this statement, I add the words and references.

We have already seen the words of Magna Charta in the reign of John ('Ecclesia Anglicana libera sit').

The 14 Edward III. c. 1, declares 'That Holy Church have her liberties.'

The 50 Edward III. c. 1, 'That Holy Church have all her liberties.'

The 1 Ric. II. c. 1, 'That Holy Church shall have and enjoy all her rights, liberties, and franchises, wholly and without blemish.'

The 2 Ric. II. c. 1, in the same words.

The 3 Ric. II. c. 1, in the same words again.

The 5 Ric. II. c. 1, the same words.

The 6 Ric. II. c. 1, 'That our Holy Mother, the Church of England, have all her liberties whole and unhurt, and the same shall freely enjoy and use.'

The 7 Ric. II. c. 1, as before.

The 8 Ric. II. c. 1, in the same words.

The 12 Ric. II. c. 1, the same.

The 1 Henry IV. c. 1, 'First, that Holy Church have and enjoy all her rights, liberties, and franchises entirely, and without imblemishing.'

The 2, 4, 7, 9, 13 Henry IV.

The 3 Henry V. c. 1, 'First, that Holy Church have all her liberties and franchises.'

The 4 Henry VI. c. 1, the same in fuller terms.[13]

Here are eighteen statutes declaring as law of England the liberties for which S. Thomas died. And be it observed that the article stands first in every statute

[13] Gibson's *Codex*, vol. i. pp. 5, 6.

as the basis of civil order. It is remarkable that from the Reformation downwards the word 'liberties' disappears. We hear only of 'rights and privileges as by law.'

The full effect and meaning of 'establishment' is to be seen in England. We have already shown that the Church in this land possessed its liberty of elections, of discipline, of administration, of appeals, and of personal recourse to the Holy See. During the centuries from Henry II. to Henry VIII., the royal customs and the civil courts steadily encroached upon the jurisdiction and rights of the Church. The 25 and 26 of Henry VIII. first completed the conversion of what before was only custom into statute law. In the preamble of the 25 of Henry VIII. it is declared that England is an empire, and that this, spiritually and temporally, suffices respectively for all government and judgments in matters of religion or law. The Church was thereby declared to be national and self-sufficing in all matters of civil and spiritual law—that is, both in doctrine and in discipline. All jurisdiction hitherto belonging to the Pope was therefore transferred and annexed to the Crown. Whatsoever the Pope could have done in time past, the King could do for the time to come. The University of Oxford has to this day the Crown as visitor, to the exclusion of the Bishop, because until then the Pope excluded the ordinary from visitation. The Crown alone has power to convene and dissolve the Synods or Convocations. Convocation cannot meet without the writ of the Crown, nor, when met, proceed to business without royal license, nor, if it resolve anything, put it

in force until it obtains the King's leave. The whole legislative power of the Church is thus suspended. In like manner, also, the judicial. From all its courts an appeal lies to the Crown, whose sentence is final. It is high treason to receive, publish, or put in use any document from Rome. The Church goods are held by favour of the State. Down to 1839 or 1840, the Established Church held its property by tenure of corporations sole and aggregate. Since the creation of the Ecclesiastical Commission, the Established Church has been divested of its corporate character. The Church goods at this day are held by a commission appointed by Parliament, and the corporate character of the Church is extinct. We have here the true notion of establishment. I have said that the Catholic Church, while it readily accepts the recognition and co-operation of the State, refuses establishment, because the effect of establishment is to deprive it of its most vital liberties—the liberty of electing its own Bishops, of judging its own members, of binding and loosing by excommunications and absolutions, and of appealing to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The royal customs, now the statutes of the realm, have reduced the Anglican Church to a bondage inevitable for all national Churches, but impossible for the Catholic. Its chains are of gold, but chains they are. It would be too long to draw out the detail of this question. The Establishment is so bound that it cannot silence a clergyman who denies the grace of Baptism or the eternity of punishment, nor depose a bishop who rejects the greater part of the Canon of Holy Scripture.

The acts of Henry VIII. have always been defended by the Anglican clergy and English lawyers, not as enacting, but as only declaratory, statutes. It is indeed true, as we have said, that the King and his courts had gradually encroached upon the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and that the customary excesses and abuses of power had gradually become the rule in respect of questions of a temporal kind, such as benefices and patronage. Lord Coke has endeavoured to show that the Crown had always an appellate jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. But Stillingfleet, moved by hostility to James II., proved against Lord Coke that it had not the power it claimed. Again, it is still further certain that the Crown never possessed the supremacy which even Stillingfleet claimed. It never touched a spiritual liberty of the Church but to be defeated. The old supremacy of the Crown recognised and obeyed the supremacy of the Vicar of Christ. They were in harmony and co-operation. The new supremacy not only excluded the authority and jurisdiction of the Pontiff, but annexed it to itself. Such, I conceive, is the true outline of the Established Church—'a national body, separate from the Roman Pontiff,' claiming to be sufficient within itself for all questions of faith and discipline; protected by law, but suspended by law from all legislative, judicial, and executive powers. To be established is to be subject to an ultimate authority, which is secular and fallible. It was to resist the first entrance of this claim that S. Thomas died. He had a prophetic instinct when he declared to Alexander III. that the King's customs, if not resisted, would have

long ago extinguished the authority of the Holy See in England. Henry VIII. extinguished the authority of the Holy See at a blow, with malice aforethought, knowing that dependence on Rome is independence of all civil powers, and that separation from Rome places a national Church at the feet of princes. Even the Patriarchal Church of Constantinople could not hold its own when separated from the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The English Church was in the power of kings from the moment it was cut off from his protection. It was this which distinguished the new supremacy from the old, and it was for this distinction that Sir Thomas More won his martyr's crown. No Catholic can surely confound the establishment of a national Church with the union of Church and State. The union of the two powers is, as we have shown, free, independent, mutually helpful and honourable to both. The establishment of a Church is the subjection of the spiritual to the civil, and can never take place except where a Church by heresy or schism is cut off from Catholic unity.

Now, as I have said, the people of these three kingdoms have already passed judgment upon the Royal Supremacy.

Its first and inevitable exercise was to enforce, by coercion and penal laws, if not an inward unity of belief, which was impossible, at least an outward uniformity of public worship. The history of the world does not contain anything more sanguinary and merciless than the persecutions in England and Ireland. The persecutions in Ireland are fabulous for their refined and relentless cruelty. The whole people re-

coiled from the Royal Supremacy as from an accursed thing, and suffered with joy that they might be innocent of the great offence. The Catholics and the Nonconformists of England suffered, side by side, under its tyranny and its tortures, and they suffered willingly rather than recognise in Prince or Parliament an authority over conscience, that is, over the Church, or the religion of Jesus Christ. The Royal Supremacy has alienated half the people from the established religion. In Scotland the tyrannous and insane attempt to force episcopacy and a liturgy upon the people was supported by cruelties which have made royal authority in religion a treason against the Crown rights of Jesus Christ. It is hardly possible to conceive antipathy deeper or more intense than the hatred with which Ireland, Scotland, and half of England regard the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown. But the Royal Supremacy and the establishment of the Church are cause and effect. And now nearly two-thirds of the population of the three kingdoms desire that both should cease to be. Time has passed over the Tudor statutes, and for the fair name of England they are being blotted out of our history.

Men, at this day, are profoundly convinced that the Tudor statutes cannot, and ought not, any longer to exist. They see that, if at the first they were politic, they have become not only impolitic, but fatal to the unity, peace, and solidity of the Empire. Men are therefore casting about for theories and schemes to solve the difficulty, and have framed the three I have already stated. And this leads on to the other points,

which I will only touch very lightly, and then conclude.

Seeing that the exclusive establishment and endowment of one religious communion is henceforward impossible, some are now proposing to endow all Churches alike. But will the advocates of this theory tell us how many Churches there are, and how they will draw this line? In Ireland alone, besides the Catholic Church, the Anglican and Presbyterian communions, there are a hundred dissenting sects. Are they all to be levelled up? If not, will their members be contented? In like manner, in England and in Scotland the sects are counted by scores. There is, moreover, a large proportion of the most powerful religious bodies of the country who reject endowment altogether. It is a law of their existence to depend on voluntary gifts. Will they likewise consent to be endowed? They hold all interference of the State in religion to be contrary to the genius of Christianity. Will they consent to be established? They think one establishment intolerable: will they be passive under half-a-dozen?

But this facile talk about endowing religious bodies is very shallow. The endowments of Churches were never yet given by votes of Parliament. Before Parliaments existed, the faithful made free-will oblations of lands, houses, and money, which, accumulating from age to age, became, as they are called in the Capitularies of Charlemagne, 'patrimonia pauperum,' that is, the inheritance whereby both the spiritual and temporal needs of the poor were anticipated and provided for. Every communion gradually endows itself. And such

spontaneous self-endowment is peaceful, legitimate, and safe. It is the work of willing hearts and open hands. No man is constrained to give, and no man has a right to complain of the free gift of his neighbour. But the redistribution of endowments, when claimed as national property, must follow the will of the nation. And here the apple of gold is the beginning of discord: and of discord without end. It is not to be doubted that the silent growth of spontaneous endowment tends to consolidate our public order, and to inspire a wise and conservative temper. But to endow by legislative enactment would be to light up popular animosities, of which no man can foresee the issue. If such a policy were ever practicable, it is practicable no longer. The golden opportunity is past, and will never return. There is another reason why the Catholic Church in these kingdoms, strongly as it holds not the lawfulness only, but the expediency of endowments, can never encourage such a policy. The endowment of the Church is never mentioned, but in the same breath we hear of *vetos* and State control. What politicians aim at is not to endow the Catholic Church, but to control it. They do not commiserate our poverty: they are jealous of our freedom. It is of no use, because it has no relevance, to quote the relation of the Church to the civil powers in France or Prussia.[14] In both, those relations are regulated by public and explicit compacts with Rome. In neither France nor Prussia has the Catholic Church been persecuted for centuries by penal laws, of which the memory and the wounds are alike

[14] I leave the text as it stands, to show the instability of States.

fresh, as in Ireland, in the hearts of Catholics. In neither is the Government swayed by the anti-Catholic spirit which produced the Papal Aggression madness, and still perverts our whole social state. Before the Catholic Church in these realms will accept relations with the civil power, the civil power must cease to proclaim itself by any anti-Catholic title in religion.

We now come to the fourth theory, namely, that the State have no religion, nor be united to any religious communion; that all religious belief and action be relegated to the private life of individuals, but that nevertheless the State retain a supreme control over all. This is a peculiar form of Erastianism, springing from a combination of the Voltairian philosophy and the pretensions of democracy. The first and normal theory of the union of Church and State, which, from Constantine to the Reformation, has sustained the Christian world, and has its source, centre, and head in the temporal power of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, may be expressed in the phrase 'Pontiff-King.' The two next schemes are only modifications of the theory of establishment, and may be expressed by the term 'King-Pontiff.' The fourth is the result of the third. Sovereignty is passing rapidly to the people, and Cæsarism is merging itself in democracy. The civil power is the representative of the sovereign people, and it claims to legislate for all religions, and to control at least their public acts. In Pagan Rome all the religions of the world were tolerated, side by side, when truth alone was persecuted. The same will probably be hereafter. The period of indifference may indeed

be only the prelude of the period of persecution. Religions which make no proselytes can abide passively under the shelter of a creedless State. But a religion whose first law is to make disciples of all nations provokes, even in its weakness, the animosity of unbelievers; and in its strength, the persecution of penal laws and their relentless execution. To this society seems drifting. We cannot indeed desire to see the civil power moored to a heresy or a schism by way of retarding its course to this condition, for reasons I will briefly suggest.

It is lastly maintained by a powerful body in this country that all religious communions ought to be placed on a perfect equality before the law. To do this the disestablishment and disendowment of the existing State Churches would follow by necessity; and the civil power would henceforward hold itself neutral and passive in all matters of pure religion, so far as the public peace is not involved.

I have already, I hope, shown that in disestablishing a national Church there is no question of the union of Church and State. No Catholic will admit that the bodies to be disestablished are Churches. Nor can he maintain the lawfulness of founding 'national Churches separate from the Roman Pontiff;' and if it be not lawful to found them, how is it lawful to uphold them?

The Syllabus alone is enough to restrain any Catholic from the defence of established national Churches. Under cover of all these declarations, I will venture to affirm that the disconnection of all re-

ligious bodies from the State in these realms is for our public peace, and for the advantage of religion itself. Forasmuch as the union between Church and State rests upon the providential order, whereby the highest work of the national order, that is, civil society, is united to the highest work of the supernatural order, that is, the Church,—this union is ordained for the elevation, illumination, and direction of the civil or political society by the action of divine truth and law, which is incorporated in the Church.

But for this very reason the union of the State with a heresy or a schism does not elevate, illuminate, and direct it. Nay, it perverts and misdirects the powers and actions of society, and turns them against the truth and law of God. The union of Protestantism with the State has produced two centuries of unexampled persecution of the Catholic faith and Church; and when the State ceased to persecute, it nevertheless kept up, by exclusion, disfranchisement, and unequal dealing, a harassing obstruction to the truth, and cruel spiritual privations against Catholics. To deliver the civil powers from the dominion and perversion of a heresy and a schism, and to restore them to a neutral impartiality, and to a natural equity towards all religious bodies, is a policy evidently wise and just.

If the civil powers are not and cannot be united to the Catholic faith and Church, at least let them no longer be united to a heresy and a schism. The pure state of nature is better than the state of *obsession*. As to disendowment, let us, for clear understanding, go back, in a few words, to first principles. Whatso-

ever the faithful laid at the Apostles' feet became the property of the Church, and was held by a Divine right of possession. The right of holding property in the Church is the highest exemplar of proprietorship. The Church holds by a higher and more perfect title than civil society. The Apostles therefore had the right either to spend or to keep that which the faithful gave. They might exhaust it before sunset, or lay it up for the morrow. The manna, by divine command, was not to be kept till the morrow; if kept, it became corrupt. But the Church does not lay up for the sake of wealth, or from want of confidence in the providence of God, but for a foreseeing care in holding and transmitting its possessions in houses and lands for the benefit of posterity. Endowments are both lawful and beneficial. And yet the Church is ready to forego them in a moment, rather than compromise a principle or endanger an article of faith. Again and again the Church has been sacrilegiously spoiled; and again and again the generosity of the faithful, by the providence of God, has re-endowed it. The Church in Ireland was robbed of everything to enrich the Establishment. But the people of Ireland have endowed it once more. Its poverty with its liberty are a hundredfold more precious than endowment with fetters of gold. The Bishops in Ireland have kindly and charitably refused the endowments of the Establisment. The Catholic Church will take heed for itself, and will trust in the care of its Divine Head. But it may justly demand that the old consecrated property, desecrated now, shall no longer be applied in maintaining the religious

ascendency of error, and of a heresy which both wounds and insults the instincts of a Catholic people, and perpetuates the memory of conquest and confiscation. The disendowment of the Irish Establishment, for I say nothing now about the English, is demanded by bare justice. In the present temper of these kingdoms, the disendowment of the Irish Establishment is also the way of peace. There is but one policy which can tranquillise the religious agitations of Ireland—a perfect equality before the law; and that equality is impossible, so long as five millions of men are unendowed, and half a million absorbs the whole endowment given by our Catholic forefathers for the spiritual welfare of the entire population.

It may, I believe, be safely affirmed that the three bodies which at this time exercise the feeblest religious influence on the masses of these kingdoms are the three Established Churches. In Ireland it is self-evident. In Scotland it is not to be doubted that the religious zeal of the people is to be found, not in the Established Kirk, but in the Free Kirk and the Dissenters. In England the will of the masses is not with the Anglican Establishment, but with the Nonconformists, who number half the population, and with the Catholic Church. If these three bodies were disestablished to-morrow, the effect would be to stimulate their internal energies, and to make them exert all the powers that are in them. The religious forces of the country would be certainly multiplied, and that not in the way of controversy, but in each body or communion upon itself. The three Establishments would

somewhat more adequately do their proper work, and the sum of the religious zeal and activity in the three kingdoms would be increased. If this be so, and it is hardly to be doubted, then the course of public legislation would assuredly not be less Christian. The public opinion of the country would be more so; and the legislature must ultimately be governed by public opinion. It is not my purpose now, and time would forbid me, to trace out the effect of all this upon the Catholic Church in this country. One thing is certain. Relations with a just and equal civil power, detached from all religious establishments, would be possible. Now they are impossible. The undoing of the Tudor statutes is a first condition to the relaxing of the attitude of anti-Catholic hostility which has rendered a peaceful and cordial co-operation of the Catholic Church with the State hitherto impracticable. In Ireland it would unite the pastors of the people with the civil authority, and make that civil authority a beneficent power to their flocks. In England the Catholic Church would stand to the State in relations more normal and fruitful of public good than in any age since the fatal day when the supremacy of kings violated the liberties of conscience and of the Church, and laid the first germs of our persecution in the past and of our contentions at this hour.

XI.

ON PROGRESS.

ADDRESSED TO THE YOUNG MEN'S CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION,
OCTOBER 10, 1871.

ON PROGRESS.

When a boy, I remember reading a book which had a great name nearly a century ago, in which one of the chapters was headed: 'Our hero talks of what he does not understand.' I have no doubt I shall hear that I am talking of what I do not understand; but in my defence I think I may say, I am about to talk of what I do not understand for this reason: I cannot get those who talk about it to tell me what they mean. I know what I mean by it, but I am not at all sure that I know what *they* mean by it; and those who use the same words in different senses are like men that run up and down the two sides of a hedge, and so can never meet. That perhaps will happen to me in talking about Progress. I have tried all I can to find out some definition or description to give me an idea of what is meant by Progress. The perpetual repetition of the word stuns and deafens us day by day. At the feet of newspaper editors and article-writers, the great teachers of the day—philosophers and sophists are gone—at the feet of these we sit, and hear constantly a great deal about Progress, of which, if I could understand it to be something true and good, I should become one of the preachers; but these apostles of the nineteenth century will not tell us their meaning. They leave

us in a state of blank amazement. I have tried to find some authorities to depend upon, and have found two —one the present Prime Minister of England, who, in a speech in Liverpool four years ago, says that Progress is what the police say to the people on the pavement, 'Move on!' My other authority is the leader of her Majesty's Opposition, who, in one of his books, introduces his hero talking with a stranger from the other side of the Atlantic, who held very cheap our great commercial towns with their machinery and manufactures, saying that they were nothing at all compared with the States. At parting he presents his card to his companion, on which was written, 'Mr. G. O. A. Head.' These are the only two authoritative meanings I can gather from our two political parties as to what Progress means. It is talked of by most people as if it were a Holy Grail of which people are in quest. Some of them spend their lives in great energy to promote Progress; but unfortunately they appear to me to verify what S. Augustin said about men who make great speed after truth without finding the right way to it. He said: You are making great strides, but are out of the road. And when I see people making for Progress in different directions, we are quite sure they cannot all be right. Some people tell us Progress means Liberalism. It is difficult again to know what that is—and when you do get their definition of it, it seems to be the emancipation of the human will from every kind of law. I do not think that is Progress, or that it leads to a good result. Then, again, *plébiscites*, or universal suffrage, are taken to be one of the tokens

of Progress, and the results of *plébiscites* do not seem to me to be the ultimate good of society—at least they are so frequently given in different directions, and one is so speedily necessary to correct another, and build up what another throws down, that neither does this seem to me Progress, unless Progress means perpetual motion, swaying to and fro. Again, we are told that material improvements, such as gas, railroads, and the abolition of intramural burials the other day, come among the evidences of Progress; trades which are what we call roaring trades; steamboats, races between them, with the steam shut in, and excited passengers stamping upon the paddle-boxes—this is taken by some people as evidence of Progress. One thing, however, I see. In every country of Europe there is what is called a 'party of progress,' but, unfortunately, this party of progress has a trail behind it like certain reptiles, and that trail is revolution. We have not, therefore, as yet arrived at a very clear notion of Progress from the popular teachers of the day; I will therefore venture to give my own humble conception of what Progress is.

I will say, then, that Progress with us simple people means the growth and ripening of anything from its first principles to its perfection. We distinguish between Progress which is growth, and Progress which is decay; because decay is the reverse of growth, and it is a departure from first principles. It is the dissolution of perfection; and therefore we distinguish between growth and decay as between ripeness and rottenness—and growth we call progress, but decay we call ruin. Now I want to show what may be classified under pro-

gress or growth, and what under decay or ruin—that is my subject.

The growth of an oak is a very intelligible thing. The acorn planted in the clay strikes its tap-root, then rises into a stem, and spreads into branches; and in the whole tree completes its symmetry, stature, and perfection—this is an example of progress from a germ in nature. But when that oak has attained its maturity, and has run through its period of time, it begins to decay, which reverses this process. The sap sinks to the root, the leaves begin to fall, the sprays wither, the branches decay and fall from the trunk, the rot in the substance of the tree gradually spreads, the trunk becomes hollow, and the tree disappears in dust: this is, then, the reverse of progress. The same is true of every fruit we hold in our hands; so Shakespeare tells us of man:

> 'And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe;
> And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot;
> And thereby hangs a tale.'

Let us apply this to human things, and first to an individual man. The idea of physical progress in man is first of all the growth from childhood to manhood, the complete expansion and development of the whole man in stature, symmetry, strength, and countenance; the whole human being filling up as it were the outline and type which belongs not only to man in general, but to that particular individual—that is what we call Progress. Then there is the moral progress in every man; that is, the progress of his character, which begins in the self-control of the will and in obedience; then in

the rectitude of conduct; and then again in prudence and the whole range of duty, and, finally, in excellence —that is, in surpassing others according to the capacity of that which is in him by nature. For men are not all equal, they are variously endowed, and some have capacities and qualities and energies far beyond others; and each individual has a progress of his own, which means, as I said before, the filling up of that which is not only due to the type of race to which he belongs, but also to his own individual gifts and capacities. In like manner of intellectual progress: there is a passive intellect in us all, which first receives the instruction of teachers, and then becomes an active intellect, whereby we educate and form ourselves; and then that active intellect becomes reflective, and has a power of research and discovery. The whole intellect of the man is thus matured and ripened according to his capacities and circumstances, and that from very small beginnings.

For instance, it is said in the life of S. Gregory VII., the greatest ruler the world ever saw, the loftiest of all legislators, the justest of all judges, and the most intrepid of all Pontiffs, who ruled over the whole Christian world with a sway which for wisdom and fortitude has never been excelled—it is said that in his childhood he was kneeling at the feet of a carpenter who was hewing wood; and the chips, so traditions say, formed themselves into the words from the Book of Psalms, 'He shall reign from sea to sea.' This was taken as an indication of his future, which he fulfilled to the letter. The movement which connected this small beginning with his mighty end was a progress of

the whole man, moral and intellectual. Take also the example of Fergusson, the astronomer, who, when a shepherd's boy, would lie on his back, and with a string of beads over his eye measure the distances or intervals of the stars, and then mark them down with his pencil —this was the beginning of his progress in astronomy. So again take another instance in the familiar anecdote of Nelson, who was perhaps one of the most intrepid and fearless of men. When a boy in Norfolk, he left his father's house, and was lost for the whole day, not coming home till after dark. His father said he wondered fear did not drive him home, upon which the boy asked: 'Who is fear? I do not know him.' I suppose that was the index of his genius, which progressed into the heroic fearless character which is written in history. That is my notion of progress in the individual man— a consistent growth of the same principles from first to last. The next example shall be the progress of a people.

I do not know whether any of you have read Carlyle's *Chartism*; if so, you will find me a plagiarist, but I shall only take his outline, not his words. He says of the British Empire, there was a time when we were Druids; and I recollect that somebody in the House of Commons attacked Mr. Pitt for speaking in favour of the abolition of slavery, on the ground that it was useless to emancipate the negro, for he was of a lower and baser race than the white man; in proof of which it was said that they sold their children into slavery, sacrificed human beings to idols, covered themselves with paint, and I know not what. Mr. Pitt

answered that such was precisely the state of our British ancestors—they painted themselves with woad, sold their children into slavery, and offered human sacrifices under their oaks. There is no doubt there was a time when we were in that unprogressive state. After that came Hengist and Horsa, in their leathern boats, upon the mud of Thanet, and springing from them came the seven kingdoms of the Heptarchy, which are described by Milton as 'the flocking and the fighting of crows and kites'—and that was pretty nearly the history of the internecine wars of the seven Saxon kingdoms. After that came an agency which was not of this world—S. Augustin breathed Christianity into the Saxon race. Dioceses, churches, and parishes were formed before the tithings, hundreds, and shires had any existence. Christianity began to shape the community, which, under Alfred, gathered together in one the whole Saxon people; and from Alfred to S. Edward the Confessor England attained a state of high Christian civilisation. It is a history full of luminous beauty. In those days it is said that along the high-roads there were drinking fountains. We of the nineteenth century imagine our drinking fountains to be the last perfection of humane and civilised invention, but our ancestors had them along their roads; and it is said that so strong was the reign of law in that time that a poor mother carrying her child might walk in safety from the Humber to the southern sea. Well, then, Progress had been made since the Druids. After that came the Normans introducing the feudal system of the continental kingdoms, consolidating and strengthening the simpler,

more primitive, and, I may say, pastoral government of the Saxon kings. England became one of the mightiest monarchies of Europe. The three kingdoms were at least united together by the Norman conquest of Ireland and Scotland. This was the first outline of the British Empire. This unity has endured and confirmed itself from that day to this. The civilisation of the Normans was far higher than that of the Saxons. They introduced a refinement and literature and a higher grade of culture. This is to be traced in our language, in which, for the most part, the simple terms describing individual things are Saxon, but the more abstract terms which describe kind and species are from the Norman-French. At least this rule may be so extensively verified in English as to show that a wave of a higher civilisation passed over a lower civilisation and elevated it. After this, from age to age, came the introduction of manufactures. Then commercial towns began to grow: London, which once was surrounded by a single wall with its one tower, has never ceased to grow till it has reached its three millions of men; Liverpool has exceeded in its magnificence the docks of London, which were thought to be the wonder of the world; Glasgow sprang up suddenly into an enormous manufacturing world, with half a million of human beings; and Manchester, which in the memory of living men was a single parish with its parish church, has half a million likewise. I cannot omit to say, in passing, that only the other day a good old venerable Catholic went to her rest in Manchester, who remembered the time when she and her family came to

Manchester and found there a humble priest and eight Catholics. The immigration of her family raised the Catholics of Manchester to seventeen. One poor church, one priest, and a flock of seventeen, was the slender beginning which she lived to see expanded to a diocese. It has now a Bishop, twelve or fourteen magnificent churches, many priests, and 100,000 Catholics. Well, this is an example of progress which I can understand.

In the seventeenth century Great Britain acquired its West Indian colonies, and in the eighteenth century it acquired the East Indies and Canada—it already possessed the plantations of America. It became therefore a colonial empire. The American plantations in the year 1775, by a happy law of progress, began to work out their own independence, and became a vast confederation. The North American Union, the greatest creation of civilised life, perhaps, in the world, sprang from Great Britain. The English tongue has gone with it throughout its whole breadth. The English tongue is more widely spread than any language, and the Anglo-Celtic race covers a wider surface of the earth than any other tongue or people. It may be very well said, then, that those leathern boats, which lay upon the mud of Thanet, brought over with them a very notable burden. When we look at the colonial empire of Great Britain, with England as its heart and centre, at the United States as its offspring and sister, it is true to say that here has been an example of true progress, and progress so grand, that perhaps in the history of the world it cannot be exceeded.

Well, now let me take another example, that is, the progress of Christianity. I will not dwell upon this, because it is so obvious; I need only give its outline. You remember the prophecy of Daniel, of a stone which became a great mountain and filled the earth; and the parable of our Lord, of the mustard-seed which took root and became a great tree. Christianity has fulfilled those two prophecies. If you consider for a moment what the faith was when it was received only by the Jews who believed, what it became when it was spread to the Greeks of the Synagogue—the Jews who spoke the Greek language, and were dispersed abroad—when from them it passed to the pure heathen of the Roman Empire; how the very word 'pagan' signifies 'the peasantry' who lived out in the country, as distinguished from the cities which first became Christian; how Christianity spread itself over the whole mass, like the prophet Eliseus, who communicated his warmth to the body of the dead child, and so communicated the warmth of life to the populations of the world, that they lived with a new and vital spirit; then how over the whole population the Universal Episcopate began to extend its sway, and to organise it into the distinct divisions and flocks which constitute the dioceses and pastoral cure of the Catholic Church; then how the faith and morality of Christianity began to work in domestic life, and how from the homes and families of men it spread into the public life of cities, and how gradually it took possession of Rome, until the world accepted it, and was penetrated through and through with the light of Christianity; how, after that, the

literature and laws, customs, and even tne very warfare of the Christian world, was guided and mitigated by the effects of Christianity; how thenceforward the Universal Church spread itself, the line of its Pontiffs continuing unbroken as its supreme rulers, the line of its Councils legislating continuously, from age to age, for the necessities of the world; how, in its office of teacher of faith and judge of morals, the Church has continually governed the Christian nations of the world, and is there still, standing imperishable, immutable, and ever progressive, always extending, always maturing and perfecting the work which it has in hand,—there is the most perfect example of Progress the world has ever seen, or ever will see.

Now let us take an example or two from the progress of science. There was a time when science hardly existed. It began by observation and reflection. A very learned and good man unhappily was lost to us some years ago by a fall from his horse, and a more lamented death among scholars these later days I have hardly known. I mean Whewell, the head of Trinity College, Cambridge. He was a man of a powerful, original, mature, and just and scientific mind. He wrote two books which I daresay many who hear me know. The one on the History of the Inductive Sciences, that is to say, the pure and applied sciences, in the true scientific sense of the term; not the chatter we hear about social and historical sciences, which can have no existence. That book, in three volumes, I believe, under correction, to be one of the most solid and precious books of these days. He wrote also two

volumes on the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, being an analysis of the intellectual processes of those sciences. Those two works trace out the progress of science from its beginning along the line of its advance. For example, he traces in astronomy the earliest observations of the Orientals; and then, how, by gradual discovery, the whole science has been developed; how its periods of observation were followed by periods of demonstration, and these again by periods of deduction, so that the science was always growing in conformity to its first principles, as the acorn into the oak-tree. The intellectual germ was always extending itself. There was a time when this earth was believed to be the fixed centre of all things, the sun revolving round it; and the solar system, as we know it, was supposed to be the whole universe. We know now that the sun, which is the centre of our system, together with all its planets, and they, with all their satellites and comets, are going at a speed which takes our breath away to hear, in the direction of the star λ^{c} in the constellation of Hercules. This is true and legitimate progress in science. Take another example. Whewell tells us of the tradition that the first idea of the octave in music sprang up in the mind of a Greek by hearing the constant ring and alternation of hammers beating on an anvil. From this the idea of number, rhythm, and sound, with the distinction of tones, grew in his mind, and the basis of scientific music was laid. In the history of music we read, that in proportion as instruments have been perfected in compass, in that proportion has music been perfected. The organ on

which Handel played had I know not how much less in compass than the organs of the present day. His music therefore was limited. And the sphere and range of music has been perpetually increasing as instruments have been perfected and their sphere enlarged. This again is an example of scientific and true progress. I might take another example in spectrum analysis, or in electricity, with its application to telegraphy, and many other uses, as an instance of true progress.

We will now take an example of progress in political government. The first law of political government in the beginning was club-law; and the way in which people made peace was by beating one another till one party had enough of it. Jurists tell us the first fiction of civil law was government by majority; that is to say, they no longer counted the number of clubs or bruises, but the number of votes; and the vote by majority and minority was taken as sufficient to settle any political controversy, which is at least a more comfortable way of settling a contest. When this mode of government sprang up, immediately there was found something which had the power of tying the hands of tyrants, of limiting the absolutism of despotic government. The very dicta and axioms of law began to change. There was a time when the first principle of law was, 'Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem;' that is, what the prince wills has the force of law; so that the will of the prince was the law of the subject. Well, the introduction of this new theory of putting votes for clubs had a beneficial effect in England, and the dicta and axioms of our lawyers, going back to Brac-

ton and Fleta, were recast. Our ancestors said, 'Lex facit regem,' not 'Rex facit legem.' The law makes the king, not the king makes the law. There came in another idea of government, and that was monarchy limited by law; both by the unwritten customs of the people and the written law made legitimately by the king and his councillors. Well, from this has come gradually what we call self-government; but the government which is municipal and local depends ultimately upon the government of each individual man over himself; and no people are worthy to obtain, or can obtain, self-government, or if they had obtained could keep it, who do not train and discipline themselves, so that they begin by governing themselves before they govern their neighbours. There has been undoubtedly great progress in those things also. One more example I will give, and with that will end this dreary part of the subject; and that shall be Progress in civilisation.

I cannot deny that we are very much better off than when our ancestors smeared themselves with woad; that our manufactures, cheapening good articles of clothing, are a great blessing to everybody, rich and poor. I also think it is much better to live on good wheaten bread than on acorns; and if we cannot grow enough wheat at home, it is a good thing that we are able to import it. Also I think it is better to live in brick houses than in huts of mud and wicker-work; and it is better we should have machinery which will do 10,000 operations with great fineness and power rather than flint knives and burnt sticks. It seems, therefore, that Progress in civilisation as regards food, clothing,

dwellings, and machinery, in the mechanical power of production, transit by railway, and the dynamic powers of machinery—that is, the mechanical powers applied to lift weights, build houses, and transport of goods which no human strength could lift—that all this is a vast progress in the material order. I may say also that the extension of the benefits of all these things, from the rich, or from the classes that might appropriate them to their own enjoyment, to the whole mass of the people, bringing them within the reach of the poor and those standing in greatest need of them—that this is a very just and legitimate idea of Progress. Next I will say that what is called credit in commerce is a notable progress. Trading in kind would be very inconvenient nowadays, if, every time you had to buy a hat, you had to pay for it with a table. Or if every time you had to purchase, it was necessary to put down the cash on the spot, you would have to carry a fortune with you; and if brass money were the chief currency, that would be still more difficult; so that the substitution of a gold and silver currency is a progress in civilisation. But it seems to me that the introduction of the bank-note is much better; and bank-notes never could have existed, if there had not been confidence created between man and man, and recognised by public and social law, which gives value and reality to a piece of paper. Now that would appear to be the result of modern civilisation, because I do not read of it either in Athens or Rome. This example, entirely the creation of a civilised state, I will not put high, but I think it an improvement as it facilitates the transaction of business. Then,

international law, that is, the law which runs from nation to nation, an extension of that domestic law which governs a people singly, by contract and mutual recognition, at last federates together and binds a number of nations in one family; and there arises what is called by lawyers a comity of nations, which means a certain mutually fair and benevolent dealing with one another. Just as charity binds individuals, so nations are bound by justice; and this is a distinction of civilisation which grew and advanced so long as Christian civilisation endured.

I hope that I have given a sufficient number of examples of Progress in our own country, in Christianity, in science, in political government, and in civilisation, to have cleared ourselves at least from the imputation of being opposed to Progress.

Let me sum up what I have said in the first part of my subject in this way: It is a philosophical axiom, a certain truth of the reason, that everything is preserved by the same principles by which it is produced. The oak which springs from the acorn is preserved by the sap and fibre and wood and bark which belong to its kind; you cannot change that nature without destroying its perfection. This is true physically, it is true in science, it is true in moral character, as I will go on to show. Whenever anything grows from its root by the same principles of development to its perfection, it retains its own identity. The oak is always the oak, and Christian society is always Christian society. Another axiom is, that destruction is the change or perversion of the principles by which anything was

produced; if you can change or pervert the principles from which anything springs, you destroy it. For instance, one single foreign element introduced into the blood produces death; one false assumption admitted into science destroys its certainty; one false principle admitted into morals is fatal. As, for example, a portion of the Church separated from the unity of the Church, therefore separated from the principles by which it was first created and preserved, becomes a schism. A state which rejects its own vital laws, which were founded upon reason, justice, and Christianity, becomes an anomaly. A body which has reached maturity, and loses the principle of its animation, becomes dust. The first of these axioms is what I may call the law of progress, the second is the law of decay. We will now consider the latter.

The last part of my subject is that which is opposed to Progress. Let me take as an example the formation of character. I daresay all of you have seen many a youth beginning life with great promise, with piety, faith, conscientiousness, and so growing to manhood; yet there has been about him something which a keen observer has detected, yet feared even to think of, lest he should do him wrong. Just as some magnificent tree suddenly snaps in the night, its strength of stem overmastered by a high wind, because at the heart there was a secret rottenness, unseen without, yet it was there within, and when the pressure came upon the branches the tree went asunder—so it is with many a character. There is some false principle or passion, something within, which, when it is tried, fails. The

piety of boyhood and of youth becomes careless, because there is a germ of sloth, and ends in impiety. Faith has, near its root, some secret germ of doubt, which begins to grow secretly, and at last shows itself in the form of captious objection, and ends in unbelief. Conscientiousness begins to manifest a certain laxity, and ends in acts of dishonour. Here we see what may be called a falling off from the first principles by which the character was formed in the beginning. Apply this, then, to the case of nations.

Take the Republic of Athens, which was cultivated, intellectually, morally, scientifically, and politically, to a very high degree, which established a colonial empire, and I may say a dominion over the Greek race. It rose to a very high point of civilisation. It then became a luxurious and licentious democracy, and began at once to decay. Rome in like manner had what its people called the *prisca virtus*, that old austerity of virtue, which carried the sway of its Republic over the whole earth. When it began to be luxurious and corrupt, an imperial tyranny was established over it. Thenceforward it went to pieces age after age, with the greatest havoc ever made on earth. Spain was a noble, Christian, and austere people, until by successful commerce, and the mines of the New World, it was inundated with gold. Among the causes of Spain's decline the enormous influx of gold has a chief place. It brought on a relaxation of industry, a carelessness and luxuriousness of life, a disposition to live on acquired wealth, which paralysed the energy of the people. Here, again, we find the principles of the

nation's greatness discarded, and its greatness lost. Take the example of the Christian world as distinct from the Church. Always remember, when we speak of the Christian world, that the Christian world and the Christian Church are two different things. The Christian Church existed before the Christian world, and created it. The Christian world may go to pieces, and it seems at this moment to be on the breakers; but the Church will remain in all its vigour and plenitude of light and power until its Divine Head comes again. The Christian world is everywhere divided; and because divided, it is in perplexity and conflict everywhere. We hear Christian men complaining and contending about 'the religious difficulty.' They cannot act together or educate their children together, because of the religious difficulty. Do you know what the religious difficulty is? It is not the Catechism, it is not the Thirty-nine Articles—it is God, the truth of God, and the will of God. Because some men have determined to interpret the truth of God in their own fashion, and to reject everything else, and because others reject God altogether, therefore they can find no common basis upon which to educate or to legislate, without shutting out God, His truth and will, from the four corners of an Act of Parliament. Here we have an example of the abandonment of those principles upon which the progress of the Christian civilisation of the world was made.

Modern civilisation, then, is civilisation without Christianity. It is perfect when the religious difficulty is eliminated and excluded from the progress of man,

intellectual, moral, and political. Take for example France, which has been for eighty years leading the way in modern civilisation. A more refined people, a people more exquisite in the cultivation of the arts and sciences of the natural order, is not to be found; but a people more incoherent in political life, more wanting in the power of permanent combination, more stricken as it were with the impossibility of adhering together in any one constant form of civil government, can hardly be found in history. That noble people, full of intelligence and of genius, because it has abandoned the first principles which formed the great French monarchy of a thousand years, and has substituted in their place the shallow theories that are called the principles of '89, that majestic people has reduced itself for a time to an instability so great, that within the memory of living men it has had two empires, three republics, three kings dethroned, seventeen constitutions, and six or seven revolutions. The present state of that noble country is such, that we may justly take it as an example of the dissolution which follows upon the loss of those first principles from which Christian society springs, and by which alone Christian society can be preserved.

Let us now take England. England in the last three hundred years has been departing from those principles by which its progress was originally impelled, and by which that progress has been preserved. I will only touch upon three points. Three hundred years ago a legal Church was set up, which covered the whole country, and, excepting only the faithful

Catholics who refused it, and a handful of dissenters, contained the whole population of England. At this moment the population of England has outgrown that legal religion by one-half its number. Next there was a political Constitution of Church and State set up at that day which spread itself over the whole Anglican population. The population has outgrown the Constitution; and, therefore, some twenty or thirty years ago we were perpetually hearing about Chartism, and now in these days we are hearing of trades-unions, political unions, strikes among trades,—the masses of the people uniting together to accomplish, by combination against capital, that which the law of the land ought to do for them. Lastly, the effect of these and other causes is that one-half of the people of England have outgrown Christianity, they have passed beyond the moral restraints of Christianity, they have become materialised. They are not atheists, not infidels. It is not by the act of their own will; it is the pressure, and I may say the tyranny, of events or the logic of facts, of which we hear so much, that has robbed them of their inheritances of faith and culture. And this because the first principles of Christian civilisation, which created the mature Commonwealth of England, were violated three hundred years ago.

I was going to take next the example of the United States, but I will not venture upon any judgment of its state. In talking of England I am always willing to give hard knocks. Englishmen like it. They give

us the privileges of sons and brothers; and we may say what we like about England, if we say it filially—I trust I never do otherwise. But of the New World I do not venture so freely to speak. I trust that in the United States good care will be taken of the faith, I mean of Christianity, of Christian education, of morals, of domestic life, and of strong-minded women—a race now rising among ourselves, and, with all good-will towards them, I hope they will be benignly kept in order. I hope that in the United States there will be great care taken to exclude political ambition and faction. About fifteen years ago I read what I believe to be an authentic statement—that a number of leading politicians and statesmen of America, of highest name and note, met together to consider the condition of the United States. It was before the war, when there were already many causes of anxiety. It was said that there was a universal and growing license of the individual will, and that law and government were powerless to restrain it; that if the will of the multitude became licentious, it would seriously threaten the public welfare and liberty of the country. The conclusion they came to was, that unless there could be found some power which could restrain the individual will, this danger would at last seriously menace the United States. Now I think we are all ready to say what that power is. It is the power which created the Christian society of the world. Whensoever it is weakened or lost, immediately all political society decays. I hope it may be restored and long retained in the American Union. I hope too

that the prophecy of Bishop Berkeley may be abundantly fulfilled in America:

> 'Westward the course of empire takes its way,
> The first four acts already past;
> A fifth shall close the drama with the day:
> Time's noblest offspring is the last.'

I hope there is a future for America which will verify this prophecy; but I am confident it cannot be, unless those first principles of Christian civilisation which have created and maintained the Progress of the Christian world shall be restored and preserved.

Now I shall be asked what those principles are; and I will enunciate them as quickly as I can. First, they are the laws of God in nature and revelation. They are the laws of God in nature; that is, the reason rightly cultivated, the conscience rightly directed; the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance; *the law*, that is, recognition of a rule and duty of obedience to the law. The idea of law is the foundation of all civil society, and the rule of the conscience and conduct of men. Second, the principles of God's law in Revelation, the Ten Commandments, a very old code, and very much forgotten; the twelve articles of the Creed, very much disliked by those who talk of the religious difficulty; the unity of the Christian Church, and *its authority*. Thirdly, the laws of man made by rulers and legislatures when conformable to those of God. And so long as legislatures and governments conform themselves and their laws to the law of God, then there is progress. I utterly deny there is progress when they depart from it.

What, then, are the principles that convert progress to decay? The violation of God's laws, their perversion, and their privation or loss. I had put down a number of examples, but I have looked at my watch, and see I must not go on. Therefore I can only give one single example, which is the most fresh and vivid at this moment.

We have heard a great deal of the Munich Conference; well, now, this revolt is nothing new. Another, precisely the same, happened at the beginning of this century. In the year 1801, on the 15th August, Pope Pius VII. issued an apostolic letter, whereby, by the supreme authority of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, he extinguished the whole existing episcopate in France, subdivided anew all the dioceses, and thus created a new hierarchy over the whole of the country. At once, a certain number of men, in whom the Gallican spirit was strong,—I have no doubt many were conscientious and good men, but they had admitted one false principle, which, as I said, like one single globule of foreign matter in the blood is fatal,—absolutely refused obedience, separated themselves from the Catholic Church, and set up what was called the *Petite Eglise*. This little Church consisted of a considerable number of bishops, priests and laity. The last bishop of the *Petite Eglise* submitted himself to the Catholic Church in the year 1829, and died in peace. But this separation is not yet extinct. In the year 1865, when I was at Poictiers, the Bishop told me that he had some 5000 of the members of this little Church in his diocese, who had no priests, no sacraments, no churches;

nevertheless, that they baptised their own children, and met, from time to time, to say prayers and the Rosary together. They are dying out. Yet they began with a number of bishops; but they had no succession, and they are now ceasing to exist.

What is now happening at Munich? The Holy Father, in the Vatican Council, issued last year the Constitution *Pastor Æternus*, whereby the infallibility of the Head of the Church was defined. The *Times* newspaper says all the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church have accepted it, 'having been fairly caught and safely landed in the great Vatican net.' Well, this was too much for the professors of Germany. They are an estate in the intellectual realm of Germany, and the consequence has been what you may have read in the newspapers. Some 500 men from all countries have met together. The names of the chief leaders from foreign countries have been mentioned in the papers, except only the English deputies. Who deputed them? Whom did they represent? I wish the names had been published, as we should know more easily how to deal with them. As it is, I can only say that every man who has participated in that Munich Congress is either directly, explicitly, or implicitly excommunicated and incapable of Sacraments. However, this Congress did a great many things. It has resolved to begin a system of parishes and public worship with priests, the greater part of whom have been suspended, and are incapable of officiating in the Catholic Church. It is a curious thing that the *Petite Eglise*, of which I spoke at first, commenced their schism upon the re-

jection of the plenitude of the supreme authority of the Head of the Church in matter of jurisdiction and discipline. These Munich separatists are committing schism by rejecting the plenitude of the doctrinal authority of the Head of the Church in matter of faith. That is to say, these two schisms are made precisely on the same ground: the plenitude of the primacy in jurisdiction and doctrinal authority; with what result, time is to show. In the mean while we have the authority of the *Times* newspaper for saying that the great difficulty with them is, that, though they have some laymen and some priests, they have no bishop.

'Here,' says the *Times*, 'are 500 professors, priests, and laymen, founding and constituting a Church—old, say they; new, says Rome—and, as it were at the last moment, they find they must have bishops to keep it going. They will beg, borrow, or steal one. Are not bishops to be found somewhere? We, nevertheless, are sure that not even an English 'colonial,' not even a suffragan, not even a Scottish bishop, without clergy, churches, or people, would hire himself out to keep up the breed of Old Catholics at Munich.'

The broad English common sense of the *Times* has saved it. It goes on to say: 'The last words in the description which our correspondent, who was present, gives of the last public meeting have, we suspect, a prophetic import. The assemblage was vast for Catholic Munich; the city was much stirred up by the strangeness of the event; but when all was over the impression left on the public was "that much more remained to be done." All Englishmen must feel that

It is a common thing to find men who retain the shell, as it were, of old conviction; who live by old habit and use the words they did in their youth; but whose inner nature, indeed, whose leading principles, are bursting these bonds. The programme before us we venture to pronounce utterly inconsistent in spirit with the conservative part of its doctrinal propositions.'

Here is good sense. Further on, the *Times*, with the accuracy of a Catholic theologian, speaking of the Munich Congress, continues: 'It retains the decrees of the Council of Trent, including all former Councils, but re-opens—and, indeed, compels the re-opening of—every controversy which that Council was summoned to close. "A dogma," it says, "to be valid, must be in accordance with Holy Writ and the old traditions of the Church, such as they have been conveyed to us in the writings of the recognised Fathers and the decrees of the Councils." Then, having said this, it proceeds to point out that even were a council really œcumenical, it would be powerless against essential truth and history; nay, that no unanimity could confer validity on its decrees. The congress, some here will think, avows an intention to look still further ahead. It sets out boldly on the road of science and progressive Christian culture; it insists that the clergy shall be theologians, and also admitted freely to the culture of the century. This must all mean something, and most people will understand it better than the dogmatic portion of the programme. Which of the two conflicting portions will survive the other on German soil is a question on

which our English readers will not be long in making up their minds.'

I must pass over much more that I had meant to say, and sum up in these words: We do not oppose any true material, scientific, social, or political progress. The reiterated and persistent way in which people say we are opposed to progress is cant. They who can believe it to be so are superstitious—they ought to believe in hobgoblins; and perhaps they do. Well, then, my general conclusion is, that the Church is progressing, and always will progress, in strength, truth, unity of faith, in the self-evidence by which it proves itself to the world. Secondly, that nations are departing from the principles which created their civilisation. Thirdly, that civilisation is becoming every day more and more material. I shall keep you till midnight if I go on. Look for proofs of what I say in any work on political economy; or in the production and use of wealth, its enjoyment, luxury, and the consequences of luxury, visible all around us. Fourthly, that this material civilisation, while more and more material, is becoming less and less moral. Fifthly, that therefore this modern civilisation is for this reason not progressive, because the nations are not growing happier, nor purer in their morals, nor more united in the charities of life. Sixthly, that society is not becoming more solid, more safe, more stable; that, on the contrary, the reverse of all these things is indubitably true and visible before our eyes. Seventhly, that individuals are becoming more anarchical, the intellect more licentious, the wills

of man more stubborn; and this self-will expresses itself in their actions, so that it is true to say that the principles upon which the Christian world was founded, and by which it has hitherto been preserved, have been rejected and are being violated on every side. The Christian world therefore is not progressing, but is going back. Finally, civilisation like everything else cannot stand still: *non progredi est regredi;* not to go onward is to go backward; and therefore it is that the Holy Father, when he condemned in the Syllabus the proposition, 'that the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and adjust himself to Progress, Liberalism, and Modern Civilisation,' condemned a great error, and proclaimed a great truth. There is no hope for either man or society, but to go back to the feet of the only true Legislator, who said 'Come unto Me: take My yoke upon you; for My yoke is easy and My burden is light.'

XII.

THE DÆMON OF SOCRATES.

THE DÆMON OF SOCRATES.

A Paper read before the Royal Institution, January 26, 1872.

At the outset I must plead guilty to a misnomer, for which, however, I am not responsible. It has become a tradition to speak of the Dæmon of Socrates; but I hope to show that the term is without warrant and incorrect.

The Dæmon of Socrates has been treated so often, and by so many authors, historians, philosophers, and critics, both in classical and Christian times, that I, at least, cannot hope to say anything new upon it. I may, however, review the judgments of others, and then offer what seems to me to be the true interpretation of this singular fact in the history of philosophy.

It will, I think, be found to be no mere intellectual eccentricity, no mere superstition, still less an unmeaning record of Greek history, but a fact in the psychology of the greatest philosophical mind of the ancient world, full of significance for us, and throwing much light upon the analysis of our moral nature.

The life of Socrates extended over a tract of seventy years, that is from 469 to 440 B.C., and embraced the most critical and splendid period of Athenian history. During his lifetime, Athens rose to the height of its

imperial hegemony over the states and islands and colonies of Greece; at the time of his death its decline was already far advanced. It was the period of the final victories over the Persians, and also of the Peloponnesian contests. In his day the Constitution of Athens passed from its aristocratic period to the conflicts of democracy and oligarchy, which completed its fall. In politics, it was the time of Pericles, and of the statesmen formed by him; in philosophy, of the Hylozoists, the Atomists, and the Metaphysical or Theological Philosophers (so ably described here last year by Professor Blackie), and also of the Sophists: in poetry, of Sophocles and Aristophanes; and in arts, of Phidias.

In the midst of all these splendours of imperial greatness, intellectual culture, excessive refinement, luxurious self-indulgence, public and private immorality, Socrates arose as a cross-questioner of men, a seeker after moral truth, an example and a teacher of temperance and justice. There is something majestic and melancholy in his account of himself, and of his mission, as he declared it in his Apology before his judges.

He was accused by Meletus and Anytus of corrupting the youth of Athens by philosophical paradoxes, and of introducing new gods, or of denying all gods. In answer he spoke as follows:

'If you should say to me, "O Socrates, we will not believe Anytus. We will let you off; but on this condition—that you no longer go on with this questioning and philosophising; and if you should be caught again doing this, you shall die;"—if, as I

said, you should acquit me on these conditions, I should say to you, O men of Athens, I reverence you and I love you, but I shall obey God rather than you. As long as I breathe, and am able, I shall not cease to philosophise, and to exhort you, and to demonstrate (the truth) to whomsoever among you I may light upon, saying, in my accustomed words, "How is it, O best of men, that you, being an Athenian, and of a city the greatest and noblest for wisdom and power, are not ashamed to be careful of money, studying how you can make the most of it, and of glory also and of honour; but of prudence, and truth, and the soul, how you may make the best of these, have neither care nor thought?" And this I will do, to young and old, whomsoever I may meet; both to alien and citizen, and, above all, to the men of this city, inasmuch as you are nearer to me in kindred. For this is the command of God, as you well know; and I think that no greater good ever yet came to the State than this service which I render to God. For I go about doing nothing else than to persuade you, both young and old, to be careful in the first place neither of the body, nor of money, nor of anything so earnestly as of the soul, how you may make it as perfect as possible. I tell you that virtue does not spring from money, but that from virtue money springs, and all other goods of man, both to the individual and to the commonwealth. If, then, to teach these things be to destroy our young men, that would be mischievous in me indeed. But if any one should say I teach anything other than these truths, he speaks falsely. Moreover, I say, O Athenians, whether

you believe Anytus or not, and whether you let me go or not, I shall never do anything else, even though I were to die many times.[1]

'Do not clamour, O Athenians, but abide by the request I made to you—that is, not to clamour at what I am saying, but to hear me. For you will be benefited, I believe, by hearing me. I am about to say to you some things at which, perhaps, you will cry out; but I pray you not to do so. For you know well, if you should kill me, being such a one as I say I am, you will not hurt me so much as you will hurt yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can any way hurt me. This cannot be. For I do not think that it is ever permitted that a better man should be hurt by a worse. Perhaps, indeed, he may kill him, or drive him into exile, or disfranchise him; and these things perhaps he and others may think to be great evils. But I do not think so; much rather the doing that which he (Meletus) is now about—the laying hands on a man to kill him unjustly—is a great evil. But, O Athenians, I am far from making now a defence for myself, as some may think; [I am making it] in your behalf; lest by condemning me you should in anything offend in the matter of this gift which God has given you. For if you should kill me, you will not easily find another man like me, who, to speak in a comic way, is so precisely adapted by God to the State; which is like a horse, large and well-bred, but from its very size sluggish, and needing to be roused by a gad-fly. For

[1] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 17; *Platonis Opp.* vol. i. p. 114, ed. Stallbaum, Gothæ, 1858.

so it seems to me, that the God has applied me, such as I am, to the State, that I may never cease to rouse you, and persuade and shame every one, fastening upon you everywhere all day long. Such another will not easily come to you, O men of Athens; and if you will listen to me, you will spare me. But perhaps, as those who awake in anger when they are stung, you will, at the instigation of Anytus, kill me at once with a slap; then you will end the rest of your life in sleep, unless God shall send some other gad-fly to be mindful of you. But that I am such a one, given by God to the State, you may know from this fact: it is not like the way of men that I, now for so many years, should have disregarded all my own concerns, and should have endured the neglect of my own domestic affairs, and should have been ever busied about your interests; going about to each of you privately, as a father or an elder brother, persuading you to be careful of virtue. If indeed I had derived any enjoyment from these things, and for these exhortations had received any reward, there would have been some reason in it. But now you yourselves see that the accusers, charging me as they do, without shame, of other things, of this at least have not been able to bring a witness against me; as if I had ever either exacted or asked any reward. I think, moreover, that I adduce a sufficient witness that I speak the truth—I mean my poverty.'[2]

'It may perhaps appear strange that I should go to and fro, giving advice, and busying myself about these things in private, but that in public I should not ven-

[2] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 18, p. 118.

ture to go up (*i.e.* to the Pnyx) to give counsel to the State before your assembly. But the cause of this is what you have heard me say often and in many places: that a voice is present with me—a certain agency of God, somewhat divine (δαιμόνιον)—which indeed Meletus has caricatured and put into the indictment. Now this began with me from my childhood; a certain voice, which always, when it comes, turns me aside from that which I am about to do, but never impels me to do anything. It is this which opposed my mixing in politics, and I think very wisely. For you well know, O Athenians, that if I had been hitherto mixed in political matters, I should have perished long ago, and should have done no good, either to you or to myself. Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; for there is no man who will save his life, if he shall courageously oppose either you or any other populace, by striving to hinder the multitude of unjust and lawless things which are done in the State. It is necessary, therefore, that any one who really combats for the sake of justice, if he would survive even for a little while, should live a private and not a public life.'[3]

When Socrates had ended his defence, the votes were taken: first, he was condemned as guilty of the charges laid against him; and secondly, he was sentenced to die. He then once more addressed the court.

'I would wish to speak kindly with those who have voted for me, in respect to what has now happened, while the archons are occupied, and before I go to the place where I must die. Bear with me, therefore, O

[3] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 19, p. 123.

Athenians, for such time as we have. While it is so permitted, nothing forbids our conversing together. I wish to show to you, as my friends, what is the meaning of that which has now befallen me. O my judges—for in calling you judges I should call you rightly—something marvellous has happened to me. Hitherto, the Oracle of the δαιμόνιον, which is familiarly about me, with great frequency has opposed itself, even in very little things, if I were about to act in any way not rightly. But now there has befallen me, as you yourselves see, that which men may think, and most men do account, to be the greatest of evils. And yet this morning, neither when I came from home did the sign from the God oppose itself, nor when I came up hither to the court of judgment, nor anywhere during the defence I was about to make; although in other speeches it has often restrained me in the very midst of speaking. But now in this affair it has not anywhere opposed me, either in any deed or word. What, then, do I suppose to be the cause? I will tell you. That which has happened to me seems to be a good thing; and if we think death to be an evil, we are in error. Of this I have a sure evidence; for it cannot be that the accustomed sign would not have opposed itself to me if I were not about to do something which is good.'[4]

'Wherefore, O my judges, you ought to be of good hope about death, and to know this to be true—that no evil can happen to a good man, whether in life or in death; nor are his affairs neglected by the gods. Nor

[4] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 31, p. 164.

are my affairs at this time the result of chance. But this is clear to me—that it were better for me now to die, and to be set free from troubles. Wherefore the sign has in nothing opposed me. I am, therefore, in no way angry with those who have condemned me, nor with those who have accused me; though they have condemned and accused me with no good will, but rather with the thought to hurt me. This, indeed, in them is worthy of blame.'[5]

Such was his general defence against his accusers. He stood up as a man conscious of something in him higher than himself—of a calling and a mission to his countrymen. He had laboured to recall them from luxury, self-indulgence, ambition, civil strife, political profligacy, and private corruption. He told them roundly that no man could serve them who mixed in their politics—that no man could rebuke their corruptions and live.

Therefore it was that Meletus and Anytus accused him; and their accusation was the expression of a wide-spread enmity in Athens.

The charges laid against Socrates were chiefly two: the one, that of corrupting the youth of the day by his philosophy; the other, that of impiety, and of introducing new gods, ἕτερα καινὰ δαιμόνια, or of denying the existence of gods. It is with the latter we have chiefly to do, because it connects itself with the belief of Socrates in respect to the Dæmonion, or voice, or sign, which from his childhood had been with him as a monitor and guide.

[5] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 33 p. 172

In answer to the charge of atheism, Socrates asked his accuser: 'Is there any man who believes that there are human affairs, but does not believe in the existence of men; or that there are certain rules for managing horses, and yet believes that there is no such thing as a horse? There is no such man. But pray answer me this point: is there any man who believes divine things and yet denies the being of a God?' Meletus answered, 'No, certainly.' Then Socrates replied, 'You acknowledge, then, that I believe and teach the existence of deities. So that, whether they be new or old, you still own that I believe in divinities or divine agencies. Now if I believe that there are divinities or divine agencies, I must necessarily suppose that there are gods.'[6]

In these passages of Plato we have the fullest and most explicit declaration of Socrates respecting the Dæmon by which he was admonished. He tells us that it was 'a familiar sign, an oracle, a divine voice;' that this sign had been with him from his infancy; that its office was to take him off from certain lines of action; that it did not impel him to any.

With such declarations before him, it is not wonderful that Plutarch should have supposed this Dæmon to be a personal being; and that he should have written a book (*De Genio Socratis*) on the familiar spirit of Socrates; and that Apuleius should have written *De Deo Socratis*—of the God of Socrates; and that the Neoplatonists and certain of the Christian Fathers should have understood this Dæmonion to be a per-

[6] *Apologia Socratis*, s. 15, p. 105.

sonal being or genius: whether good or bad they did not determine.

Plutarch has not promoted either the perspicuity or the gravity of the subject by telling us that a voice in the Cave of Trophonius expounded to Timarchus the philosophy of dæmons in the following words: 'Every soul partakes of reason. It cannot be without reason and intelligence. But so much of each soul as is mixed with flesh and passions is changed, and through pain or pleasure becomes irrational. Every soul does not mix itself in the same manner. For some plunge themselves altogether into the body, and so in this life their whole frame is corrupted by appetite and passion; others are mixed only in part, but the purer part still remains out of the body. It is not drawn down into it; but it floats above and touches the upper part of a man's head. It is like a cord to hold up and direct the part of the soul which is sinking, as long as it proves obedient, and is not overcome by the passions of the flesh. The part that is plunged into the body is called the soul; but the uncorrupted part is called the mind, and people think that it is within them: as likewise they imagine the image reflected from a glass is in the glass. But the more intelligent, who know it to be external, call it a dæmon.'[7]

'Such was the soul of Hermodorus the Clazomenian, of which it is reported that for nights and days it would leave his body, travel over many countries, and return, after it had seen things and talked with persons at

[7] Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis*, sect. 22; *Moralia*, tom. i. p. 713, ed. Dœhner, Paris, 1841.

a great distance; till at last, by the treachery of his wife, his body was delivered to his enemies, and they burnt it in his own house while the soul was abroad.' Plutarch considerately adds, 'It is certain that this is not true;' but he goes on to say, 'The soul never went out of the body, but it loosened the tie that held the dæmon, and gave it range and freedom.'[8]

Plutarch then relates the following anecdote: 'More and greater things you may learn from Simias, and other companions of Socrates; but once, when I was present, as I went to Euthyphron the soothsayer, it happened—Simias, as you remember—that Socrates was going up to Symbolum, and the house of Andocides, all the way asking questions, and playfully attacking Euthyphron. When, suddenly standing still, and making us to do the same, he pondered with himself for some time. Then, turning about, he walked through Trunk-makers' Street, calling back his friends that walked before him, affirming that it was because of his dæmon. Many turned back, amongst whom I, holding Euthyphron, was one; but some of the youths, keeping on the straight road, in order, as it were, to disprove the dæmon of Socrates, took along with them Charillus the piper, who came with me to Athens to see Cebes. Now, as they were walking through Sculptors' Street, near the court-houses, a herd of pigs, covered with mud, met them; and being too many for the street, and running against one another, they upset some that could not get out of the way, and dirtied others; and Charillus came home with his legs and clothes very muddy; so that

[8] *De Genio Socratis*, sect. 22.

often, in merriment, they would remember Socrates' dæmon, wondering at its constant care of the man, and that Heaven kept such a particular watch over him.'[9]

'I myself, Galaxidorus, have heard a Megarian, who had it from Terpsion, say that Socrates' dæmon was nothing else but the sneezing either of himself or of others; for if another sneezed, either before, behind him, or on his right hand, then he went on to do what he was about; but if on the left hand, he refrained from acting. One sort of his own sneezing confirmed him, whilst deliberating and not fully resolved; another stopped him when already about to act. But indeed it seems strange that if he used sneezing as his sign, he should not have told this to his friends, but should have said that it was a dæmon that hindered or enjoined him.'[10]

The following passage is more to our purpose. Plutarch says: 'The resolute impulses of Socrates seem to be both vigorous and firm, as springing from right principles and strong judgment. Therefore he, of his own will, lived in poverty all his life, though he had friends who would have been glad and willing to give to him; he would not give up philosophy, notwithstanding all the discouragements he met with; and at last, when his friends endeavoured and skilfully contrived his escape, he would not yield to their entreaties, nor withdraw from death, but maintained an inflexible mind in the last extremity. And surely these are not the actions of a man whose designs, when once fixed, could be altered by omens or sneezings; but of one who,

[9] *De Genio Socratis*, sect. 10. [10] Ibid. sect. 11.

by some higher guidance and principle, is directed to do right.'[11]

Plutarch then says that Socrates foretold the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily; and that in the pursuit at Delium he, with Alcibiades and Laches escaped by Registe, while others who would not follow him were overtaken and slain. This caused the dæmon of Socrates to be much talked of in Athens.

We may now dismiss these speculations, and come back to Socrates, and learn from himself what he understood and intended us to understand by his Dæmon or Dæmonion.

But here again we are brought to a standstill. We cannot interrogate Socrates himself. We can only get at him by hearsay. Between him and us, stand Xenophon and Plato. It is, after all, Xenophon and Plato, not Socrates, who speak to us. Worse than this, Xenophon and Plato do not agree in what they tell us; and, worst of all, what they tell us evidently takes form and colour from their own minds. It may recall to us Sir Walter Scott's description in *Kenilworth* of Blount and Raleigh sitting on the bench in the hall at Say's Court. They were both looking in silence at the wall. The bluff old soldier looked at the wall and saw the wall, and nothing but the wall; but between the wall and the eye of Sir Walter Wittypate there was a whole imaginary world, with an endless procession and maze of persons and things of his own creation.

The Socrates of Xenophon stands out clear, hard, definite; a matter-of-fact description, a photograph with

[11] *De Genio Socratis*, sect. 9.

few after-touches, with little sense that anything needs explanation, or could have any meaning but the letter of the text. The Socrates of Plato comes to us through the prisms of his marvellous imagination; so as to create a misgiving whether it be a conscientious likeness or a portrait by the hand of an artist and a friend, too creative and too fond to be faithful.

Nevertheless, we are reduced to those two biographers. They are the only full and trustworthy witnesses in close personal contact with the man whom they describe.

We will endeavour, then, to ascertain what they understood by the Dæmon of Socrates. This will at least give the best approximation to what Socrates understood by it himself.

In order to do this, we will first take down their evidence as they give it, and next compare the two testimonies; and lastly, make an estimate of their differences.

When this is done we may use our own criticism: for it is one thing to ascertain what Socrates may have understood, it is another to ascertain what we may understand by the psychological facts narrated by him or by them. It is not to be too hastily assumed that Socrates was an adequate interpreter of the internal facts even of his own mind. It is not unreasonable to believe that the philosophical and other profounder experience of two thousand years may have enabled us more truly than he could to analyse and to appreciate the facts and phenomena of moral and mental philosophy. The heart has beat, and the blood has cir-

culated, from the beginning of time; yet we take the physiology of Harvey as to the blood, rather than that of Hippocrates. The Ethics even of Aristotle are, in analytical depth and precise delineation, conspicuously in advance of the method and teaching of Socrates. In this the disciple is above his master, and we may be above both.

Let us begin, then, with Xenophon. The chief passages in which he describes the Dæmonian are as follows:

'It was in the mouths of men that Socrates declared that the Deity or Dæmonion (τὸ δαιμόνιον) made things known to him, or gave him signs by which to know them.'

'He used to say that the Dæmonion signified (things) to him; and that he often advised those who were with him to do some things, and not to do others, as the Dæmonion forewarned him.'[12]

'For he thought that the Gods (τοὺς Θεοὺς) had care of men in a way unlike that which most men imagine: for they suppose that the Gods know indeed some things, and do not know others. But Socrates believed the Gods to know all things—whatsoever things are said, or done, or purposed in secret; and that they are everywhere present; and that they make known human things to men.'[13]

When Hermogenes sorrowfully upbraided him for not defending himself more elaborately, and for even provoking his judges against him, Socrates answered: 'Of a truth, Hermogenes, when I set to work to think

[12] *Xenoph. Mem.* lib. i. c. 1, s. 1, Oxon. 1785. [13] Ibid. s. 4.

out my defence before the judges the Dæmonion hindered me.'[14]

Finally, Xenophon says of him that he was 'so pious that he would do nothing without the counsel of the Gods.'[15]

Such, then, is the evidence of Xenophon; upon which these remarks may be made:

1. That Xenophon carefully distinguishes between the Dæmon of Socrates, which he calls τὸ δαιμόνιον, and the Gods, whom he calls τοὺς Θεούς.

2. That he describes the Dæmonion as showing beforehand what things are to be done, and what not to be done: that is to say that the action of this monitor was both to enjoin and to forbid.

3. That he refers this admonition and direction to the Gods, without whose counsel (γνώμη) Socrates would never act.

4. That nothing in Xenophon is to be found which invests the Dæmonion with personality, or with any other character than that of a divine influence or agency, or a counsel or direction of the Gods acting upon the reason of man.

We will now proceed to our other witness.

The chief passages of Plato bearing on the Dæmonion are those which we have already quoted from the Apology. They need not be repeated.

To these may be added what follows.

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates says: 'I happened to be providentially sitting alone in the place where you saw me, in the dressing-room (of the Lycæum), and

[14] *Xenoph. Mem.* lib. iv. c. 8, s. 3. [15] Ibid. s. 4.

I had in my mind to be gone. When I got up, the accustomed sign, the Dæmonion, came; I therefore again sat down.'[16] Soon after came Euthydemus and his companions.

Again, in the *Phædrus*: 'When I was about to cross the river, the Dæmonion, the accustomed sign, came, which restrains me when I am about to do anything; and I seemed to hear a certain voice which did not suffer me to proceed until I should have expiated myself, as having in some way offended against God.'[17]

And in the *Alcibiades*, he says: 'The cause of this was nothing human, but a certain divine hindrance, the power of which you shall hereafter hear; but now, as it no longer hinders me, I am therefore come, and I am in good hope that for the future it will not hinder me.'[18]

In the *Theætetus*, he says: 'The Dæmonion which comes to me hinders my intercourse with some, and not with others.'[19]

And in the *Republic*: 'It is not worth while to speak of the divine sign which comes to me, whether it have occurred to any other or not.'[20]

I do not quote from the *Theages*, in which there is much on the point, for two reasons. First, doubts have been raised as to its authenticity; and secondly, the statements contained in it may be found also in other dialogues of which there is no doubt.

Now in these passages we have the following points:

[16] *Euthydemus*, 273, vol. vi. 80, ed. Stallbaum, Gothæ, 18[illegible]6.
[17] *Phædrus*, 242, vol. iv. 72.
[18] *Alcibiades*, 103, vol. v. 221.
[19] *Theætetus*, 151, vol. viii. 71.
[20] *De Republica*, lib. vi. s. 496.

1. That the Dæmonion is spoken of as *θεῖον τι*, *δαιμόνιον*, *σημεῖον*, *φωνή*, and *εἰωθυῖα τοῦ δαιμονίου μαντική*: something divine, something of the Deity, a sign, a voice, the accustomed divination or oracle of the Deity. It is evident, therefore, that Plato represents it as an agency or a voice, not as an agent or a person; and if the agent or person from whom this agency or voice proceed be sought for, it is to be found in God or in the Gods.

2. That the function of this agency or voice was to check, to hinder, and to restrain, not to suggest or to prompt to any line of action.

3. That it manifested itself in such apparently fortuitous events as the hindering the departure of Socrates from the Lycæum till Euthydemus came; and *πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς*, even in the least things: that is to say, its function was to forewarn or to check in matters not so much of right and wrong as of safety, or of expediency, or of good fortune.

Comparing these two testimonies of Xenophon and Plato we find:

1. That they agree as to the impersonal nature of the Dæmonion. The terms used by them signify, at the utmost, a divine agency or a divine voice; they do not signify the presence or attendance of a divine person or of a familiar spirit.

It is, perhaps, not wonderful that some of the ancients should have so misunderstood their language, and that Socrates should have been accused of introducing new deities. The same charge was in like manner made against the Apostle at Athens, because

he preached the Resurrection, *τὴν ἀνάστασιν*. Nevertheless Cicero understood Plato's language, and translated the Dæmonion by *divinum aliquid*.

It is to be borne in mind that both Xenophon and Plato speak, not as we do, of the *Δαίμων* of Socrates, but of the *δαιμόνιον*. They never speak of the *δαιμόνιον* as *θεός*, but observe strictly the known distinction between these terms. *Δαιμόνιον* signifies the abstract or neuter idea of divine power, the Deity or the Divinity. As Aristotle says, it implies *ἢ Θεὸς ἢ Θεοῦ ἔργον*,[21] either the presence or the power, not of a *δαίμων* or inferior divinity, but of God. *Δαίμων* is so far used convertibly with *Θεός*, that it is sometimes used for *Θεός*, but *Θεός* is never used for *Δαίμων*. *Θεός* and *Δαίμων* are sometimes used together; but *Δαίμων* signifies a divinity of lower rank.

In the Apology, Socrates tells his judges that when he was coming out of his house, *τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*, the sign of the God, distinguishing the agency from the person, hindered him. Xenophon also makes Euthydemus say that the Gods showed a special friendship to Socrates. And again he says, speaking of voices, signs, and divinations, that by these things, *τοὺς θεοὺς σημαίνειν*, the Gods signified things to man. The *δαιμόνιον* was one of those signs: impersonal, derived from a divine agent.

2. That they disagree as to the function or office of the Dæmonion. Xenophon ascribes to it the twofold office of suggestion and restraint. Plato ascribes to it expressly that of restraint only.

[21] *Arist. Rhet.* ii. xxiii. 8.

Plutarch agrees with Xenophon, and describes its office as either restraining or enjoining; κωλύων ἢ κελεύων.[22]

3. That they further disagree, inasmuch as Xenophon recognises the action of the Dæmonion in matters of right or wrong, as well as in matters of expediency; whereas Plato seems to restrict it to the latter.

The sum of the evidence, therefore, may be thus stated: Socrates believed himself to be assisted from his childhood by a divine agency, whereby he was forewarned and guided in matters of his own personal conduct, both towards himself, as in his escape after the defeat at Delium, and his waiting in the Lycæum; and towards others, as in judging what disciples to receive or to reject, and in his whole mission as cross-examiner of his fellow-countrymen.

Such is the judgment of ancient writers. I will quote only a few of the many modern critics on this subject. Bishop Thirlwall says: 'Socrates, who was used to reflect profoundly on the state of his own mind, had, it seems, gradually become convinced that he was favoured by the Gods with an inward sign, which he described as a voice.'[23]

In like manner, Mr. Grote says: 'We have also to note that marked feature in the character of Socrates, the standing upon his own individual reason and measure of good and evil: nay, even perhaps his confidence in it so far as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him.'[24] Mr. Grote further refers

[22] *De Genio Socratis*, sect. 11.

[23] *Hist. of Greece*, vol. iv. p. 290. [24] Grote's *Plato*, vol. i. p. 295.

in a note to a curious passage from the Life of Coriolanus by Plutarch, where he says that the Gods do not infuse into men new volitions; but they work upon the principle of association in the mind, suggesting ideas which conduct to the appropriate volitions. Plutarch's words are, 'Not infusing the motive powers, but the ideas which call those motive powers into activity; not making the act involuntary by constraint, but giving an outset to the will, and inspiring it with courage and hope.'[25]

According to both these estimates it would appear that the groundwork of this divine action, as Socrates believed it to be, was the intellectual and moral activity of his own mind.

Zeller, in his work on Socrates and the Socratic Schools, gives his estimate of the Dæmonion in the following words:

'The *δαιμόνιον* is therefore an internal oracle, and as such it is by Xenophon and Plato included under the more general notion of divination, and placed on a par with divination by sacrifice and the flight of birds. In attempting to bring this inward revelation of Socrates into harmony with the facts of psychology, it may be laid down, in the first place, that the *dæmonium* must not be confounded with the voice of conscience, as many ancient and modern critics have done.' . . . . 'The *δαιμόνιον* has nothing to do with the universal moral standard, which, according to Socrates, is a matter for

[25] Κινοῦντα τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐδ' ὁρμὰς ἐνεργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγούς, αἷς οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀκούσιον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑκουσίῳ δίδωσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλπίζειν προστίθησιν. *In Vita M. Coriolani*, vol. i. sect. 33, ed. Dœhner, Paris, 1857.

pure intelligence to determine.' . . . 'For these [that is, actions in prospect] Socrates either has recourse to μαντικὴ in general, or to his δαιμόνιον, leaving moral conduct to be determined by clear knowledge.'[26]

We are here approaching to the estimate which appears to me to be both adequate and true.

Mr. Riddell, of Balliol, after carefully analysing the evidence we have hitherto examined, says:

'If, then, declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the phenomenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily, provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone. All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view that it was a quick exercise of a judgment, informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect, without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose, and unperturbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties, especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to forecast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense.'

'As to the reconcilement of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με, he describes it by its most perceptible act. For its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable.' . . . 'The voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function.'

[26] Zeller's *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, pp. 76-78. Longman, 1868.

Mr. Riddell goes on to say that the δαιμόνιον was 'an unanalysed act of judgment;' that it was κριτική, not ἐπιτακτική, that it was Socrates' substitute for μαντική, and that, where men are wont to have recourse to external preternatural aids, Socrates went by a guide within himself; that to this guide he, in all good faith, gave a religious name. 'His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken, they were divine. And what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.'[27]

This appears to me to be in outline an explanation both true and adequate.

If I were asked to add my own judgment as to what the Dæmon of Socrates was, in the estimate of Socrates himself, I should answer as follows:

It was a belief of a divine assistance, granted, as he says, to all men in some things, and in some special circumstances; of which most men are hardly, if at all, conscious; but in his case it was consciously recognised from his childhood, and it acted upon him in and through the intellectual and moral operations of his own mind: so that he ascribed to the action of the Dæmonion much that was undoubtedly the normal activity of his own intellectual and moral state.

Such, I think, Socrates believed it to be.

If, however, I were asked what we may believe it to have been, I would answer:

1. That, holding altogether with Lord Bacon, when he says in his essay on atheism, 'I had rather believe

[27] Riddell's *Apology of Plato*, pp. 105-8, Oxford, 1867.

all the fables of the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind,' we may well believe in a divine providence surrounding the life, and a divine action present to the mind, of any man who, according to the testimony of one that knew him by closest intimacy, was 'so pious as never to do anything without the counsel of the Gods; so just as never to hurt any one even in the lightest thing; but full of the greatest benefit to all who conversed with him; so temperate as never to prefer what was pleasant to what was best; so prudent as never to err in discerning the better from the worse, and never to need the judgment of any other in this discernment, being sufficient in himself.'[28] That a divine providence and a divine help are over the whole intellectual and moral world is an axiomatic truth in the relation of God to man: that they may be looked for in a special degree in just and prudent men follows as a corollary from that axiom. But as this lies beyond our analysis, we will confine ourselves to the subject as a matter of psychology.

I will therefore add a further proposition, namely:

2. That the statements of Xenophon and Plato may be, not only harmonised, but brought under the same psychological explanation, resting on the laws of the speculative and the practical reason. It would indeed be too narrow an explanation, as Zeller objects, to refer the signs of this monitor to the action of conscience alone; for conscience is only one office or one function of the reason of man. Nevertheless it is certain that,

[28] *Xenoph. Memorabilia*, lib. iv. c. 8, s. 5.

in a large part of that which Socrates referred to the Dæmonion, conscience was directly present and perceptibly in action. It is no objection to this to quote, as Zeller does, the declaration of Socrates that, 'It is idle to consult the Gods about things which may be known by deliberation;'[29] or to say that Socrates 'referred morals to the judgment of reason.'[30] This is precisely the philosophical definition of conscience. Conscience is *dictamen rationis*. It is reason acting upon right and wrong with a view to practice: just as apprehension is the reason acting upon truth and falsehood with a view to science. In matter of speculative truth, as in physical science, geometry, and the like, the intellect acts without any response from the passions or affections of the moral nature. Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric*, says that mathematics have no ethical character, but that the teaching of Socrates has.[31] In matter of practical truth, the discernments of the intellect are followed by a response of the moral nature by way of approval or disapproval. But the *primary* judge is the reason, the response of the moral nature is *secondary*. It is, therefore, most true that morals are subject to the jurisdiction of reason; but that does not prove that this monitor of Socrates was not in great part the action of conscience.

And here it may be well to make more clear and precise the philosophical definition of conscience.

Scientia is the simple knowledge of things by the reason. *Conscientia* is the self-knowledge of the reason or mind. 'Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.'

[29] *Xenoph. Mem.* p. 78. [30] Ibid. [31] *Rhet.* iii. 16, 8.

Now this conscience in its *first* intention is consciousness, as we commonly call it. It extends over all the internal acts of the reason or mind, over the whole inner world of our personal identity. Conscience, in the *second* intention of common parlance, signifies the reason judging of moral action, and discerning of right from wrong, with an approval or disapproval of the moral sense following upon its decisions. Metaphysicians, therefore, distinguish the operations of conscience into two kinds, and speak of a *psychological* conscience, by which we reflect upon internal acts of the minds in general, and a *moral* conscience, by which we reflect upon and judge of the *ethical* character of actions, whether internal or external. And this conscience they again distinguish into *habitual* and *actual*. The *habitual* conscience is the permanent disposition of the mind in relation to its own moral *state;* the *actual* conscience is the fixing of its attention and judicial discernment on its own moral *acts*. The *habitual* conscience is *spontaneous*, and therefore unconscious; the *actual* conscience is reflex, *deliberate*, and therefore conscious.

Such is the language of scholastic philosophy; and this seems with great precision to account for the fact which Socrates appears to have observed in himself, and Plato has recorded; namely, that the Dæmonion seemed to act only by way of check and restraint. The spontaneous action of conscience was habitual and unperceived—the actual aroused attention and conscious effort.[32]

[32] *Prisco Filosofia Speculativa*, tom. i. pp. 208-10, Napolis, 1864.

In saying, then, that this internal monitor of Socrates is the reason, including the conscience, I intend expressly to include what is here described as the psychological as well as the moral conscience, and also the distinction between the habitual or spontaneous and the actual or deliberate conscience. The application of this will be further seen when we answer an objection which may be anticipated. This comprehensive view includes all the mental judgments, whether of expediency or of morality, that is, both of prudence and of rectitude.

As to the examples given by Xenophon and Plato, in almost every one of them may be traced a moral element and a moral discernment.

For instance, the decision of Socrates to keep out of politics, that he might better serve the public good. This is surely a high moral judgment, involving the noblest motives of relative duty. The discernment as to what disciples to retain, or what persons to receive back again among them after they had once left him, unless it were a blind and capricious act, which in Socrates is incredible, must have been founded upon such a discernment of moral qualities and distinctions, both in his own character and in that of others, as to demand the exercise of the moral reason. When we say that one man is *simpatico* and another *antipatico*, we are exercising a moral sense and discrimination of an intimate and explicit sort; and this determines us in receiving or refusing to receive men to our confidence.

In deciding that he would not defend himself so as

to escape death, the action of conscience, sustaining the highest aspirations and the noblest intrepidity, is clearly revealed.

I admit that in the escape after the flight and pursuit at Delium, and in the waiting in the Lycæum, and in the matter of Plutarch's pigs, there is to be discerned rather the activity of prudence than of conscience. But on the supposition that the monitor of Socrates was a mature and experienced reason, the action of both prudence and conscience would be alike included.

To this it may be objected, that Plato distinctly declares that the monitor of Socrates told him, not what things to do, but what things not to do; that inasmuch as conscience has a twofold office towards both good and evil, the Dæmonion could not be conscience.

But to this objection two answers may be made.

The first, that Xenophon and Plutarch directly say that the Dæmonion both enjoined and forbade, that is, pronounced for or against certain lines of action.

The other answer has been anticipated by the statements of our scholastic philosophy. It has been shown that the action of conscience, when it suggests or approves anything, is less perceptible than when it disapproves or forbids. This may be seen by analogies. We are insensible of our continuous respiration, but distinctly sensible of the act of holding the breath; it is an *actus imperatus* requiring a conscious exertion of the will. Again, in walking we are unconscious of the momentum of our pace, but conscious of any hindrance

and even of the act of stopping. The moral reason or conscience is always in activity, but with little or no reflex action upon itself until something offends it. We are then conscious of a change of attitude and of a recoil. For instance, the reason and conscience of Socrates permitted him freely to mix among men to cross-examine them, but not to enter into politics. In the former, he followed his own spontaneous inclination; in the latter, he imposed a conscious restraint upon himself. This is what Aristotle describes as prudence, or Φρόνησις. He distinguishes it from science, as being an intellectual habit conversant with practical and contingent matter; and from intuition, as being of details rather than of principles. He says that Φρόνησις, or prudence, is an intellectual virtue conversant about moral action. And he ascribes to it a power of sight, which is so trained and perfected by experience as to discern with an intuitive rapidity what is right or expedient in practice. He says that prudent men have a faculty which men call (δεινότης) skill, or ability, or resource, 'the nature of which is to do—and to do correctly—the things which conduce to the end proposed. If this aim be good, the skill is praiseworthy; but if it be bad, it becomes craft.' Wherefore Aristotle says, 'We call prudent men skilful, and not crafty. But prudence is not the same as this faculty (*i.e.* δεινότης, or skill). But the habit of prudence grows upon this *eye*, as it were, of the soul.'[33] This is a precise description of the prompt and provident intuition, a sort of ἀγχίνοια, and εὐβουλία, presence of mind, rapidity of

[33] *Arist. Eth. N. L.* vi. xii. τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ· γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς.

counsel, with which Socrates discovered the useful, or the expedient in matters of practice. But the nature of this intellectual faculty is, in the main, distinctly moral, and belongs to the region of conscience, or the discernment of right and wrong.

This instinct or faculty of moral discernment is traceable throughout the whole history of the ancient world. S. Paul only affirms what all records of antiquity demonstrate in saying, 'When the Gentiles which have not the law do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which show the works of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness (*συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως*), and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.'[34]

Once more: it may be objected that it is not for us to theorise as to what Socrates ought to have understood of his own inward life, but to take things as he expressed them.

To this I have already by anticipation made one sufficient answer. But I will add another. Socrates refused to be classed with the philosophers or teachers of Athens. He delivered no system of philosophy. He framed to himself no moral or mental science. He found philosophy in the hands of physicists, or physical theorists, and of Sophists. He thought the physicists to be vainly curious, if not impious, in trying to discover what the gods kept secret; he thought the Sophists to be venal, superficial, and immoral. He was the

[34] Rom. ii. 14, 15.

founder, not of a new philosophy, but of a new era in philosophy. He extricated the conceptions of God and of morality from the region and philosophy of matter, and set them in the sphere of mind. He brought down philosophy, as Cicero says, from heaven to earth, to the market-place and the streets, and the homes and the hearts of men. He cross-examined every man he met with, politicians, philosophers, rhetoricians, painters, private citizens, artisans; but he framed no system and laid down no theories; he made no analysis of the human mind. Lord Bacon is said to have created a Novum Organum in philosophy by questioning Nature. This Socrates certainly did by questioning man. His method was one of universal questioning, whereby he heaped up materials for his disciples, one of whom afterwards gave to them a scientific order and precision of expression which has formed the imperishable basis of mental and moral philosophy to this day. The Ethics of Aristotle analyse, lay out, distinguish, and define the intellectual and moral processes of the human mind—modern metaphysicians must bear with me — with a truth which has never been surpassed. What Socrates felt, Aristotle has fixed by exact analysis. The character of Socrates is the φρόνιμος of Aristotle, the prudent man; but prudence is etymologically and essentially far-seeing,[35] the perfection of the moral reason. 'All men,' he says, 'seem to testify that such a habit which is according to prudence is virtue. But it is necessary

[35] 'Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus.' *Hor. Od.* iii. 29.

to make a slight difference, for virtue is not only a habit according to right reason, but inseparably joined with right reason; and prudence is the same as right reason on these subjects. Socrates, therefore,' Aristotle says, 'thought the virtues to be reasons or rational habits, for he thought them all to be sciences; but we think them to be intellectual habits joined with reason. It is clear, however, from what has been said, that it is impossible for a man to be properly virtuous without prudence, or to be prudent without moral virtue.'[36] Aristotle seems to me to give in this passage the psychological analysis of the intuition and providence with which Socrates was eminently endowed. His prudence or Φρόνησις constituted the αὐτάρκεια, or self-dependence of reason in all questions of morality, of which Xenophon speaks.

> 'Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia, nos te
> Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam cœloque locamus.'[37]

The prudence of Socrates was his own moral state, and yet *non sine Numine*, for we may well believe that to him was granted no common share in the 'Light that lighteth every man that cometh into this world.'

In saying this I am not rejecting the supposition that the particular providence which never suffers even a sparrow to fall to the ground without its Creator's will may have in a special way encompassed the life of a man who witnessed in a corrupt world to the lights of Nature and to the laws of right. In the midst of an intellectual frivolity and a moral degradation

[36] *Eth. N. L.* vi. xiii.
[37] Juvenal, lib. iv. sat. x. 365-6.

never surpassed in the history of mankind, made all the guiltier by reason of the refined culture and luxurious civilisation of Athens, Socrates bore witness, until seventy years of age, to the supremacy of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, the four perfections of man in the order of Nature.

Whether the estimate I have given of the Dæmonion of Socrates be true or not, the inquiry in which we have been engaged is manifestly not a barren speculation. It sets before us a great moral example; it teaches us a great moral law, necessary to men at all times, vital to us in these declining days. I mean, that there is no way for men to attain their true dignity, nor to serve their age and country, but to be upright in conscience, and, even at the cost of life, to be both in public and private duty prudent and temperate, just and brave. It tells us with a thrilling human voice, and in the accents of our common humanity, that man's supreme rule of right is the moral reason or conscience; that the cultivation of the mere intellect, while the moral life and powers lie fallow, is the work of sophists, deceivers or deceived, or both; that the education of man is his moral formation; that intellectual culture without moral goodness is a wildfire and a pestilence, which makes havoc of men and states; that knowledge is virtue, and virtue knowledge; for that, unless we would maim and mutilate our being, the intellectual and moral powers of man must be simultaneously and equably unfolded and matured. These are axioms of the moral life; vital, I say, at all times and in all lands, but nowhere more in season

and more wholesome than to us, who, in the sudden growth of a vast maritime empire, splendid and unstable for its very greatness, in the refinements of luxury, and the inundation of a stupendous prosperity, seem to be developing some of the moral and intellectual evils which went before the fall of imperial Athens,—political factions, licentious freedom, sophistical education, a relaxation of moral and religious traditions, a growing scepticism, an unstable public opinion, swayed to and fro by nameless hands and by irresponsible voices. In such a public state Socrates lived and died, bequeathing to us this lesson —**that conscience is the Voice of God.**

XIII.

A LETTER TO HIS GRACE THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,

PRIMATE OF ALL IRELAND.

A LETTER TO HIS GRACE THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH,

PRIMATE OF ALL IRELAND.

My dear Lord Primate,—I can say with truth that, among the disappointments which have befallen me in events of this kind, I can remember none greater than that of failing of my promise to be with you at the dedication of the cathedral of Armagh.

When your Grace first invited me, I answered at once that I could refuse nothing to the successor of S. Patrick. Any such invitation from Ireland would come in his name; but an invitation from Armagh comes with his authority. It speaks from his own see as Metropolitan and Primate of Ireland.

I felt also that your invitation was not only a personal and private kindness, but that it had a wider meaning. It was a bidding to me to come and to greet once more the Bishops of Ireland, among whom I spent so many happy hours during the Council of the Vatican. I may say still more: it was an invitation to the Catholic Church in England to come and join with the Catholic Church in Ireland in a solemnity which bears witness to the indissoluble unity of the Faith. It

seemed to me very fitting, and in these days very timely, and in every way very good and full of meaning, that the Primate of Ireland should have by his side a representative of the Catholic Church in England. I knew also from certain sources that among the clergy and people of Ireland many kind hearts wished to give me a welcome.

Therefore I do not think that I failed in any way to appreciate the reasons which now make my disappointment greater. Your Grace will believe me, then, when I say that no light cause would have made me deprive myself of so much pleasure, and disappoint so many kind friends, and frustrate so many kind intentions. I may also add that no light cause would have made me even seem to be wanting in respect to your Grace and the Bishops, and to the clergy and people of Ireland.

But in truth I had, as I wrote last week, no choice.

Our Provincial Council, which I thought would be over in ten or twelve days, took two-and-twenty; and after it closed it laid upon me many more days of work. The dedication of the church at Rathkeale was fixed for the 17th. I could not leave S. Edmund's College, where the Council was held, until the 16th. It was then impossible to reach Rathkeale in time, even if I could have travelled night and day; and I did not know till the work was over how completely unable I was to travel at all, still more to fulfil the promise I had made of preaching in Rathkeale and in Dublin and Armagh, and of accepting the many kind tokens of welcome which were, as I knew, prepared for me.

Those who were then with me know that I do not often break promises of work. Between the conviction that I ought not to undertake any work at that time, and the pain of disappointing so many known and unknown to me, I was in real anxiety. I can therefore assure you that your Grace's kind and considerate letter, and one equally kind and considerate from his Eminence the Cardinal, have given me a sensible relief and consolation. I will now therefore go on to fulfil my promise to give you in print what I should have said in words. Your Grace need not be afraid lest I should send you the sermon I was to preach. My purpose is more merciful. I wish to write what I should have said about the Catholic Church in Ireland, and also in England, their mutual relations of co-operation and support; and somewhat about the witness we have to bear, and the work we have to do in our country, at this strange crisis of the Church in all nations of Europe.

I.

If I had been able to be among you, I should have expressed, so far as I could, some of the many motives of veneration with which I regard Catholic Ireland; for I know no country in the world more truly Christian, nor any Catholic people that has retained its faith and traditions more inviolate. The one only exception I know is indeed out of all comparison: I mean Rome. It is true indeed that the immutability of Rome is thrown out into higher relief by the fact that the city has been submerged, times without number, by every

form of anti-Christian enmity, and that it has been the centre of all the warfare of the world against the Faith; but it has been sustained by its exceptional divine prerogatives, and therefore remains immovable. Ireland has not the special support of either 'Tu es Petrus' or of 'Ego rogavi pro te;' nevertheless it remains to this day, for fourteen hundred years, as S. Patrick left it, unstained and inviolate in Catholic fidelity. I know of no other province in the Kingdom of our Divine Master of which this can be said. Every other country in Europe has had its heresy and its periods of obscuration. Some have risen and fallen again, and have been restored once more; some, after centuries of light and grace, have apostatised utterly, and lie dead to this day; but Ireland is the Ireland of S. Patrick to the present hour. I am well aware what nibbling critics and historical scavengers may rake up from the twelfth or thirteenth centuries of Irish history; but this still more confirms my assertion. Even in those dark days the faith of Ireland never failed. It was Catholic and Roman, as S. Patrick taught it. I note this, not only because it is a great glory, which has been won by centuries of suffering even unto death—and Ireland may indeed be truly inscribed in the calendar of the Church as both confessor and martyr—but I note it because it seems to me to be related to other great truths. If England had been less prosperous in this world, it might have been more faithful to the Kingdom of God. If Ireland has had an inheritance of sorrow, it has received, in the order of grace and life eternal, the recompense of a great reward. In this I see some

explanation of the unexampled spiritual fertility of Ireland. What other race since the Apostles has so spread the Faith on earth? There is at this hour an Irish and catholic population in England, Scotland, Canada, Australia, and the United States, double in number as compared with the whole population of Ireland. They are multiplying beyond all other races; founding churches and episcopates, building cathedrals; raising everywhere altars, schools, colleges, convents; and covering the surface of new countries, I may say new continents, with the Catholic faith as fervent, fruitful, and pure as in Dublin, Cashel, Tuam, and Armagh. I know nothing else like this in the world; I may say, in Christian history. When I remember how this faith has been preserved, through what sorrows and sufferings, with what a prolonged martyrdom of generations, I must believe that our Divine Master has called the Irish nation to a great mission and a great destiny. And this comes out all the more visibly in this age of national apostasy. The nations have fallen away one after another from the unity of the Kingdom of God. Germany and the North fell first; France, and Italy, and Austria, and now Spain, have followed. By anti-Christian revolutions and public rejection of the Vicar of Jesus Christ they have as nations ceased to be Catholic, and seem bent on ceasing to be even Christian; but Ireland, in heart and soul and will, in its private life and public opinion, in its popular voice and political action, is Christian and Catholic; with a noble pride and manly indignation at the apostasy and cowardice of the nations who are hiding their face from the Redeemer

of the world, and disowning His Vicar on earth. With all my heart I love Ireland for this apostolic fidelity, for this chivalry of Catholic fortitude and Christian love. Your Grace is at this moment while I am writing surrounded by the Bishops and clergy of Ireland, dedicating the cathedral at Armagh. I am consoling myself for my privation by writing these words: and praying that the promise made to S. Patrick may be abundantly fulfilled in all the world, and with a special benediction on the province of Ulster, and upon the faithful, fervent, generous people of Ireland.

Edmund Burke said that, with some changes, the Catholic Church in Ireland, to his mind, bore the closest resemblance of any Church on earth to the Church of the Apostles. I fully believe this; for it is the most pastoral Church in the world, where pastors and flock are in the closest bonds of confidence and love. Where this is, Christianity is in its primitive purity of life. I am not going to dwell on these topics now. Ireland, its adversaries being both judges and witnesses, is at the head of the nations for purity of morals and freedom from ordinary crime. For years I have declared my belief that Ireland is the most Christian country in the world. Its Christian traditions are universal and unbroken; its people know their religion; the intelligence of Ireland has been illuminated, quickened, enlarged by the inherited faith of fourteen hundred years; to your flocks Christian and Catholic are convertible terms. An Irishman without faith is a shame to his mother and to Ireland. The laity of Ireland, as I well know, are as prompt and clear when

Catholic doctrine or principle is at stake, and speak as authoritatively and logically in defence of the Catholic religion, as if they had been trained in a seminary. The whole action of Irish homes, Irish public opinion, and the social life of the nation moulds them, not by constraint and unwillingly, but insensibly and spontaneously, to the instincts and character of Christians. May God preserve this inheritance of His grace to you. In England it has been shattered and wasted; every year mutilates more and more the remaining Christian traditions of public life and opinion among us. We can test this comparative difference under our own hands. The difference of Catholic formation between those who come to us from Ireland and those who are born of Irish parents in England is sadly marked. The atmosphere of Ireland unfolds and ripens the Catholic instincts of faith; the atmosphere of England, like untimely frost, checks and cuts them off.

II.

I could have wished also to say to my Irish brethren what, as one looks at Ireland from a distance, may perhaps be a mirage or an illusion; but it may also be a truth and reality, more promptly seen by those who look from a distance than by those who live in the monotony of every day and the importunate presence of the common life which surrounds them. Perhaps no one is so quick to perceive the growth of the trees about a friend's house as a visitor who comes only from time to time. One conviction, then, is strongly impressed upon my mind. I do not believe that Ireland was ever

so full of life, power, and resource as at this day. I can fully understand how the constant sense of the many evils and wrongs you daily see may make it hard to realise this fact; but I believe it to be the simple truth.

1. First, was there ever any time in the history of Ireland when its people were so completely united? There have been in past times many interests of races, families, and classes which have hindered the fusion of the people into one whole. At this day they are as solidly united as the people of Scotland or of Yorkshire. The moral importance of this fact will be estimated by all who know the past history of Ireland.

2. Next, it may with certainty be said that the people of Ireland were never so well or so universally educated as at this day. The College of S. Patrick's, at Maynooth, has now since the beginning of this century wrought its effects throughout the Catholic clergy; a number of lesser colleges throughout the provinces has powerfully affected the Catholic laity. The system of education which for the last thirty years has covered Ireland with national schools has diffused education through the whole body of the people. Popular education in Ireland is more widely spread than in England. What was intended by some to undermine the Catholic religion in Ireland has turned to the confirmation of the Faith. The mass of the people at this day are an intelligent and educated Catholic nation: all the more Catholic because all the more intelligent; and thereby able to appreciate explicitly the grounds of their faith, the notes of the Church, the history of heresy, and the

emptiness of all anti-Catholic systems, which, after ages of pretension, are visibly dissolving every day before their eyes. Firm, changeless, and invincible as Ireland has ever been in its faith, it is more so now than ever. Everything has been tried against it, from martyrdom and pitchcaps to soup and secular education: *merges profundo pulchrior evenit.* I am old enough to remember the high days of Exeter Hall, and Irish missions at Dingle and the like, and Priest Protection Societies, and the New Reformation in Connemara; of which the great public oracle of England declared that, if its progress should be long maintained, Roman Catholicism would one day be as extinct in Ireland as the worship of the Phœnicians in Cornwall. But all these things have gone to the limbo of South Sea Bubbles; and the Catholic people of Ireland are rising and consolidating every year in vigorous intelligence and immutable faith.

3. To this I may add one more sign of prosperous growth in Ireland. Since the day when its people were put out of their inheritance in the soil, there was never a time when so much land had returned again into Catholic hands. Famine and fever and the exodus have indeed done their mournful work, in assuring to those who survive or remain a better remuneration for their industry; but, apart from this, there never was, I believe, a time when more industry was at work in Ireland, when more capital was invested, more activity of production and exchange was in motion, and when therefore better returns were secured to the employers and better wages to the employed. Of this I lately had an unlooked-for and trustworthy proof. A very intelli-

gent Englishman, who had raised himself, as he told me, from the plough's tail, went over last autumn to Connemara, to see with his own eyes the material condition of the peasantry in Ireland. On his return he assured me that in abundance and quality of food, in rate of wages, and even in the comfort of their dwellings, the working men of Connemara are better off than the agricultural labourers of certain of our English counties. It is therefore to me beyond a doubt that the Catholic population of Ireland is at this moment forming to itself a social organisation, in all its conditions of industry and commerce, labour and capital, and filling up the unsightly chasm between the richest and the poorest with a gradation of social classes, which must every year indefinitely increase the resources and power of the country. I know, indeed, that the last census shows once more a diminished population: but when this descent has touched a certain point emigration will slacken, if not cease, and the population will increase again.

4. And lastly, I must say that no one without a foresight almost prophetic could have foretold, in 1828 and 1829, to how high a share in the public life and power of the Empire Ireland has been lifted by the last five-and-forty years. On this let me speak out of my own observation. I was just entering upon life when the Catholics of these kingdoms were admitted into Parliament. I well remember the political conflicts from the time of Mr. O'Connell's election for the county of Clare. From that day to this many events and reasons have made me note somewhat closely the course of our legis-

lation: and my clear and firm conviction is, that at no time in the history of the English monarchy has Ireland had so wide, so various, and so powerful a share in the legislature, in the public opinion, and in the public life of the Empire. The justice of Englishmen has admitted Ireland to the same legal privileges and powers as England and Scotland; and the intelligence and energy of Irishmen are every year converting what is potential in the statute-book into actual exercise and possession. It is not my intention now to enter upon political matters; but I must say in passing that I do not forget the inequalities which still depress the Catholic population of these kingdoms. They are not, however, inequalities of the law, which is the same for all; but inequalities of social and personal conditions, which still weigh upon the posterity of those who were a generation ago under penal laws. Who would have believed that, after five-and-forty years—that is, nearly half a century after the admission of Catholics to Parliament—there should not be a single Catholic returned to the House of Commons by any constituency in England or in Scotland? And who would believe that, of the hundred and five Irish members in the House of Commons, the Catholic members should be only one in three to represent a people of whom the Catholics are nearly four to one? Nevertheless, as I am aware, the Protestant representatives of Catholic constituencies are men of honour; and through them also Catholic Ireland makes its just claims felt, so far as they are felt, in the Imperial Legislature. Your Grace will correct me if I be in error; but am I not right in affirming that Ireland has

a public opinion of its own, which has matured and strengthened in the last forty years beyond all example in the past history of the country? And has not that public opinion a powerful action, through an extensive and active press, upon the public opinion of England and upon the Imperial Legislature? And let me add that, in all the great cities and towns of England and Scotland, there is a response to this public opinion and to this public voice of Ireland which carries home both to the ear and to the intelligence of this country. My belief is that there is a great future for Ireland. If less than fifty years have brought about what I have hardly touched in outline, what may not another fifty years with the accelerating ratio of improvement accomplish? When I look on foreign nations, and I may say also upon England, I see cause for grave foreboding. Everywhere I see change, or what men call progress, without stability. Governments and nations are marching into the unknown, without a base of operations, and therefore without any line of retreat; without communications open for resource, or means of reforming in case of a disaster. States—I do not say monarchies, for they have sold themselves and are morally gone—but States without faith are therefore without God; and States without God have no stability, because they have no vital coherence. They may hold together by the force of custom for a while, or by the tenacity of interest even for a long time; but they have no source of life or curative resources in themselves. All these things I see in Ireland. You have a people pervaded by faith, openly serving God by every form of private and public

duty. You have a religious unity in doctrine, worship, and communion, which resists and casts off all modern expedients of latitudinarianism or Godless legislation. The progress of Ireland is on the pathway of Christianity, which has made the nations of Christendom and the glory of them. They have departed, or are departing, from faith, and their glory likewise is departing from them. For them I see no future. I see no future for imperial Germany; or for revolutionary Italy; or for Spain, if it abandon its ancient Catholic traditions; or for France, if it continue to deify Voltaire and to glorify the principles of 1789. But I do see a future for Ireland, and I see also a future for England—if Ireland be Ireland still, and if England have still a Christian heart. Here is the trial which has now reached its crisis. The trial is this: Shall the next generation of Irishmen be formed as Catholics? Shall the next generation of Englishmen be formed as Christians?

III.

I am at a loss to understand the blindness which has fallen upon a multitude of men at this day. They would indignantly claim to be Christians. But they deal with Christian education as they would deal with the casting of iron and the combing of wool—as a necessary but expensive work, in which there is no motive for enthusiasm. Not so those who desire to rid the world of the Catholic faith, of doctrinal Christianity, and of religion in any form. They know perfectly well that the school is more fatal to their policy than the church. Our churches would soon stand empty if our

schools were not full. They see what we are either blind enough not to see, or, as they may well think, stupid enough not to understand—that the shape and mould and form and character of the next generation are to be decided in our schools. Bring up the children without religion, and the next generation will pull down the churches. We in England were upon the brink of being terrified by agitation, and juggled by leagues into some compromise, which is the beginning of interminable concessions. This danger is, I hope, past, because the momentary scare is over, and the weakness of the agitation is found out. We have need, however, of a hundred eyes, and of keeping them all open, to watch the dangers which beset the Catholic and Christian education of these countries. The popular education of Ireland is indeed safe: not through any favour of legislatures, but through the fidelity and industry of the Catholic Church and its people. Your danger will be in the higher education. And your only safety will be in the same Catholic fidelity and industry; which will render all experiments at mixed education in Ireland useless, because the Catholic laity in Ireland refuse them, and the Catholic Church is resolved to provide colleges and a higher education for its people. When the late proposal for university education in Ireland was first made known, I was, for a time, induced to believe, looking at it as for us in England, that it could be accepted with safety and worked for ultimate good. But this impression—for I will not call it a judgment or even an opinion—I carefully guarded by the consciousness that those only who are upon the spot and familiar

with all local and personal conditions could form an adequate judgment. I was fully aware that what could be tolerated in England might be intolerable in Ireland: and that what would be a gain to a handful of Catholics in a vast non-Catholic population might be a great loss, and even a wrong, to a Catholic people of which the religious unity and Catholic traditions are unbroken. When, then, the Catholic Episcopate of Ireland refused the proposal on the high Christian principle that it involved two things which the Catholic Church inflexibly refuses—the one, mixed education; the other, education without faith—I recognised the higher and nobler attitude of its refusal. I saw in it the broad assertion that a Catholic people have a right to Catholic education; that education is impossible without faith; that already enough had been endured by Ireland, and that had been done by Parliament in the establishment of primary schools in which the Catholic religion could not be taught, and in the founding of colleges where education is mixed; that both these things are wrong against a Catholic people; and that it was therefore impossible to consent to a measure which would consolidate, perpetuate, and extend this system of mixed and Godless education in the heart of a people profoundly religious and profoundly Catholic. When I saw this, I at once recognised, not only the truth and the justice, but also the higher elevation, of your reply. Such mixed and Godless schemes of university education have become inevitable in England by reason of our endless religious contentions. England has lost its religious unity, and is paying the grievous penalty.

But Ireland may well remind the Imperial Parliament that it has not forfeited its religious unity, and that such penal legislation is neither necessary nor tolerable. Even Scotland has made this plea good, in bar of schemes of education at variance with its religious convictions. The Scotch Education Bill is essentially religious and denominational. Parliament has legislated for Scotland wisely and justly, according to the desires and the conscience of the Scotch people. It will assuredly take its measure of any education schemes for England from the ideas and choices of the English people. To their shame be it spoken, there are Englishmen and Scotchmen who will claim this for themselves and will deny it to Irishmen. We have of late years fully unmasked this injustice. For a long time your claim was not denied, because it was not distinctly enunciated. Ireland had borne with a long course of niggard and ungenerous legislation, in which the least possible recognition was admitted that Ireland is a Catholic country, and the Irish a Catholic people. But when certain politicians began to claim Presbyterian education for Presbyterian Scotland, the whole truth was told, and the claim of Ireland was unintentionally established. The Presbyterians in Scotland are as somewhat more than four to one of the entire population. The Catholics of Ireland are about the same to their non-Catholic fellow-countrymen. The late Irish University debates have lifted the whole question, and placed it upon this level: Catholic Ireland justly claims that its higher education shall be Catholic. And from this demand, I trust, under God,

it will never go back. The Bishops and people of Ireland, who, in resistance of the Godless colleges, five-and-twenty years ago founded a Catholic University, will not fail now in resisting the scheme of a mixed university, to give permanence and development to the university which already exists. The vigorous unity of the pastors and people of Ireland will not hesitate to take up and to consolidate the work which was so well begun, with so much foresight, and with so much self-denial. Its very existence on Stephen's Green is a witness that Catholic Ireland claims a pure Catholic University. I trust that no line, no letter, of this noble and explicit inscription will be effaced. It was the work of the Irish Church and nation. It has stood for more than twenty years, bearing witness to the claims of the laity of Ireland, and to the duty of the Imperial Parliament towards the Irish people. If it served no other purpose in our day—and it does serve a multitude of other and excellent uses—this one alone would suffice to bind the faithful to maintain it in its integrity, and to make it the centre of the higher national education of Ireland.

IV.

If this be done by the spontaneous efforts of the Irish people, the day must come when a juster spirit will prevail in our Legislature. It will not for ever obey the narrow bigotry of Covenanters, nor the jealous fears of sectarians, nor the imperial haughtiness of tyrannical Liberals, nor the supercilious contempt of infidels. The Parliament of the future will be broader,

and more in sympathy with the constituencies of the three kingdoms. England and Scotland will not claim to legislate for Ireland according to English and Scotch interests and prejudices; and Ireland, when it is justly treated, will have no more will then than it has now to make or meddle in the local affairs of England or Scotland. The three peoples are distinct in blood, in religion, in character, and in local interests. They will soon learn to 'live and let live,' when the vanishing *reliquiæ* of the Tudor tyranny shall have died out; unless the insane example of Germany shall, for a time, inflame the heads of certain violent politicians to try their hand at what they call an imperial policy. I have watched, with a mixture of sorrow and indignation, the writings and the speeches of a handful of boisterous and blustering doctrinaires, who are trying to turn men away from doing what is just towards Ireland by grandiloquent phrases about the imperial race and an imperial policy. An imperial policy, in the mouths of doctrinaires, means a legislation which ignores the special character and legitimate demands of races and localities, and subjects them to the coercion of laws at variance with their most sacred instincts. Not so the imperial policy of ancient Rome, which wisely consolidated its world-wide power by the most delicate regard to the religion of every race and nation. But our doctrinaires either have no religion, or a Scotch or English creed. They will take good care to make provision for themselves.

Imperial policy means, and may be defined as, legislation to hamper and harass the Catholic Church

in Ireland. Such imperial legislation would be intensely English for England and Scotch for Scotland, but imperial—that is, anti-Irish and anti-Catholic—for Ireland. Imperial legislation means using imperial power to force Ireland into subjection to the religious ideas of England. These same gentlemen lament openly that the policy of the Tudors stopped short of exterminating the Irish Catholic race. They are saying, 'If we had lived in the days of our fathers not a Catholic soul should have been left in Ireland, and then we should now have had no trouble with questions of Church, or land, or university education.' The appearance of such public counsellors is a portent of evil. They distort the vision and heat the blood of men; they revive animosities and kindle old hates. They may be the forerunners of convulsions which would lay waste our public peace, if there be not calmer heads and juster hearts to repress their inflammatory declamation.

The rise of an empire is no cause of joy to men who love their country. It is often the sign of the loss of true liberty. When local government, springing from mature national self-control, grows weak and impotent, then, and then only, it is that imperial centralisation becomes possible and necessary. France has tried it, and is expiating the fault by half a century of successive revolutions and a chronic instability. Germany is beginning to inflict upon itself a vengeance worse than France could wreak, by an imperial despotism which legislates in violation of the religion and conscience of its subjects. Its present ecclesiastical laws

have been hailed and heralded by our newspapers as the policy of Henry VIII. Till the other day no Englishman was found to glorify Henry VIII. Now he has received his apotheosis as a great Englishman and a wise king. Germany is applauded because it is persecuting the Catholic Church. The imperial power is setting to us the magnanimous example of defying the Pope. Articles without end appear every week, all alive with sympathy for this ignoble tyranny, which violates liberty of conscience, of religion, of speech, and of action in its most sacred sphere. And Englishmen, who have prated for three hundred years of the duty of private judgment, of the rights of conscience, of civil and religious liberty, are praising the German penal laws with all the fervour with which they used to denounce the fables of the Spanish Inquisition.

V.

I cannot say that I have much fear of an imperial policy in Great Britian and Ireland. The day is past, and the work would be found too tough for our doctrinaires. My chief reason for this confidence is that the people of these three kingdoms will not have it so. They mean to manage their own affairs with a great extension, rather than a hair's breadth of diminution, in the freedom of local self-government. They are willing, as I said, to live and to let live ; not to meddle with others, nor to allow anybody to meddle with them : above all, in matters of conscience and of religion they will not be interfered with by any authority. They have no desire to interfere with the conscience

or religion of their neighbours; and they do not mean to be used again as the tools or the weapons of any party, political or religious.

Such is certainly the mind and will of the English people, as I believe I can undertake to say; and I think your Grace would be able to add your testimony as to the people of Ireland. They have least of all any desire to meddle with the political or religious affairs of their neighbours; and they have no intention that any neighbours whatsoever should meddle with theirs. In this temper of mind I see the surest guarantees of our future peace; and of the healthful development of a local self-government over the three kingdoms, suited to the character, faith, conscience, traditions, and interests of each. We shall be thereby removed every day further and further from the dangers of 'imperial' centralisation, which is everywhere, as it has been in France, the paralysis of all local and individual energy and life. In this expansion of our distinct and various national life and energy I see also the bonds of mutual good-will and justice, which must assuredly draw us more closely together and hold us indissolubly united.

I shall, therefore, hope that our Legislature will hereafter represent more adequately the legitimate will, conscience, and mind of Great Britain and Ireland; and that when certain politicians, who would vote for denominational education in England and mixed education in Ireland, because they exist by favour of the Orangemen of Ireland and the Anglicans in England, shall have put off their traditional narrowness and

their anti-Catholic enmity; and when the so-called Liberals shall have repented of their sympathy with the German penal laws, and the Nonconformists shall have remembered that it is not for Free Churches to force the conscience of those who believe education without religion to be anti-Christian,—when these recent mental aberrations shall have been rectified by the repentance of certain of our legislators—and they will be rectified when the House of Commons truly represents the people of the three kingdoms—then I believe the university education offered to the people of Ireland will be such as a Catholic nation has a right to possess. Until then I hope both the Bishops and the laity of Ireland will wait in patience. The policy of patience won for them unconditional Catholic Emancipation fifty years ago; and it will win for them hereafter a true and pure Catholic University.

VI.

In the course of the late debates I heard strange utterances about the duty of Government to interfere to save the laity of Ireland from an Ultramontane priesthood. There are yet men alive, and in Parliament too, who can harbour and utter such wild talk. This was the dream of those who set up the National Education of 1835. They fought 'Popery' 'with their right hand tied behind them.' The result was not encouraging. And now rather than confess their mistake they must try it again. It has failed with the poor, but it may prosper with the upper class, especially if there can be found anywhere the fear of being

thought to be priest-ridden to work upon. I will confess that I had maliciously made up my mind, when I should be enjoying your hospitality, to see what the laymen of Ireland would say to this benevolent purpose of their English protectors. As I have not seldom to converse with men who profess to know on the best evidence that the laity in Ireland are sighing for redemption from an Ultramontane and domineering priesthood, I thought it would not be amiss if I could give in this matter the result of my own experience. But in truth I have no need to go to Armagh to know what the laity of Ireland would say to those who scatter imputations on their fidelity, and would try to seduce them from their pastors; nor do I need any evidence to assure me that the handful of men who, in London or in Dublin, mutter and whisper under the eaves of Castles and Governments against the Hierarchy of Ireland do not represent or know the Irish people.

VII.

I am well aware how many questions there are bearing on the welfare of Ireland which demand attention; but I must take leave to say that in my judgment there is none that bears any comparison in vital importance to that of education. It is nothing less than this: Shall the posterity of Ireland be the children of S. Patrick, or the children of this world? Here is an issue in which I believe all Irishmen will be united. Even the Protestants and the Presbyterians of Ireland desire that education shall be religious and Christian. The whole Irish people, Catholic and Protestant, there-

fore, alike demand that the tradition of Christian education, unbroken hitherto, may be preserved inviolate, and handed down as they have received it to their children's children.

I rejoice to know that on the 12th of July no Catholic in Ulster raised his hand or his voice to hinder the freedom which his Protestant neighbours enjoyed; and that on the 15th of August no Protestant moved to disturb his Catholic neighbours. When these things can be done in Ulster, what may not be done in all Ireland? I learned yesterday that on Sunday, while the Catholic cathedral of Armagh was dedicated, the bells of Armagh rang a friendly greeting. God grant that their mingled harmony may be a prophecy of a future perfect unity of faith. It made me doubly sorry that I was not there to hear them. Whatever experiments, I was almost going to say tricks, the miserable political and religious contentions of England may force men to practise in this country, Scotland will have none of them. John Knox has just put his foot down, and while he gives freedom to others, he will have his own Bible and catechism. Ireland will not fail to do what Scotland has done. S. Patrick will claim that the Christian faith of the whole people shall be guarded in all its purity and freedom; and Irishmen will know how to make this national right understood and felt at the next general election. I hope to see the hundred and five Irish members vote as one man against every attempt to meddle with the full freedom and purity of religious education in Ireland.

And now, my dear Lord Primate, I have detained you too long; and if I were not to put some force on

myself I should run on out of bounds. I hope my brethren, the Bishops of Ireland, will accept what I have written as an expression of my heartfelt regret at finding myself here alone while they were offering up the Holy Sacrifice in thanksgiving in the new cathedral of Armagh. The Catholic Church in Ireland and in England has at this day a solid unity of mutual co-operation such as it never had since Armagh and Canterbury were founded. In the Vatican Council no Saint had so many mitred sons as S. Patrick; and, wonderful are the ways of God, no single power on earth had there a hierarchy so numerous gathered from the ends of the earth as our own. These things are not without a future; and that future hangs in great measure on our close union and mutual help. In your brotherly invitation to Armagh I read the same meaning; and in this answer, in the name of the Catholic Bishops and Church in England, I accept and reciprocate the assurance of our alliance.

Believe me, my dear Lord Primate,

Your Grace's affectionate brother and servant,

✠ Henry Edward,

Archbishop of Westminster.

London, August 31, 1873.

XIV.

DR. NICHOLSON'S ACCUSATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

The following pages contain five articles reprinted from the *Tablet* newspaper.

To explain their purport it will be enough to say that the *Guardian* newspaper of September 17 published a correspondence between the Rev. Dr. Nicholson, a clergyman of the Church of England, and the Rev. F. Guiron, Secretary to the Archbishop of Westminster.

Dr. Nicholson charged the Archbishop with heresy; and so far as his letters are comprehensible, the charge ranges over the following heads:

1. That the Archbishop had declared the Sacred Humanity to be deified; *i.e.* changed into God; or made 'God.'
2. That he had separated it from the Divinity and set it up as a deified object of separate worship: a 'quasi God,' as Dr. Nicholson calls it.
3. That he had thereby taught at one and the same time two heresies, namely, Nestorianism, which makes two Persons in Christ, and that thereby he fell under the anathema of the Fifth General Council, and Eutychianism, which taught that the human nature was so absorbed into the Divine, that there were no longer *two* natures but *one* only in Christ.

It may seem wonderful that Dr. Nicholson as a Christian should have thought the first proposition to be a possible error in a human mind, even of a Romanist. That he should have accused anybody of two heresies which mutually and by necessity exclude each other, and cannot possibly be found in the same mind, howsoever heretical, would be wonderful to any one who has not read Dr. Nicholson's letters. But perhaps even they will wonder no longer after they have read the following pages.

October 25, 1873.

DR. NICHOLSON'S ACCUSATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

SEPTEMBER 1873.

'Improbatio hæreticorum facit eminere quid Ecclesia Tua sentiat, et quid habeat sana doctrina.' S. AUG. *Conf.* lib. vii. c. xix.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE RASHNESS OF THE 'GUARDIAN.'

THE *Guardian* is beside itself with joy in the belief, that the Archbishop of Westminster has been trapped in a theological error condemned by an Œcumenical Council. The *Guardian* has been deceived by Dr. Nicholson, an Anglican minister, who appears to be the first to rake this moon out of the pond. The Archbishop, in preaching at the Pro-Cathedral, had stated two things: first, that the human heart of Jesus was deified by union with His Godhead; and, secondly, that it is therefore an object of divine worship. On this Mr. Nicholson, unconsciously perhaps, following the Jansenists, affirmed that by this doctrine the Archbishop introduced two adorations to the two natures separately, and had thereby fallen under the condemnation of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

We would therefore propose to the *Guardian* and to its theologian the following question: The Sacred

Heart of Jesus, is it or is it not an object of divine worship? If the answer be, It is: then the Archbishop is justified out of the mouth of the *Guardian*. If the answer be, It is not: then the *Guardian* and its theology fall into the very pit which it dug for the Archbishop of Westminster.

If the Sacred Heart of Jesus be not an object of divine worship, such divine worship can only be denied to it by asserting one or more of the following heresies:

First, that the Sacred Humanity had a human personality of its own; which is the heresy of Nestorius, condemned by this same Fifth Œcumenical Council; or,

Secondly, that the personality of the Son is inferior to the Father, which is the heresy of Arius; or,

Thirdly, that the Sacred Heart of Jesus is not hypostatically and indissolubly united to the Person of the Eternal Word, and that it is not the Heart of the Incarnate Word in such wise as to entitle it to a communication and participation of the divine worship due to the Word as God.

Now, even if this were true, the *Guardian* and its teachers will not say that the Sacred Humanity is not worthy of some honour, even if inferior to divine worship, of whatsoever degree and kind it may be. And this is precisely the heresy which the Fifth Council anathematises. This is precisely the bringing in of 'two natures, to be honoured separately, with two adorations.' How was it that the *Guardian*, in its haste to assail a Catholic Bishop, did not at least see that it was

running straight into the pit which it had been digging for the Archbishop?

It was for this reason, that he had been so careful to affirm,

1. That the human Heart by union with the Godhead of the Eternal Son was 'deified,' as S. Cyril of Alexandria teaches of the whole human nature of Christ; that is to say, it became the Heart of God.

2. That it is for ever indissolubly united with the Godhead of the Son.

3. That it therefore partakes of the divine worship due to the Divine Person whose human Heart it is.

4. That this indissoluble hypostatic union excludes the heretical notion of two natures to be separately adored with two adorations.

5. That the unity of the Person of the Incarnate Word excludes not only two adorations but any worship less than the divine.

6. That the Sacred Heart is the Heart of God, in which the uncreated and created love of God to man are indissolubly united; and that it is therefore to be adored in one act of divine worship now and to all eternity.

To put this in the simplest theological terms:

First: The Humanity of Christ is to be adored by one and the same divine worship which is due to the Eternal Word with whom it is hypostatically united. This is matter of faith; and its contradictory is condemned under anathema.

Secondly: The *objectum materiale* of the divine worship is Christ, God and Man.

Thirdly: The *objectum formale* or *motive* of the divine worship is the Divine Person of the Son.

This divine worship, one and the same, is due to Christ, God and Man: to His Godhead 'in se et propter se,' *in* and *for itself;* to His Manhood, 'in se, non tamen propter se,' *in itself*, but not *for itself*. The Sacred Humanity is to be adored with divine worship, because it is the Humanity of God, and every part of it is adorable for the same reason; therefore the Sacred Heart is an object of divine worship.

We cannot refrain from adding two observations.

The naked and explicit heresies which have been put forth on the subject of the Sacred Heart prove to demonstration a profound and heretical ignorance on the whole subject of the Incarnation. The subject of the Sacred Heart seems to have been providentially used at this time that 'the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.' We have been hitherto altogether unconscious, and could not have believed that so much formal Nestorianism and Semi-Arianism could lie hid in the Anglican Church. And when we remember that the *Guardian* is, by privilege, the paper of the Anglican clergy, and to be found in a large number of their homes, we feel a profound disappointment. We had hoped better things. We have no pleasure in the errors even of our antagonists. Hitherto we have believed that in the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation at least the Anglican clergy were faithful and well instructed. We are much shaken in this hope by these revelations.

The other reflection is hardly less grave. Charity

'thinketh no evil' and 'rejoiceth with the truth.' We cannot understand the outburst of delighted exultation with which the *Guardian* published to the world that it had heard and believed that a Catholic Bishop had erred from the truth. The *Guardian* must hate the Catholic Church a great deal more than it loves the Christian Faith. This spirit is not of God, but of the Evil One, and is an ill omen for Anglican Christianity.

Second Article.

Nicholson *v.* Guiron.

Dr. Nicholson, having attacked the Archbishop by letter, was answered by the Rev. F. Guiron. A long correspondence followed. We know nothing like it except the Tichborne Case. If we wrong Dr. Nicholson he must thank himself for it. We know nothing of him but by his letters. If he be better than his letters we are glad of it, for his sake. Anything more shallow, pretentious, impertinent, and to all appearance insincere, we have seldom read. We will justify this severe sentence by his own words.

I. Dr. Nicholson states that he heard the Archbishop say: 'The humanity of our Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.' This statement is perfectly Catholic and orthodox. It affirms two things, the assumption of humanity by the Son of God; and that the humanity thereby became 'Caro Dei,' or 'Humanitas Dei;' and secondly, that

the Sacred Humanity was thereby indissolubly united to the Person of the Son, and therefore 'deified.' The Archbishop states that he said: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity is deified, and is therefore an object of divine worship.' The terms of these propositions are different: the doctrine is the same. Both affirm the indissoluble union of humanity with the Son of God by the hypostatic union; and that the Sacred Humanity is therefore an object of divine worship. Will it be believed that upon this Dr. Nicholson founds the following charges:

1. That the Archbishop *separates* the Sacred Humanity from the Godhead.

2. That he teaches *two* adorations.

3. That he therefore falls under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

It is impossible for falsification to be more direct, formal, and, we do not know how to refrain from adding, conscious. But we shall see as we go on the process of this juggle upon plain words.

II. F. Guiron, who answered Dr. Nicholson's charge, brought to his knowledge the following passage of Perrone: 'Quamvis hæc Caro (*i.e.* Caro propria Verbi, or Caro Dei) adoretur in se, non adoratur tamen propter se, quod est proprium solius Dei.'

In these words Perrone affirms:

1. That divine worship is due to God alone, 'Dei solius.'

2. That both natures receive divine worship in the unity of the Person of the Word Incarnate.

3. That the Divine nature is worshipped *in se et*

propter se, in and *for itself*, the Human Nature *in se* but not *propter se*, in itself but *not for itself;* because it is worshipped with divine worship by reason of the Godhead of the Word, whose humanity it is.

This is a Godsend for Dr. Nicholson, who begins with new courage as follows: Perrone says that divine worship belongs to God alone, 'proprium Dei solius.' Therefore Perrone *does not extend it to the human nature, because it is not God.* With Dr. Nicholson, to affirm and to deny are one and the same thing. What he did with the Archbishop's words he now does with Perrone's. He adds, 'Perrone did not teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity.' Now it so happens that in the immediate context from which F. Guiron quoted, Perrone does teach it in the following words: 'Nonnulli Patres humanum Christi velle dixere *deificatum*, quatenus intime conjunctum erat cum velle divino, *uti ipsa humana natura cum divina*.'[1] But of this we hope Dr. Nicholson was in his accustomed ignorance; for if not, we must charge him not with ignorance but with something worse.

F. Guiron most truly says, Perrone did teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity, or else he could not without error have taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of the divine worship of the Incarnate Word. This is so true that to do so would be blasphemy.

Dr. Nicholson denies that Perrone taught the deification of the Sacred Humanity. But it is undeniable that he taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of the divine worship of the Word. Therefore, accord-

[1] *Tract. de Incar.* pars ii. c. iii. tom. iii. 131.

ing to Dr. Nicholson, Perrone taught blasphemy. So, of course, F. Guiron, for he teaches what Perrone taught.

III. But the recoil of this on Dr. Nicholson is instant and fatal. If Perrone did not teach blasphemy, he taught that the Sacred Humanity is worshipped with divine worship, because of the hypostatic union with the Word; by which union it is 'deified.' If so, the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped 'una adoratione,' according to the teaching of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, quoted by Perrone in the same context,[2] but Dr. Nicholson knows nothing about it; at least so we hope for the sake of his sincerity.

Here, then, we have a dilemma.

Perrone either taught that the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped with divine worship by reason of the hypostatic union; or he did not so teach. If he did, Perrone and F. Guiron are sheltered from Dr. Nicholson, and from the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

If he did not so teach, then Dr. Nicholson charges not only F. Guiron and the Archbishop, but Perrone also, with introducing two adorations to two separate natures.

But Dr. Nicholson has destroyed himself; for in one of his letters he affirms that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored, not because it is deified, but because it 'Verbo Divino hypostatice unita.' We will assume, then, that Dr. Nicholson admits that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of divine worship by reason of the hypostatic union. But

[2] Pars ii. c. iv. tom. iii. 141.

why not say so? Because, we fear, Dr. Nicholson began to have a nervous instinct that if he were to say so, his whole case would be ruined. As we shall next show.

IV. F. Guiron very truly says, in perfect conformity with the fathers and theologians of the Church, that the word 'deify' ordinarily signifies 'to be exalted to an object of worship.' Now nothing can be worshipped with *divine* worship but God alone—'est *Dei solius*,' as Dr. Nicholson learns from Perrone. Therefore nothing which is separate from God, or out of God, can be an object of divine worship. But the Sacred Humanity, which by hypostatic union was assumed by the Eternal Word, is made 'Caro Dei,' and therefore *eo ipso deified*. Dr. Nicholson calls the hypostatic union a 'possessive relation:' of which more before we have done. We affirm that the 'Caro Dei,' hypostatically, indissolubly, and eternally united to the Son, partakes of the divine worship due to His Godhead alone *in se, et propter se*, because Totus Christus, *Deus et Homo*, is worshipped *una eademque divini cultus adoratione*. *Iniquitas mentita est sibi*, which may be rendered, Ill-will is caught in its own trap.

Dr. Nicholson's affirmation that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of divine worship because it is hypostatically united to the Divine Word, proves also that Perrone held that the Sacred Humanity was elevated by assumption to be 'Caro Dei,' or deified. But these are the *ipsissima verba* of F. Guiron; therefore Perrone and F. Guiron alike teach the same Catholic doctrine of the deification and divine worship

of the Humanity of the Incarnate Word; or they are alike blasphemous. But Dr. Nicholson either does not see what he is saying, which is a crime in an accuser, or he sees and knows that his accusation is false. We leave him to take his choice.

V. We will now go one step onward into Dr. Nicholson's labyrinth, or, as Lord Bacon would call it, his 'maze.' Rising to the occasion, he finally delivers himself of the following sentence: 'The Chief Pastor of the Roman Church in England, from the principal pulpit of his charge, delivers himself dogmatically of a heresy which has been condemned under Catholic anathema.'

If this means anything it means:

1. That the Archbishop taught that the two natures in Christ are to be adored *separately*.

2. That these two adorations are not one and the same. For if they were one and the same they could not be two.

But we have no need to argue and deduce. Dr. Nicholson has asserted all this in words. He writes: 'Compare with this the dogmatic statement of Archbishop Manning conveyed in your letter:

'"The Divine Person is adored and the Humanity which He assumed is adored.

'"The two natures of Christ are both the objects of divine worship, but in a different degree."'

We hope to prove that Dr. Nicholson has deliberately falsified the Archbishop's words, and foisted in his own. There is not a syllable of the Archbishop's or of F. Guiron's, as we shall show, even susceptible of this per-

version. It is a pure, gratuitous, and very culpable imputation. This we shall show in due time.

Now we have Dr. Nicholson's report of the Archbishop's words before us. 'The human nature of the Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.' The Archbishop was speaking of the divine worship of the Sacred Heart, and only incidentally of the doctrine of the Sacred Humanity as a whole. He therefore restated his words as follows: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity, was deified, and therefore an object of divine worship.' What is true of the Sacred Humanity as a whole is true of every part of the same. Now the word 'hypostatically' is indeed not used here, because few who hear a preacher understand the terminology of the schools. But both these formulæ contain and fully enunciate the hypostatic union as the motive of the divine worship of which the Sacred Humanity partakes.

By '*assumed by the Divine Son*,' as in the first formula, or by '*united with the Divinity*' of our Lord, as in the second, the hypostatic union is completely enunciated. The human nature is thereby declared to be '*Caro Dei*:' therefore *eo ipso* it was deified, and therefore it partakes in the divine worship due to the Eternal Word. Deification and divine worship are inseparable from the hypostatic union.

Where, then, are the 'two natures to be worshipped *separately*' and the '*two* adorations' condemned by the Fifth Œcumenical Council? There is not a shadow of two adorations in either the Archbishop's or F. Guiron's

words. It is Dr. Nicholson who, by the juggle on Perrone's words '*Dei solius*' has foisted in the notion of separation ; and then argues thus: The Archbishop says the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped. But Perrone says divine worship belongs to God alone, therefore the Sacred Humanity is not to be worshipped with divine worship. And this with the word '*deified*' before him. But F. Guiron asserts, as Dr. Nicholson says, 'the two natures of Christ are both *the objects* of divine worship, but in a different degree.' Dr. Nicholson repeats the words and changes *object* into *objects*, and on his own falsification founds a charge of two separate adorations. F. Guiron expressly says that Christ is the *objectum*, one and indivisible. His meaning by 'degree' is that the Divine nature is worshipped for its own sake, the Human is not. The worship is one and the same. If he had said, 'With this difference' he would have more effectually shut out Dr. Nicholson's cavils. Therefore the heresies condemned by the Fifth Council are taught, not by the Archbishop, not by F. Guiron, not by Perrone, but profoundly and explicitly by Dr. Nicholson, unless in dissimulation he be prevaricating like the Pharisees when they answered the dilemma of our Lord as to the Baptism of John: 'If we shall say from heaven, He will say to us: Why, then, did you not believe him? but if we shall say from men, we are afraid of the multitude, for all held John as a prophet.'

VI. We will now proceed to deal with Dr. Nicholson's own theology. If it be as he states, it is bad enough. If it be better than his statements, so much

the worse for him, for then we cannot clear him of dissimulation. But we reserve our estimate of Dr. Nicholson's conduct as he has exhibited himself to us for the end. Now for his theology. If Dr. Nicholson's notion of 'deification' can be ascertained from his words at all, it would seem to be this, that the human nature ceased to be *created* and *finite*, and became *infinite* and *uncreated:* that is to say, it ceased to be *Human* nature and became *Divine* nature. This is portentous: but unless Dr. Nicholson means this, we can in no way discover what he means. He says in one place, 'No one denies that the Divine Word holds a possessive relation in respect to *Caro:* what the precise modus of that possession is, the Catholic faith defines in the doctrine of the hypostatic union.' We will hope that Dr. Nicholson does not mean the Nestorian 'habitudo σχετική.' Well, what is the hypostatic union? Dr. Nicholson does not tell us. He could not do so without saying that it is 'the assumption of Humanity by the Son or by the Eternal Word into the unity of His Divine Person.' But if he had said this, he would have repeated the Archbishop's and F. Guiron's statements, and destroyed his own.

VII. He then quotes as applicable to the pending question the words of S. Proclus in the Council of Ephesus, 'neque hominem deificatum prædicamus, sed Deum incarnatum confitemur;' that is, 'we do not preach *a Deified Man*, but the Incarnate God.' What has this ostentatious parade to do with the question? But we will leave this point for a future article. The Exucontians and Nestorians, indeed, taught that Jesus

had a created and human personality, and, in condemning them, the Council of Ephesus gave to Mary the title of 'Mother of God.' This title is a test of faith in the sole and divine personality of Jesus. Will Dr. Nicholson call her Mother of God? If so, he will then understand S. Proclus: and not before. But this is, we trust, simple blundering. We go on to something worse. Dr. Nicholson proceeds to quote the following passages to prove that divine worship is not to be given to the Sacred Humanity of Christ. Theologians, says Bellarmine, attribute hyperdulia 'Soli Humanitati Christi et Matri ejus.' He next quotes Dens as saying 'Humanitas Christi *concepta per mentem ut separata* a Persona Verbi non sit colenda cultu latriæ sed hyperduliæ.'

And yet with this before him, with '*soli*,' and '*separata*,' and '*per mentem concepta*,' Dr. Nicholson is either incapable of seeing, or unwilling to see, that both Bellarmine and Dens, as S. Thomas did before them, are contemplating, not the question of the Adoration of the Sacred Humanity 'assumed' by, or 'united' to, the Person of the Son, with which the Archbishop and F. Guiron are all through and exclusively occupied, but *in se*, and *as mentally separated* from the Person of the Eternal Word. If Dr. Nicholson will take the trouble to read what S. Thomas says in P. iii. *Quæst.* XXV. articles 1 and 2, of which we hope he was ignorant, he will see that it has nothing to do with the question.

The Archbishop and F. Guiron, Perrone and Franzelin, with every Catholic theologian, affirm that

the Sacred Humanity of Christ is deified by assumption and by *union* with the Person of the Divine Word.

And yet Dr. Nicholson has, we must say, the effrontery to write as follows: 'Archbishop Manning abstracts the Humanity and separates the human Heart *per se* of the Blessed Redeemer as the *objectum materiale* of divine worship.'

This is precisely what the Archbishop and F. Guiron exclude and render impossible for any truthful mind to imagine.

Their position all along is that the human Heart is the Sacred Heart, and it is sacred because of the hypostatic union, by which it is deified and is indivisibly united to the Person of the Incarnate Word, who is, both as God and Man, the *objectum materiale* of divine worship.

VIII. Further, to draw the accusation closer around the Archbishop, Dr. Nicholson quotes the ninth canon of the Fifth Council. He gives it as follows: 'Si quis in duabus naturis adorari dicit Christum' (which Archbishop Manning does say), &c. We hope the Archbishop does say so, for it is the Catholic faith, without which no man can be saved. Indeed the same canon of the same Council says so. It declares that Christ is to be adored *unâ adoratione*; '*Deum Verbum Incarnatum cum propriâ ipsius carne*,' that is to say, He is to be adored in two natures with one adoration, namely, with divine worship. Dr. Nicholson does not perceive that the point of the Canon is in the words which follow: '*ex quo duas adorationes introducunt*.' If we understand him, Dr. Nicholson explicitly does

this, for he restricts *latria* 'Deo Soli,' and gives *hyperdulia* 'soli Humanitati Christi.'

Dr. Nicholson is therefore by his own confession pointedly under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, and there, as a theologian of immense pretence and of equal incapacity, for the present we leave him.

We will next deal with Dr. Nicholson's assertion that the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is not an object of latria.'

Third Article.

Is the sacred Humanity to be worshipped with latria?

It is impossible to guess what Dr. Nicholson does believe as to the doctrine of the Incarnation; but he has at length committed himself to a statement of what he does not believe. Here, then, we have something positive; and with this we can deal.

He says the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of latria.'

We will therefore prove that the Roman Church does distinctly teach that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria. To preclude all misunderstanding or cavil we will begin by the following assertions:

1. That the Humanity of Christ was so assumed by the Eternal Word that it never for a moment of time existed apart from the Person of the Son.

2. That the Humanity so assumed by hypostatic union is indissolubly united to the Person of the Son.

The supposition that it ever in reality existed apart from the Person of the Son is Nestorianism.

The supposition that it can or ever will exist apart from the Person of the Son is a heresy without a name.

S. John makes such heresies the sign of Antichrist: 'Every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God; and this is Antichrist.'[3]

The Sacred Humanity is the Humanity of Christ 'in concreto.'

To abstract it 'per mentis conceptionem' is to create a mental idea which has not, never had, and never can have a real existence.

The Humanity, therefore, of which the Archbishop spoke, and of which we treat, is the Sacred Humanity as it exists by hypostatic union in the Incarnate Word at the right hand of God, and in the Blessed Sacrament.

Before we prove this point it will be well to point out a mishap which has befallen Dr. Nicholson. He was evidently not aware that there are among scholastic theologians two questions bearing on the Adoration due to the Sacred Humanity perfectly distinct from each other.

1. The one is, What adoration or cultus is due to the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*, that is as subsisting in the Person of the Incarnate Word.

[3] 1 S. John iv. 3.

2. The other is, What adoration or cultus is due to the Humanity of our Lord *in abstracto*, that is 'per mentem concepta tanquam separata a Persona Verbi;' or, as they say, 'præcisione facta ab unione hypostatica.'

The former of these two questions is resolved by every Catholic authority, by fathers, councils, schoolmen, and theologians, in one and the same sentence: namely, that the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*—that is, as subsisting by hypostatic union in the Person of Christ—is to be worshipped with one and the same adoration; namely, with Latria. This was the affirmation of the Archbishop and of F. Guiron, and with this solely and exclusively they had to do.

The other scholastic question was brought in by Dr. Nicholson, and imputed without shadow of reason to the Archbishop. And it is evident that he picked up this notion out of Dens, altogether misunderstanding its meaning. At page 39, vol. v. *De Incarnatione* (Dublin, 1832), Dens says that the Humanity of Christ, 'concepta per mentem *ut separata a Persona Verbi*' is to be adored, not with latria, but with hyperdulia.

Now this question is both treated and resolved by a line of scholastics and theologians from S. Thomas downwards. All who have commented on the twenty-fifth Question of the Third Part of S. Thomas have more or less treated of it.

But Dr. Nicholson did not know, at least so we hope, that this question has nothing whatever to do with the Adoration of the Sacred Humanity *as subsist-*

ing in the Incarnate Word. And this alone is the Adoration of the Sacred Heart.

The meaning of this scholastic question as to the Humanity *in abstracto* is as follows: Treating of the cultus due to persons or objects separate from the Divine Nature, theologians say: The Humanity of Christ is the most perfect Humanity in and by itself. It was conceived of the Holy Ghost. It was born of the Virgin Mary, who by special privilege was exempt from original sin. It was, in its origin and in its perfections natural and supernatural, of a greater excellence than the Humanity of His Blessed Mother, who, though without stain of original sin, was born in the order of nature. It is more excellent than the Humanity of the first Adam made of the earth, and is therefore of the highest excellence among the works of God; and, as such, is an object of veneration or cultus proportioned to that excellence. Now its excellence transcends that of all Saints, and it is therefore to be worshipped with hyperdulia.

Bellarmine holds this opinion. Suarez maintains the same. Vasquez maintains that it is impossible to conceive the thought, and that if it were possible, it is not right to do so. De Lugo holds the balance between them, agreeing partially with both, but treats the question as a pure speculation. Nobody ever dreamed of bringing S. Thomas and all the Scholastics under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, which condemns two adorations to the two natures God and Man separately *in* Christ. The question is one of mere intellectual abstraction. All alike affirm, as a

matter of faith, that the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*, that is, as subsisting in the Incarnate Word, is to be adored *una eademque Divini Cultus adoratione*.

But Dr. Nicholson, it appears, knows nothing of this scholastic question, and in his haste to accuse Archbishops and priests has fallen into his own snare. He denies that the Sacred Humanity *as it subsists in the Incarnate Word* is an object of latria.

He thus falls directly under the anathema condemning two adorations, because he thereby separates the natures in Christ.

We say we hope he was ignorant, though such ignorance in an accuser is very culpable. And yet we do not know how to believe that he could be ignorant of it, for in the paragraph immediately going before his quotation, Dens says: 'Q. Quo cultu adoratur Christus Homo? R. *Cultu Latriæ* . . . . . Adoratur enim Humanitas ut subsistens in Verbo.'

We will now give the evidence to show that the Catholic Church distinctly teaches, and has always distinctly taught, that the Sacred Humanity, as subsisting in the Incarnate Word, is an object of latria.

We will proceed to prove this as follows:

I. First by Scripture. The three following passages have been from the earliest ages quoted to prove that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria:

1. 'When He bringeth in the first-begotten into the world He saith: And let all the angels of God adore Him'—that is, the Incarnate Son.[4]

2. 'For which cause God also hath exalted Him,

[4] Heb. i. 6.

and hath given Him a name which is above all names: that at the Name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth: and that every tongue shall confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father'—that is Jesus, God and Man.[5]

Now in both these texts the object of divine worship in heaven and earth, that is of angels and men, is Christ, God and Man.

But to preclude cavil we add a third text:

3. 'Adore the footstool of His feet, for it is holy.'[6] S. Ambrose, S. Augustin, and others quote these words, and explain them thus: 'Itaque per scabellum terra intelligitur: per terram autem *Caro Christi*, quam hodie quoque in mysterio adoramus, et quam Apostoli in Domino Jesu, ut supra diximus, adorarunt; neque enim divisus est Christus, sed unus.'[7] 'Therefore by the word footstool the earth is to be understood, and by the earth the Flesh of Christ, which to-day also we adore in a mystery, and which the Apostles worshipped in the Lord Jesus as we before said. For Christ is not divided, but is one.'

In like manner S. Augustin: 'Suscepit enim de terra terram, quia caro de terra est: et de carne Mariæ carnem accepit . . . nemo autem illam carnem manducat nisi prius adoraverit, inventum est quemadmo-

[5] Phil. ii. 9-11. [6] Ps. xcviii. 5.

[7] S. Ambros. *De Spiritu Sancto*, lib. iii. 79. For greater convenience, we refer to the reprint of the *Dogmata Theologica* of Thomassinus (Vives, Paris, 1872) for this and the following quotations. See *De Incarnatione*, lib. xi. tom. iv. p. 500.

dum adoretur tale scabellum pedum Domini, et non solum non peccamus adorando, sed peccamus non adorando.'[8] 'For He took earth from the earth, because flesh is of earth, and He received flesh from the flesh of Mary . . . but no one eats that flesh except he has first adored it, and so we have shown how such a footstool of the Lord's feet is adored, and not only do we not sin in adoring it, but we sin in not adoring it.'

These quotations serve two purposes. They prove that latria is due to the Sacred Humanity, and to Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament; but we confine ourselves to our thesis.

II. Secondly, the same is proved by tradition, of which the following passages are sufficient evidence. S. Athanasius writes: 'We do not adore a creature, God forbid. Such madness belongs to heathens and to Arians. But we adore the Lord of things created, the Incarnate Word of God. For though the flesh itself, by itself, be a part of things created, yet it is made *the body of God*. Neither do we adore His body divided and apart from the Word; nor when we adore the Word do we separate the Word from the flesh: for inasmuch as we know that the Word was made flesh, we acknowledge God the Word dwelling in the flesh.'[9]

S. John Damascene says: 'Christ therefore is one, perfect God and perfect Man, whom we adore

[8] S. August. *Enarr. in Ps.* xcviii. 9.

[9] S. Athan. *Epist. ad Adelphium*, sect. 3.

with the Father and the Holy Ghost in one adoration, with His immaculate flesh.'[10]

So also S. Ildephonsus of Toledo: 'As to which mystery, Cyril, answering Nestorius, declares Christ to be so one, that is God and Man; not as if we adore a man with the Word, lest by this a certain division be introduced; but adoring one and the same (object) in the unity of the Person: for the body (of the Word) is not apart from the Word; nor diverse, because the Word was made flesh; and Manhood is so united and assumed into God as to be one God.'[11]

We have already given the evidence of S. Ambrose and S. Augustin. If we were writing a book instead of an article, we could add proofs from S. Jerome, S. Cyril, S. Epiphanius, and many more, but we refer the reader to the Dogmata Theologica of Thomassinus, *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, lib. xi. c. ii. tom. iv. p. 499, in which he profusely proves from the Fathers the following proposition: 'That the Word made Flesh is worshipped with the one Adoration of latria; and that thus the Humanity also is encompassed in the worship of latria.'

III. The same doctrine is taught by Petavius, *De Incarnatione Verbi*, lib. xv. c. iii. His thesis is that Christ, God and Man, is to be adored with one adoration. This he proves by the same texts of Holy Scripture quoted above, and by the same and other Fathers, and by the Decrees of Councils. We have

[10] S. John Damas. *De Fide Orthodoxa.*
[11] S. Ildeph. *Fragm. de Partu Virginis.*

sufficiently given the two first classes of evidence and will give only the last.

The Synod of Alexandria under S. Cyril addressed to Nestorius a Synodal Epistle with twelve anathematisms. Nestorius was required under anathema to subscribe to the following Canon: 'If any one shall dare to say that the Humanity assumed is to be adored *together* with God the Word and to be glorified together with Him, *as one thing with another* (*i.e.* as two things), and not that Emmanuel should rather be adored with one adoration, . . . let him be anathema.'

This Epistle and the anathematisms were inserted in the Definition of Faith by the Council of Chalcedon. The Fifth Œcumenical Council also confirmed the same by a new, that is, its ninth Canon. So also the Lateran Council, under Martin I., confirmed all these previous acts. It gives the ninth Canon of the Fifth Council as follows: 'If any man shall say that Christ is to be adored in two natures, *by which they bring in two adorations*, to God the Word *separately* and to the Humanity *separately*; or if any man so adore Christ, affirming the nature or essence of the two that are united to be one, so as to destroy the flesh or to confound the Godhead and the Manhood; and shall not adore with one adoration God the Word Incarnate with His flesh according to the tradition of the Church of God from the beginning, let him be anathema.' On this Petavius continues: 'Hence it is evident from the consent and tradition of the Church as a fixed and established truth, that the flesh or

the Human Nature of the Word is to be worshipped with one only, and that the divine and supreme adoration.'[12] He proves the same also in lib. vi. c. xvi.

IV. It can hardly be necessary to proceed further; and yet it may be well to show the rigorous precision with which the Catholic Church teaches by all its authorities that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored with the worship of latria.

We will begin, then, with the Scholastics; and we will take one who may stand for all, though it would be easy to multiply authorities without number. S. Thomas, p. iii. art. xxv. a. 1, proposes the following thesis: 'Utrum una et eadem adoratione sit adoranda Divinitas Christi et ejus Humanitas?' He answers, quoting the same Epistle and anathematisms of S. Cyril, that Christ, God and Man, is to be adored with one and the same adoration. He next asks (2), 'Utrum Humanitas Christi adoranda sit adoratione latriæ?' He answers affirmatively, 'the adoration of the Humanity is the adoration of latria.' The whole school of Summistæ, that is those who have expounded the Summa of S. Thomas, repeat the same doctrine.

V. We will, however, add certain more recent theologians. Dr. Nicholson does not know what weight is to be given to Perrone or to Franzelin. We do not know what weight he may ascribe to Tournely, or whether he has ever heard of him. We select Tournely because of his great and widespread and mature authority as a Catholic theologian representing the theology of the Church of France. In

[12] Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, lib. xv. c. iii. 6.

his chapter headed, 'De Adoratione Christi Hominis,' he begins at once by affirming 'Humana Christi natura hypostatice Verbo conjuncta, eadem et unica cum Divinitate Verbi adoratione colenda est:' that is 'the Human Nature of Christ hypostatically joined to the Word is to be worshipped with one and the same adoration as the Divine Word.' This he proves by the same Scriptures and Fathers adduced above. He then adds what Dr. Nicholson will do well to weigh: 'Atqui hinc facilis est solutio communis ac tritæ hujus objectionis: soli Deo latriæ cultus debetur; humanitas vero Christi Deus non est; ergo Latriæ cultus illi non debetur. Distinguenda minor propositio: Humanitas seu homo non est Deus, separatus et sejunctus a Verbo, *concedo;* hypostatice unitus cum Verbo, *nego.*' 'Hence we may easily solve the following common and trite objection: viz. the worship of latria is due to God alone; the Humanity of Christ is not God; therefore the worship of latria is not due to it. We must distinguish the minor proposition: the Humanity is not God separated and apart from the Word: granted; but hypostatically united with the Word, I deny it,' *i.e.* it is God.

We shall return upon this, when we speak hereafter of the Deification of the Humanity of the Word. We must not be deterred by Dr. Nicholson's want of appreciation of Perrone and Franzelin from giving their evidence.

Perrone places at the head of the chapter distorted by Dr. Nicholson, who did not even know Perrone by name, the following thesis: 'The Human Nature of

Christ is to be adored with one and the same worship of latria in the Divine Word, with whom it is hypostatically united.' He adds, 'De fide est propositio, cujus contradictoria proscripta est in Concilio Gen. V., Con. IV.'[13]

Franzelin says, 'Christ is to be adored, both regarded as to His Divine Nature, and regarded as to His Human Nature, with one and the same supreme worship of latria.'[14]

We give only one more quotation, because it will represent the whole Society of Jesus in its theological tradition. In the *Theologia Wirceburgensis*[15] we read, 'Quæritur nunc: utrum Christus, non qua Deus tantum, ut per se patet, sed et qua homo, religionis cultu adorari debeat? Dico. Christus homo, in utraque natura, divina et humana subsistens, hoc est homo Deus, sive humana Christi natura verbo hypostatice conjuncta, uno eodemque latriæ actu absolute adorari debet quo Verbi Divinitas.'

Question. Is Christ to be worshipped with religious worship, not only as God, which is self-evident, but also as Man?

Answer. 'Christ as Man, subsisting in both divine and human nature, that is the Man-God, or the human nature of Christ hypostatically united to the Word, is to be worshipped absolutely with one and the same act of latria as the Divine Word.'

From all these proofs it is evident that the Catholic

[13] *De Incarn.* p. ii. c. iv. art. ii.
[14] *De Verbo Incarn.* p. 458, cap. vi. th. xlv.
[15] P. ii. *De Incarnatione*, diss. v. sect. iii. art. 1.

Church teaches as a doctrine revealed by God and defined by the Church 'that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria.' This is *de fide;* and to be held as of divine and Catholic faith.

Dr. Nicholson's assertion therefore that the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of latria,' is heretical. A material heretic he certainly is; a formal heretic, 'sciens et prudens,' we hope he may not be, because the abundant proof he has given of ignorance, culpable as it is, demonstrates that he does not know what he is saying.

Fourth Article.

THE DEIFICATION OF THE SACRED HUMANITY.

Dr. Nicholson affirms that 'Perrone does not teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity.' This proposition must also mean that the Catholic Church does not teach that doctrine; for he does not surely intend, that Perrone does not teach it, but that the Church does. This would destroy his own argument and prove F. Guiron's. We therefore assume that Dr. Nicholson means that the Roman Church, as he calls it, does not teach the Deification of the Sacred Humanity.

We shall now go on to prove that the Catholic Church does teach the Deification of the Sacred Humanity: and in doing so we shall show what is the true meaning of this mode of speech.

We will begin by affirming that the 'assumptio

humanitatis in Deum,' or 'the assumption of manhood into God,' and the 'deificatio humanitatis,' or 'the making of humanity to be God's humanity,' are in effect one and the same thing. Whatever distinction of thought can be conceived, the action and the effect are identical.

We will first give evidence from the Fathers, secondly from the scholastic theology, and lastly from theologians of unquestioned authority.

And first for the evidence of the Fathers.

The fourth book of Petavius's great work on the Incarnation is amply sufficient to prove our assertion. He begins thus: 'Of the two natures which subsist in the one Person of Christ, it has been thus far shown that one of them, namely the Divine, has been made incarnate: that is, the Word Himself was made flesh and man. Now, on the other hand, we must inquire whether it ought to be said that man has been made God.'

S. Gregory of Nazianzum writes: 'What greater thing could befall the humility of manhood than that it should be joined to God, and from that union become God?' And again: 'For both these natures by union are one (suppositum), God indeed made man, and man deified.'

'For when,' as he says, 'the humanity assumed by the Word is said θεοῦσθαι, it is the same as to be and to be called God.'

In another place S. Gregory says, 'God was manifest with that which He assumed, One in two natures opposed to each other, flesh and spirit: one of which

deified, the other was deified.' And again, 'That which deifies and that which is deified is one God.'

S. John Damascene also writes as follows: 'The Word Himself was made flesh, conceived of a Virgin and manifested to be God with the nature He assumed, which was already deified by Him in the moment when it began to exist. So that there were three things simultaneous: Assumption, Existence, Deification.' He then calls the Blessed Virgin Mother of God, 'propter deificationem humanitatis.'

Euthymius in like manner speaks of 'Deus inhumatus,' and 'homo deificatus,' and of 'inhumatio' and 'deificatio;' and finally says, 'That which was assumed, by the fact of union, was deified.'

S. Augustin says, 'Such was that assumption which made God man, and man God.'

In the Lateran Council against the Monothelites, Maximus of Aquileia declared the 'human will to be deified.'

After many other quotations from the Fathers, Petavius adds, 'Atqui hominem assumi a Deo, nihil aliud est quam fieri Deum.' 'But, that Humanity is assumed by God is nothing else but that it is deified.'[16]

Though these proofs are enough, we will yet add one or two more because of their special clearness and weight.

S. Athanasius says, 'God Himself was made Flesh, that His Flesh might be made God the Word.'[17]

'Therefore He assumed a human and ingenerate

[16] 1 Petav. *De Incarn.* lib. iv. ix. 5, 1-5.

[17] *Lib. de Human. Natura Suscepta*, sect. 3, tom. ii. p. 873, ed. Ben.

body that, having renewed it as its maker, He might make it God,' *i.e.* 'deify it.'[18]

'Though the Flesh regarded in itself be a part of things created, yet it has been made the Body of God.'[19]

'He deified that which He put on.'[20]

'The Lord when made man for us, and bearing a body, was no less God, . . . but (He) rather deified it.'[21]

'For He received it as far as man's nature was exalted; which exaltation was its being deified.'[22]

'Being God, He has taken to Him the flesh; and, being in the flesh, makes the flesh God, *θεοποιεῖ*; *i.e.* He deifies it.'[23]

S. Cyril of Alexandria says: 'We never say that the flesh of the Word was made divinity, but divine, forasmuch as it was His own (flesh). For if the flesh of man is called human, what hinders our calling that (flesh) divine which is the flesh of God the Word? Why, then, mock and revile the apotheosis of that holy flesh which we rightly understand to be deification?'

We will add only one more passage: 'Therefore we assert the Body of Christ to be divine; since it is the Body of God, adorned with ineffable glory, incorruptible, holy, life-giving; but that it has been changed into the

[18] *Orat. II. contra Arianos*, 70, tom. ii. p. 537.
[19] *Ep. ad Adelphium*, sect. 3; *S. Ath. Opp.* tom. ii. p. 912.
[20] *Orat. contra Arianos*, i. sect. 7.
[21] *Ep. in Defence of the Nicene Creed*, sect. 3.
[22] *Orat. I. contra Arianos*, sect. 45.
[23] *Orat III. contra Arianos*, sect. 38. See also *Petav. de Incarn.* lib. iv. cap. ix. sect. 1, and lib. ix.

nature of deity neither any of the Holy Fathers either thought or said; nor do we so think.'[24]

So much for the evidence of the Fathers. Next for the scholastic theology; but that we may not overload a mere article we will confine ourselves to S. Thomas alone. He says in Part III. q. ii. art. 1:

'As S. John Damascene says, "The Divine Nature is said to be *incarnate* because it is personally (*hypostatice*) united to the flesh, not that it is converted into flesh. In like manner the flesh is said to be *deified* (as he also says), not by conversion, but by union with the Word, without change in its natural properties; so that the flesh is understood to be deified *because it is made the flesh of* God *the Word*, not because it is made (to be) God."'

Also in q. xvi. art. 3, S. Thomas says:

'And in this manner the human nature is not called *essentially* God (Deus), but deified; not indeed by conversion of it into the divine nature, but *by union* with the divine nature in one Person, as is evident from Damascene.'[25]

And again, q. xvi. art. 5, S. Thomas says: 'Both natures in Christ are united to each other in the Person, by reason of which union the divine nature is said to be incarnate, and the human nature to be deified.'

This same tradition of doctrine and of terminology runs through the schoolmen and the theologians of the Church. We will pass over Bellarmine, Vasquez, Petavius, and Thomassinus, who all use it, and give only

[24] *Apud Franzelin*, pp. 319, 321.
[25] *De Fide Orthod.* lib. iii. cap. xi. xiii.

two examples, which will be abundant, and then sum up the evidence.

De Lugo, whose name alone will suffice for all who know what theology is, writes as follows:

'Though,' he says, 'the Deity be not united immediately with the humanity, but only mediately (*i.e.* mediante Persona), yet this is enough, that it should truly deify the humanity. For the Deity alone, and not the Personality, is (forma deificans) that which deifies the humanity.'[26]

'The Deity is the same in the Father and the Son: yet it is not the Father that formally deifies or sanctifies the humanity, but the Son; because the Deity as it is in the Son, and not as it is in the Father, has the *condition* necessary for that effect, that is to say, the subsistence (hypostasis) of the Son, *by means of which it is united* to the humanity.'[27]

De Lugo continues: 'The Personality is not (forma deificans) that which deifies, nevertheless the Deity formally deifies the humanity by means of the Personality (mediante personalitate); not that this is that which deifies, but because it is the *condition necessary to this effect*, namely, that the Deity may deify (the humanity).'[28] The Humanity subsisting in the hypostatic union, *i.e.* with the Person, is therefore *eo ipso* deified, but it is deified by union with the Divine Nature.

In treating of the abstract question discussed by Suarez and Vasquez as to the adoration of the Humanity *per mentem concepta tanquam separata*, De Lugo

[26] *De Incarn.* disp. xvi. sect. 1, 39. [27] Ibid. [28] Ibid. 48

uses throughout the word 'deified' as the recognised terminology.

He says that the Humanity of Christ has not its sanctity from itself, but partakes of the sanctity of God: 'Sicut enim participat deificationem, sic etiam participat sanctificationem.'[29]

Suarez had said that the Humanity may be adored for the excellence of the union which it has with the Word, without at the same time adoring the Word also. De Lugo answers, 'You will say with Vasquez that the Humanity cannot be adored, as united with the Word, without adoring the Word, because the Humanity as it is united is the Humanity deified, and the Humanity deified includes the Deity itself.'[30]

We will add one quotation from the Sixth Œcumenical Council: 'As His most holy spotless animate flesh (*i.e.* flesh with the soul) was not destroyed by being deified, but remained in its own state and nature, so also His human will being deified was not destroyed.' This use, then, of the term '*deify*' is consecrated in a definition of faith by an Œcumenical Council.

We may now sum up this part of the subject.

The Humanity assumed into God is not united immediately with the Divine Nature, for the Divine Nature is common to the Three Persons of the Ever-Blessed Trinity; but the Son alone is Incarnate. Nevertheless the action whereby the Incarnation was accomplished, being an action of God *ad extra*, was an action of the Three Persons of the Ever-Blessed Trinity.

[29] *De Incarn.* disp. xvi. sect. iii. 56.
[30] Ibid. disp. xxxv. sect. ii. 40.

But the Son alone assumed our humanity in the unity of His Person, and by this hypostatic act it became the Humanity of the Eternal Son; so that S. Cyril says, 'As we have each one our own body, so in like manner the body of the Only Begotten was His own and not another's.'[31] So the Sixth Council teaches: 'His flesh is called and is the flesh of God the Word.'

But the Humanity which is united immediately with the Person of the Son is united in the Person of the Son with the Divine Nature; and is thereby deified. 'Nam propria ipsius erat illa Caro.' It was therefore 'Caro facta Dei.' S. Thomas writes, 'The union of human nature with the Word of God is made in the Person, not in the Nature;'[32] that is, as Rusticus says, 'Non Deus Verbum per Divinam Naturam, sed Divina Natura per Dei Verbi Personam unita dicitur carne.'[33]

Franzelin says, 'In the human nature Incarnation is the being so united that the humanity subsists not in itself, but as a nature of the Word in the Word; and this is properly that which the Fathers call the Deification of the Human Nature.'[34]

It may not be amiss to restate here the propositions which gave rise to the correspondence of Dr. Nicholson and F. Guiron.

The Archbishop of Westminster had said, according to Dr. Nicholson, that 'the Humanity of our Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.'

[31] Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.* p. 287.
[32] S. Thom. p. iii. sect. 2, art. 2.
[33] Franzelin, p. 288. [34] Ibid. p. 290.

That is to say: The Sacred Humanity being united immediately with the Person of the Divine Son, and in His Person with the Divine Nature, it was thereby, *i.e.* by that union, deified.

This proposition is to the letter Catholic and precise; and in the very terms of the Councils, Fathers, and Theologians of the Catholic Church. The Archbishop stated his words as follows: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord being united with the Divinity, is deified, and is therefore an object of Divine Worship.'

That is, the Human Heart immediately united with the Person of our Lord is united with the Divine Nature, and thereby deified. Therefore it shares in the Divine Worship.

Such, then, is the *ratio formalis* of deification, namely, union with the Person of the Son, and in Him, with the Divine Nature: and such is the hypostatic union of the two Natures in the One Person of our Lord.

What shall we say, then, of Dr. Nicholson's—we will not call it theology, but Christianity, as exhibited in the following words?—'From the phrase *Caro Verbi* you infer .... the Deification of the Caro. This surely is particularly feeble. Every Catholic theologian knows the interpretation of such phrases.'

Most assuredly, as we have shown above; but also most assuredly Dr. Nicholson does not.

We need only quote one sentence in proof. 'If the Archbishop means to reason thus "Deus mortuus est," ergo *the Humanity is Deity*, it would not be difficult to classify this sophism.'

We confess ourselves conquered. To us it would be difficult to qualify this comic impertinence. Has Dr. Nicholson ever read S. John's words?—'In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down His life for us.'[35] Does he believe Christ to be God? Does he believe that Christ died for us? Let us advise him to leave off lecturing Catholic theologians till he has learned his Catechism.

Moreover he says: '"by *facere Deum*, I presume is meant to deify as *Verus Deus*;" by *Dei facere*, to deify in some sense which is less than *Verus Deus*. The *facere Deum* is *facere Deum qui est Deus*: the "*Dei facere*" is "*facere Deum qui post hoc non est Deus*."' This he calls a '*Deus non Deus*,' and adds sapiently, 'This distinction is surely nothing less than a *red. ad absurdum*.' Beyond doubt. But to whose absurdity?

Fifth Article.

Final estimate of Dr. Nicholson's theology.

Our readers must be as weary as we are of Dr. Nicholson. But in our second article we made a promise which we must redeem; and then we hope to have done with him. We promised that we would take account of his conduct in this correspondence with F. Guiron. This we will now do under two heads; the first shall be what manner of Theologian, and the second what manner of man, he is.

Now in estimating the former we will confine our-

[35] 1 S. John iii. 16.

selves to the quotations which he has either interpreted or adduced. They are about fourteen in number, and of these we will give a brief account.

I. First, Perrone was quoted by F. Guiron to show that divine worship is given to the Person of the Word, 'in itself and for itself:' and to the Humanity subsisting in Him, 'in itself but not for itself.' Dr. Nicholson starts by calling Perrone 'Du Perron,' knowing as little of the man as of his meaning. Perhaps he took him for Cardinal Du Perron, who lived in the seventeenth century, as a French traveller, at Moscow, took Plato the patriarch for Plato the philosopher. We note this because before we have done we shall show Dr. Nicholson as setting up for a grave authority about Catholic theologians.

Now for Perrone's words. Dr. Nicholson interprets them as follows:

1. That divine worship is due to God *alone;* therefore,

2. That it is not to be given to the Sacred Humanity.

Perrone expressly says that it is to be given 'in itself but not for itself,' which Dr. Nicholson plainly did not so much as understand; for, if he did, his flat contradiction of Perrone's statement is a worse fault.

II. F. Guiron next referred Dr. Nicholson to S. Athanasius for the use of the word Deify. We gave in our fourth article seven quotations from his works: four from the *Orations against the Arians*, and three from his other writings.

Dr. Nicholson answers, 'As regards the reference to S. Athanasius, I can find nothing in the *Orations*

c. Ar. (*sic*), or elsewhere in the works of that Catholic Father, which can support the proposition.'

Dr. Nicholson pretends to know, or to have read, or to have searched S. Athanasius, especially the Orations. Why not honestly tell the truth? He knew nothing about S. Athanasius.

III. F. Guiron next quoted Franzelin, proving by direct words the divine worship of the Sacred Humanity: and especially of the Sacred Heart, as the special organ of the 'operationes deiviriles' of the Incarnate Word.

Dr. Nicholson knew, if possible, less who Franzelin is than he did who Perrone is.

But he answers, 'Allowing any weight you may claim for it, the thesis lends no support to the error.' What error? Franzelin makes the very same two assertions which F. Guiron and the Archbishop had made.

The passage quoted explicitly asserts the Divine Adoration, and implicitly the Deification, of the Sacred Humanity. But Dr. Nicholson was incapable of understanding the very terminology.

IV. Next F. Guiron gave Dr. Nicholson a scent of the Fifth Œcumenical Council. This was new life to him; but it has been his ruin.

Dr. Nicholson's incredible blunder about the two Adorations we have exposed both in the first and the second article of this series. We will say no more now, because we have something more of the same kind in store for him.

V. F. Guiron then quoted the Constitution of Pius VI., 'Auctorem Fidei,' by which the errors renewed by Dr. Nicholson were condemned in the Synod of Pistoia.

He evidently knew nothing about it. He says, 'You quote no part of it, and I might not unreasonably wait until you do.' From this it is certain that he was ignorant that the 61, 62, and 63 Propositions condemned by the 'Auctorem Fidei' relate to the devotion of the Sacred Heart by name. Yet he pretends to be ready to discuss it. 'I am not unwilling to discuss it *on occasion*.' On what occasion, if not on this? But Dr. Nicholson was evidently once more concealing his ignorance under a pretence of superior knowledge.

VI. Now we come to an event in this correspondence. Down to this point Dr. Nicholson had literally done nothing but misinterpret quotations given to him by F. Guiron.

It so happened that by a strange chance we heard of Dr. Nicholson at this date in great activity, searching for Catholic books, in Bath. His next letter is dated 'Bath.' And there he has found 'Doctor *Peter Dens*,' of whom he says with a tone of patronage to F. Guiron, 'with whose works you are no doubt familiar.' We can imagine F. Guiron may indeed have heard of Dens; but we will engage that he has drawn his theology out of deeper wells.

However, now for Dens:

'Non recte enim dicitur de Christo (ut docet S. Thomas, Art. 7) Homo factus est Deus.'

'Obj.-Vera est hæc propositio, &c.'

Now, will it be believed that this scrap, which Dr. Nicholson gives as a continuous quotation, without sign of garbling, is completely garbled and its sense changed?

Dr. Nicholson *has omitted the whole of Dens' assertion.* Between the sentences quoted by him are these words. He says, We cannot rightly say, 'Homo factus est Deus: Significaretur enim quod *Persona* Verbi facta esset *in tempore* Deus: vel quod *aliquis homo præexistens* factus esset Deus.'

Does Dr. Nicholson mean that F. Guiron ever asserted that the '*Word became God in time*,' or that '*Some man already in existence* was made God'?

If he dares to say this, let him put his finger on the words.

If he cannot do so, he is convicted of either a patent false accusation, or once more of a pretence at knowledge in which he is evidently and culpably wanting.

After this he has, we cannot refrain from saying, the effrontery to write as follows: 'Any proposition co-ordinate with this Respons. (*sic*) I am free to grant.' We are bound to confess that he is beyond us here. Unless we have lost our senses, these words are absolutely without meaning.

He then goes on:

'Thus the dogmatic theologian Dens shows the fallacy on which your reasoning rests.' F. Guiron had affirmed that it is true and Catholic to say, 'Deus mortuus est.' Dr. Nicholson, in refutation, quotes this scrap of Dens. And yet Dens himself just before, that is on the fourth page before this quotation, says: 'Recte dicitur, Deus, sive filius Dei, natus est ex Virgine, passus, *mortuus*.'[36] We do not quote Dens to show that it is right to say, 'Deus mortuus est;' for the

[36] Reg. i. ii. *De Incarn. Idiom.* tom. v. p. 21.

whole Catholic theology proves it. We quote Dens, which he had in his hand, to convict Dr. Nicholson of want of knowledge or want of sincerity.

VII. But we have not yet done with Dens, who was found by Dr. Nicholson at Bath, to his own undoing. Whoever gave it to him gave him indeed a δῶρον ἄδωρον. He then quotes the passage we treated in our third article in the following way. 'Dr. Dens[37] speaks thus: Interim cum S. Thoma observandum quod Humanitas Christi *concepta per mentem ut separata* a Persona Verbi, non sit colenda cultu Latriæ, sed Hyperduliæ, quia sic Humanitas *abstracta*, et omnis perfectio quæ ei inest, est creata.'

We have already abundantly proved:

1. That S. Thomas and all theologians teach that the Sacred Humanity never *in reality* existed separate from the Person of the Word, nor, to all eternity, ever can.

2. That to the Sacred Humanity, so indissolubly united to the Word, the divine worship of latria is due.

3. That the Humanity of Christ *separate* from the Word, *non-existent* except by mental abstraction, would be only a *res creata;* and therefore an object at most of hyperdulia.

We have demonstrated in our last article but one, that this has no more to do with the question than the 37th Problem of the First Book of Euclid.

But we quote it here again to convict Dr. Nicholson once more. He takes this from Dens, tom. i. p. 39. His quotation is the four last lines of the page. No-

[37] *Tractatus de Incar.* No. 23.

body would believe that the whole paragraph going before affirms what F. Guiron had said, and refutes what Dr. Nicholson was saying. Dens says: 'Adoratur enim Humanitas ut subsistens in Verbo; et sic subsistentia, sive Persona, Verbi simul adoratur ut causa adorationis,' *i.e. cultu Latriæ.*

VIII. We have already dealt in former articles with the Fifth Œcumenical Council. If Dr. Nicholson knows or means what he says, he is under its anathema, for he has declared:

1. That divine worship is due to the Divine Nature in Christ.

2. That to the Human Nature in Christ is due only hyperdulia.

Therefore he thus introduces two Adorations of the two natures *separatim:* which denies the unity of the Incarnate Word; and is condemned under anathema by the Fifth Council.

IX. But books are fatal to Dr. Nicholson. He next quotes the homily of S. Proclus in the Council of Ephesus: 'Neque hominem deificatum prædicamus, sed Deum Incarnatum confitemur.' This, he says, condemns the dogma that the Sacred Humanity is deified and worshipped with latria. Will it be believed that the words preceding this quotation are as follows?—

'He who by nature was impassible, through pity became full of suffering. Christ did not *become* God by *increase* (of merit, ἐκ προκοπῆς); God forbid the thought: but through pity He became man. We do not preach *a* deified *man*, but the Incarnate God.'[38]

[38] *S. Procli Hom.* sect. iv.; Labbe, *Concil.* tom. iii. p. 580.

Now, did Dr. Nicholson, or did he not, know this context? If he did not, what might we not justly say of this ignorance, coupled with his daring to accuse Catholic teachers of heresy? If he did know it, we leave him to the judgment of all honest men.

S. Proclus was refuting the Nestorians, who affirmed Christ to be a human Person; the Son of Mary, but not the Eternal Son of God.

X. But, if possible, we have worse coming. Dr. Nicholson quotes the Epistle of S. Cyril, read in the Fifth Œcumenical Council, as condemning F. Guiron's assertion that the Sacred Humanity is deified and worshipped as subsisting in the Word.

S. Cyril's words are these: 'We guard against saying of Christ, "for *His* sake who puts on (humanity) I venerate *him* who is put on" (*διὰ τὸν φορεῦντα τὸν φορούμενον*); "for *His* sake who is invisible I worship *him* who is visible," . . . "*he* who is assumed co-exists as God with *Him* that assumes (*him*)." He who says these things cuts asunder (Christ) into two Christs, and makes a man apart by himself, and God likewise apart by Himself.'[39]

Is it possible that Dr. Nicholson did not see that S. Cyril is refuting the Nestorian doctrine of two *Persons* in Christ? We have inserted the original in one place as a sample, because the article which runs all through shows, if possible, more clearly what he was asserting. Dr. Nicholson might have been warned by the 'eum' and 'eum,' and 'qui,' and 'ille,' and 'ei,' which he prints in capitals. But he was so full of the

[39] *Epist. S. Cyril*, &c. s. vi.; Labbe, *Concil.* tom. iii. p. 950.

desire to assail F. Guiron, that even the 'in duos' did not open his eyes. The whole is simply irrelevant. What has all this to do with the Sacred Humanity in, or even *separate mentally* from, the one Person of the Word? Does Dr. Nicholson accuse F. Guiron of denying that Mary is Mother of God? If not, how can he accuse him of making two Persons in Christ? The fact is Dr. Nicholson did not understand what he was saying, how much less what he was quoting.

XI. We now come to Dr. Nicholson's quotations from Bellarmine, which are, if possible, more fatal to him than those from Dens. He quotes Bellarmine to prove that 'the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of Latria.' For this he quotes '*Lib. de Rel. et Imag. Sanct.*,' without number of book, chapter, or section. We can, however, help him to them.

The passage he quotes *does not exist at all* in the *Lib. de Reliquiis*, &c. It is to be found in lib. i. c. xii. *De Beatitudine, &c. Sanctorum.*

Here is Dr. Nicholson's first blunder. His second is the old story over again: that hyperdulia is to be given 'soli Humanitati Christi et Matri ejus.' This we have answered ten times already.

Now if Dr. Nicholson had really known the Book *de Reliquiis*, he would have found an answer to his perversion of Bellarmine's words. In ch. xxiv. s. 14, Bellarmine says, 'Ambrose means to say that Christ is One, as God, and as crucified: and therefore, when Christ is adored as God, *the humanity is not separated from Him;* and when Christ is adored as crucified, the Divinity is not separated.'

And immediately after he says:

'True latria belongs to Christ when He is adored as He is in Himself, not, however, when He is adored (how does Dr. Nicholson think? in the *sola humanitas separata*, &c.?)—when He is adored *as He is in an Image by participation*.' Is the Sacred Humanity an Image?

Now, as we have fallen on this point again, it may be as well to give Dr. Nicholson one more quotation from Bellarmine. He says: 'What Gregory of Nazianzum says to Chelidonius, that the Flesh by the Incarnation is *deified*, has this sense, that it is made the *Flesh of God* by union with the Word, not made God by conversion into the Divinity.'[40]

Finally, we come to his quotation from the 20th chap. of this book, in which he expresses his surprise that, not F. Guiron, but that the Archbishop of Westminster, should 'either dissent from, or not be aware of, the doctrine of Cultus in the Roman Church.' There is in this an exquisite impertinence. Let us see the result.

Dr. Nicholson proceeds: 'You did me the favour in the first letter to call my attention to a passage of Perrone;' *i.e.* F. Guiron quoted the words, 'in se, et propter se,' and 'in se, non tamen propter se.' This, he says, refutes F. Guiron's position, namely, that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored with latria, 'not for itself,' but for the divinity of the Incarnate Word. He proves this assertion in the following way: 'It appears to me strange that a difficulty should be raised as to

[40] Lib. iii. c. iv. 2.

the significance and application of phrases so familiar to Roman theologians as *adoratio propter se* and *adoratio in se*.' The difficulty was altogether of his own making. F. Guiron never made it. Bellarmine, Dr. Nicholson says, explains the expressions clearly enough. Let us hear the explanation. The 'adoratio propter se' is paid to that object which has in itself the essential reason of the worship, depending on itself, and not on any other thing; 'quod habet in se rationis vim, non dependentem aliunde.' This is what F. Guiron and Perrone put more concisely 'in se et propter se,' and affirm of adoration as given to the divinity of the Incarnate Word. Dr. Nicholson then adds, 'The *adoratio in se*, the full expression of which is *adoratio in se propter aliud*, is the adoration of an object which contains within itself the cause or *motivum* (Perrone) of the worship; which cause, however, altogether depends on some other thing—quod habet in se causam honoris, sed illa causa tota pendet ab alio.'[41]

Now will it be believed that the passage from which these words are garbled is the following?—'Potest aliquid honorari propter se, vel propter aliud. Id honoratur propter se, quod habet in se rationem venerationis non dependentem aliunde; et hoc modo *sola natura rationalis* est venerabilis. Propter aliud honoratur id, quod habet quidem in se causam honoris, sed illa causa tota pendet ab alio: et hoc modo *signa rerum sacrarum* sunt venerabilia; habent enim in se *relationem similitudinis* sive *representationem rei sacræ*, et proinde quandam excellentiam, sed illa tota pendet ab ipsa re

[41] See Bellarmine, *Lib. de Rel.* xx. 14.

sacra.' Is the Sacred Humanity a similitude or a representation? Bellarmine, after laying down these principles as to the worship—not of the Incarnate Word with His Humanity, as Dr. Nicholson evidently thinks, but of IMAGES—proceeds in this way to apply them.

In c. xxv. 1, he says: 'Neither Latria, nor Hyperdulia, nor Dulia, can properly be given to images: nor any other such worship as *is paid to an intelligent nature*.'

What, then, has this to do with the adoration of the Sacred Humanity?

Is it not an intelligent nature?

Did not Dr. Nicholson affirm 'with Bellarmine' that hyperdulia is to be paid to it?

The fact is, that Dr. Nicholson did not know that Bellarmine, in the whole of this book, is treating of the *relative* worship due to *images*, not of the *absolute* worship due to the Incarnate Word.

Yet Dr. Nicholson had before his eyes these words: 'True latria is due to Christ when He is adored *as He is in Himself* (*i.e.* God and Man), but not when He is adored as He is in *an image by participation*.'[42]

And again: 'The *image* of Christ *represents* Christ, that is, *the Divine Person clothed in human flesh*. . . . Otherwise the Apostles, when they saw Christ in the flesh, ought not to have adored Him with latria: nor ought Thomas to have said, My Lord and my God. For they did not see Christ as God, but *as man*.'[43]

These words are in the very column next to Dr. Nicholson's quotation.

According to Dr. Nicholson, Bellarmine's argument

[42] C. xxiv. 21. [43] C. xxi. 2.

is, the image of Christ is not adored in itself, but as a representation of Christ.

Therefore the Sacred Humanity is not to be adored in itself.

Does Dr. Nicholson mean that the Sacred Humanity is a *representation?* If so, of what? If not, what does all this pomp of quotation of the *Lib. de Rel.*, and of 'the phrases so familiar to Roman theologians,' mean? Certainly they are familiar to a Catholic child: but not in any way familiar to Dr. Nicholson. In the *Penny Catechism* our children learn to say and to understand as follows:

Q. Is it allowable to honour relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures?

A. Yes: with an inferior and *relative* honour: as they *relate* to Christ and His saints, and are *memorials* of them.

Q. May we not pray to relics or images?

A. No, by no means: for they have no *life* or *sense* to help us.

Here are Bellarmine's very words. But what has this to do with the *absolute and divine* worship of the Incarnate Word?

XII. Dr. Nicholson quotes the eighth of S. Cyril's Twelve Anathematisms. We have fully answered this amazing ignorance already, and have shown that the 'alterum cum altero adorari,' that is 'one (Person) with another' (Person), is a condemnation of the Nestorian adoration of two Persons in Christ, and has no shadow of bearing upon the question between Dr. Nicholson and F. Guiron. The man who can think so show

that he does not understand either the Nestorian heresy or the doctrine of the Incarnation.

And here we will redeem the promise made in our second article.

Dr. Nicholson says that the Divine Word 'holds a possessive *relation* in respect to Caro; what the precise modus of that possession is, the Catholic faith defines in the Doctrine of the Hypostatic union.'

On this we have to say that the doctrine of the hypostatic union is defined by the Church, not as 'a possessive *relation* in *respect* to Caro,' which is simple Nestorianism, but, as Dens will tell Dr. Nicholson, 'est *unio* qua natura humana, *realiter* et *substantialiter* sic est *unita* Personæ Divinæ Verbi, ut in illa habeat suam *subsistentiam*.' The Church uses the word '*unio*' expressly to exclude all equivocal terms, such as 'relation,' or 'inhabitation,' or 'conjunction,' or 'operation,' and the like.

Therefore the fourth Canon of the Fifth Council says: 'If any man say that the union of God the Word with Humanity was made according to grace, or according to operation, or according to equality of honour, or according to *relation* (σχεσιν), &c., and shall not confess that the union of God the Word was made with the flesh, with the life and soul rational and intellectual, that is, according to hypostatic union (as the holy Fathers have taught), and that therefore His Person is one, who is the Lord Jesus Christ, one (Person) of the Holy Trinity, let such man be anathema.' We do not say that Dr. Nicholson is under the anathema, for he knows nothing about it; but we advise him to learn the

terminology of the Church, and not to invent senseless verbiage on doctrines defined by it.

Dr. Nicholson comes back once more with Dens.

'It seems strange,' he says, 'that Archbishop Manning should not be aware of the common dictum, "*Non omne illud quod coadoratur cultu Latriæ debet esse ipse Deus.*"' Now this 'common dictum' is no dictum at all; it is half a premiss made for the occasion. But let that pass. Will it be believed that Dens' next words are, '*sed sufficit quod sit Personæ Divinæ substantialiter conjunctum*:' which half of the premiss Dr. Nicholson deliberately suppresses? Dens is actually and expressly proving what Dr. Nicholson is actually and expressly denying; namely, that the Sacred Humanity, though it be not *ipse Deus*, *i.e.* the Person of God, is to be worshipped with latria. Dr. Nicholson, as his wont is, carefully mutilates the words of Dens, and uses them to deny that the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped at all with latria, because it is not 'God,' *i.e.* the Divine Nature. Dens here affirms that it is to be so worshipped because it is united with God. We are beginning to believe that Dr. Nicholson does not know black from white.

XIV. We now come to the last quotation; and to the end of our task. Dr. Nicholson writes:

'The error of literally predicating Divine attributes of the Humanity, and *vice versâ*, is well rebuked by the Augustinian Thad. Perusini (*sic*) preaching before the Council of Trent.'

The words of F. Thaddeus, of Perugia, are: 'They who endeavour to meditate piously and without error

on the wonderful and Divine works of Christ,' must keep before their minds the two natures, Divine and Human, which still retained their own operations and fulfilled their own offices. For, he adds, 'Those things which are proper (*conveniunt*) to Christ as God, no way are proper (*conveniunt*) to Him as Man. And those things which are proper to Him as Man, it would be a sin to ascribe to Him as God.'

That is to say, you cannot say of Christ that He died as God, nor can you say of Christ that He is Omnipresent as Man. You can say of Christ, God and Man, both that He died, and that He is Omnipresent.

Very sound doctrine, but very irrelevant. You cannot say of Christ, as God, that He hungered. You cannot say of Christ, as Man, that before Abraham was He was.

But we have no need to interpret F. Thaddeus's words. He does it himself; but, as before, Dr. Nicholson puts his hand over 'Perusini's' mouth in the midst of his sentence.

Our readers will hardly believe what we now add. Dr. Nicholson breaks off his quotation at a colon, and puts a full stop. F. Thaddeus's next words are: 'but inasmuch as they are joined together, as we have said, by an indissoluble and inexplicable link in one and the same Hypostasis, most frequently what things are of (*i.e.* belong to) the Divine Nature are ascribed to (Him as) Man, what things are of (or belong to) the Human Nature are ascribed to (Him as) God.'[44]

[44] Le Plat, *Hist. Con. Trid.* tom. i. p. 399.

Dr. Nicholson not only cannot understand his quotations, but he cannot extract them faithfully.

F. Thaddeus's assertions are nothing more than the *communicatio idiomatum*, not *in abstracto* to the Natures, but *in concreto*, *i.e.* in the Person. This Dr. Nicholson in his grand way calls, 'The commonplace *Communicatio idiomatum* is a *forma loquendi*, well understood.' By whom?

F. Thaddeus then goes on to say that the Ascension, on which festival he was preaching, cannot be ascribed to the Divinity, for He was in heaven already. Also, he adds, Christ did not forsake the earth even as Man (quemadmodum impii quidam senserunt hæretici), because He has left us His Body, 'sub Divini Sacramenti tegumento obtectum,' hid under the veil of the Divine Sacrament.

We have now done with Dr. Nicholson's quotations.

It remains for us now to sum up the case against Dr. Nicholson, and then to take an estimate of what manner of Theologian he is:

1. We have shown that he did not even know the name of Perrone; that he did not understand his words; and that he made him say the direct contradictory of his own proposition, and of the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

2. That he pretended to know, or to have searched, the works of S. Athanasius: and denied, contrary to fact as we have shown, that they contain the Deification of the Humanity of Christ.

3. That without so much as understanding Fran-

zelin's words, or ever having seen the outside of his book, he denies his plain and explicit teaching.

4. That he applies the condemnation of Nestorianism, by the Fifth Œcumenical Council, to the Catholic doctrine that Christ is to be adored in His two natures with latria.

5. That he did not even know the condemnations of the Constitution 'Auctorem Fidei;' and yet, pretending to know it all, professed his readiness 'to discuss it on occasion.'

6. That he represents Dens as denying latria to the Sacred Humanity, *Verbo unita*, because he had fallen upon the assertion that *a Persona Verbi, per mentis conceptionem, separata*, it is to be worshipped with hyperdulia.

7. That he either did not know that Dens in the very same treatise affirmed the doctrine of the Archbishop; or, knowing it, he suppressed it.

8. That he distinctly affirms that two Adorations are to be given to the two Natures subsisting in Christ, latria and hyperdulia respectively.

9. That he suppresses half of the statement of S. Proclus and altogether perverts his meaning. This we are ready to believe was from utter incapacity.

10. That with S. Cyril's letter before him, and the Nestorian doctrine of two Persons plainly expressed in it, even in the Latin translation, by '*eum*,' '*eum*,' and '*ille*,' &c., showing the *two persons* of the Nestorians, he pretended that it applies to the adoration of the Sacred Humanity subsisting in the One Person of the Incarnate Word.

11. That he quotes as from the *Liber de Reliquiis* of Bellarmine a passage which does not exist in it. And where it does exist, in the *Liber de Sanctorum Beatificatione*, its meaning is perverted by Dr. Nicholson in direct contradiction of Bellarmine's explicit teaching. Moreover, through complete want of elementary knowledge, he mixes up the distinct questions of Absolute and Relative worship; and applies what Bellarmine says of the worship of images to the worship of the Sacred Humanity subsisting in the Incarnate Word.

12. That he again mistakes S. Cyril's anathematism against Nestorius as applicable to the devotion of the Sacred Heart.

13. That he has directly inverted the argument of Deus, who was affirming that latria is due to the Sacred Humanity, and converted it into a denial of that doctrine by a suppression, which we do not know how to believe to have been unconscious, of one half of a premiss, mutilating words and sense, and changing an affirmative into a negative proposition.

14. That in like manner he suppressed one half of a sentence of F. Thaddeus, making him to say the direct reverse of what he was saying, and thereby suppressing the fact that F. Thaddeus precisely confirms F. Gairon's argument from the doctrine of the *Communicatio idiomatum:* with which Dr. Nicholson pretends to be so familiar as to pity the Archbishop for his ignorance of it.

So great a mass of pretentious and supercilious

blundering, and so many distinct mutilations of the words pretended as the text of authors, and as their *ipsissima verba*, we have never seen in so small a compass as in Dr. Nicholson's seven letters.

And so we will leave him, adding only two quotations of his words.

'In respect to the distinction now proposed: by *facere Deum* I presume is meant, "to deify as Verus Deus;" by *Dei facere*, to deify in some sense which is less than Verus Deus. The "facere Deum" is "facere Deum qui est Deus:" the "Dei facere" is facere Deum qui post hoc non est Deus.'

It would be cruel to criticise the Latin. We will only ask, Is this the man to call S. Athanasius a Catholic Father in whose works is to be found nothing to support the proposition that the 'Caro facta Dei is deified'?

To pretend learning which we have not in medicine is a moral obliquity. What is it, then, to pretend learning which we have not in theology?

Once more: in his parting letter Dr. Nicholson says: 'I have had no controversy whatever with Roman Theologians; but simply with certain interpretations of them, which are obviously untenable.'

That is to say: You did not know your own theologians till I arose with Dens to expound them.

But does he sincerely mean that he will accept what Roman theologians teach? If so, he will soon be a wiser man. If he will not accept it, then it is not F. Guiron's interpretation but the Holy Catholic Faith which he reviles and rejects.

Let him rest in peace. No Roman theologians will contend with him till they see that he can understand them. Then he will be worth answering, but not till then. He will therefore long remain in peace.

We have only one more office to discharge. We have seen what manner of theologian Dr. Nicholson is. It only remains to see also what manner of man. We do not trust our own appreciations: and he might think them unjust. We will therefore learn it of himself.

For this purpose, having analysed the argument of this correspondence, we will now collect its flowers.

'You declared,' he says to the Archbishop in his first letter, 'that the Human Nature of the Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son. Immediately after the service I addressed a Roman ecclesiastic. He had noticed the same statement of the preacher; he sought by qualification to reduce it to some conformity with the Catholic faith; but failing to do so to my satisfaction, and evidently labouring under a confusion of thought and an incapability of which he did not seem wholly unconscious, he finally referred me for an explanation to his Archbishop.'

'It is due to the attention which Archbishop Manning has given to the subject, &c.'

'The Archbishop essays to change his position.'

'Such propositions or illustrations tend to a mere verbal confusion, and are instances of a well-known fallacy.'

'I must take leave to say that you misinterpret your author.'

'The heresy here is patent.'

'The reasoning is an ordinary fallacy, and the thing assumed is against the Catholic faith.'

'Archbishop Manning has misapprehended the teaching of Perrone.'

'You change your position for a second time.'

'It is only possible to answer this reckless assertion by a direct contradiction—the Roman Church does not teach any such thing.'

'I certainly cannot conceal my surprise that you (the Archbishop) either dissent from, or cannot be aware of, the doctrine of *Cultus* in the Roman Church.'

'It serves no purpose to iterate references to the doctrines and practice of the Church, while both are rejected and ignored,' *i.e.* by the Archbishop.

'I would now beg of you once more to study a passage adduced by yourself.'

'Nothing in the course of this correspondence has affected me with more surprise than the imperfect knowledge of the rudiments of Roman dogmatic theology which it betrays.'

'I should have supposed that the least acquaintance with such dogmatic works as those of Dens or of Cardinal Bellarmine would have rendered such blunders impossible.'

'To produce a document and to confess ignorance as to its validity' (*i.e.* a Pontifical Constitution *ex cathedrâ*) 'discovers remarkable weakness and perplexity.'

'The chief Pastor of the Roman Church in England,' &c. &c., as quoted before.

'When asked for an explanation, the preacher quotes authorities which are proved to be fresh heresies, and which are incompatible with the rudiments of the theology of his Church.'

'Finally, the whole correspondence is no ordinary instance of confusion of thought and language.'

'In this grave matter I have no alternative but to bring the charge of heresy against your teaching.'

'Unless you fully retract the heresy, I reserve to myself the right of publishing this correspondence.'

'If, as you consider, you have in the present case answered all reasonable inquiries, the force of the reasoning might have been left to assert itself *without the present plea ad misericordiam*.'

Ne respondeas stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne efficiaris ei similis.

Responde stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne sibi sapiens esse videatur.

Vidisti hominem sapientem sibi videri? magis illo spem habebit insipiens.[45]

In reading these utterances of lofty wisdom and compassionate authority, we have been at times inclined to believe that the whole of the correspondence was an elaborate hoax. Its pompous absurdity and exquisite nonsense reminded us of Swift's prophecy and condolence with Mr. Isaac Bickerstaff on the mournful event of his own death. But one thing in it seemed to us to be real: namely, the intense desire to wither up the Archbishop with scornful commiseration, and patronise him with condescending enlightenment. F.

[45] Prov. xxvi. 4, 5, 12.

Guiron, who was face to face with Dr. Nicholson, utterly disappears. It is the Archbishop who 'bestows attention,' and 'cannot but know,' and 'is ignorant of rudiments,' and is not aware of the Roman doctrine of 'cultus,' aliaque pœne innumerabilia.

This amusing and irrepressible determination to get at the Archbishop, and to hold him up sky-high as a heretic, reveals itself at once in the first letter, and betrays the intention to lay a trap. What if it should turn out after all that Dr. Nicholson's trap, when opened, will be found empty: or that the trapper is trapped himself?

We say this because the Rev. F. Guiron has given us leave to print the following letter:

'S. Michael's, Hereford, Sept. 28, 1873.

'My dear F. Guiron,—On Wednesday last, as I was coming in the train from Manchester to Worcester, I read for the first time your correspondence with Dr. Nicholson in the *Guardian*.

'Until then my knowledge of the whole affair was confined to his first letter, which I read when I gave it to you to answer, and his last, which, as the correspondence was closed, I put, without reading it, into the basket. Of all his intermediate letters I knew nothing, and with your answers my only contact was that I suggested to you certain books and references for your first letter. I remember that I heard you read a paragraph or two of your second; and when I afterwards found that, unknown to me, it was still going on, I told you to waste no more time upon it, and also in what terms to close the correspondence.

'Having now read your letters, I think it due to you to say that they are perfectly sound, Catholic, and unanswerable. If you had made any slip in doctrine, I should have taken upon myself the full responsibility; on the just rule, *quod facit per alium facit per se*. I take now the full responsibility of saying that you have not only made no such slip, but have done your work thoroughly well.

'It is a just retribution that Dr. Nicholson, who began by accusing me and one of my clergy as either ignorant or unable to defend my words, should after all fall into your hands, and learn to his cost that he had better leave Catholic priests alone.

'His solemn appeals to me all through, and my excommunication as a heretic at last, are very amusing.

'I cannot end this letter without saying that I admire in your letters nothing more than the calm, grave, respectful tone with which you bore with an assailant very unlike yourself. It is a sign of the love of truth and of souls. I hope Dr. Nicholson is a young man; for if he be an old one, you, at the outset of your priesthood, have read him a sharp lesson on the manner which befits the treatment of sacred things. He will have learned also that Catholic priests know their theology better than he can teach them, and that it is not safe to accuse even an Archbishop. May every blessing be with you and your work.

'Believe me always yours affectionately in Jesus Christ,

'✠ HENRY EDWARD,
'*Archbishop of Westminster.*'

XV.

THE DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF LABOUR.

THE DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF LABOUR.

A Lecture delivered at the Mechanics' Institution, Leeds, on the 28th January 1874.

Mr. Mayor,

When I received from your Secretary the invitation of the President and Committee of the Leeds Mechanics' Institute, I had great hesitation in accepting it; not that I doubted the kindness with which it was tendered, nor that I doubted my own entire will to do the utmost that I could to meet your wish: but I felt that the invitation called me to launch upon a venture so far beyond my ordinary navigation, and into a deep that I had not sounded, that prudence would have counselled me to decline the honour that you offered. Nevertheless I had rather do what I am about to attempt feebly, and I must say very imperfectly, than seem to be wanting to you in respect and good-will, and in the desire which I truly have to promote, if it be in my power, not only the good, but even the recreation, of my neighbour. And when I was assured that we meet upon what your President has called the neutral platform, it so entirely fell in with what I conceive to be a high dictate of our duty that I could no longer hesitate: I mean this—that in everything of private life, and everything of domestic

and civil and political life, we have but one common interest—the welfare of our common country. If there be divergencies, as there must be, as always have been, and as I fear there always will be, it seems to me that it is the duty of every one of us to strive that they should be suspended at least in every region of our public and private life wheresoever it is possible.

When therefore I had ventured to accept your invitation, I was asked what subject should be put upon your programme, and thinking to choose an easy matter, I found I had taken myself in a snare. I thought that the 'Dignity and the Rights of Labour' would be a subject common to us all; one in which you and I are united, though in a different way; and that, as our interest is common, the subject would not be difficult. But I confess, when I began to examine what I had done, I felt that I had imposed upon myself a task of no ordinary difficulty; for the plainer and commoner a subject is, the harder it is to treat it in any other than a familiar and a commonplace way. And easy as it would be to heap up mountains of truisms and to spread out continents of platitudes on the subject of labour, it is very difficult, at least for me, to say anything with which you are not altogether familiar. Nevertheless what I can do I will endeavour to do.

Now Lord Macaulay, in his *History of England*, tells us that in the reign of Charles II. the town of Leeds was already a town of clothiers and clothmakers; but, he said, it had only in the time of Charles I. received its municipal privileges; it obtained the power of electing a member to Parliament in the time of Oliver

Cromwell. It was a town of 7000 inhabitants. It had a cloth trade, which upon a brisk market-day, as he says, might sell in the open air upon the bridge some thousands of pounds' worth of cloth, and the men of Leeds were well satisfied with such a market. The oldest inhabitants of that day could remember the building of the first brick house, which was called for a long time after the Red House: which, as I am told, still exists.

Now I suppose at this moment there are single firms in Leeds that turn over a larger capital than the whole town of Leeds at that day. At that time Norwich was a far greater town in importance than the town of Leeds. Norwich was a city of eight or nine and twenty thousand people. It had already a flourishing trade. What is the relative condition of things now? Leeds has from two to three hundred thousand people. It has a manufacture which is amongst the most renowned in England, perhaps standing at the head of its kind. The capital of Leeds I will not venture to conjecture. It has become the sixth or seventh great city or town in the British Empire. While Leeds has grown to this vast importance in commerce and in wealth, the whole of the British Empire has increased likewise. There has been a development of its commercial power, of its productiveness, of its labour, its skill, its capital, which is almost fabulous. I will give but one fact, which will be sufficient. A French gentleman, well conversant with commercial subjects, gave in evidence before a committee of commerce in France that at this time Great Britain, with its population of some

30,000,000, has a larger mercantile marine than all the other maritime powers of the world put together. Whereas the mercantile marine of all other powers reaches 6,600,000 tons, the mercantile marine of Great Britain reaches 6,900,000 tons. What is the cause of all this enormous development of wealth? Some may say it is capital. I say there is something before capital —there is skill. Some then may say it is skill. I say there is something before skill—there is labour; and we trace it up to labour strictly. The first agency and factor of this great commercial wealth, and therefore of the greatness of our country in this respect, is labour. In a book with which I have no doubt you are all familiar, one of the series of the Useful Knowledge Library, published first about the year 1830, when the insanity of certain uneducated persons set on foot an agitation to destroy agricultural machinery—and perhaps many who hear me reach back in their lives sufficiently long to remember personally what I mean—in this book, then called the *Results of Machinery*, and afterwards published some ten or fifteen years ago under the title of *Capital and Labour*, is to be found this sentence: 'In the dim morning of society Labour was up and stirring before Capital was awake.' There is no doubt of this; and therefore I may affirm that labour is the origin of all our greatness.

I am speaking, as you will remember, strictly upon that one point; I am not now speaking on the moral conditions of labour, though I may touch that hereafter slightly, but I speak of labour as a political economist would speak. I will not try to define labour,

but will describe it to be the honest exertion of the powers of our mind and of our body for our own good and for the good of our neighbour. I say honest, for I do not account any labour which is not honest—which is superficial, tricky, and untrusty—as worthy of the name of labour. I call it exertion, because unless a man puts forth his powers, and puts them forth to the full, it is not worthy of the name of labour. Unless he puts forth his powers honestly for his own good, I call it his destruction: and if he does not put forth those powers for his own good, and also for the good of his neighbour, I call it selfishness. I think, therefore, that my description is a just one: it is the honest exertion of the powers of mind and body for our own good and the good of our neighbour. And here I must put in a plea in passing for the exertion of the powers of the mind, and I feel confident that in the Mechanics' Institute of Leeds I shall be safe in saying that those who exert the powers of the mind and of the brain are true labourers. They may never have wielded an axe, they may never have guided a locomotive, and they may never have driven a spade into the ground; but I will maintain they are true labourers, worthy of the name. But this I pass over, and shall only touch it again hereafter for the purpose of applying it strictly to our subject.

I. We will now come to what we call, for the present, bodily labour. I may say that this bodily labour is in one sense the origin of everything, though it is clear that mind must precede it. The first man that ever bent a hook to take a fish, the first man that ever constructed and laid a snare to take a bird or a beast

—that man exercised a mental action before his hand accomplished what he designed. This stands to reason.

In these days, perhaps, men are inclined to depreciate mere strength without skill, because our labour is become half skilled and fully skilled, and our industry is becoming scientific. Nevertheless in the mere labour of the body there is a true dignity. The man who puts forth the powers of the body, and that honestly, for his own good and the good of his neighbour, is living a high and worthy life, and that because it is his state in the world. It is the lot in which we are placed, and any man who fulfils the lot of his existence is in a state of dignity.

The condition on which we obtain everything in the world has always more or less of labour. Nature, it is quite true, offers to us certain of her gifts as if she held them out in her hands. The trees bear fruit over our heads, and they seem to be offered to us to eat; and yet we must take them. The gold is in the earth, coal is in the mine, and we must take them too; and the taking is more laborious. And the bread that we eat is in the grain, and before that grain will nourish us there is a great deal of labour in raising it and in preparing it. So in the smaller things; and that which is in the smallest becomes more complex as we advance.

Now there is no limit as yet ascertained to the fertility of the earth. We are told that in the time of King John the productiveness of the soil of England was about one-fourth as compared with the productiveness of the soil all over the face of England at this time, and as about one-fifth compared with the productiveness

of the soil round about London. What makes the difference? Labour, skill, capital, science, and the advancement of agriculture. This calculation shows that we have been steadily advancing in the productiveness of our soil, and have never reached its limit. Only the other day I saw a statement which seemed to me at first so incredible that I bought the Report, and verified it by examining the passage. Till then I believed that there must be some inaccuracy in it. The committee of the House of Lords last year upon the drainage and improvement of land has this statement, resting upon the authority of two very eminent agriculturists. The one stated that of 20,000,000 of acres in England only 3,000,000 are adequately drained; and the other said that of the land in England only one-fifth part is as yet adequately treated by agriculture. Therefore labour may be only in the dawn of its work; and if England has developed itself by its labour—as I began by saying—to so vast an extent, do not let us for a moment imagine that we have reached the limit of what may be done by the advancement of that labour.

I am old enough to recollect when the political economists of England startled us by a statement that there did not exist in England coal under the earth for more than 800 years. It seemed to me even then that our nerves might stand the announcement. Nevertheless it is clear that we never yet have ascertained what is the limit of the coal-mines in England. I do not know that any man can make even a probable conjecture.

But not only is labour the law of our state, it is also the law of our development—it is the law of the development of mind and body. Just as labour cultivates the earth, so labour cultivates and civilises man. I do not know whether those who hear me are familiar with the book of Mr. Pritchard, published some years ago, on Man. The first chapter contains a contrast which I always thought both just and striking, proving what I say. He says: 'Who could ever imagine that a boshman sitting in a hole of the earth, and watching for spiders as his daily food, was of the same race as the civilised and cultured Englishman whom we see in the streets of London?' I have shown that the soil of England in King John's time, as compared with the soil of England in the time of Queen Victoria, represents the same law of advancement. Now what has been the cause of this? Call it education, call it civilisation, if you like; it is, after all, labour bestowed upon ourselves — self-culture, self-improvement — that for which, I suppose, all Mechanics' Institutes were formed.

But, further than this, labour is the condition of all invention. I quoted before a very expressive sentence, that 'in the dim morning of society Labour was up and stirring before Capital was awake;' I may say that not only in the 'dim morning,' but through the noontide of society, mind must be up and stirring before labour is awake. For mind must precede labour; and the whole history of inventions of every form, scientific and social, all show this law, that mind carries the light before the hand—mind goes first, and labour follows. I need not dwell upon this, because it is a

truism. Nevertheless an illustration or two may show more clearly what I mean. Between the intelligence and the hand there is a correspondence so delicate, so minute, that it bears one of the strongest evidences of the wisdom of our Maker. The versatility of the mind in its operations can never be measured; nevertheless the flexibility of the hand is such that it corresponds with the versatility of the mind. The man who in the dim morning of society made a flint knife had a hard labour to execute works of skill. The man who succeeding him had a Sheffield blade could do perhaps a thousand operations which the flint knife could not accomplish. Now we read that in the time of Edward III. a tax was laid upon the property of England for a war against France, and in Colchester, at that day one of the largest towns, a tax was laid upon all property. The names of all the tradesmen, artificers, and residents were taken down, with the value and description of their property, and I think the whole amount came to something like 3000*l.* or 4000*l.*; and yet Colchester was then about the tenth town of importance in England. There was a carpenter in the town, whose whole stock-in-trade was taxed, and the value of his implements and tools was put down at one shilling. We will not calculate the difference of the value in money; he possessed two axes, one adze, a square, and a naviger for making wheels. Supposing that this carpenter, who was far beyond the man with only a Sheffield blade, and still farther beyond the man with the flint knife only, were to find himself in such a shop as Holtzapffel's in Long Acre, and were to see himself surrounded with

planes and bevel planes and finisters and centre-bits, and I know not what, he would believe that he had got into a magician's palace, or that he himself had a hundred hands, and every one of those hands had a hundred operations: that is to say, mechanical instruments give to the intelligence an outlet, arm it with power, invest it with a variety and a tact and a delicacy of execution, so great that we can set no limit to its capacity.

Next, labour with invention is the condition of all creation. I should like to know—if the Mayor of Leeds, who is the highest authority here, will tell me—how many hands were employed in making a yard of cloth when cloth was sold upon the bridge? Compare it with the number of hands employed in making a yard of cloth now, when we are seated here in the Mechanics' Institute. The other day I made a calculation on this point. You will find in the little book to which I have already referred, and from which, if there be anything that I am saying worthy of your hearing, I may confess it is in most part derived—that there must be now some five-and-twenty operations before ever we get a coat of Leeds cloth on our back. I will throw out the farmer, and the factor, and the shipper, and the carrier, until we get the wool into Leeds: and I then find certain operations which were to me occult and mysterious, the very names of which I had never heard before, and cannot even now understand, but I have no doubt to practised ears I shall only be speaking words of a most familiar language. I find there were sorters and scourers and dyers and carders and slubbers and spinners; and that there was warping and weaving and burling

and muling and dressing and gigging and brushing and singeing and friezing, as I suppose it ought to be, and drawing—that is to say, sixteen distinct skilful operations. Invention has separated the tangled skein of labour, and has thrown off separate threads into a multitude of hands—these operations have become finer and finer and continually more perfect by that operation. I suppose that I ought to add that the calculation says there are still five-and-twenty thousand stitches before the coat is put on our back; and this too shows how minutely labour is subdivided, and how in that minuteness of labour perfection is ever advancing.

Well, further than this, I have already said I can remember the time of what were called the Swing riots. I daresay in the North of England the fame of Swing may not be so familiar as it is to me, who have lived all my life in the South; but I remember well at that time I was living in the county of Kent, and night after night I saw the horizon red with the burning of threshing-machines and of rick-yards. Madness had been infused into the minds of our simple agricultural population. They believed that machinery was their ruin. We have now happily, and I think through the action of Mechanics' Institutes more than any other agency, come to a period when our whole population, agricultural and manufacturing, recognise that the advancement and multiplication of machinery is the greatest aid to them in creating labour. In order to give the simplest proof of this—if proof be needed, and from your response I see it cannot be—I will mention one or two facts which may not be familiar to some who

hear me. Until the other day they were not familiar to myself. First of all, in the last century, inventions followed one another in a rapid succession. As you are well aware, in 1743 the fly-shuttle was invented; in 1769 the son of the inventor constructed what is called the drop-box; in 1767 came the spinning-jenny, in 1769 the water-frame, in 1779 the two were combined into the mule, in 1813 the power-loom followed; in 1765 the steam-engine had been completed, in 1811 steam was applied to ships, and in 1824 it was applied to railroads. That is to say, taking only one line of invention—that which applies to the manufacture of cotton and wool—this extraordinary advancement in machinery was attained in two-and-twenty years. Then the power of locomotion by land and by sea was added. Now what was the effect of this? At first sight it might have been supposed that it would have thrown out of employment a vast number of hands.

M. Say, the French political economist, in his complete Course of Political Economy, states, upon the authority of an English manufacturer of fifty years' experience, that in ten years after the introduction of the machines the people employed in the trade—spinners and weavers—were more than forty times as many as when the spinning was done by hand. According to a calculation made in 1825, it appears that the power of 20,000 horses was employed in the spinning of cotton, and that the power of each horse yielded, with the aid of machinery, as much yarn as 1066 persons could produce by hand. But if this calculation be correct—and there is no reason to doubt it—the spinning machinery

of Lancashire alone produced in 1825 as much yarn as would have required 21,302,000 persons to produce with the distaff and spindle. In order to bring down our calculation to a nearer time, I find in Mr. Brassey's most interesting address on wages the other day, before the Social Science Association at Norwich, this statement: he says: 'Messrs. Bridges & Holmes estimate that the proportion of spindles in 1833 [eight years later than the date I have quoted] was 112 to each hand, while the corresponding number at the present day would be 517. The speed of the mule has been so much increased that more stretches are now made in ten and a half hours than formerly in twelve. In 1848 a woman would have had only two looms; now she will attend to four. The speed of the power-loom in 1833 varied between 90 and 112; it now varies between 170 and 200 picks in a minute.'[1] The great Pyramid in Egypt is one of the mechanical wonders of the world, and we have no certain knowledge of the mechanism by which the stone was lifted into its place from the quarry, but we have one mode of estimating the amount of labour that was employed on it. The Egyptians, according to Herodotus, hated the memory of the kings who built the Pyramids, and he tells us that the great Pyramid occupied 100,000 men for twenty years in its erection. Now it has been calculated that the steam-engines of England, worked by 36,000 men, would raise the same quantity of stones from the quarry and elevate them to the same height as the great Pyramid in eighteen hours. If this be so, it seems to be a proof

[1] *Wages in* 1873, p. 39. By Thos. Brassey, M.P. (Longmans, 1873).

that while labour has been advancing, skill has been developing, invention has been increasing, and the creation of every kind of capital has been augmented beyond anything we could have conceived. So that there has been a perpetual accumulation of muscular power, of mental power, of manual power, and of mechanical power; and this is the true capital of our country, not money alone.

Let us, then, enlarge our idea of capital, and take into that conception all that I have enumerated—the muscular and mental and manual and mechanical power which has been created by labour. Therefore, as I said before, I claim for the man that can only bring to the field of labour his strength without skill, as well as the man that brings his strength with a half skill, or with a complete skill, or with a scientific industry—I claim for them all the name of honest labourers; and I believe that if they be honest—that is, mentally and morally exerting their power for their own good and the good of their neighbour—they are entitled to all respect for the dignity of their state and of their work. And I cannot better express what I mean than in these words, which I find also quoted by Mr. Brassey, and his selection of them shows how he sympathised in what I am saying. Quoting some words of Mr. Ruskin, who has written lately with great sympathy for working men, and for all who are engaged in labour, Mr. Brassey says that 'there is one thing necessary for us all, and that is "reverence."'

I know nothing that is more undignified than for a man to think there is nobody of higher stature, morally

or intellectually, than himself. The smallest man on earth is the man who thinks there is nobody greater than himself. A man who is able to lift up his eyes to excellence wherever he finds it, and who has an honest and earnest admiration for it, without a spark of jealousy and without a particle of envy—I think that man is worthy of the name of a true labourer. 'Now,' Mr. Ruskin says, 'this is the thing which I know, and which if you labour people usually know also, that in reverence is the chief power and joy of life; reverence for what is pure and bright in your own youth, for what is true and tried in the age of others, for all that is gracious among the living, and great among the dead, and marvellous in the powers that cannot die.'[2]

II. I will turn now to the other part of my thesis; that is, to the rights of labour. I am not going to be communistic, and I have no will to be revolutionary. Adam Smith says, 'The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property.' Therefore, first of all, I claim for labour the rights of property. There is no personal property so strictly one's own. It is altogether and entirely personal. The strength and skill that are in a man are as much his own as his life-

[2] *Wages in* 1873, p. 53. By Thos. Brassey, M.P. (Longmans, 1873).

blood; and that skill and strength which he has as his personal property no man may control. He has this property in him. Lawyers say a man's will is ambulatory, that is, it travels with him all over the world. So the working man carries this property with him as ready money. He can buy with it, and he can sell it. He can exchange it. He may set a price on it. And this ready money which he carries with him, he may carry to every market all over the world; and, what is more, he will not be impeded by any foreign currency. No coins, no difficult calculations, decimal or otherwise, obstruct his exchange with other nations of the world. And further, in one sense it is inexhaustible, except that we all have limits and dimensions, and our strength and skill are bounded by what we are. But there it is, perennial, going on always through his life till old age diminishes it; then what remains in him is to be honoured with a reverence of which I spoke just now. Shakespeare gives an account of what a true labourer is in this way. He says in *As You Like It*, and puts it into the mouth of a labourer, 'I am a true labourer; I earn that I eat, get that I wear; owe no man hate, envy no man's happiness; glad of other men's good, content with my harm.' Well, then, I claim for labour (and the skill which is always acquired by labour) the rights of capital. It is capital in the truest sense. Now our Saxon ancestors used to call what we call cattle 'live money;' and we are told that what we call chattels, and cattle, and the Latin word '*capita*,' are one and the same thing; that is, 'heads' of cattle, or workers or serfs. This was 'live money.' And so is the labour,

the strength, and the skill in the honest workman 'live money.' It is capital laid up in him; and that capital is the condition of production. For capital which is in money, which I will call dead capital, or dead money, receives its life from the living power and skill of the labourer. These two must be united. The capital of money and the capital of strength and of skill must be united together, or we can have no production and no progress. And therefore 'labour and capital must,' as the book I quoted from before puts it, 'ride on the same horse;' and that book says, in a sort of mother-wit way, that 'when two men ride on a horse, one must ride behind.' It says that capital rides before. Well, now, if they cannot ride side by side, they ought to walk hand in hand. Whatever rights, then, capital possesses, labour possesses.

Once more: labour has a right of liberty. We read in Columella, who wrote a book on Roman agriculture in the first century of our era, that the soil all around Rome became so sterile, barren, and unproductive, and year after year so perceptibly lost its fertility, that the philosophers of Rome accounted for it by saying that the earth was growing old. We do not find that England has grown old, as comparing King John's time with our own. But the secret of this diminution in its productiveness was very easily discovered. It was cultivated by slaves; and slave labour is labour without a heart, it is labour without a will. It is not the strength of the arm, but it is the vigour of the will that makes the axe ring upon the root of a tree. Every labourer has a right to work or not to work. If he refuses to

work, as an idler there is an old law which says, 'If a man will not work, neither let him eat.'[3] That law has never been repealed. And the same law says that 'The labourer is worthy of his hire;'[4] and I am happy to say that law still stands in the sacred statute-book. Well, a labourer has a right to determine for whom he will work and where he will work. I do not mean in any capricious and extortionate way, but he must be first and last the judge and the controller of his own life, and he must pay the penalty if he abuses that freedom. This carries with it also the right to say whether he can subsist upon certain wages. This is undeniable. He may set too high a price upon his labour, but then he will pay the penalty. No man can appraise it for him. Another man may offer him his wages, and if he is not content he may refuse it. He cannot say, 'You shall work.' Well, now, in England serfdom lasted until the fourteenth century, and I have no doubt that serfdom was one of the reasons why the fertility of England was not what it is now;—one, I say, for I do not forget capital, skill, and science. Serfdom died out under the benign action of Christianity. Then for many centuries there existed a state of labour in this country which, though it was free in one sense, was not altogether free in another. It was under certain social circumscriptions which limited the freedom of the labourer—the old law of settlement and the like, into which I will not enter. At the present time the labour of Englishmen is, I may say, as free as the air. They may go where they will; they may labour where they

[3] 2 Thess. iii. 10. [4] S. Luke x. 7.

will; they may labour for whom they will; they may labour for what they can obtain; they may even refuse to labour. This again is undeniable. I do not see how anybody can deny this without denying a right which belongs both to property and to capital.

Let me here enter a protest, though I have no doubt you do not need it. I have said it before, in Manchester, some years ago; and I cannot help saying it again in Leeds. There are some people who are trying to force into the mouths of Englishmen a very long word—the *proletariat*. I have no doubt you have all heard it and all read it. When I see it in a book, I suspect the book at once. When a man says it to me, I doubt whether he is an Englishman. Our old mother-tongue has a great many more monosyllables than polysyllables in it, and I love it all the more for that, for I think our old Saxon monosyllables have the strength of a strong race in them. Now I had ten thousand times rather be called a working man than a *prolétaire*. I will tell you my reasons against the name of *prolétaire*. It is pedantry; it is paganism; it is false; and it is an indignity to the working man. It is pedantry, because it was dug up out of the old Roman law by certain French writers, chiefly in or about the time of the first French Revolution; and that accounts, perhaps, for its paganism in its revived state, because that was a period very rank with paganism. It is strictly pagan in its origin; it belongs to the Roman civilisation such as it was before the Christian era. But further, it is utterly inapplicable to our present state, and I will tell you why. The population of Rome was distinguished into

classes. There were those that were called in legal phrase *capite censi*, or men told by the head. They were mere numbers; they possessed nothing; they were nothing; they could do nothing; they had two eyes and two hands and two feet, and they were entered in the poll-tax by the tale. These were the lowest of the Roman population. Next to them were the *proletarii*, or men who had homes and families—if you call a home a roof or a shelter where a man could lie down; but they were destitute of property. They had nothing but their children. They could only serve the State by themselves and by their children in military service, or something of that sort. Moreover, they were slaves, or to a great extent they were slaves. They were the greatest of idlers, and the most profligate and the most dependent of the Roman populace. They lived on alms; or, what is worse, they were the followers and the flatterers of those who had anything to give them. Well, now, I ask whether it is not an indignity to English working men to call them *prolétaires?*

Labour has a right not only to its own freedom, but it has a right to protect itself. And now, gentlemen, I know I am treading very near to dangerous ground; nevertheless I will speak as an historian or as a political economist, but certainly not as a demagogue. If you go back to the earliest period of our Saxon history, you will find that there always were associations distinct from the life of the family on the one side and from the State on the other. The family has laws of its own—laws of domestic authority, laws of domestic order, and—I will say, after King Solomon—laws

of very salutary domestic punishment. On the other hand, the State has its public laws, its legislature, and its executive. But between the public and the domestic life there is a wide field of the free action of men and of their mutual contracts, their mutual relations, which are not to be controlled, either, by domestic authority, and cannot be meddled with by the public authority of the State;—I mean the whole order of commerce. Commerce existed as soon as there was the interchange of one thing for another, and these free contracts between man and man—between employer and employed—are as old as civilisation. Clearly, therefore, there is a certain field which must be regulated by a law of its own, by tribunals of its own; and as soon as we begin to trace anything in our Saxon history, we begin to trace the rise of guilds. They were of a religious character at first. Some have thought they were religious only, but that is a mistake; they were also what we should call benefit societies; they were also for protection; they were again for the vindication of liberty from the oppressive jurisdiction of those who held local authority. There were guilds, or gilds, of many kinds—some were called 'frith-gilds,' and others were called 'craft-gilds,' and these craft-gilds were composed of masters and of men—of employers and of employed.

In all the history of civilisation, if you go back to the Greeks or to the Romans, you find that trades and professions always had their societies and fellowships by which they were united together. It seems to me that this is a sound and legitimate social law. I can conceive nothing more entirely in accordance with

natural right and with the higher jurisprudence, than that those who have one common interest should unite together for the promotion of that interest. I hope to show before I have done that this has always been a principle of the most solid civil and political order, and it is that with which I am now concerned. To tell the truth, the Leeds Mechanics' Institute, as described to me by its excellent President before I came here, appears to me to be a 'craft-gild;' for, as I understand, there are in it both employers and employed—there are both capitalists who hold what I have called the dead money, and there are capitalists who hold the live money—and therefore you are united in a common interest. You seem to me, if 'craft-gilds' are dangerous bodies, to be a very dangerous body. Well, the whole of our social order in England springs from organisations of this sort. First of all, let me refer you to a book which I can only name, because I heard the clock just now, and though I was kindly told that I might have a large margin, for very shame I should not venture to go up to the frontier that was assigned to me. Therefore all that I can do will be to refer to a book by Brentano, a Bavarian writer, on the history of craft-gilds, tracing them down to present associations of trades in various kinds; and I confess that book took out of my mind entirely the erroneous conception which in some degree I had formed, that such associations have anything about them which is not perfectly innocuous if they are rightly conducted. Only let us remember this one fact. All the great mercantile cities of England are little more than the aggregation of these gilds. In

Norwich there were 12; and that was when as yet Leeds was nothing. In King's Lynn there were 12; in Bishop's Lynn there were 9; in Cologne there were 80; in Lubeck there were 70; in Hamburg there were 100; in London there were 70; and, as I think I can show, London itself is the greatest example of an aggregation of craft-gilds, for, as Brentano says, 'The oldest reliable and detailed accounts which we have of gilds come from England. They consist of free gild statutes. The drawing up of these statutes took place in England in the beginning of the eleventh century. In the case of one of these gilds, there is no doubt whatever as to the accuracy of this date. This gild was founded and richly endowed by Orcy, a friend of Canute the Great, at Abbotsbury.'[5] He says again, 'The forbiddance of gilds in the Frankish Empire, for abroad they were not well regarded, could only be justified from certain motives relating to their mode of being conducted; but from England we hear nothing whatever of any evil in these gilds.'[6] 'It appears that Englishmen at all times knew better than Continentals how to maintain their right of free and independent action, and their Government seems to have known, even at that time, how to make use in an excellent manner, and in the interest of public order, of organisations freely created by the people.' At Canterbury a gild following the same ends stood at that time at the head of the city, whilst two others existed by the side of it. There are also accounts of a 'Gildhall' at Dover, from which a craft-gild may be inferred; and charters of a somewhat later time frequently mention

[5] *Brentano on Gilds*, p. 1 (Trübner, 1870). [6] Id. p. 15.

many other gilds besides these as having been long in existence. The organisation of the gilds was thus, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, not only completed, but probably already widely extended amongst the Anglo-Saxons, who even recognised all their ordinances, or at least permitted them, in legislation. The gilds enjoyed already such authority in England that their agreements bound even non-members, and town constitutions were already developing themselves from them. I may say, in passing, that York at that time had three and Beverley had four. As an example of what they were, here is a curious extract from the gild of Killingham in Lincolnshire: 'If a brother or a sister is unlucky enough to lose a beast worth half a merk, every brother and every sister shall give a halfpenny towards getting another beast. If the house of any brother or sister is burned by mishap, every brother and every sister shall give a halfpenny towards a new house.'[7] Brentano then goes on, but I must not venture to give you all the matter which I have before me. He says that a much higher degree of development comes in with the amalgamated gilds. These amalgamated gilds had each grown up distinctly and separately; then they were amalgamated together. 'The fact of London preceding other places in this development presents no difficulty, since England must be regarded as the birthplace of gilds, and London, perhaps, as their cradle. At least there is documentary evidence that the constitution of the city was based upon a gild, and it served as a model for other English towns. According to the *Judicia*

[7] *Toulmin Smith on English Gilds*, p. 185.

Civitatis Lundoniæ of the time of King Athelstane, the frith-gilds of London united to form one gild, that they might carry out their aims more vigorously. This London gild governed the town, as is proved by the fact that their regulations bound even non-members. The occasion of this union was, perhaps, that here, as afterwards in other places, other gilds had gradually been formed at the side of the original old gild, and the rivalries between the old and the new prejudiced the objects of the gilds—the protection of freedom and of right.' Brentano shows that 'a similar union took place three centuries later at Berwick-on-Tweed in the year 1283-4. The townsmen of Berwick agreed upon the statute of a single united gild, that where many bodies are found side by side in one place, they may become one and have one weal, and in dealings of one with another have a strong and hearty love.'[8] Now London at this moment has, I think, some 73 or 74 liveries or companies, which are strictly the old traditional gilds surviving to this day. The Lord Mayor of London invites them to a great banquet once a year, and they are solemnly introduced to him with all the ceremonies of the City of London, as representing the original gilds.

From this it would seem to me to follow that the protection of labour and of industry has at all times been a recognised right of those who possess the same craft: that they have united together; that those unions have been recognised by the legislature; that whether they be employers or employed; whether they

[8] *Brentano*, p. 35.

possess the dead capital or the live capital—the dead money or the live money—all have the same rights. And I do not see, I confess, why all men should not organise themselves together, so long as they are truly and honestly submissive to one higher and chief, who is superior over us all—the supreme reign of law which has governed, at all times, the people of England. There is a passage of great interest quoted in this same book. I verified it, lest there should be any inaccuracy on the part of a foreign writer, and I found it entirely correct. At a time in the early part, I think, of this century, or at the close of the last, when there was great suffering at Nottingham, when the stocking-weavers were under severe depression, and there were very painful and hostile conflicts between the employed and the employer, Mr. Pitt said in the House of Commons, 'The time will come when manufactures will have been so long established, and the operatives not having any other business to flee to, that it will be in the power of any one man in a town to reduce the wages; and all the other manufacturers must follow. Then, when you are goaded with reductions and willing to flee your country, France and America will receive you with open arms; and then farewell to our commercial state. If ever it does arrive to this pitch, Parliament (if it be not then sitting) ought to be called together, and if it cannot redress your grievances, its power is at an end. Tell me not that Parliament cannot; it is omnipotent to protect.'[9] I think it remarkable that Mr. Pitt at that

[9] Pitt's Speech on the Arbitration Act, quoted in vol. xxiii. p. 1091, *Hansard*.

day should have foreseen the questions which are before us at this moment; but it is not remarkable that he should have had the statesmanlike prudence of seeing that the remedy lies in the supreme control and protection of the law.

I am now, I fear, going to utter a politico-economical heresy. I have great respect for Political Economy. I entirely believe—as you may have seen—in the law of supply and demand and free exchange and safety of capital, which are the first conditions of industry; but there is one point on which I am sorry to say I am a very lame political economist, and I cannot keep pace with others. I find political economists denouncing all interference, as they call it, of Parliament with the supply and demand in any form of any article whatsoever. They argue that as a reduction of the price of bread gives the poor more food, and as the reduction of the price of cloth gives the poor more clothing, so the reduction of the price of intoxicating drink gives the poor a greater abundance of comfort. Now, gentlemen, I do not introduce this for the purpose of giving any expression on the Permissive Bill. I have done that at other times and elsewhere; this is not the place for it, neither was I invited for this purpose. But I give that instance to show that the principle of free-trade is not applicable to everything. Why is it not applicable? Because it is met and checked by a moral condition. There is no moral condition checking the multiplication of food and the multiplication of clothing—the multiplication of almost every article of life which is not easily susceptible of an abuse fatal to

men and to society. Well, now I am afraid I am going to tread upon difficult ground, but I must do so. I am one of those—which is of no importance, but Mr. Brassey is also one of those, and that is of a great deal more—who are of opinion that the hours of labour must be further regulated by law. I know the difficulty of the subject; but I say the application of unchecked political economy to the hours of labour must be met and checked by a moral condition.

If the great end of life were to multiply yards of cloth and cotton twist, and if the glory of England consists or consisted in multiplying, without stint or limit, these articles and the like at the lowest possible price, so as to undersell all the nations of the world, well, then, let us go on. But if the domestic life of the people be vital above all; if the peace, the purity of homes, the education of children, the duties of wives and mothers, the duties of husbands and of fathers, be written in the natural law of mankind, and if these things are sacred, far beyond anything that can be sold in the market,—then I say, if the hours of labour resulting from the unregulated sale of a man's strength and skill shall lead to the destruction of domestic life, to the neglect of children, to turning wives and mothers into living machines, and of fathers and husbands into —what shall I say?—creatures of burden—I will not use any other word—who rise up before the sun, and come back when it is set, wearied and able only to take food and to lie down to rest,—the domestic life of men exists no longer, and we dare not go on in this path. I am not going to attempt a prescription—I should fail

if I were to attempt to practise in an art which is not my own—but this I will say: Parliament has done it already. Parliament, at the instance of Lord Ashley, now Lord Shaftesbury, whom all men honour for his life of charity, has set the precedent. Lord Shaftesbury, about the year 1834-5, as I remember, obtained a committee, by which he brought to light—he unearthed and brought on the surface of the earth, under the light of the sun—all that was hidden in the mines, and Parliament forbade the employment of the labour of women and of children. Parliament has again and again interposed to forbid the employment of children in factories before a certain age. In some they cannot be employed as whole-timers till after eleven years of age; in others not until after fourteen years of age; in agricultural labour not before ten years of age. Parliament has interposed over and over again with the freedom of labour. More than this; Parliament has interposed to prevent fathers and mothers from selling the labour of their children. It has forbidden it, and Mr. Walpole, the other day, extended to other trades the Acts by which the employment of children in certain noxious trades is limited or forbidden altogether. It has forbidden even the parents themselves to employ their children in those trades. They may not use the labour of their own children, to enrich themselves, if the employment of that labour be injurious to the child. Do not let it be said, therefore, that Parliament has not interposed in the question of labour, and in the question of the hours of labour. I will ask, is it possible for a child to be educated who

becomes a full-timer at ten or even twelve years of age? Is it possible for a child in the agricultural districts to be educated who may be sent out into the fields at nine? I will ask, can a woman be the mother and head of a family who works sixty hours a week? You may know better than I, but bear with me if I say I do not understand how a woman can train her children in the hours after they come home from school if she works all day in a factory. The children come home at four and five in the afternoon; there is no mother in the house. I do not know how she can either clothe them or train them or watch over them, when her time is given to labour for sixty hours a week. I know I am treading upon a very difficult subject, but I feel confident of this, that we must face it, and that we must face it calmly, justly, and with a willingness to put labour and the profits of labour second—the moral state and the domestic life of the whole working population first. I will not venture to draw up such an Act of Parliament further than to lay down this principle.

I saw in my early days a good deal of what the homes of agricultural labourers were. With all their poverty, they were often very beautiful. I have seen cottages with cottage-gardens, and with a scanty but bright furniture, a hearth glowing with peat, and children playing at the door; poverty was indeed everywhere, but happiness everywhere too. Well, I hope this may still be found in the agricultural districts. What may be the homes in our great manufacturing towns I do not know, but the homes of the poor in London are often very miserable. The state of the houses—families

living in single rooms, sometimes many families in one room, a corner apiece. These things cannot go on; these things ought not to go on. The accumulation of wealth in the land, the piling up of wealth like mountains, in the possession of classes or of individuals, cannot go on, if these moral conditions of our people are not healed. No Commonwealth can rest on such foundations.

I have endeavoured to draw out before you what is the dignity of labour. It is the law of our state, the law of our development and perfection, the source of invention, the power of creation and the cause of manifold capital in money and in skill. And as to its rights, I have shown that it is true property, true capital; that it has a primary right of freedom, a right to protect itself, and a claim upon the law of the land to protect it. I will only add that there can be nothing in a working man undignified unless he be himself the cause of it. Forgive me if I use a very common proverb, and if I make another like it: 'An idle man is the devil's playfellow;' and 'An intemperate man is the devil's slave.' As to the rights, I know nothing that can ever limit the rights of a working man excepting his committing wrong. If he commits wrong, the strong may retaliate; if he does no wrong, the supreme power of law will protect him.

Now, gentlemen, I have detained you a great deal longer than I ought—a great deal longer than I intended. I will therefore bring what I have said to an end.

I said at first that I should claim for those that

labour with the head a share with those who labour with the hand. Without brain-work where would have been all the inventions which have created our new continents of toil—our new worlds of industry? And the brain-work, how long, how continuous, how exhausting it has been before it has reached its end. How many have been worn out by it in the search after some invention which they never found: but though they died in disappointment, they laid the trains of the discovery for those who came after them. It was well said by a writer of the last century, 'We cannot reasonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected.' The intelligence of a country does not rise like the peaks of mountains, nor like Artesian wells, in isolated spots. The intelligence of a country rises equably all over the surface, like the waters of a lake. The cultivation of science in its highest ranges enriches the lowest valleys and plains of labour. The science of Davy gave the safety-lamp to mines; the chemistry of Liebnitz has multiplied the fertility of our fields. And it is not only astronomy that helps the clothiers of Leeds, but ethics; and in morals I ought to have my say, but at the beginning, not at the end, of an evening; and therefore with ethics I will conclude. The science of morals rests on four foundations—on prudence, which guides the intellect; on justice, which guides the will; on temperance, which governs the passions; and on fortitude, which sustains the whole man in the guidance and government of himself. These four cardinal virtues of the natural order

perfect the character of man; and to-night I am not speaking in any other sense. They underlie all the dignity of man, and they justify all his rights. The labourer in our common field of toil who is prudent, just, temperate, and brave is indeed 'a workman that needeth not to be ashamed.'[10]

[10] 2 Tim. ii. 15.

XVI.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

WRITTEN BY REQUEST FOR THE 'DAILY TELEGRAPH' NEWSPAPER, 1873.

IN no other land has the Catholic Church been subjected to so many or to so great vicissitudes as in England. It has been twice swept away, and it has been twice restored. The Christianity of to-day has no continuity from the Roman and British Christianity of England. It dates from S. Augustin of Canterbury, from whose mission sprang the faith and the hierarchy of Saxon England. But the Catholic Church in England at this day does not possess the dioceses or the parishes, the cathedrals or the parish churches, or the lands, or any part of the ecclesiastical order which sprang from our Saxon forefathers, and was perfected by their Norman and English successors. It has no continuity with the vast and noble material system wherewith the Catholic Church in England invested itself down to the sixteenth century of our history. From that date the Catholic and Roman faith and Church were once more all but swept away. It was for at least two generations without churches or bishops—a handful of priests ministered to a remnant of Catholics, the number of whom at the end of the last century was supposed to amount to thirty thousand. At the beginning of the seventeenth century its chief authority was

an arch-priest; after a while he was succeeded by a single vicar-apostolic. Later on a second was appointed; afterwards the number was increased to four, in more recent times to eight; and in the year 1850 a Hierarchy of one metropolitan and twelve suffragans was restored to England.

Although the Catholic and Roman Church in England has no material continuity with the structures which it raised, and the possessions which it held, down to the sixteenth century, nevertheless its spiritual continuity is unbroken. The lineage of its Catholic laity has never been extinct; the succession of its priesthood has never ceased; the direct jurisdiction of the Head of the Church supplied its supreme pastoral authority until the ordinary jurisdiction of its Episcopate was once more restored. In its faith and doctrine, jurisdiction and discipline, in its sacraments and worship, it is identical with the Church of S. Augustine of Canterbury. It presents at this hour the living image which the Venerable Bede describes in his *History of the English Nation*. It celebrates at this day every year the festivals of S. Augustine, S. David, S. Chad, S. Cuthbert, S. Swithun, S. Wilfrid, S. Alphege, the martyred Archbishop of Canterbury, S. Edmund, King and Martyr, S. Edward, King and Confessor, S. Edmund of Canterbury, S. Richard of Chichester, S. Hugh of Lincoln, S. Thomas of Hereford, S. Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury and Martyr for the liberties of England; and a multitude of other saints of Saxon and royal blood, whose names, elsewhere forgotten, are commemorated in the festivals and prayers of an

unbroken tradition of 1200 years. We lament, indeed, the loss of our noble inheritance of the English people, which, next after the inheritance of unity with the Church throughout the world, is dearest to our hearts.

Such vicissitudes as these have never passed over any other portion of the Church. The Church of Ireland, from S. Patrick to this day, abides in all its changeless identity and unbroken traditions of faith and jurisdiction the Church of the people. The Churches of Africa have indeed been swept away, but they have never been restored. The Church in Spain was for a time clouded by Arianism, but never ceased to exist, and was soon cleansed of its stain. Twice to the eyes of men extinct, and twice restored, the Catholic faith and Church in England exist full and complete at this day.

It is eminently and visibly the Church of the poor. Although, indeed, the lineage of a few great historic names binds the Catholic Church indissolubly to all classes of our English monarchy, nine-tenths of its flock in England are amongst the poorest of the land.

For the last forty years its churches have been open to the English people; they have habitually frequented them, they have been present at its worship, they have heard its instructions, they have become familiar with its members. The fears and the terrors of ignorance and prejudice and hostile misrepresentation have given way, not before the refutations of controversy, but before the plain dictates of honest common sense, founded on what men have seen and heard for themselves. The Catholic Church

at this day has once more entered fully into the public and private life of England. It takes its place amongst the public institutions of the land. It bears its part in all public works of education, of charity, and of utility. Its beneficent action is acknowledged even by those who have least sympathy with it.

The statistics of the Catholic Church in England are as follows:

1. The Hierarchy, consisting of an archbishop and 12 suffragan bishops.

2. Thirteen cathedral chapters, consisting each of a provost and 10 canons.

3. Thirteen dioceses, with 1621 clergy.

4. Churches, chapels, and 'stations,' 1016.

5. Greater colleges, 6.

6. Lesser colleges, 10.

7. Schools for the middle class and poor: in London, 200; in the rest of England, about 800.

8. Of the convents about ten are of the contemplative life; and all others of every kind of active charity: chiefly for education in every grade, but, above all, of the poor; for nursing the sick, for penitentiaries, for reformatories, for orphanages, for asylums and homes of every sort.

9. The number of Catholics in England and Wales, by every test at our command, of baptisms, &c., may be put at about a million and a half.

The disinheritance of the Catholic Church in England, by the cruelty of the sixteenth century, was so complete that no religious body in the land subsists more strictly upon the voluntary principle. Its

churches and schools have been entirely built by the offerings of its people. Its bishops and clergy are in like manner almost altogether, and in great part are wholly, dependent on the alms of their flock. It may be said, with truth, that a very large part of the clergy subsists chiefly on the offerings of each Sunday. With the exception of the larger churches in cities and towns, the greater part of the missions or parishes have an income less than their outgoings; nevertheless the generosity of the people and the good providence of God make up the balance from year to year. No religious body in England subsists more habitually on trust in the providence of God; and this state of poverty has the best and the deepest effects both on the clergy and on the people. It binds them together in the closest confidence and charity. It makes them feel that all the works of the Church are their common duty and their common interest. The authority and the independence of the clergy are not diminished in a jot or a tittle: by reason of the instincts of their faith the people recognise the office of their priests; and the clergy are united with their people by every bond of gratitude and affection. Neither the priest nor the people would exchange this mutual service in spiritual and temporal things for the richest endowments of the State.

It is hardly necessary to say what is the faith of the Catholic Church, and upon what it rests; but the present outline would not correspond with that which was given some weeks ago in the columns of the *Daily Telegraph* concerning the Established Church if this topic

were wholly omitted. The faith, then, of the Catholic Church is that which has been held from the beginning throughout the universal Church—namely, the whole revelation of God, as it is preserved, and proposed to our belief, by His perpetual Divine assistance through the Church of Jesus Christ. The revelation of Christianity was given whole and complete, and was both preached and believed throughout the world, before the Scriptures of the New Testament were written. It was therefore anterior to the New Testament Scriptures and independent of them. They presuppose it throughout; they reflect the greater part of it; they are a corroborative proof of its truth; but the New Testament Scriptures themselves depend upon the same witness which guards and delivers to us the whole revelation. The Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ, compacted and inhabited by the Holy Spirit of God, spread throughout the world by the Apostles, is the living witness of the Incarnation, and of the doctrines, and of the commandments of the Redeemer of the world. The Church is the guardian and the keeper of the New Testament Scriptures; it is the ultimate and only competent witness of the authenticity, genuineness, number, and meaning of the books: and in its guardianship, both of the revelation it originally received, and of the books in which that revelation was subsequently in great part recorded, the Church is not only the highest human and historical witness, but a witness of supernatural authority, guided by a Divine assistance. To Catholics, therefore, the voice and authority of the Church are the voice and authority of its Divine Head,

according to the promise of the Divine Founder, 'He that heareth you heareth Me;' which promise would be falsified if the teaching of the Church were not identical with the teaching of Jesus Christ. It is this continuous and unbroken authority which identifies the Catholic faith in England at this day with the faith which S. Augustine of Canterbury taught; and it is this which identifies the Catholic faith of England with that of the Catholic Church throughout the world. It is this immutable voice which has spoken through the nineteen successive Œcumenical Councils. To this in the Council of Trent all Catholics rendered the obedience of faith; and to this in the Council of the Vatican the whole Church throughout the world, both pastors and people, renders the same obedience. The first eighteen Councils of the Church condemned particular errors, and defined particular doctrines of revelation; the Council of the Vatican defined the principle of Divine authority upon which the custody and announcement of the whole revelation of faith depend. The former Councils defined *what* we believe; the Vatican Council defined *the motive* why we believe it. It is to the doctrines of faith what the keystone is to the arch.

The world external to the Catholic Church was led to believe that the Vatican Council was divided, and would be followed by divisions. Every Council of the Church has been more or less divided by vivid discussions: witness the Arians at Nicea, the Monophysites at Chalcedon, the Nationalist parties at Constance. Few Councils have had less of internal difference than the Council of the Vatican. There was but one point of

difference of any moment; and that was not as to truth, but as to the opportuneness of defining it. Every Council has been followed by divisions. Witness again the Arian schism after the Council of Nicea, and above all the Protestant separations after the Council of Trent. What divisions have followed after the Council of the Vatican? A handful of persons, most of whom were already known to be of alienated minds, have since declared themselves, and have misled some hundreds of persons here and there in Germany, and drawn to themselves the encouragement and sympathy of a certain number of Protestants of various kinds. Thus much is said here because of the studious and sustained endeavours to make men believe that within the Catholic Church, abroad and in England, there are divisions like those which prevail elsewhere. Divisions in opinion there may be, for in opinion Catholics are as free as air. But divisions in faith there cannot be; because the motive of faith in all Catholics is one and the same—the Divine and immutable witness and authority of the Church. This internal unity is nowhere to be seen in more conspicuous relief than in the Catholic Church in England, in Ireland, in the colonies, and in the United States, where the most unrestrained liberty in opinion coexists with the most absolute unity of faith. It is, indeed, in these countries of unbounded religious liberty that Ultramontanism is to be found in its fullest strength.

Of the Catholic Church in Scotland it may be well to add a few words. The Hierarchy in Scotland was extinguished by the political events of the time about

the year 1603; and then, for two or three generations afterwards, the Catholics of Scotland were without a succession of bishops. The first Scottish vicariate was founded in 1694. Subsequently, in 1731, Scotland was divided into two districts, the Lowland and the Highland; and finally into three, in 1827, namely, Eastern, Western, and Northern, which continue to this day. A considerable number of Catholics have always maintained the succession of the faith in the Highlands and the Western Highlands. The history of their sufferings has many a dark page for Scotland. In one of the highest flats of one of the oldest houses of the wynds of Edinburgh there was to be seen, until the other day, the name of Mr. Hay indented, but painted over, upon the outer door. Bishop Hay was one of the most energetic and learned of the Vicars-Apostolic of Scotland in the latter part of the last century. The number of Catholics in Scotland has been rapidly increased by communication with the North of Ireland, and by the immigration which the great industries of Scotland have drawn to Greenock, Glasgow, Dundee, and other parts of the country. The number of Catholics in Scotland, so far as it can be ascertained, may be put at between 400,000 and 500,000. The number of priests is over 200, and there are about as many churches, chapels, and 'stations.' Of the colleges, schools, and educational establishments it is not easy to give a detailed statement.

To give any adequate account of the Catholic Church in Ireland at the end of such an article as this is impossible. It would be to write the history of a nation;

for no people in the world have ever been more identified with their faith and with the Church. We have already said, in contrasting the vicissitudes of England with the unbroken Christian traditions of Ireland, that no country in the world, except Rome alone, presents so noble an example of imperishable faith and inflexible constancy. It is the tradition of Ireland that S. Patrick received a Divine promise that he should never lose the people whom God had given him in the ends of the earth; and the unbroken fidelity of the Irish to their faith, not in Ireland alone, but throughout the colonies of the British Empire, and in the great continent of North America, presents an example of immutable perseverance in religion which fully verifies this national tradition. There was a time in the seventeenth century when the whole Catholic population of Ireland was reduced to a remnant—it has been estimated at 80,000—and shut up in the province of Connaught, which, by the Act of 26th September 1653, was 'reserved for the habitation of the Irish nation.' They have multiplied in a ratio beyond the increase of the English and Scotch races, and at this day in Ireland, and throughout the world, they overpass twelve millions. Ireland was never wholly deprived of its bishops and pastors. Its Episcopate, after many sufferings, has been always steadily replenished. It retains to this day its archiepiscopal and episcopal sees, its provinces and dioceses, its entire hierarchical and parochial form in unbroken succession and vitality.

The statistics for the Catholic Church in Ireland are as follows:

1. The Hierarchy consists of 4 archbishops, of whom 2 are primates, and 24 bishops.

2. Twenty-eight dioceses, with 1080 parishes and 3440 priests.

3. The public churches and chapels are 2349.

4. One university, 25 colleges, 116 superior schools, and about 7000 primary schools.

5. The number of Catholics in Ireland, according to the census of 1871, was 4,141,933.

The condition of the Catholic Church in Ireland is so self-evident as to render all further description needless. One only remark may be added. The great act of justice whereby the British Parliament and public opinion of these kingdoms made reparation to the Catholic people of Ireland, by the disestablishment of the Protestant Church, was brought about by two distinct causes—the one, a just and generous repudiation by the non-Catholic population of these kingdoms of the religious injustice and oppression of the last centuries; and the other, the moral power of the Catholic race of Ireland. No people have a higher appreciation of justice in their rulers, as Sir John Davies declared in the midst of their suffering in the seventeenth century; and no people are more loyal when justly dealt with, for no people more truly Christian are to be found.

The attitude of the Catholic Church in England, Scotland, and Ireland, towards all the forms of Christianity which exist around it, is not one of hostility, but of hopefulness. It believes all the Christian doctrines that the separate communions in England believe. It

would fain that they all believed all the Christian doctrines which it believes. It would not diminish one jot or one tittle of the truths which they retain. Its mission is not to pull down, but to build up. Its labour is not to destroy, but to fulfil. It is, in its spirit and in its action, essentially constructive and conservative. It desires that showers of blessing may fall upon England like the early and the latter rain; and that 'the land that was desolate' may rejoice, and that the wilderness may 'flourish like the lily.' Every fresh light that springs up over England is a cause of thankfulness: and a growing light has been visibly descending upon England for three generations. The Catholic Church bears the heart of Him who will not 'break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax.' Its mission is one, first of truth, then of peace, of charity, order, benevolence, and beneficence; and, that these things may be handed down undiminished, it stands inflexibly for the tradition of Christian education, which, from the mission of S. Augustine to this day, has never yet been broken. Its thoughts towards England are thoughts of peace. They who mistrust it do not know the Catholic Church. They who would stir up Englishmen against it, whatever be their intentions, are not the friends of our common country.

XVII.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

PREFACE.

The following paper was not intended for publication at the time it was delivered; and would not have been published in its first rough state, but for circumstances which had been caused without my knowledge. Nevertheless I thought it better to let it go as it then stood.

Since its publication, a great many answers and objections have been made to it from various quarters. I therefore think it well briefly to reply to the more important of them; but as I wish to avoid all appearance of personal controversy, I omit the names of the public journals in which such answers and objections have appeared.

1. I affirmed that wheresoever the civil and spiritual powers have been united in one temporal sovereign, civil despotism and religious persecution have followed.

In answer, it was objected that the state of this country is a refutation.

In the context of the passage objected to, I had expressly precluded this answer: first, by pointing out that civil despotism and religious persecution prevailed in this country for two hundred years; that is, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thereby excluding the present time; secondly, that the reaction against the excessive prerogatives of the Crown and its ecclesias-

tical supremacy had vindicated a complete religious freedom for Scotland, Ireland, and one-half of the people of England.

In the outset of the paper, I referred to a previous Essay read by me before the Academia, from which I insert the following passage as a full reply to the above objection:

'In opening our proceedings of the year before last, I made certain observations on the state and tendency of religious thought in England, and on the temper and spirit in which we ought to meet it. And now, in addressing you at the outset of our eighth year, I do not know that I can do better than to take up the same subject where I left off. In the conclusion of the paper I then read were these words: "The Royal supremacy has perished by the law of mortality, which consumes all earthly things." I need hardly guard my words by saying that I spoke only of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown. The civil and political supremacy was never contested. The power of the Crown, if less absolute in its mode of procedure, was never more supreme and never so widely spread as now. Its indefeasible prerogatives in the order of civil Government have become more evident and irresistible in proportion as it has disengaged itself from the monstrous pretensions of Henry VIII. The theory of established Churches demands an ecclesiastical supremacy in the civil power. The two come and go together; and when the ecclesiastical supremacy is declining, the days of establishments are numbered. In the year before last, I pointed out the fact that the Tudor statutes have almost passed

away. The greater part are actually erased from the Statute-book. Those that remain are almost equally dead. The mind of the country is against them. In Ireland, all the tyranny of Tudors and Stuarts failed to impose the Royal supremacy upon a Catholic people. Penal laws could not accomplish it. The Established Church has not only utterly failed to conciliate the people of Ireland to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown, but it has rendered the name and thing more than ever intolerable.[1] In Scotland, the whole people rose against it. In England, half the population has gradually rejected it. The remaining half of the people passively endure it; but in the Established Church itself, a large class profess to limit the jurisdiction of the Crown in ecclesiastical matters to the temporal accessories of spiritual things, denying altogether its competence to touch any matter purely spiritual, and reject all Royal acts exceeding these limits as abuses or excesses of power. Now, though this theory is manifestly not the law of the land, it is nevertheless worthy of our sympathy and respect. It is an additional evidence of the cancelling of the Tudor supremacy from many of the best and highest minds in the Established Church. They who hold this theory protest against all such judgments as that in the case of Mr. Gorham, and of the *Essays and Reviews*. They treat them as tyrannical acts of the State, external to the Church of England. They contend that the Church of England is persecuted, but not committed, by such acts of the

[1] Since this was written the Established Church in Ireland has ceased to exist.

Crown. The facts are not so; but it is a hopeful sign that the members of the Established Church have come to reject these pretensions of the Tudor supremacy. It is equivalent to an admission that the Catholics were right in refusing it from the first; that their instincts are justified by the event. I note this, because it is an evidence of the direction in which the stream is running; and both charity and generosity require of us to forward these tendencies with all good-will, and without a word of unkindly comment.'[2]

England is therefore a normal example of my meaning. We have neither despotism nor persecution, because the exercise of the two powers is not united in one person.

2. Some objectors have strangely affirmed that I make Cæsarism and the civil power convertible terms. I have expressly affirmed that the civil power is a creation of God, and within its own sphere has an authority and rights sanctioned by God; and that where the civil power is exercised in conformity with Christianity, it has a consecrated authority. Cæsarism is a disease; it is to legitimate civil power what elephantiasis is to the human frame, or mania to the human mind. I have affirmed that it does not exist in England, and for this reason we are free; and that it is rising again in Germany, and for that reason Germany is losing its freedom.

3. Again, it has been objected that the Prussian Government has a right to control the action of the

[2] *Essays on Religion and Literature*, third series: Inaugural Address, Session 1868-9 (H. S. King & Co., 1874).

Church, because it is established. The answer to this is obvious. The Church in Prussia was as much 'established' before the Falck laws as it is now; but the laws then were consistent with the Divine constitution of the Church and with the conscience of Catholics. It is precisely because these laws violate both, that the Bishops and Catholics of Germany refuse to obey them. A Church that consents to be 'established,' at the cost of violating its Divine constitution and its own conscience, is not a Church, but an Apostasy; and such laws are explicit persecution. No Establishment by State laws and State support has ever been, or can ever be, accepted by the Catholic Church at the cost of its own Divine constitution. The Catholic Church can stand, and has stood for centuries, in relations of amity with the civil powers of the world; but in the sense of 'establishment,' as here understood, the Catholic Church has never been 'established' in any kingdom upon earth. In the Essay before referred to, I have pointed out that the Catholic Church in England down to the 24th and 25th of Henry VIII. was not an 'Established Church,' and that by its 'establishment' in that reign it ceased to be Catholic. One objector has quoted the three great statutes of *Mortmain*, *Provisors*, and *Præmunire*, and the reigns of Edward III. and Richard II., as proofs of a Royal supremacy in England at that date, equal to the Royal supremacy of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth. Against this I have expressly pointed out that, in all pre-reformation statutes, however encroaching, the 'liberties' of the Church were always recognised and guaranteed. These very words

are to be found in no less than eighteen pre-reformation statutes, and notably in the two of Edward III. referred to by the objector, and in eight of Richard II. It is indeed true that the statutes of *Præmunire* hampered the exercise of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Holy See; but they did not invest the Crown with a final jurisdiction in appeal, nor did they make it to be the fountain of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, nor did they deny the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, nor did they touch any purely spiritual or doctrinal question. But the Falck laws have done all these things. It seems strange to me that this objector, who is manifestly learned in the law, should fail to perceive that the Tudor legislation differs from the acts of Edward III. and Richard II. precisely in the point of transferring to the Crown 'the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the Pope.' This cuts off the Tudor statutes from all legislative precedents before the 24th of Henry VIII. The ante-reformation laws in England, like the ante-Falck laws in Prussia, carefully guarded the spiritual liberties of the Church and its union with the Holy See. The Tudor legislation and the Falck legislation alike violate the spiritual liberties of the Church and its union with the Holy See. Lord Coke's attempt to show that the acts of Henry VIII. were only declaratory of the ancient supremacy of the Crown was as transparently futile as it would now be to attempt to show that the Falck laws are merely declaratory of the former ecclesiastical laws in Prussia. The German Bishops, who had uniformly obeyed the preceding laws, a year ago unanimously refused obedience at Fulda to the new Falck laws. It is

upon this ground that the Bishop of Ermland, on the 8th of December last, refused to plead before the Court of Final Appeal in Ecclesiastical Cases. In his letter to Dr. Falck, he writes as follows:

'The old constitutional bases of the contract between the State and the Church are abolished; the Westphalian peace, which issued from a prolonged, bitter, and bloody struggle, with its principles protecting religious rights, is pushed aside; the guarantees of the rights of the Catholic Church are disregarded; a multitude of regulations, imperilling or interring ecclesiastical freedom and independence, are put forward in vindication of the modern ideas of State authority and State peril; and, to crown the whole work, the Royal tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs has been created the new German Papal Curia, with a Protestant-Catholic *corpus juris*, which, to begin with, takes the place of the Head of our Church, according to Clause I. of the law of the 17th of May on ecclesiastical discipline, and in time will, by means of legally arranged usurpations in regard to other matters, appropriate to itself his whole inheritance in regard to all other powers.' The Prussian Episcopate had from the first (Dr. Kremenz proceeds) respectfully intimated its inability to co-operate with laws that assail the rights of the Church, and which are wholly inconsistent with liberty of conscience. The Bishop of Ermland can only repeat his former declarations, 'and must ascribe to want of respect for, or ignorance of the claims of, our faith and the religious feelings of our hearts, that I am asked to resort to a tribunal (to make good my complaints), the

acknowledgment of which is identical with treason to our Church. No Roman Catholic Christian will, if mindful of his duty, resort to such a tribunal. If, on that account, the judicial protection of the rights guaranteed to our Church is to be withdrawn, we shall bear in patience this wrong, like all the other penalties threatened in these laws, and tread the path in which the Christians of the first three centuries walked, in order to be true to their faith and consciences, in opposition to the laws of the heathen Roman Empire. All the rest we leave in the hands of God the Lord.'[3]

4. The same objector tells us, that all this 'is a question not of right but of power, or, rather, it is a question in which might makes right.' 'It is a case in which the best man will win, and in which the result alone can show which is the better of the two.' If I understand these words, they deny the existence of right altogether, and therefore of all Divine law, and therefore of any Divine Lawgiver. This grim jurisprudence would seem to me to belong neither to heaven nor earth, but to the hard realms where the Supreme Judge makes might to be right, and inflicts punishment before he hears the cause. If the justice of a cause is to be learned, not from its intrinsic nature, but from its accidental issue, that is, from its success, all morality seems to me to be extinct. This worship of material force throws much light on the worship of smallpox in India. We must be allowed to deny, with the *Syllabus* and Christianity, that accomplished facts are the tests of justice.

[3] *Pall Mall Gazette*, Dec. 31, 1873.

5. The same writer has affirmed that before the authority of the Church as a 'separate and supreme' jurisdiction can be admitted, it will be necessary to prove the existence of God, the revelation of Christianity, and the divinity of our Saviour, &c. This is what I said. I affirmed that no man could deny these principles 'without renouncing his Christian name or the coherence of his reason.' The reasoning powers of the objector are manifestly coherent.

6. The same objector says that I affirm that modern Cæsarism owes its rise to the influx into Italy of Greeks and Byzantinism after the fall of Constantinople. I made no such narrow assertion: but carefully enumerated many other causes. I affirmed that Cæsarism pervaded the Middle Ages,—nay, that it is in flesh and blood, and that Byzantinism was *one* of the causes which gave to Cæsarism a particular *form*. No Imperial or Royal supremacy had ever before attempted to suspend the canons of the Church, to prohibit the meeting of Councils, to annul their decrees, and to cut off appeals to the Holy See. They had always pretended to continue in union with Rome. The essence of Byzantinism is separation from the Holy See.

7. Again, we are told that the offence of the Emperor and Prince von Bismarck is that, in a country in which the clergy are 'State officers,' they are made to obey the laws. What laws? Not the laws which existed before the Falck laws. The Catholics of Germany are appealing to them, as Englishmen appealed to the laws of 'good King Edward.' They were willing to be, if I must use such a phrase, 'State officers,' under laws

which respected the Divine constitution of the Catholic Church. These laws they never did and never would refuse to obey. But the Falck laws are not these laws: they are new laws, tyrannous and persecuting. Rather than obey them, the Catholic Bishops of Germany have made their election. They refuse any longer to be 'State officers,' whatsoever costs, privations, or penalties they may have to endure. They have made their choice between two things, which I cannot better express than in the well-chosen words, 'the mess of pottage, or the portion of the bride.'

8. Lastly, notwithstanding incessant contradiction, we are told, over and over again, that the Catholic Church was the first to innovate; that the Vatican Council established as an authoritative article of faith a point on which opinion was formerly free; and that the plain truth is, that the decree of infallibility 'definitely cut the Church adrift from all existing moorings.' I cannot doubt that the public writers who make these assertions believe them to be true; but I am at a loss to conceive how men of undeniable ability, with the facts of history before them, can make such assertions. The governments of the world have consciously framed all their contracts and concordats with an infallible Church. The conditions on which those relations of amity were founded were always based upon the laws and principles of an infallible Church. The question as to the *seat* of that infallibility is not temporal, or civil, or political, or diplomatic, or external, but strictly internal, domestic, and theological. The Vatican definition has not altered, by the shadow of a jot or a tittle,

the relations of the civil powers of the world to the infallibility of the Church. To allege the Vatican definitions as a justification of the Falck laws appears to me to be a blot upon the good sense or upon the candour of those who allege it. Into which of the Falck laws does the infallibility of the Pope enter? No one can pretend to believe that it does. This declamation about the Vatican Council and the Pope's infallibility appears to me to be the evidence of a weak case. It is easy to create a prejudice against the accused when the world hates him, and there is a motive for doing so when the witnesses cannot agree together.

January 1, 1874.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

READ BEFORE THE ACADEMIA OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION, DECEMBER 23, 1873.

My object in this paper is to inquire whether there be any special character in the conflict which the Church has to encounter at this day; and, if so, of what kind it is. In one sense the conflict of the Church and the world is always the same. The enmity of the world is one, and the truth is one; nevertheless the forms of that enmity are endless and always changing. In one point indeed the warfare of the world against the Church is always the same. It always uses the same weapons; but the motives and aims of those that use them vary. The weapons have been, are, and always will be, the civil power. For the first three centuries the Jews and the heretical sects excited the suspicions, fears, and hatred of the Roman Empire against the Church. In the Middle Ages the ambition or despotism of Christian princes wielded the civil power against the spiritual. Now for the last three hundred years, and especially in this century, it is a world departing from Christianity which uses the civil power for the oppression of the Church. In one word, the antagonist of the Church has always been Cæsarism, or the supremacy of the civil over the spiritual.

In a former paper I traced this out in the history of Christianity in England, and showed, first, with what

care our Saxon forefathers recognised and guaranteed, by the oaths of kings and by Acts of Parliament, the full spiritual liberties of the Church; next, that during the whole Norman and English period of our monarchy, our Parliaments always recognised and guaranteed the liberties of the Church in the very text of the statute law, even in times when custom, the corruption of Royal courts, or national jealousy, habitually violated its freedom; and, lastly, that from the date when the legal Church of England was established, the word 'liberties,' which till then had always been incorporated in Acts of Parliament, vanished from the Statute-book. What thus happened in England has happened also throughout the history of Europe. Cæsarism is to be found in all ages and countries, but the Cæsarism of the nineteenth century has a character of its own.

I. The first manifestation of Cæsarism in history, for I am not dealing with prehistoric legends or with Oriental tyrannies, may be seen in the Imperial despotism of Rome after the suppression of the Republic, and in the Roman Emperors who have stamped it with their name. In essence it is the absolute dominion of man over man: the power of life and death, including supreme power over liberty and goods, and extending to the whole life of man, political and religious, social and domestic. It may be summed up in a few words—'Divus Cæsar, Imperator et Summus Pontifex.' There is nothing in the public or private life of man that escapes from the sweeping jurisdiction of this universal sovereignty. The sovereignty of Cæsarism is absolute and dependent on no conditions; it is also exclusive,

because it does not tolerate any jurisdiction above or within its own. It does not recognise any laws except of its own making.

Now this supreme power need not be held in the hand of one man. It may be a People or a Senate, or a King or an Emperor. Its essence is the claim to absolute and exclusive sovereignty. It by necessity excludes God, His sovereignty and His laws. The sole fountain of law is the human will, individual or collective. Cæsar finds the law in himself, and creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane. He has no statute-book but human nature, and he is the sole and supreme interpreter and expositor of that natural law. Therefore law, morals, politics, and religion all come from him, and all depend upon him. The Sovereign Prince or State legislates, judges, executes, by its own will and hand. This sovereign power creates everything: it fashions the political constitution; it delegates jurisdiction, revocable at its word; it suspends or measures out personal liberty; it controls domestic life; it claims the children as its own; it educates them at its will, and after models and theories of its own device.

Now this exclusion of God is the deification of man. It puts man in the place of God as supreme legislator, the fountain of authority, liberty, law, and right. It gives to him the control of men's actions and men's minds. 'Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem,' and 'Cujus regio ejus est religio,' are the axioms of Cæsarism.

This is the *Lex Regia;* and where this is, human

liberty no longer exists. When I say that God was excluded from the State of Imperial Rome, I mean the one true God, Creator and Governor of all things: for Rome was full of gods. But the Supreme Pontificate of all the religions congregated in Rome was vested in Cæsar. He was 'Summus Pontifex.' He was invested with a divinity. He was addressed as 'Æternitas Tua,' and Diocletian could say, 'Diocletianus maximus æternus Imperator . . . . . ad divinas aures nostras fama quædam pervenit.' The author of the *Histoire Universelle de l'Eglise*[4] describes in these words the Cæsarism of Caligula: 'The Pagan idea of the Pagan Cæsar was perfectly realised in his person. He declared himself to be a god; he consecrated to himself a temple, with priests and sacrifices. His sister Drusilla, with whom he had been guilty of incest, being dead, he made her a goddess, and publicly swore by her divinity.' He gave to his agents in Rome authority over all the goods of all men; and he told one of his kindred to remember that everything was lawful to him in respect to all men—*omnia et in omnes sibi licere*. It is not to be forgotten that Caligula made his horse a Consul.

Such is the *Lex Regia*, which may be thus summed up. Cæsar inherited all the rights of the Senate and of the people. In political matters he was the chief of the army and of the navy; he had the power of peace and war. In administration he was perpetual Consul, Proconsul, Senator, President of the Senate, and Tribune of the people. In the civil order he was Censor

[4] Röhrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Eglise*, tom. xviii. pp. 1 and 2.

and Prætor; his edicts, letters, rescripts, decisions, had force of law. In religion he was priest, augur, Sovereign Pontiff, head of all priesthoods and of all religions. He was judge of all questions of religious rights, ceremonies, and worships, and interpreter of all mysteries. In fact, the sovereignty of the people in all its functions was transferred to Cæsar.

Terrasson describes the *Lex Regia* in these terms: 'All power—religious, political, legislative, and civil—in a word, omnipotence in all things and over all things—the people and the Senate transferred to Cæsar when the Republic passed into the Empire.' And this took place in virtue of the *Lex Regia*, of which Ulpian speaks in these words: 'Quod principi placuit legis habuit vigorem, utpote cum Lege Regia, quæ de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat.' This Imperial power was therefore absolute, exclusive, unlimited, and omnipotent.[5]

II. We will now proceed to trace the course of Cæsarism in the Christian world. The greatest of Divine acts is the Incarnation of God. Christianity has changed the state of mankind in every relation to God and to men, in this world and in the world to come. The theological aspect of the Incarnation lies beyond the bounds of our subject; but the political consequences of the Incarnation constitute the essence of the moral, social, domestic, and civil life of men and of nations. King Herod had a true instinct in seeking

[5] Gaume, *Recherches Historiques sur la Révolution*, tom. vi. pp. 14-16.

the life of the King who was born in Bethlehem. The Cæsars of this world have followed his example. There can be no Cæsarism where Christ reigns.

Christianity, in consecrating the civil authority of the world, has laid on it the limits of the Divine law. Christianity has confirmed the civil power within its own sphere as a delegation from God Himself; but by the same act Christianity has limited the sphere of its jurisdiction. It has withdrawn from its cognisance and control the whole inner life of man. The civil power cannot command his intellect, it cannot control his conscience, it cannot coerce his will. Christianity has indeed subjected the outward actions of man to civil government, but it has withdrawn from civil rulers the whole domain of religion.

The State may imprison the body, and even take its life, but it has no jurisdiction over the soul. All its acts are free. They know no lawgiver or sovereign but God alone. By the coming of Christ into the world the kingdom of God was set up among the kingdoms of men. Cæsar was no longer 'Divus' nor 'Pontifex Maximus,' nor absolute nor exclusive lord of men. No man any longer had unlimited sovereignty over man, and no man could by right hold property in man. The Son of God had brought deliverance to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that were bound. He had redeemed men into the liberty of the sons of God, and He secured that liberty for ever by a sovereign act. He divided the two powers, spiritual and civil, and gave them into different hands, so that they could never be again united in one person, except Himself and His

Vicar, upon earth. By this Divine fact the *Lex Regia* was abolished for ever, and the *cujus regio ejus religio* became a heresy as well as a tyranny.

The presence of the Catholic Church among the civil powers of the world has changed the whole political order of mankind. It has established upon earth a legislature, a tribunal, and an executive independent of all human authority. It has withdrawn from the reach of human laws the whole domain of faith and of conscience. These depend on God alone, and are subjected by Him to His own authority, vested in His Church, which is guided by Himself.

This is the solution of the problem, which the world cannot solve. Obedience to the Church is liberty; and it is liberty because the Church cannot err or mislead either men or nations. If the Church were not infallible, obedience to it might be the worst of bondage. This is Ultramontanism, or the liberty of the soul divinely guaranteed by an infallible Church; the proper check and restraint of Cæsarism, as Cæsarism is the proper antagonist of the sovereignty of God. But to this we will return hereafter.

I will draw out somewhat more exactly and technically what is the separation and partition of the two powers, spiritual and civil, in order to show that it is from the Christian Church that the world has learnt the stable liberties of the civil order and the measured equity of a written law.

Pope S. Gelasius, in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius, enunciates the whole doctrine in few words. 'There are,' he says, 'august Emperor, two things by

which this world is governed—the sacred authority of the Pontiff and the power of Cæsar. The authority of Bishops is all the more to be venerated as they must render account to God in the last judgment, even of the salvation of kings. You are not ignorant that, though your dignity lifts you above other men, you are bound humbly to bow the head to Pontiffs, who are charged with the dispensation of Divine things, and that you owe to them submission in all that belongs to the order of religion, and to the administration of the holy mysteries. . . . In all things which are of the public order these same Bishops obey your laws, and in your turn you ought to obey them in all things which concern the sacred things of which they are the dispensers.'[6]

And what a Pontiff said to an Emperor an Emperor said to Bishops. Constantine at Nicea said: 'God has elected you to be priests and judges, to judge and to decide (the contentions of the people), forasmuch as God has set you to be over all men.'[7]

S. Bernard expresses the same in a passage of profound insight and beauty. Writing to Conrad, King of the Romans, he says: 'The Empire and the Priesthood could not be more sweetly, peacefully, or closely united and mutually interwoven than that both should alike meet in the Person of the Lord; who, according to the Incarnation, was made unto us of both tribes, Priest and King. Not only so, but He mingled and confederated these in His own Body, which is the Christian

[6] Epist. S. Gelasii ad Anastasium; Labbe et Cossart Concil., tom. v. p. 308.

[7] Gelasii Cyzic. Hist. Concil. Nicæn.; Labbe et Cossart Concil., tom. ii. p. 175.

people, He being the Head; so that this race of mankind is called by the voice of the Apostle an elect nation, a Royal Priesthood. . . . Therefore what God has joined together let no man put asunder. But rather what Divine authority has sanctioned, let the will of man strive to fulfil; and let them unite in mind who are united by laws. Let them cherish one another; let them defend one another; let each one bear his own burden. The Wise Man says, when brother helps brother, both shall be consoled. But if—which God forbid—they gnaw and bite one another, shall not both be brought to desolation? Let not my soul enter into the counsel of them who say that either the peace or liberty of the Church is hurtful to the Empire, or the prosperity and exaltation of the Empire hurtful to the Church. For God, who is the Founder of both, has united them, not unto destruction, but unto edification. If you know this, how long will you connive at the common insult and the common injury of both? Is not Rome both the Apostolic See and the Head of the Empire? To say nothing about the Church, is it honour to the King to hold in his hands an empire which is a headless trunk? I know not indeed what your wise men and princes of the kingdom counsel you in this matter; but I, speaking in my unwisdom, will not be silent of what I think. The Church of God, from its beginning unto these times, has been oftentimes in tribulation, and oftentimes delivered. Hear, lastly, what it says of itself in the Psalms, for it is its own voice: "Often they have fought against me from my youth, but they could not prevail over me. The wicked

have wrought upon my back: they have lengthened their iniquity" (Ps. cxxviii. 2, 3). Be sure, O King, that neither now will the Lord leave the Rod of Sinners upon the lot of the just. The hand of the Lord is not shortened, nor is it made weak to save. He will set free in this time also without a doubt His Spouse, whom He has redeemed with His own Blood, and endowed with His Spirit, and adorned with heavenly gifts; and, moreover, with earthly gifts. He will set it free, I say, He will set it free; but if in the hands of another, let the princes of the empire see whether it be for the honour of the King or the good of the empire? No, by no means. Wherefore gird thee with thy sword upon thy thigh, O most mighty, and let Cæsar restore to himself what is Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's. Both are the interest of Cæsar: that is, to defend his own crown and to protect the Church. The one becomes the king, the other the advocate of the Church. Victory, as we confide in the Lord, is at hand.'[8]

S. Thomas Aquinas defines this doctrine more precisely as follows. The end of the Commonwealth is the same as that of individuals. 'God has created us and placed us in this world to know, to love, and to serve Him, and by these means to obtain eternal life, which is our final end.' Every Christian Society is ordained by God to the same collective end. From this S. Thomas proves that though the king or prince has only civil power, he is bound to use it for the eternal good of the Commonwealth. He adds, 'If man

[8] S. Bernardi ad Conradum, epist. ccxliii. tom. i. p. 242 (Paris, 1690).

could obtain by his natural power this last end it would be the duty of the King to guide him in it. . . . But, as man cannot by merely human virtues attain to his end, which is the possession of God, it follows that it is no human direction, but a Divine direction, that must conduct him to it. The King to whom that supreme direction belongs is not man alone, but God also—our Lord Jesus Christ. In order that spiri ual things may be distinct from earthly things, the authority of His kingdom is committed not to earthly kings, but to priests, and especially to the chief of priests—the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom all kings of Christendom ought to be subject, as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Forasmuch as the bliss of heaven is the end of the life which we now live, it belongs to the office of a king for that reason to promote a good life in his people, with a view to attain the bliss of heaven—that is, in enjoining those things which tend to the attainment of heavenly bliss, and in forbidding, as far as possible, what is contrary to them. But what things conduce to the bliss of heaven, and what things are a hindrance to its attainment, are to be known out of the Divine law, the teaching of which belongs to the office of priests.'[9]

From these principles we see the difference between the Pagan Cæsarism and that which I will call the Christian Cæsarism.

1. The first regards the State as its own creation, the second as the creation of God.

2. The first is Pontiff and King over body and

[9] S. Thomas Aq. de Regimine Principum, lib. i. chap. xiv.

soul absolute and exclusive; the second is subject in all that belongs to the soul to the Divine law and to the Church of Jesus Christ.

3. The first makes religion an instrument or department of the State; the second makes it the limitation of civil power, and the protection of human liberty.

4. The first treats the Church as subject to itself; the second treats all civil power as subject to God and His law, of which the Church is the guardian and the interpreter.

5. The first regards all power, civil and religious, as derived from the people; the second regards civil power as formally from God, and the spiritual power as exclusively from God, and therefore dependent on God alone.

This is Ultramontanism: the essence of which is that the Church being a Divine institution, and by Divine assistance infallible, is, within its own sphere, independent of all civil powers; and, as the guardian and interpreter of the Divine law, it is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith or morals.

Inasmuch as at this moment the term 'Ultramontane' is used as a nickname to kindle persecution against the Church by false accusations and misleading the public opinion of this country, I will draw out a proof that Ultramontanism and Catholicism are identical, as are also Catholicism and perfect Christianity.

Christianity, or the faith and law revealed by Jesus Christ, has, as I have said, introduced two principles

of Divine authority into human society: the one, the absolute separation of the two powers, spiritual and civil; the other, the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil in all matters within its competence or divine jurisdiction. I do not know how any man, without renouncing his Christian name or the coherence of his reason, can deny either of these principles. I can indeed understand that, admitting both, he may dispute as to the range or reach of that jurisdiction. He may contend that it is wider or narrower, that it does or does not extend to this or that particular matter. But on this, also, I will speak hereafter. For the present it is enough to say that these two principles are held by all Christians, except Erastians, who deny the spiritual office of the Church, if not also its existence. But I hope to show that these two principles are Ultramontanism; that the Bull 'Unam Sanctam' contains no more, that the Vatican Council could define no less; that in its definitions it enunciated nothing new; that its two Constitutions were, as Parliament would say, not enacting but declaratory acts; that they have changed nothing and added nothing either to the constitution of the Church or to the relations of the Church with the civil powers of the world.

To make this clear, let us shortly examine these two principles.

First, as to the separation of the spiritual and civil powers, the whole history of Christendom is sufficient evidence. The civil sovereignty is coeval with man. Society is not of man's making. The relations of authority, submission, and equality lie in the human

family, and from it are extended to commonwealths, kingdoms, empires. The civil sovereignty resides materially in society at large; formally in the person or persons to whom society may commit its exercise. Immediately, therefore, sovereignty is given by God to society; mediately, through society to the person who wields it. Both materially and formally, mediately and immediately, sovereignty is from God, and within its competence is supreme and sacred. Civil allegiance to sovereigns is therefore a part of Christianity, and treason is both a crime against a lawful authority and a sin against God, who has ordained that authority. Ultramontanism teaches that within the sphere of its competence the civil power is to be obeyed, not only 'for wrath, but for conscience' sake.'[10] It is a part of the Christian religion to obey 'the powers that are.'

As to the independence of the Spiritual Power, we need waste no words. The existence of the Church and the primacy of its head in these eighteen hundred years are proof enough. Further, no Christian of sound mind will deny that these two distinct and separate powers have distinct and separate spheres, and that within these spheres respectively they hold their power from God. Where the limits of these spheres are to be traced, it is easy enough to decide in all matters purely civil or in all matters purely spiritual. The conflict arises over the mixed questions. And yet here there ought to be no real difficulty. Nobody can decide what questions are pure or what questions are mixed except a judge who can

[10] Romans xiii. 5.

define the limits of these two elements respectively, and therefore of the respective jurisdictions. In any question as to the competence of the two powers either there must be some judge to decide what does and what does not fall within their respective spheres, or they are delivered over to perpetual doubt and to perpetual conflict. But who can define what is or is not within the jurisdiction of the Church in faith and morals, except a judge who knows what the sphere of faith and morals contains, and how far it extends? And surely it is not enough that such a judge should guess, or opine, or pronounce upon doubtful evidence, or with an uncertain knowledge. Such a sentence would be, not an end of contention, but a beginning and a renewal of strife.

It is clear that the civil power cannot define how far the circumference of faith and morals extends. If it could, it would be invested with one of the supernatural endowments of the Church. To do this it must know the whole deposit of explicit and implicit faith; or, in other words, it must be the guardian of the Christian Revelation. Now no Christian, nor any man of sound mind, claims this for the civil power: and if not, then, either there is no judge to end strife; or that judge must be the Church, to which alone the revelation of Christianity in faith and morals was divinely intrusted. And if this be so, still, unless the Church be divinely certain of the limits of its commission and of its message, no doubt or controversy between the two Powers can ever be brought to an end. But if the Church be certain with a Divine

certainty as to the limits of its jurisdiction, its voice in such matters is final. But an authority that can alone define the limits of its own office is absolute because it depends on none, and infallible because it knows with a Divine certainty the faith which it has received in charge.

If, then, the civil power be not competent to decide the limits of the spiritual power, and if the spiritual power can define with a Divine certainty its own limits, it is evidently supreme. Or, in other words, the spiritual power knows with Divine certainty the limits of its own jurisdiction; and it knows therefore the limits and the competence of the civil power. It is thereby in matters of religion and conscience supreme. I do not see how this can be denied without denying Christianity. And if this be so, this is the doctrine of the Bull 'Unam Sanctam,' and of the *Syllabus*, and of the Vatican Council. It is, in fact, Ultramontanism, for this term means neither less nor more. The Church, therefore, is separate and supreme.

Let us, then, ascertain somewhat further what is the meaning of supreme. Any power which is independent and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is, *ipso facto*, supreme. But the Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of revelation, of faith and morals, is all this, or is nothing, or worse than nothing, an imposture and an usurpation—that is, it is Christ or Antichrist. If it be Antichrist, every Cæsar from Nero to this day is justified. If it

be Christ, it is the Supreme Power among men; that is to say:

(1) It holds its commission and authority from God alone;

(2) It holds in custody the faith and the law of Jesus Christ;

(3) It is the sole interpreter of that faith and the sole expositor of that law. It has within the sphere of that commission a power to legislate with authority; to bind the consciences of all men born again in the baptism of Jesus Christ; it alone can fix the limits of the faith and law intrusted to it, and therefore the sphere of its own jurisdiction; it alone can decide in questions where its power is in contact with the civil power—that is, in mixed questions: for it alone can determine how far its own Divine office, or its own Divine trust, enters into and is implicated in such questions; and it is precisely that element, in any mixed question of disputed jurisdiction, which belongs to a higher order and to a higher tribunal.

For instance, a Catholic Professor of Theology in a State University, salaried by the State, refuses the definitions of the Vatican Council. The Bishop excommunicates him; the State supports and pays him, in spite of the excommunication of the Church, as a Professor of Catholic Theology. Here is a mixed question made up of stipend and orthodoxy. Surely orthodoxy is a higher element than stipend; faith is of a higher order than thalers; and to judge of orthodoxy and faith belongs not to the Civil but the Spiritual Tribunal, which is, in that sphere, superior, absolute, and final.

The same is true of every mixed question of benefice, or collation to benefice, or privation of benefice—in a word, of every question of contract between the Church with the State, so far as faith and morals enter; and it belongs to the Church to determine whether they enter or no, and how far they enter and are implicated in the conflict.

Now let it be clearly understood that in these assertions I am vindicating to the Church her Divine rights. I am not denying to the State its power to violate every Divine right upon earth. It may abuse its power at the license of its will—Imperial, Royal, Bureaucratic, Democratic. I deny only its right. '*Id potest quod jure potest.*' It can re-enact and enforce the *Lex Regia* against the Church. But its power is violence, and its acts are tyranny.

I have affirmed, then, that the Cæsarism of the Pagan world, which was the enemy of God and the destroyer of all the liberties of man, was by one Divine act reduced to its lawful sphere. The separation of the spiritual power from the civil, and the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil order of the Christian world, have redeemed princes from the degradation of tyrants, and mankind from an inhuman slavery.

Cæsarism, whether in one person, or in a senate, or in a populace, always has been, is, always must be, tyranny in the civil and persecution in the spiritual order. The direct antagonist of this worst of human ills is the Divine law revealed by Jesus Christ, and the Divine authority committed to His Church. It has been, and ever will be, the source of all human liberty.

The Church was the mother of all free nations. All freedom of soul and conscience in men, in families, in States, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from a superior authority. That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian Monarchy is law; and that law the law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth, by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation, independent of all human Legislatures and superior to all prerogatives of kings.

Now what I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men, in all ages, by Catholics and by Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and by Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England, whose noble and pathetic history has just been written, on the eve, as I fear, of their apostasy from the high and heroic spirit of their Founders and Fathers in patience and fidelity to the great law of Christian Liberty in Jesus Christ.

The sum, then, of our argument is this: Cæsarism consists

(1) In the union of the two powers in one person;

(2) In the claim of supremacy over all causes and persons;

(3) In the coercion of conscience in spiritual matter;

(4) In the isolation of national religions on the plea that no foreign jurisdiction can enter the State;

(5) In the isolation of national Churches, and

thereby the rejection of the universal authority of the Church.

Ultramontanism consists

(1) In the separation of the two powers, and the vesting them in different persons;

(2) In claiming for the Church the sole right to define doctrines of faith and morals; and

(3) To fix the limits of its own jurisdiction in that sphere;

(4) In the indissoluble union of the Church with, and submission to, the universal jurisdiction of the Holy See.

Such, then, was the Cæsarism of the heathen world: the dominion of man over man, both in matters of civil obedience and in matters of religious worship; and such was the restraint of this absolute and intolerable sway of man over man by the separation of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, into distinct authorities and spheres of jurisdiction vested in distinct persons. To this we owe the order, progress, civilisation, and, so far as there has been peace on earth, the peace of the Christian world.

III. But Cæsarism is in human nature. It is the government of flesh and blood, or of 'blood and iron;' and though restrained for a time by Christianity, it has never been extinct. Through the whole history of Christendom, from the fourth to the sixteenth century, it has been always striving to reassert itself. The Roman Empire was no sooner translated to the East than Cæsarism began to reappear. The Byzantine despotism over civil freedom and ecclesiastical liberty is a byword. Byzantine and despotic are convertible terms. The

Roman Empire was no sooner revived in the West than the same tendency began to reappear. Even Charlemagne stretched his protectorate, or episcopate of outward things, into many violations of ecclesiastical liberty. But the Cæsarism of the Saxon, Suabian, and Bavarian Emperors, as seen in the conflicts of S. Gregory VII., Alexander III., Innocent IV., makes the reign of Charlemagne to seem normal and Christian, like the reign of Constantine.

The two chief causes of the revival of Cæsarism in Christendom are—first, the school of jurists created by the Pandects of Justinian and the University of Bologna, from which sprang the whole theory and organisation of the Ghibelline Cæsarism; and, secondly, the influx into Italy of Greeks and Greek literature and Byzantinism after the fall of Constantinople. It was this that rendered possible in Christian Europe the royal supremacies of the sixteenth century. The theory of investing the prince with supreme legislative and judicial power over all persons and in all causes, ecclesiastical and civil, is not only Byzantine, but Pagan. It is the reunion in one person of the two powers which Christianity has put asunder. And it has been followed, in every country where it has taken root, and so long as it has existed, by civil despotism and by religious persecution. The most ample exhibition of this is to be found in the Tudor legislation, and in the enforcement of a legal religion in England and Ireland by penal statutes. The religious history of England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, and the North of Germany, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is the

history of the revival of Cæsarism, and of a reaction against the liberty of religion and of conscience with which Christ has made us free. What is chiefly to be noted is, that this oppression of Christian freedom has been accomplished to the cry of liberty of religion and of conscience.

For proof of this, it is enough to refer to a book entitled *A History of the Free Churches of England*,[11] in which the sufferings of Nonconformists and Catholics under the Cæsarism of the English Crown are patiently and fully described. The effect of this mixed civil and religious despotism has been gradually to obtain for one-half of the English people and the whole population of Ireland a complete religious liberty. Scotland has always rejected the interferences of kings in matters of religion; and in our day one-half of the Scottish population has rejected even the remnants of civil interference lingering in the law of patronage. The political tendency of the whole world is towards 'free churches;' that is, to the desecration of the civil power and to the rejection of the Church.

The temporal sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff has been violated on the plea that the civil and spiritual powers ought to be once more separated, not as Providence has ordained hitherto, but on the impossible theory of a free Church in a free State. The Italian Revolution has put this forward as its solution of the religious conflicts of the nineteenth century. It will endure until the first quarrel, and the first quarrel will arise upon the first pontifical act in condemnation of the

[11] By Mr. Herbert S. Skeats (Miall, 1868).

usurpations of the free State. The supremacy of the civil power will then be declared to be vital to its freedom. It must, however, be acknowledged that, violent and sacrilegious as the acts of the free State have been and still are in practice, Italy has hitherto refrained from committing itself in the domain of principle and of law to doctrines such as are embodied in Prussian ecclesiastical legislation. From this the Catholic faith and instinct of Italy have saved it. Through twenty years of revolution, it has never entangled itself in the tyrannous and pedantic absurdities of the Falck laws. It has had two things profoundly impressed upon its intellect and its conscience—the one, the impious monstrosity of the 'Divus Cæsar;' the other, an inextinguishable consciousness that the Catholic Church is a Divine creation. Excepting a handful of Petruccelli della Gattinas, no people in Europe can look upon the Prussian persecution with less sympathy or more secret contempt than the Italians.

But the pretensions of the Berlin Government are only the first indications of an Imperial omnipotence, which will hereafter be more explicitly and violently put forth. This Imperial legislation may be regarded as the link between the old royal supremacies of the sixteenth century and the revived *Lex Regia* which the anti-Christian revolution is preparing for the future of Europe.

The following quotations will best exhibit what I mean. I will give a passage from a leading journal, representing a school of political doctrine which, though not yet numerous, has already obtained a place among

us. After saying that there is a conviction widely spread hostile to the Catholic Church, the writer goes on to say: 'Side by side with this negative conviction, a positive conviction, vague indeed and indistinct, but exceedingly powerful, has been and still is growing up, that a nation, as such, is essentially a better thing than a Church; that it is, in fact, of all positive human institutions at present known to us, the most sacred, the most deeply-rooted in human nature, and the best fitted to engage the affections of a rational man. Contrast for a moment the English nation and the Catholic Church, and see to which of the two it is best worth an Englishman's while to be loyal. . . . All this, we say, puts nations—for the same sort of statements are true of most other nations besides England—above Churches as objects of affection and loyalty. . . . We should regard no one as really loyal to his nation who did not regard it as being to him a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatever.'[12] This doctrine is revived Paganism.

In the Prussian Chamber, Dr. Falck laid down the following doctrine on the 15th of January last year: 'We have become more "concrete;" we have estimated the rights of the State. There is the reason why the proposed laws must be carried.' On the 17th of January he added: 'If the State and the Church are equal in the domains of moral power, the State must always have the supremacy in the domain of law.' That is to say, as M. de Pressensé remarks, 'This amounts to saying that the Church has all the benefits

[12] *Pall Mall Gazette*, Jan. 23, 1873.

of equality in the domain of abstractions, on the condition that the State has all power in the domain of the "concrete;" that is, Right is a theory, Force is the only reality."[18]

This brings out the essence of modern Cæsarism, which is not only that the State has supreme power over the Church in all persons and causes, but supreme right to determine the limits of the rights of the Church, its liberties, offices, and duties; or, in other words, that the State can determine, and the Church cannot determine, what is the authority and commission intrusted to it by its Divine Founder. This is the vital point in the contention. The Church claims to be the sole, because the divinely-appointed, judge of the sphere of its own spiritual office, authority, and jurisdiction. The modern Cæsarism claims this ultimate power of determination for the State. Between these conflicting claims there can be no *modus vivendi*. To concede or to abdicate this supreme spiritual office would to the Church be death. It was for this that a long line of its martyrs died. It was for this that S. Thomas of Canterbury died, which the other day was described as his 'exploits.' It is for this that the Archbishop of Posen has also declared his readiness to die. And now the Berlin Government, it is said, is about to attempt to impose on every future Bishop the following oath:

'The Bishops are henceforward to swear obedience to the laws of the country, to bind themselves by oath to exhort the clergy and laity to be loyal to the king, patriotic and obedient to the laws, and not to permit

[18] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Mai 1873, 1er liv. p. 27.

the clergy under their control to teach or act in opposition to these principles.'[14]

The cynicism of this oath is clear as day. The Berlin Government supports the Old Catholic heretics against the Catholic Church, on the ground that the Church has innovated in its doctrines. It now proposes to bind Catholic Bishops to obey the laws of the State after all the Falck innovations. It refuses the innovations of an infallible Church, but binds the Bishops of the Church by oath to obey whatsoever laws may now or hereafter be made by a fallible State. But Cæsarism is infallible in 'the domain of the concrete.' 'Divus Cæsar.'

Prince von Bismarck declared in the Chamber of Peers that 'the future of an Evangelical Empire has shown itself clearly on the horizon of Germany;' that is to say, the Catholic Church, which is the direct antagonist of the Evangelical Empire, must cease from before it. Such is, in fact, the inevitable effect of this legislation. Finally, the Emperor justifies his legislation against the Catholic Church by asserting a claim of absolute independence against all religious or spiritual authority whatsoever upon earth, which is equivalent to claiming a supremacy over all religious and spiritual matters within the Empire of Germany. 'The Evangelical creed, which, as must be known to your Holiness, I, like my ancestors and the majority of my subjects, profess, does not permit us to accept in our relations to God any other mediator than our Lord Jesus Christ.'

[14] *Times*, Friday, December 19th, 1873.

As it is impossible to suppose that the august personage whose name is attached to this letter could intend that the Pope had claimed to be a mediator between God and man, except as the Chief Pastor of the Church of God, these words must be taken to deny the existence of any such Church, under any such ministry, bearing Divine authority upon earth. This denial, coupled with the assertion of supreme power over the Catholics of Germany, is equivalent to the claim of an absolute and unlimited Cæsarism. The recent ecclesiastical legislation, which violates both religion and conscience, is the legitimate consequence of this supreme Pontificate. This is the key to the Falck laws, the effects of which are in sum as follows:

First, they cut off appeals to the Holy See, by declaring that all causes must be determined by German tribunals. This cuts the Church in Germany from the centre of Catholic Unity and from its universal jurisdiction.

Secondly, they suspend the power of excommunication upon the concurrent sanction of the civil authority, which is to deprive the Church of its judicial power of deciding who are and who are not of its communion.

Thirdly, they give to the State the office of forming and educating the clergy, by compulsory education in the gymnasiums, lyceums, and universities of the State, leaving to the Bishops to superadd a course of theology on men whose whole intellectual and moral nature has been shaped by a State training: and even in their theological examinations the presence of a commissary of the State is required.

Fourthly, they suspend the power of the Bishops in giving cure of souls, and changing their clergy from cure to cure, upon the assent of the civil power.

Fifthly, they establish an Ecclesiastical Council, which is, in fact, the supremacy of the Crown put in commission, invested with a final jurisdiction over ecclesiastical persons and matters. The effect of this is to substitute the Emperor for the Pope; and to invest him with supreme power over religion and conscience, over the Church, the Episcopate, and the clergy, as the head of all religions and of all priesthoods within the Empire.

The result, then, of these laws is that no 'official function,' as the Berlin Government puts it,—that is, no spiritual act, from the excommunication of a heretic down to the teaching the catechism to school-children, —can be performed without the sanction of the civil power, under pain of fine or imprisonment, and, this failing, of deposition. The Ober-Präsident of Posen has already called on the Archbishop of Posen to resign his archbishopric for numerous offences against the Falck laws; which offences are so many high spiritual duties. If he refuse to resign within eight days, he is to be cited before the Royal Tribunal in Berlin. The Act 24 and 25 Henry VIII. made the king outright head of the Church, and by one stroke all jurisdiction formerly belonging to the Pope was transferred to the Crown. This was intelligible. The Falck laws are indirect and circuitous. They compass what they do not claim. They suspend all spiritual jurisdiction on the civil power, and make the sovereign absolute in matters of religion.

What is this but 'Divus Cæsar'? It is the reuniting in one person of the two powers which God has separated, and a denial, not only of the supremacy of the spiritual power of the Church of Christ, but a denial that any such spiritual power of Divine institution exists upon earth. This, as we have seen, was formally enunciated by the Emperor in his letter to the Pope.

Now we might at first sight wonder how such a preposterous claim could have been set up in the nineteenth century. But there are agencies at work which will account for it.

First, there is, perhaps, no country in Europe from which the Christian faith has been more completely wiped out than Prussia. It became Christian in the thirteenth century; it fell into the Lutheran heresy in the sixteenth; it has developed into simple rationalism in the educated, and into materialism among the masses of the people. The idea of a Church with spiritual authority is simply effaced. The civil power, with its military organisation, is the sole ideal of power before the eyes and the minds of the Protestant population of Prussia. The fusion of the Lutherans and the Calvinists, some years ago, into an Evangelical Church has prepared them for the return of the old rule—*Ejus religio cujus regio.*

We have seen how the vivid consciousness of the Divine authority and office of the Church has restrained and saved Italy from greater revolutionary excesses. There is nothing of this kind to restrain or to save Prussia. In rejecting the Church of God it is deifying Cæsar. We are going back into the barbarism of the

Old World. And this is not said as a mere stroke of rhetoric or of controversy. There has been for some time a school of writers in Germany labouring to restore the Byzantine Cæsarism. Just as the jurists were the satellites and flatterers of the mediæval emperors of Germany, and as Machiavelli and Gravina and Hobbes have been the apostles of royal supremacies and modern Erastianism, so the school known at Munich as Byzantines has been preparing the way for the Imperial primacy of Berlin. The Byzantines got their name from their literary labours upon the Greek Church and the canon law of the Patriarchate at Constantinople. They so far affected the Government of Munich as to induce it to meddle with the seminaries of the Bishops. It was this school, together with certain persons once honoured among us, who used Prince Hohenlohe as their mouthpiece in conspiring against the Vatican Council. After this their ecclesiastical politics were carried to Berlin, and the Government of Prussia was thereby led to commit itself to the patronage of the 'Old Catholic' heresy. Like all heretics, they sheltered themselves under the civil power, and flattered it into the attempt to carry out that Byzantine Erastianism against the Catholic Church in the Empire. Witness the oath lately taken by Dr. Reinkens, and the State grant which was its reward.

Finally, there is another agency which has been far more potent than all others in bringing about this present persecution. There is no manner of doubt that the sect of Freemasons has been long labouring to break up the religious settlement in Germany. The

Peace of Westphalia secured the political status of Christianity, though divided into Catholic and Protestant. The Freemasons desired the overthrow of both. They thought that the time was come to complete what the Thirty Years' War left unfinished. They believed that the Catholics in Germany, weakened by the overthrow first of Austria and next of France, would easily fall under the power of the Evangelical Empire, as Prince von Bismarck calls it. I am but repeating his own words. In the Prussian House of Peers in 1870 he spoke as follows :

'Peace began to be disturbed after the war in Austria, after the fall in 1866 of the Power which was the bulwark of the Roman influence in Germany, and when the future of an Evangelical Empire showed itself clearly on the horizon of Germany. All tranquillity was lost when the second-rate Catholic Power in Europe had followed in the way of its predecessor, and Germany became the first great military power for the moment, and, according to the will of God, for a long time.'

Does Prince von Bismarck fear for the stability of 'the first great military power' of the world? What could the Catholics of Germany do against it? What would they ever have desired but its perpetual stability if it had only dealt justly with them, according to the existing laws? Prince von Bismarck creates resistance by persecution, and then pleads that resistance to justify the persecution which has called up that resistance. There was no resistance to the existing laws as they stood before the new Falck legislation. It cannot be doubted

that the object of the Falck laws is to render impossible the existence of the Catholic Church in Germany,—that is, to exterminate it. I say this because no Catholic, without sin against God, can obey these laws. Every man who obeys them ceases in that moment to be a Catholic. Can we, then, for a moment imagine that Prince von Bismarck was not aware of this? That he acted in ignorance, or unconsciously, or on misjudgment? That he so little knows the Catholic doctrine and discipline as to expect obedience? He does not desire it. He wished for a pretext, and has made it. Nobody can doubt that he knew to the full extent the violation of conscience and of faith which he was inflicting. These laws can be no otherwise understood than as a deliberate scheme to render it impossible for Catholics to obey, that they might then be accused and dealt with as resisting the authority of the Empire. But in this the astuteness of the German Chancellor has overreached itself. If the Falck legislation had been such as a Catholic could by any subterfuge obey, even though its injury to the Church were never so great, then the nations of Europe might have been misled into condemning the Catholics of Germany as contumacious and refractory.

But at this time not a nation in Europe commends the Falck laws. A handful of strangely-assorted persons about a year ago went on a pilgrimage to offer their incense to Prince von Bismarck on his penal laws. They were peers and gentlemen, Free Kirk men and Liberals, and the preachers of 'our glorious Revolution' and of civil and religious liberty; and now we are in-

formed that the delegates of cities and towns in England are to meet this month, under the presidency of Earl Russell, to express sympathy with Prince von Bismarck in his persecution of Catholics and in his violation of religious liberties; which, for half a century, has been the special political cry of the noble Earl. We are a paradoxical people, and somewhat too reckless of what the outside world may think of our political incoherencies.

But it is well to see how we are regarded from without. M. de Pressensé, a Frenchman and a Protestant, in denouncing the Prussian persecution, has given to Englishmen a warning which I hope will not be lost upon us. In last May, after detailing the injustice of the ecclesiastical legislation of Prussia, he added:

'That which is more grave is that (public) opinion is misled even in countries which, like England, are the classic land of religious liberty. The religious policy of the German Emperor receives in England congratulations which we must be permitted to look upon as scandalous. We know that the English Parliament would not allow any one of the laws passed at Berlin to be so much as discussed: but it is not right to applaud that which we would not do. We ought more than ever to rise above sectarian passions, and to remind ourselves that the persecution which strikes our religious adversaries strikes that which is our common good, and our sole guarantee in the conflict of ideas and beliefs—I mean, the liberty of conscience.'[15]

We have now traced in outline the three Cæsarisms —the Pagan Cæsarism, the Christian, and the modern,

[15] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Mai 1873.

which I must describe as the Cæsarism of the last age of civil power lapsing or lapsed from Christianity. But it is more than time to make an end. I hope that I have made clear that Christianity has redeemed man and society from Cæsarism—that is, from the unlimited despotism of man over man—and that so long as the two powers, spiritual and civil, are vested in distinct persons, the liberty of conscience and the liberty of religion, as well as the liberty of man in his public and private life, are secured; that wheresoever the civil power or Sovereign usurps upon the spiritual liberty of the Church, and affects to exercise a supremacy over it, all liberties are at stake—the liberty of conscience, the liberty of religion, the domestic liberty of families, and the political liberty of citizens. Under Cæsarism all kinds of freedom alike are violated.

The natural antagonist of Cæsarism is the Christian Church, with all its liberties of doctrine and discipline, of faith and jurisdiction; and the vindication of these liberties of the Church in their highest and most sacred form is Ultramontanism. Therefore the world hates it. Therefore it now rails against it in all its tones and with all its tongues. 'Divus Cæsar' and 'Vicarius Christi' are two persons and two powers and two systems, between which there can be not only no peace, but no truce. They have contended for eighteen hundred years. In Germany they are locked once more in conflict. The issue is certain. The same who has always conquered will conquer again. Where, now, are the Emperors of Rome, Germany, and France? But Peter is still in his See, and Peter now is Pius IX.

XVIII.

ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

I took up Mr. Stephen's article on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism with a full hope of finding all that could be said for the former, and against the latter, urged with the close reasoning of which I have always believed the author to be a master. I laid it down with a feeling of disappointment. The case argued is not mine. The whole issue has been changed. The title ought to have been 'Faith and Doubt.' This is the sum of the argument. 'Ultramontanism is untenable, because Christianity cannot be proved to be true;' or, again, 'Ultramontanism cannot be proved to be true, because we cannot be certain of the existence of God.' The whole article is a profuse verification of a sentence in the essay under attack, in which I said: 'No man can deny that the authority of the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere supreme, without renouncing his Christian name, or the coherence of his reason.' In this the article before us is not incoherent, and Mr. Stephen admits that, granting Christianity to be a Divine Revelation, and the Church to be a Divine institution, he does not see how he could stop short of my conclusions (p. 510).

He then proceeds to say that, so far from Chris-

tianity being proved to be true, even the existence of God is not certain: that the arguments of Locke, Clarke, Butler, Pascal, and Dr. Newman fail to prove it. He says: 'We have all great want of light and knowledge about the nature of the world in which we live, and what is to follow it. We are all impelled to dwell upon the questions—What? Whence? Whither?' (p. 503.) He says 'that the existence of God is probable enough to supply to men a motive to a virtuous life, but is not so established as to serve as a foundation for inferences about any particular event or institution' (p. 504). He then proceeds thus: 'What is necessary for me to say is, that the truth of the history of Jesus Christ is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt as against ordinary men of the world, on whom the clergy are trying to force their yoke on the strength of it' (p. 510). Mr. Stephen then goes on to consider the evidence of the truth 'of the history of Jesus Christ as given in the Apostles' Creed.' He believes, 'supposing the universe to be the work of a Being having consciousness, will, and power, that such a Being would be able to raise the dead;' also, 'assuming that Jesus Christ did actually live, die, rise, and ascend into heaven after working miracles, it would be rational to believe Him;' and that it would be 'probable that He would know more about God and a future state than other people' (p. 511); that he can imagine 'evidence which would put these things beyond reasonable doubt.' But he adds that of the witnesses of these facts, 'most were not original witnesses' (p. 514); that they had only 'hearsay;' that the vision on the way to Damascus is not easily dis-

tinguishable from the delusions of sunstroke' (p. 515); that as to the four Gospels, 'the state of things is as if in the year 3800, the principal authorities as to the life of Napoleon Bonaparte were four popular biographies written in English somewhere about the present time, and quoting no authorities' (p. 515). Much more of the same kind on the articles of the Apostles' Creed I gladly pass over, and come to the conclusion. Mr. Stephen proceeds: 'Upon the whole it appears to me that ordinary men of the world both may and ought to say to Archbishop Manning, as I do, "You have entirely failed to make out any sort of claim to be my spiritual master. . . . The fundamental principle upon which your whole system depends is based upon arguments which the limitation of human knowledge considerably weakens. The history which you next appeal to rests upon hearsay evidence which can no longer be tested, though innumerable points in it show the necessity of further inquiry or of continued doubt"' (pp. 525, 526). I have here collected what may be called the serious argument of the article, for I cannot believe that Mr. Stephen's excursions to Bellarmine and the *Arabian Nights*, the Limbus Patrum and the imaginary jury, the black man and the fishes, winding up with the wit of undergraduates about Moses and the whale, were intended for argument. When a writer has declared that Christianity is not yet proved to be true, and that the existence of God is doubtful, I think I may postpone my answer as to what I believe of infants dying without baptism. My answer cannot appreciably affect the thesis before us. I have, indeed, very explicitly given

my answer to this question, publicly and in print, but to repeat it here and now would break the line of what I have to say. I fully acknowledge that I cannot render Ultramontanism credible to any mind that does not believe the articles of the Apostles' Creed; nor can I hope to render Christianity credible to any mind that is not convinced of the existence of God. The article before us is of great value. It reveals the position of a small number of minds among us. They are convinced that what they think is the opinion of their age. The more confidently they believe it themselves, the more confidently they believe others must think as they do.

This comes out somewhat amusingly in two sentences. 'The Church is simply a collective name for a number of *not very wise laymen*, superintended by clergymen who differ from the ordinary Anglican clergy principally in the colour of their spiritual veneering' (p. 526). Ten lines lower we read, 'I am entitled to appeal to the general conduct of the *lay world* as a plain proof that *mine* are the views usually entertained by *laymen*.' The lay world is thus divided into 'not very wise laymen,' and 'laymen who hold my views.' They, if not very wise, at least are wise. *Sapiunt quia sentiunt mecum.* This does not seem to me powerful or consecutive as reasoning. And when I recall to mind the belief of Englishmen in the Christian Revelation, and in the existence of God, it does not seem to me to be a true estimate of the laymen of the Church of England, or of the Established Kirk or of the Free Kirk of Scotland, or of the Nonconformists in either country. I hope I have said nothing disrespectful to

Mr. Stephen, for whom I entertain a true regard. It will not, I hope, give him pain if I add how well I am aware that to him Ultramontanism must be foolishness if, indeed, I am right in affirming Ultramontanism to be Christianity.

Although I cannot think that I shall be expected to enter upon the question whether God exists or no, as a necessary condition to the discussion of Ultramontanism, I cannot refrain from making certain remarks on Mr. Stephen's argument.

First, I am glad to see that he justly and truly appreciates the nature of the evidence which is to be expected or required for proving the existence of God. He says, 'I should not require a mathematical demonstration' (p. 503). It was probably, therefore, a slip of the pen when he wrote that I am not entitled to affirm the existence of God unless I affirm it as I would the proposition, 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space' (p. 504).

Secondly, I am not sure that I understand Mr. Stephen's comment on Bishop Butler's letter to Clarke, in reference to the book on the *Demonstration of the Being of God*. Does Mr. Stephen mean that Bishop Butler expressed himself to be in doubt as to the sufficiency of the proof for the existence of God? Butler says only that he cannot make up his mind to affirm that the proof is *demonstrative*. That he held the proof to be *certain* is beyond all question. He doubted only whether it reached the character of demonstration. We in England have affixed to the word *demonstration* a technical and second intention. We confine it to such

proofs as science, properly so called, can afford. Clarke used the word in its larger sense, as other languages of Latin origin are wont to do; intending to affirm that the moral certainty of the existence of God amounts to demonstration. It does, indeed, amount to a certainty beyond all doubt. But it cannot be stated in terms which involve the intrinsic impossibility of conceiving its contradictory, as in the propositions that 'two parallel lines can never meet,' 'the whole is greater than a part,' and the like. It was of this only that I understand Bishop Butler to hesitate.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Mr. Stephen has failed to state correctly the method of proving the Divine origin of Christianity and the Divine foundation of the Church.

He has treated it as a question of evidence from Scripture. Surely it is a question of facts. The documents of the New Testament may be offered in proof at a certain stage of the argument; but assuredly not at the outset.

Again, Mr. Stephen writes as if the *onus* of proving Christianity to be true rests upon us who believe it. But surely at this time of day the *onus* of proving it to be false or to be doubtful rests upon those who refuse to believe it. Meanwhile, *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*. The Christian world is in possession. It is a fact which must be accounted for before Christianity can be rejected. It is a visible fact, as palpable as the British Empire. It is a fact in history which can be traced up to its foundation. As the British Empire has its succession of sovereigns, its unwritten

and written laws, its legislature and its tribunals, its customs and traditions of public and private life, its documents and records: so has the Christian Church, more widely known, more profuse in evidence, more open to every kind of test. Like the British Empire, the Church has a corporate identity and living consciousness which are traceable up to the time of its Founder. Its account of itself rests upon a history which cannot be rejected without shaking all evidence, except the personal eye-witness and ear-witness of each man for himself. If we were to believe nothing but what we have seen, heard, and touched, the human mind would dwell in a blank isolation. The Divine origin of the Christian Church rests upon a history which cannot be shaken without shaking the foundations of all moral certainty. It rests upon a legitimate authority of direct evidence, the most explicit and uninterrupted to be found in all history. It claims our belief on the maximum of historical certainty. If its history is not to be believed, all history would be shaken.

S. Augustin says: 'Si auferatur hæc fides de rebus humanis, quis non attendat quanta rerum perturbatio, quam horrenda confusio subsequeretur' (*De Fide*, cap. 2, n. 4).

And Grotius: 'Pro rerum diversitate, diversa quoque sunt probandi genera. Alia in mathematicis, alia de affectionibus corporum, alia circa deliberationes, alia ubi facti est quæstio: in quo genere standum est nulla suspicione laborantibus testimoniis; quod nisi admittitur non modo omnis historiæ usus perit, medicinæ quoque pars magna, sed et omnis quæ inter parentes

liberosque est pietas, ut quos haud aliter noscamus' (*De Verit. Relig. Christ.* lib. ii. c. 29).

I use authority here, not in its official or jurisdictional sense, but in its etymological sense, for the motive of our belief or source of evidence. No witnesses have authority but those who are competent and veracious. All incompetent and unveracious witnesses are excluded as illegitimate, because wanting in the properties necessary for evidence. But the common sense and common lot of mankind compel us to believe much upon authority.

The whole formation of the human mind, *ante usum rationis*, is by necessity on authority, which is legitimate both by parental duty and by competence of reason.

The scientific knowledge of almost all men is received on authority.

The whole practice of medicine and surgery exacts submission to authority.

The whole historical knowledge of men rests upon two authorities which do not corroborate each other: first, on the authority of historical monuments and documents; and next, upon the authority of the historical critic.

This is no small tax on our submission, or credulity; and if we were not free to disbelieve every word of it, and if the value of a halfpenny or the slightest civil privilege depended upon it, we should perhaps rise against it. And yet to reject the authority of human history would be an irrational act, unworthy of reasonable men.

But why? Because its authority is measured by its evidence: because if the writers who give testimony to facts of the past be competent and veracious, they have a claim to be believed: above all, if they were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the facts they relate. They have then the highest certainty of sense and reason for what they record.

To affect to doubt the credibility of human history is the work of reckless or senseless men; it is to ruin the traditional basis of right, and law, and contracts, and moral obligations, and loyalty, and authority in the commonwealth and in human life.

For the truths of the natural order, which are the proper objects of moral and metaphysical philosophy, we have the legitimate authority of the monuments and documents of the old world; which testify to us the belief of mankind in the existence and nature of God, of the human soul, and of the primary distinctions of morality. This *communis consensus* is an authority sufficient to demand my attention. It is also a criterion whereby to distinguish these uniform and universal truths from the local partial idiosyncratic opinions of men or of ages. And yet though this be a *rule*, it is not the *motive* of my belief. I believe these truths on their own intrinsic evidence, which manifests them to my reason; and my reason reflecting on itself verifies the conformity of its own acts with these truths, and thereby generates in my reason a certainty which excludes the hesitations of probability and the entrance of doubt.

Again, the visible fact of the Christian world pro-

poses to my reason the maximum of evidence for the events upon which it rests. That evidence is the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. It is a part of their autobiography; their testimony was an adequate motive of credibility to those who heard them; the expansion of that testimony throughout the world, and its continuity through all ages, if it has not added to the *intrinsic* certainty of the facts, has in no way lessened it. But it has proportionally increased the *extrinsic* evidence by way of corroboration and accumulation, reaching up to the moment of the facts alleged. I affirm, therefore, that this authority is both competent and veracious, and for that reason legitimate; and that its action upon the human intellect is not by way of imperious command, but of the proposition of evidence. It comes and speaks to us clothed with the evidence of its testimony.

Authority is, therefore, not an imperious act substituting command for reason, *Sic volo sic jubeo stet pro ratione voluntas:* but it is reason and evidence speaking by a legitimate voice. Authority and evidence are thereby identical and convertible.

Bishop Butler has pointed out that the proof of Christianity does not rest wholly upon the probative force of particular evidences, but also upon the *cumulus* of a multitude of proofs and probabilities which amounts to moral certainty. He says: 'Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things reaching as it seems from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up all

of them together one argument; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call *the effect* in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view.'[1]

Again, he says: 'Admitting the fact that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible, surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault, it deserves their most serious consideration whether it be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt; and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligation as demonstrative evidence.'[2]

Now though I have not called upon Mr. Stephen to admit my claim to be 'his spiritual master,' on the arguments offered in the essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, I fully admit that I have bound myself to justify my assertions that the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own sphere supreme. This is my thesis, and this has been attacked. This I am in duty bound to defend, and with this only I have now to do. If the Lord Chief Justice had delayed judgment the other day until counsel had argued the Mosaic cosmogony, the lawful heir of the Tichborne estates would still be long kept out of his rights. I will not, then, be captured by the temptation to discuss even the

[1] *Analogy*, part ii. chap. vii.
[2] Ibid., conclusion.

existence of God, though I admit it to be fundamental, not only to Ultramontanism, but to the civilisation of man; and that because in this present contention it is so remote as to be irrelevant.

I am addressing those who believe Christianity to be a Divine Revelation.

I will therefore dismiss from this contention the two first of Mr. Stephen's four theses, namely:

1. There is a God.

2. The historical statements of the Apostles' Creed are all true in fact, and amount to an account of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.

And I accept as a duty the maintenance of the third and fourth:

3. Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church.

4. My Church is the Church so established.

For the present I will confine myself to the third thesis.

And in proof of this I will offer in this article only the evidence of non-Catholic witnesses.

The point we have in hand is this, that the Church is separate and supreme.

I. The Established Church of England affirms to this day, in its whole ecclesiastical law and by the teaching of its highest authorities, that the Church of Jesus Christ is a society separate in its spiritual constitution from all civil powers, and within its own sphere of doctrine and discipline supreme. In making this assertion I shall not be misunderstood to mean that the Established Church has preserved its spiritual supre-

macy in doctrine and discipline. I may refer to the first essay in a volume lately published, in which I have expressly shown that the change effected by the 24 and 25 of Henry VIII. has reduced its spiritual powers to subjection. Nevertheless the spiritual supremacy in doctrine and discipline is in *theory* explicitly recognised in the very statutes by which in practice it has been suspended. The claim pretended by constitutional lawyers from Lord Coke downwards, that the Acts of Henry VIII. did not create any new jurisdiction in the Crown, but only restored its ancient supremacy, is enough alone to prove this point. No man of ordinary knowledge will pretend that the Catholic Church in England prior to Henry VIII. was not in perfect communion of doctrine and discipline with the Church throughout the world; and no man will venture to say, with S. Gregory VII. and S. Thomas of Canterbury before his eyes, that the Catholic Church did not claim and vindicate to itself its spiritual supremacy in faith and morals. If anybody has doubts as to the independence and spiritual supremacy within its own sphere of the Church of England from its first foundation, I may refer to the essay already mentioned, and to such works as Spelman's *Councils*, Wilkins' *Concilia*, and the collections of Mr. Haddan and Mr. Stubbs. The doctrine cannot be better summed up than in the following passages. Of the Anglican Councils, after speaking of the provincial and diocesan synods, &c., Mr. Wilkins says:

'Besides these councils in the time of the Anglo-Saxons, convened for the affairs of the commonwealth, there met also synods

of the clergy, in which the bishops as ecclesiastical judges presided, and promulgated rules and statutes in matters purely ecclesiastical. And if at any time during the session of the civic councils there were any urgent necessity to treat of ecclesiastical questions, the bishops used to withdraw from the convention of the State to an ecclesiastical synod, to decide on points affecting the welfare of the Church; and their decrees sometimes received the assent of Parliament, and in this manner acquired the authority of the laws of the kingdom, in addition to their force as the canons of the Church.

To these synodical assemblies of the Saxon times we must add other ecclesiastical councils, which, so long as they had no civil character, were held at the summons of the archbishop, by the suffragan bishop and prelates. The kings with their nobles attended them *by invitation;* and such of their proceedings as they approved obtained the royal assent. If any ecclesiastical canons were made in synod in the king's absence, they were enjoined on the whole Anglican clergy by the decree of the custos and nobles of the kingdom and the king's counsellors in the next convention. None of the determinations of the ecclesiastical councils were regarded as *public statutes* unless approved and confirmed by the supreme power of the sovereign.'

After the Conquest, Wilkins says:

'When ecclesiastical matters were to be treated, the legate of the Pope, or the archbishop, with the consent, sometimes by the order, of the king, caused a mandate for the holding of a synod to be published, the meeting of which mostly coincided with the state assemblies or festivals, so that the king might be present to conduct the proceedings, and either restrain or confirm them. In the king's absence abroad, the archbishop had from him authority to convene the bishops and prelates, even when the great councils were not held' (Wilkins' *Dissertatio de veteri et moderna Synodi Anglicanæ constitutione*, viii., prefixed to the *Concilia*).

Johnson's account is as follows:

'During the time of our Saxon and even Danish kings, the bishops were in full possession of the power of making as well as executing canons; nor does it appear that they ever abused it to the hurt of civil government. Our kings were so far from apprehending any mischief from ecclesiastical synods, or from send

ing their prohibitions to them, that they often honoured these assemblies with the presence of themselves and their nobility, without interposing in their debates or giving any stop or impediment to their definitions. The Norman princes never attempted to diminish or interrupt the archbishop's ancient right and practice of assembling synods, and making such canons and ecclesiastical provisions as were deemed necessary or seasonable. But after the Pope had set himself up for sovereign in *temporals* as well as spirituals, and in order to exercise this sovereignty had introduced his canon law into all nations that were in communion with him, and had a number of men in every country ready to execute his will and pleasure, in opposition to the *civil* government, and to its great detriment, our kings saw it necessary to check the arrogance of the Pope, and his creatures here in England, by sending prohibition to the bishops in their synods (that they might make no canons to *the injury of the king's prerogative* and of the civil constitution) and in their courts, that they might put no such canon in execution. . . . But still the authority of enacting canons and constitutions in matters merely *spiritual*, and the cognisance of such causes, remained untouched, entirely in the hands of the convocation as to the *enactive* part, and of the prelates as to the *executive*.

Though the Saxon bishops had an unlimited power of making canons, yet we have many laws relating to matters merely spiritual enacted by kings in their great councils or civil gemotes. This may seem to some to have been an intrenchment on the authority of the bishops. To this it has been answered that the bishops, without whom no great council was held, retired into a place by themselves in order to draw up and enact laws relating to religion, as was the practice in some neighbouring countries. And I will not deny that this might sometimes be done. Yet when I see here and there an ecclesiastical law interspersed among a great number of such as are purely temporal, at other times almost an equal number of ecclesiastical and civil laws mutually succeeding each other in the same system, at other times two or three ecclesiastical laws dropped into a set of temporal, and *vice versâ*, temporal among ecclesiastical,—I am inclined to believe that both sorts of laws were made by an amicable conjunction of both powers. *In truth the old Saxon laws and English statutes made in relation to the Church were in effect only civil sanctions of old canons or grants made to the Church of some civil privileges* which she enjoyed not before, or a reinforcement of such grant with penalties annexed; and there could be no

reason why the bishops and clergy should not accept the assistance of kings and great men for these purposes. . . . I do not remember a single instance of a law (before the Conquest) but what any bishop upon the principles of that age might fairly consent to, and no law relating to the Church or religion but what may justly be thought to have been promoted, if not postulated, by the prelates. And I take the Articles of Clarendon (A.D. 1164) to be the first instance in our history of making laws that bishops did not care to sign' (Johnson's *Ecclesiastical Laws*, part i. Preface, xxiii. xxiv.).

I have given these quotations in full, because they will afford the best prelude and exposition of the celebrated Act of 24 Henry VIII., by which religion in England has been made to depend upon the civil power. We have seen that the Church in England was from the first recognised as a spiritual society of Divine foundation, invested with Divine authority, both legislative and judicial, independent of all civil powers, and in matters of doctrine and spiritual discipline supreme. The frequent violations of this Divine authority, and the royal customs which usurped upon this independence, are simple violations and usurpations, which in no way extinguish or annul the Divine rights and powers of the Church. The encroachments of the royal power were ever advancing from the Conquest to the reign of Henry VIII. In the reign of Henry II. they were checked and thrown back for a while by the martyrdom of S. Thomas of Canterbury. Afterwards they revived again and gathered strength, and at last grew to a head in the reign of Henry VIII., under the form and title of the Royal Supremacy. Nevertheless it will be found that in theory the Divine foundation, authority, rights, powers, and office of the Church both in doctrine and discipline were still recognised in the

fatal statute which rent England from the Catholic faith and unity. The preamble of the 24 of Henry VIII. runs as follows:

'Whereby divers sundry and authentick Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme Head and King, having Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same: Unto whom a Body politick, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms and by names of Spirituality and Temporality, been bounden and owen to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience: He being also institute and furnished, by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God, with plenary whole and entire Power, Pre-eminence, Authority, Prerogative, and Jurisdiction, to render and yield Justice and final determination to all manner of folk, resiants or subjects within this his Realm, in all Causes, Matters, Debates and Contentions happening to occur, insurge or begin within the limits thereof, without restraint or provocation to any foreign Princes or Potentates of the World: The Body Spiritual whereof having power, when any cause of the Law Divine happened to come in question, or of Spiritual Learning, that it was declared, interpreted and shewed by that part of the Body politick called the Spirituality, now being usually called the English Church.'[3]

The preamble affirms the following points:

1. That the realm of England has only one supreme head and king.

2. That the body politic subject to that supreme head is divided into spiritualty and temporalty.

3. That the body spiritual has power, when any cause of the law divine or of spiritual learning should come in question, to declare and interpret, and that part of the body politic called the spiritualty was called usually the English Church.

[3] 'On the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the Church of England, 24 Henry VIII. cap. 12: For the Restraint of Appeals;' Gibson's *Codex*, ol. ii. p. 924 (Oxford, 1761).

The effect, therefore, of this statute was, as its title declares, to restrain appeals by excluding all authority of the Holy See. As regards, indeed, the universal Church, this statute violates both unity and faith: but as regards the constitution of the local Church in England it made no organic change. The two provinces of Canterbury and York, with their spiritual jurisdiction, tribunals, and judges for doctrine and for discipline, remained as before. They were, however, paralysed and annulled by the erection of an appellate jurisdiction higher than the Court of the Metropolitan, and vested in the Crown. Against this it was, among other things, that S. Thomas of Canterbury contended to the death. One of the Constitutions of Clarendon runs as follows: 'Ab archidiacono debebit procedi ad episcopum, ab episcopo, ad archiepiscopum, et si archiepiscopus defuerit in justicia exhibenda ad Dominum Regem perveniendum est postremo.' The jurisdiction and tribunals of Archdeacons, Bishops, and Archbishops in both cases were left intact, though they might be annulled in the last resort; but even in this case, as we shall see hereafter, it has been done, not by denying the spiritual rights and powers of the Church, but under the plea of reviewing and correcting the forms of procedure. Throughout the whole of the Tudor legislation, notwithstanding the encroachments of the Crown and Parliament, and the actual violations of liberties and office of the Church, its Divine constitution, rights and powers, synods and tribunals, for doctrine and for discipline, were always explicitly recognised and professedly respected. I can hardly think it necessary to load this

article with quotations in proof of this assertion. The members of the Anglican Church will certainly not require it, excepting those only who represent the small Erastian school, which has always existed in it. It may nevertheless be as well to show in what language the highest authorities of the Anglican Church have spoken in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, on the Divine authority of the Church, its unbroken succession, the powers of the keys and of ordination, the deposit of the faith, and the teaching and judicial office of the Church.

Bishop Bilson says, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth:

'The Apostles' charge to teach, baptise, and administer the Lord's Supper, to bind and loose sinners in heaven and in earth, to impose hands for the ordaining pastors and elders: these parts of the apostolic function and charge are not decayed and cannot be wanting in the Church of God. There must either be no Church, or else these must remain; for without these no Church can continue.'[4]

In the same manner Hooker says:

'In that they are Christ's ambassadors and His labourers, who should give them their commission, but He whose most inward affairs they manage? Is not God alone the Father of spirits? Are not souls the purchase of Jesus Christ? What angel in heaven could have said to man, as our Lord did unto Peter, Feed My sheep; preach, baptise; do this in remembrance of Me; whose sins ye retain they are retained, and their offences in heaven pardoned whose faults you shall on earth forgive?'[5]

Jeremy Taylor says:

'If Antichrist shall exalt himself above all that is called God,

[4] Bilson, *Perpetual Government of Christ's Church*, chap. ix. p. 156, Oxford edition, 1842.

[5] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book v. sect. 77.

and in Scripture none but kings and priests are such—*Dii vocati, Dii facti*—I think we have great reason to be suspicious that he that divests both of their power . . . does the work of Antichrist for him . . . especially . . . if the discipline or government which Christ hath instituted is that kingdom by which He governs all Christendom . . . when they . . . throw Christ out of His kingdom.'[6]

Bishop Beveridge, speaking of the succession of Bishops, says: 'By which means the same Spirit which was breathed by our Lord into His Apostles is together with their office transmitted to their lawful successors the pastors and governors of our Church at this time; and acts, moves, and assists at the administration of the several parts of the Apostolic office in our days as much as ever.'[7]

Almost any amount of quotations might be added from Andrewes, Hall, Laud, Bramhall, Hammond, Pearson, and a host of others. I will, however, add but one more witness, and that because his language is identical with that which is to be found in 'Cæsarism and Ultramontanism.' In the midst of the controversy between Atterbury and Wake and Kennet, on the subject of the Royal Supremacy and the independence of the Church, Leslie, one of the best defenders of the Church of England, writes thus:

'I intend not to interpose in this dispute: only this use I have to make of it, that both parties do now happily agree in the original and inherent rights of the Church as a society *distinct* from and *independent* upon the State, even when the State is Christian. This Dr. Kennet does frankly declare to be the chief end that moved him to write his book, viz. "to assert the nature of the Christian Church as a society endowed with fundamental

[6] *Taylor on Episcopacy*, Introduction.
[7] Beveridge, *Sermon on Christ's Presence.*

rights to preserve its own being; and among these a right for the governors to assemble and agree upon the common measures of faith and unity as at first independent on the heathen, so even now on the Christian magistrate, when the necessities of desertion or persecution so require." The Christian Church was endowed as a society, with a Divine right of preserving the faith and securing the discipline that should be necessary to hinder the gates of hell from prevailing against her. In order to this end the Church governors had authority to meet and consult upon all urgent affairs.'

Leslie says that Kennet quarrels with Atterbury, because

'He claims no Divine right; he quotes not one text for the Divine right of councils . . . he proposes no one reason for the necessity of such an inherent and original power in the Church: he does not labour to prove that Christian magistrates cannot retract nor a national clergy recede from antecedent rights; he waives the Christian, and acts only the Englishman. I am sorry the Church of England has come to that pass, that to assert her only rights is to waive the Christian. Have not our laws confirmed to her all the rights belonging to a Christian Church? if not, sure they should be mended.'

I may say that Leslie's whole work, from beginning to end, affirms as the doctrine of the Established Church of England, that the Christian Church, and the Church of England as a part of it, is a society separate from all civil powers, and in the exercise of its spiritual office in doctrine and discipline independent and supreme. I will therefore add only a few more passages:

'If the independence of the Church not only on heathen but Christian magistrates be an original, inherent, and Divine right, with which Christ has invested her, it ought always to be maintained; good princes will be most willing to allow it, but if granted to them others will not part with it; nor will they endure to have their encroachments on the rights of the Church called either persecution or desertion; and they will always find time-servers and flatterers to support them in it.'

He says it is the duty of bishops and priests

'To tell them [civil rulers], and not to fear they will be displeased at it, that Christ is *above them*, and His Church too, and *independent* on them: that they themselves are part of her flock, and so *subject* to her discipline, and in that capacity as well as any other, though entirely and without reserve, subject to them in all temporals.'

'Again, if bishops will not exercise that power which Christ has given them, they are accountable to their Lord for it: but they cannot give it away neither from themselves nor from their successors, for it is theirs only to use, not to part with.' . . .

'This makes short work with the submission: let lawyers, therefore, look to it, how they can reconcile it with this great and fundamental truth; if not, then down it must come. The bishops are no ways concerned: let them try whether any judge in Westminster Hall will hold up an Act of Parliament against the Gospel, or say that they are more proper judges of the Gospel than the bishops. Let Erastus show his face without a vizard; it is the only way to overthrow him effectually. You need not be afraid that any Christian will fall in love with him. But if the bishops will submit themselves to his yoke, who can speak in their defence? Some would let them go, if religion did not go with them; and that is the reason why others would have them gone. They find the keys of their discipline hung at the belt of Erastus; and some would persuade them that it is best so, lest Pharaoh increase their burdens; and that to think of a deliverance is to put a sword in his hand to slay us!'[8]

There is nothing contained in the essay of 'Cæsarism and Ultramontanism' more explicit than these passages. They assert the Divine foundation, the Divine authority, the Divine office of the Church in doctrine and discipline, its judicial office by the power of the keys, its independence of the State, and its ultimate and supreme power in the sphere of spiritual things over all civil powers, as abundantly and as precisely as I have done. The re-

[8] Leslie, 'Preface to the Case of the Regale and Pontificate;' *Works*, vol. iii. (Oxford, 1832).

lation of the Established Church to the Crown and civil power has always been justified in the following, or in similar terms. They have said:

'1. It is an article of our Baptismal Faith that the Church of Christ is a Divine Kingdom; in this world, but not of it; governed by its Divine Head through the Pastors whom He has lineally commissioned to feed His flock; that to His Church He intrusted the custody of the Faith and Holy Sacraments—or, as we say, of doctrine and discipline—with full spiritual power to administer and to rule in all things pertaining to the salvation of souls, by His authority and in His Name. For the perpetuity of the Church, and for the preservation of the truth, He has pledged His own perpetual presence and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

'From all which revealed promises and principles of His Divine Kingdom it follows that the Church, in all things relating to the custody of doctrine and discipline, possesses a sole, supreme, and final power, under the guidance of its Divine Head, and responsible to Him only.

'2. And further, we believe that the Church in England, as a member or province of this Divine Kingdom, possesses *in solidum*, by inherence and participation in the whole Church, the inheritance of the Divine tradition of faith, with a share in this full and supreme custody of doctrine and power of discipline, partaking for support and perpetuity, in its measure and sphere, the same guidance as the whole Church at large, of which, by our Baptism, we have been made members.

'3. The Church in England, then, being thus an

integral whole, possesses within itself the fountain of doctrine and discipline, and has no need to go beyond itself for succession, orders, mission, jurisdiction, and the office to declare to its own members, in matters of faith, the intention of the Catholic Church. On this ground alone the present relation of the Church in England to the Church of the East and of the West can be justified. We trust that the spiritual organisation of the Church, which, through Saxon, Norman, and English periods of our history, has united this great Christian people, surviving through all perils and mutilations, contains still within itself the whole doctrine and discipline, the faith and power descending from its Divine Head.

'So far from exalting the insular position of the Church in England into a normal state, we lament the unhappy suspension of communion which divides the visible Church of Christ. But we trust that as, in the period of the great Western schism, the Churches of Spain, France, Germany, and many others were compelled to fall back within their own limits, and to rest upon the full and integral power which by succession they possessed for their own internal government; so the Church in England has continued to be a perfect member of this Divine Kingdom, endowed with all that is of necessity to the valid ministry of the Faith and Sacraments of Christ.

'On these grounds our chief writers and canonists have rested the defence of the English Church, and it is of vital necessity that the principles of this defence should not be violated.

'4. By this we see at once what is the office and relation of the civil power towards the Church at large, and in England in particular, namely, to protect, uphold, confirm, and further this, its sole, supreme, and final office, in all matters of doctrine and discipline. The joint but independent action of the spiritual and civil powers from our earliest history may be traced through the succession of our Councils and Parliaments —the king expressing and exercising the sum of the civil power, the archbishop of the spiritual,[9] of which joint action the celebrated preamble of the 24th of Henry VIII. 12 is a recital and proof.

'5. The Royal Supremacy is, therefore, strictly and simply a civil or temporal power over all persons and causes in *temporal* things, and over ecclesiastical persons and causes in the *temporal* and *civil accidents* attaching to them. It is in itself in no sense spiritual or ecclesiastical—understanding the word ecclesiastical to mean anything beyond a *civil* power accidentally applied to ecclesiastical persons or causes.

'An Anglican would further add, that he knows of no supremacy in ecclesiastical matters inherent in the civil power or prince, but either (1) such power as all princes, Christian or heathen, alike possess; or (2) such as has been received by delegation from the Church itself.

'As to the first or original prerogative, Constantine, before his conversion, had as full a supremacy as after it; Julian, after his apostasy, had no less. S. Augustin says: "Qui Augusto imperium dedit ipse et Neroni

[9] Stillingfleet, *Ecclesiastical Cases*, vol. ii. p. 91.

. . . qui Constantino Christiano ipse Apostatæ Juliano."[10] The supremacy was simply a supreme dominion of power and coercion by the civil sword.

'As to the derived or delegated supremacy, it amounts to no more than a supreme power over all the forms and processes in which the *coercive* jurisdiction of the Church in Christian States has been clothed. It is neither legislative nor judicial by way of *discretion* or *determination*[11] in any matter relating to the faith or discipline of the Church.'

If I were to object to such an Anglican argument, that the Convocations and tribunals of the Established Church have been again and again violently overborne by the Crown and Parliament, or by the Crown in Council, as, for instance, in the decisions in the case of Mr. Gorham and in the case of the *Essays and Reviews*, it might be said that violence does not make law; and that though the Established Church suffers the intrusion of false doctrines, that does not alter its spiritual office; and, moreover, that the judges of the Privy Council recognise that spiritual office by expressly declaring that they are incompetent to judge as to the *truth* of any doctrine, and use their jurisdiction only to inquire what doctrines may *legally* be held and taught by the clergy of the Established Church. It is not my purpose now to point out the reach and bearing of this answer in relation to Catholic truth and unity.

[10] S. Aug., *De Civit. Dei*, lib. v. c. 21.

[11] Beveridge, *Synodicon Prolegomena*, tom. i. p. 11: 'Leges civiles non præcedere debent sed sequi ecclesiasticas.'

I adduce it only to show that theoretically the law of England at this moment recognises the spiritual office of the Church, and its exclusive competence in determining the truth of doctrine, and therein of judging whether and when its spiritual office and its doctrines are invaded. It was therefore strictly accurate to say, as I have said, that the Established Church of England affirms as broadly as I did that the Christian Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere superior to them. It was, I believe, a profound consciousness of this truth which caused the conspicuous absence of the Anglican clergy from the late meetings at St. James's Hall and Exeter Hall. Self-respect made it impossible for them to take part in stirring up a No-Popery cry, and the consciousness that the Falck laws are a tyrannous violation of the Divine constitution and office of the Church, as they themselves believe it, restrained them both in conscience and in justice from countenancing the outrages and persecution of the Prussian Government.

In thus drawing out the historical and legal theory of the Established Church in its relations to the civil power, I do not forget that a large latitudinarian and rationalistic section of its members would in practice refuse its spiritual office and authority. I must, however, affirm that the still larger numbers of its clergy and of its members who hold the theory and principles I have here drawn out are the truer representatives of its history and of its legal rights. Still less do I forget the habitual violations of these rights at all times, and in all reigns, for three hundred years. No one in these

days can forget for a moment the appeals to the Crown in Council, and the legalising of false doctrine within the Established Church. These very facts have brought out into greater relief and fuller light the theory and claims of the Established Church as it exists on paper. It has, moreover, spread throughout a large part of its clergy and people a desire of separation from the civil power as the only way of obtaining independence. And lastly, it has called forth from many of the highest and best minds in the Establishment an outspoken declaration that they do not and will not recognise the sentences or judgments or condemnations of the Crown in Council, either as affecting the Anglican Establishment or as binding in any way upon their conscience. Such men, if consistent, may one day form a Free Kirk in England.

II. What has hitherto been proved from the documents of the Established Church in England may be even more easily proved from the documents of the Kirk of Scotland.

'Presbyter is but Priest writ large.'

In the first chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline*, under the title of 'The Kirkis Jurisdiction is of God, and is groundit on the Word,' we read:

'The Kirk . . . has a certain power granted by God, according to the which it uses a proper jurisdiction and government exercised to the comfort of the whole Kirk. This power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the Mediator Jesus Christ unto His Kirk gathered, and having the ground in the Word of God to be put in execution by them, unto whom the spiritual government of the Kirk by lawful calling is committed.

'The policy of the Kirk flowing from this power is an order

or form of spiritual government which is exercised by the members appointed thereto by the Word of God: and therefore is given *immediately* to the office-bearers, by whom it is exercised to the weal of the whole body.'

Under the title 'The difference betwixt the spiritual and civil jurisdiction,' we read:

'This power and policy ecclesiastical is different and distinct in the own nature from that power and policy ecclesiastical which is called the civil power, and appertains to the civil government of the Commonwealth, albeit they be both of God. . . . .

For this power ecclesiastical flows *immediately* from God and the Mediator Jesus Christ, and is spiritual, *not having a temporal head on earth* but only Christ, the only spiritual king and governor of His Kirk.

It is a title falsely usurped by Antichrist to call himself head of the Kirk, and ought not to be attributed to angel or man, of what estate that ever he be, saving to Christ, the only Head and Monarch of the Kirk.

Therefore this power and policy of the Kirk should lean upon the Word *immediately* as the *only* ground thereof, and should be taken from the pure fountains of the Scriptures, *the Kirk hearing the voice of Christ, the only spiritual King*, and being ruled by His laws.

Notwithstanding as the ministers and others of the ecclesiastical estate are subject to the magistrate civil, so ought the person of the magistrate be subject to the Kirk spiritually and ecclesiastical government. And the exercise of both these jurisdictions cannot stand in one person ordinarily. The civil power is called the power of the sword, and the other the power of the keys.

The civil power should command the spiritual to exercise and do their office according to the Word of God: the spiritual rulers should require the Christian magistrate to administer justice and punish vice, and to maintain the liberty and quietness of the Kirk within their bounds.

The magistrate handles external things only and actions done for men; but the spiritual ruler judges both inward affections and external actions in respect of conscience by the Word of God.

The magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacra

ments, nor execute the censures of the Kirk, nor yet *prescribe any rule how it should be done.*

Finally, as ministers are subject to the judgment and punishment of the magistrates in external things if they offend, so ought the magistrates to submit themselves to the discipline of the Church if they transgress in matters of conscience and religion.'

In the third chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline* is prescribed how persons are admitted to ecclesiastical office. Besides the inward calling of God is required the outward calling of the Kirk; and this has two parts—election and ordination. In the election must be the judgment of the eldership and the consent of the congregation. No intrusion contrary to these two conditions is valid.

In the tenth chapter, 'Of the Office of a Christian Magistrate in the Kirk,' Christian princes are said to be

'Holden to advance the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, to be nourishers of the Kirk, to maintain, foster, uphold, and defend it against all hurt. . . . Also to assist and maintain the discipline of the Kirk, and punish them civilly that will not obey the censure of the same, *without confounding always the one jurisdiction with the other.* . . . To make laws and constitutions agreeable to God's Word, for advancement of the Kirk and policy thereof; without usurping anything that pertains not to the civil sword, but belongs to the offices that are merely ecclesiastical, as is the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, using of ecclesiastical discipline and the spiritual execution thereof, or any part of the power of the spiritual keys which our Master gave to the Apostles and their true successors.'

We have here in the amplest terms the separate existence of the spiritual power, its independence, its direct authority derived from its own Head, its supremacy within its own sphere over the civil State and civil rulers, its exclusive power to make spiritual laws, to pronounce spiritual judgments, to elect and ordain its

own ministers, in absolute independence of all persons and powers of the civil State, and its right to invoke the secular arm to enforce by civil process the discipline and the judgments in which it admits neither of appeal nor review.

It would be waste of time to trace out the history of the Kirk since these decrees were made. It gave pretty good evidence of its independence and supremacy in the seventeenth century, when it bound kings in chains and nobles in links of iron. It vindicated these great laws of liberty of conscience by noble histories of suffering unto bonds and death under the persecutions of Charles II.

III. Direct and explicit as the evidence of the Kirk of Scotland is in proof of my assertion, the witness of the Free Kirk is still more decisive. Between the Established Kirk and the Free Kirk there is no particle of difference either in doctrine or discipline; the sole cause of the Disruption was the refusal of the Free Kirk to recognise the jurisdiction of any civil court in the call of ministers. They regarded the acquiescence of the Established Kirk in the claims of the civil courts to be at variance with their duty towards Christ, and fatal to the independence of His Church. On the 18th of May 1843, four hundred and seventy-four ministers, headed by Dr. Chalmers, accompanied by a great body of elders and multitudes of people, separated themselves from the Established Kirk. By that act they revived in all their precision and intensity the principles of spiritual independence and supremacy declared by the *Second Book of Discipline*.

IV. Lastly, it can hardly be necessary to trace the history of what are called the Free Churches of England. They came into existence by a refusal of the Royal Supremacy in religious and ecclesiastical matters. This one principle of spiritual independence and liberty of conscience within the sphere of religion has created the Brownists, the Puritans, the Presbyterians, the Independents, the Baptists, and all Nonconformists of every name. For this one principle for two hundred and fifty years they suffered civil disfranchisement, penalties, imprisonment, capital punishment, exile, contempt, and every form of contumely and privation galling to upright and honourable men. In all these sufferings they had companions, who, though differing from them in the most sacred truths, nevertheless agreed with them in this, that the faith and the Church of Jesus Christ are 'neither of men nor by men, but by the Holy Ghost,' and that the authority of revealed truth is supreme over all civil powers. Nonconformists and Catholics lay bound in the same prisons and suffered on the same scaffold, and, notwithstanding their wide divergence of faith, in this point at least they suffered for the same cause.

It would be easy to go on multiplying historical evidence of what I have affirmed, but I think that enough has been already offered to justify the main assertion, which has caused the criticism of Mr. Stephen. I had said: 'All freedom of soul and conscience, in men, in families, and in States, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from superior authority.

That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian Monarchy is law; and that law the law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation.' These words read like a quotation from the *Second Book of Discipline*, or from the Anglican Leslie. There is not a syllable which does not fall within the limits of the Free Kirk of Scotland.

I further affirmed what follows: 'Now what I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone: it is Christianity as it has been held by all men in all ages, by Catholics and by Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England, whose noble and pathetic history has just been written on the eve, as I fear, of their apostasy from the high and heroic spirit of their founders and fathers in patience and fidelity to the great law of Christian liberty in Jesus Christ.'

I then added: That Ultramontanism consists

1. In the separation of the two powers (spiritual and civil), and the vesting them in different persons;

2. In claiming for the Church the sole right to define doctrines of faith and morals; and

3. To fix the limits of its own jurisdiction in that sphere.

I affirm, then, once more that these three principles are held by Anglicans, by Presbyterians, by Nonconformists of every name; and, further, that they are of

the substance of Christianity; that no man can deny any one of them without denying the office, and even the existence, of the Christian Church, or without affirming the preposterous and monstrous doctrine that the revelation of Divine truth is to be judged and disposed of by royal mandates, legislative enactments, and civil tribunals, which is the lowest and basest form of Erastianism. *Cujus regio ejus religio.* Surely this is a denial of Revelation altogether. Why not say so at once?

I therefore affirm again that every Christian, who believes that Christianity is a Divine Revelation, must also believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities, and is dependent upon the authority of God alone, whether that Divine authority make itself known by its own action in the isolated conscience of each individual man, or in the assembly of each Christian sect, or in the congregation of a Presbytery, or by the acts of an Episcopate, or by the voice of the Visible Head of the Universal Church. The forms, indeed, are different; the principle is one and the same. The Revelation of God is sustained and promulgated to the world by the authority of God Himself, in independence of all civil authorities, and in supremacy over them all.

This is the claim I have, therefore, made for the Catholic Church, abstracting from all forms of visible order and external polity; and I submit that Mr. Stephen's third thesis is maintained explicitly by the Anglican Establishment, the Established Kirk, the Free Kirk of Scotland, and by all Nonconformists in

both countries: namely, that 'Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution (visible or invisible) and powers which I claim for my Church.' The answer, 'We ought to obey God rather than men,' carries the whole claim of Divine authority.

XIX.

CHRISTIANITY AND ANTICHRISTIANISM.

CHRISTIANITY AND ANTICHRISTIANISM.

I LAID down Mr. Stephen's first article on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism with disappointment; I have now read through his second with satisfaction; not, indeed, without regret. It is a still further and ampler confirmation of the assertion in my last paper, that the independence and supremacy of the Christian Church cannot be denied without denying the Christian revelation. Mr. Stephen has again explicitly done this, and in terms which I have no will to repeat.

As I read through his article I noted certain epithets, phrases, and figures of speech which struck me as hardly worthy of a grave subject or usual in educated writers. My first thought was to make a *catena* of them; but when I reached the end I felt that it would give to this article a character of personality. I decided, therefore, to disconnect altogether this manner of writing from the defence of Revelation, and indeed I hope I may say from myself. Nevertheless, though I shall refrain from reference to Mr. Stephen, I shall take in as we go on, and reply to, such of his arguments or assertions as are relevant to the point I have to maintain. Let me, therefore, re-state the purpose I have had in view.

In the essay on Cæsarism I condemned the Falck

laws and justified the resistance of the German Bishops on the ground that the civil power of Prussia had violated the spiritual office and liberty of the Church. Further, I justified this assertion by affirming that the Church has a spiritual authority, independent of all civil powers, and, within its own sphere of faith and morals, supreme. I was met by the charge that this is Ultramontanism. I answered by saying that it is Christianity; that, in this respect, Christianity and Ultramontanism are one and the same; that all Christian Churches, even while they disclaim infallibility, assert the same independence for themselves; that all Christians, even those who deny the institution of a visible Church, assert the same independence and supremacy of revealed truth conveyed to them by some channel or test of Divine certainty. It was, therefore, strictly relevant to bring forward Anglicans, Presbyterians, Free-Kirkmen, and Nonconformists as witnesses. Even these, while they deny infallibility, claim the same spiritual independence of all civil powers, and would regard the Falck laws as violations of religious liberty and of conscience.

For instance, neither the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor the Moderators of the Kirk or of the Free Kirk, nor the President of the Wesleyan Conference, nor any Nonconformist, would ordain or admit to their ministry any man not trained and tested by themselves. None of them would allow the claim of the civil power to decide who ought or who ought not to be excommunicated, or put out of his office as a religious teacher of youth. And this resistance would be offered on one

and the same principle, namely, that the Church visible, or invisible as some of them say, is independent of all civil powers, and in such questions supreme.

It is, therefore, of no use, it is simply irrelevant, to talk of the differences and mutual contradictions of these bodies.

If they be in contention with each other, so much the better for my argument. Multiply their contradictions as you will, you do but strengthen my proof. If, in spite of all contentions, they agree at least in this, then I claim it as a still stronger proof that such points as they hold in common are of the essence of Christianity. But they are also of the essence of Ultramontanism. This answer, then, is clear gain to my thesis.

The *Spectator* of April 4, 1874, has borne a direct testimony to the truth of my main position, namely, that in the claim to be, within the spiritual sphere, separate from all civil powers, and superior to them, Ultramontanism and Christianity are identical. It was for this precise reason that I forbore, in the last article, to quote any Catholic evidence. It was for this also that I widened out the proof from the extremes of Anglicanism to the extreme of Pietism. By this evidence I showed beyond contradiction that, whatsoever be the notions entertained by Christian bodies or sects as to the *form* or *constitution* of the Church, they all alike refuse to receive from the civil powers the definitions of doctrine, or the forms of worship, or the matter of religious belief; thereby declaring that Revelation has a jurisdiction over conscience separate from and superior to all prerogatives of Princes and all legislation of States.

The *Spectator* says that I have taken 'pains to prove what needed no proof, that most Christian Churches have hitherto, whether consistently or inconsistently with their practice, held highly anti-Erastian views, and generally assumed that a certain sort of spiritual infallibility was, somehow or other, within their reach. That is perfectly true, and, as we hold, a very natural mistake for a body, to which a Divine Revelation had been committed, to make.' It is strange that this error should be universal. Whether they all possess it or not, this common belief points to a truth which the *Spectator* has well put in these words: 'Nothing seems more natural *à priori* than that, if God reveals any truth to man, He should take precautions for exactly defining and preserving the truths so revealed—otherwise the revelation would be misunderstood, and, so far as it was misunderstood, would be no revelation.' The *Spectator* adds, that 'we are just beginning to understand that God has *not* done so.'[1] Of this we must speak hereafter.

I am, however, surprised that the thoughtful and candid writer in the *Spectator* should not perceive that the force of the argument is greatly increased by the fact that the same claim is made by every community of Christians 'in the widest possible acceptance of the terms.' To be separate, therefore, from civil powers and to be supreme in matters of faith—for this only, and not *infallibility*, is our present thesis—is not peculiar to Ultramontanism. It is universal in all Christian bodies and sects; all alike claim this independence and

[1] April 4, 1874, p. 442.

supremacy. I repeat this, and insist upon it for an obvious reason. It demonstrates the inconsiderateness or the bad faith of those who are endeavouring to crush Ultramontanism under the mountains of popular odium, suspicion, and Falck laws, on the charge that it claims to be independent of all civil powers, and, in the sphere of faith, supreme. So does every Christian Church, communion, and sect upon earth. Crush them all if you can. Be open and sincere. Cry *Ecrasez l'infâme*. Cry aloud and spare not. Let us know what you are, and we shall know how to meet you. Tell us at once that you are Antichristian. But do not profess to be Christians; do not pretend that you are believers in Christianity, or in a Divine Revelation. Now it was to take the mask off this pretence that I said in the essay which has provoked so much criticism, 'What I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men, in all ages, by Catholics and Protestants alike' ('Cæsarism and Ultramontanism,' p. 145).

I believe, indeed, that the reckless habit of talking and writing, common at this day, may have betrayed some men who sincerely believe in Christianity into the grave fault of denouncing Ultramontanism, without reflecting that in so doing they are destroying the base of their own Christian belief. But of this I am sure: the journals of the Revolution, which are at this time denouncing Ultramontanism with every form of calumny in all countries, and the foreign correspondents of our own newspapers, who are playing the same game in

England, are, with more or less of consciousness, writing down Christianity. They wish to pull down all Churches, to destroy Christian education, and to efface the Christian name. My purpose, then, has been to divide the camps; to show that the Christian Church claims independence and supremacy in all matters of Divine Revelation, not because it is Ultramontane, but because it is Christian; that if this be Ultramontanism, the Established Kirk of Scotland, the Wesleyan Conference, are all alike Ultramontane; and that the persistent reiteration of this stupid clamour is a proof of shallowness or of bad faith. I shall not be for a moment suspected of offering this dilemma to the courteous and evidently sincere critic in the *Spectator*.

One further remark in the *Spectator* ought to be noticed. The writer says that I have not proved that a Church has been founded 'with the constitutions and powers that I claim for my Church, but only that Christ has been hitherto generally understood by Christians in all ages to have done so.'[2] What further proof could I have offered? If Christians of all ages have so understood, who shall know better than they? The *Spectator* goes on to say that even this I have established only in the widest possible acceptation of the terms. That was precisely my intention.

For my answer is this. I have proved that the spiritual independence and supremacy of the Church is no question of 'constitutions' or 'forms,' but of the Divine authority of truth; that every Christian body, whether it hold the Church to be visible or invisible,

[2] *Spectator*, April 4, 1874, p. 442.

holds its authority as a teacher to be Divine, independent of all civil powers, and supreme in its own sphere. I am sure that the friend, whose words I quote without his leave or knowledge, will forgive me for doing so. An Independent minister of high and deserved influence, and of much cultivation, in a letter just received, writes as follows: 'I believe most earnestly in the Personal Comforter, Interpreter, and Guide. There is a sentence of Bishop Hoadley's which, much as I sympathise with some of Hoadley's views, seems to me about as far as possible from the truth. He says, "Christ, the chief captain of the army, being absent and invisible, instead of leaving officers whom His soldiers are bound to obey, has left orders in writing to be considered and consulted by every soldier in His army." I think that this expresses very fairly the popular Protestant view; but to me "orders in writing" in spiritual matters are a dreary substitute for a living guide, in whose perpetual presence I believe, and in whose guidance of the Church I trust.' He then adds, 'But I cannot see the kind of guidance which I seem taught to look for in any authoritative human organ, be it Council or Pope.'

In the act of rejecting 'any human organ,' which I also do as earnestly and peremptorily as this thoughtful writer, he affirms the existence of an order divinely guided for the perpetuity of truth. This is, in effect, a Church, 'in which there is neither Pope nor Council;' nevertheless it is a Divine organ of perpetual guidance in truth. The *Spectator* will not tell us that such 'a divinely guided Church' is neither independent of civil powers, nor in its spiritual office supreme. No or

has recognised this more clearly or affirmed it more broadly than the *Spectator* in many valuable articles.

I will now take up the main argument where I left it last time.

My thesis, then, is this: not only, as Mr. Stephen somewhat hastily supposes, that a Divine Revelation depends on God alone, a truism that he might easily have known to be unlikely to be found in his pages or in mine, but that the Revelation of Christianity has been so given and left, as Bishop Butler says, that the evidence for it in the natural order of human and historical evidence amounts to moral certainty; and, as the Catholic faith further affirms, that this certainty is also Divine.

The Act of Faith made by every Catholic contains two points: the first, 'I believe all that God has revealed;' the second, 'I believe all that the Church teaches;' or, in other words, 'I acknowledge God as the sole fountain of Revelation; and the Church as the sole channel of what He has revealed.'

Now in the last paper I have stated the position of those who believe the first of these two propositions. They rest on the moral certainty of human and historical evidence. I have now to go on and to state the position of those who believe that God has not only revealed His truth, but has made a Divine and imperishable provision for the custody, perpetuity, and promulgation of His truth to the world, that is to say, through the channel of His Church, divinely founded, divinely preserved from error, and divinely assisted in the declaration of truth.

With Schlegel I have affirmed, and I affirm again, that the maximum of evidence for the history of the past is to be found in the witness of the Catholic Church. I have pointed out how this witness contains in itself all the sources of truth, namely, sense, reason, testimony, and authority. I have affirmed that authority has two senses, obvious to any mind patient enough to think. In its popular sense it stands for command or rule; in its stricter sense it stands for the motive of belief. We say, 'I have this on the authority of an eye-witness.' In this way of speaking it is equivalent to evidence. I have, in this sense, affirmed that the authority of the Church is evidence of the Divine facts which it attests. The eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of those facts delivered their evidence to others. These again, after testing the evidence, believed on their authority. The authority of the Apostles was grounded on their personal evidence of the facts which they had seen and heard. There is no confusion of terms here. Words clink as men think; and it needs little art to make a jingle out of what we do not understand.

The witness, therefore, of the Catholic Church is both a motive of belief and the source from which we receive the evidence on which we believe the Divine facts of Christianity. That witness contains in itself the personal testimony of those who were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the facts they attested. Their testimony is intrinsically certain. To reject such evidence is to isolate the human mind, and to confine it in a state of irrational scepticism or self-sufficient ignorance of human history and of human life. Such a

scepticism destroys the moral relations of human society by destroying the trust which binds human life together; 'Perit,' as I quoted from Grotius, 'omnis quæ inter parentes liberosque est pietas, ut quos haud aliter noscamus.'

The witness of the Church, then, has ultimately this element of personal evidence and *intrinsic* certainty in itself. It has also the world-wide and accumulating *extrinsic* evidence of the whole of Christendom. If this *intrinsic* certainty never grows greater, at least it never grows less. It is the same to-day as it was in the beginning. Its safe custody and unchanged tradition is secured and attested by the *extrinsic* evidence of the whole Church from the beginning until now. Such was and is my argument. When any man says, in reply to this, 'How very true Buddhism and Brahminism must have grown by long keeping and earnest belief,' I can only hold my peace; especially when it is the same person who is telling others that they do not understand what proof or evidence means. Such things need no answer.

To expose this fully let us take a parallel.

The fact that Charlemagne was consecrated emperor by Pope Leo III. in the Basilica of St. Peter's on Christmas-eve in the year 800 is, I suppose, attested by the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses whose testimony is intrinsically certain. This fact laid the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, which, as Mr. Bryce tells us, lingered on till the year 1806. For a thousand years the nations of Christendom have believed in the fact and the place and the date and the agent

of that consecration. The tradition of Christendom has guarded and handed on that original testimony. It was intrinsically certain at the first. It has never become more certain or less certain in itself; but the extrinsic historical tradition which has guarded and delivered it to every successive age has attached to it an ever-accumulating security of its unchanged identity and truth.

Let me take another illustration. I remember hearing Lord Macaulay say that some day the New Zealanders may, perhaps, describe the conquest of their country as the exploit of two valorous chieftains called Lion and Unicorn, just as we describe the conquest of England by Hengist and Horsa. Now I suppose no calm man would believe that this fiction would become true by any extent or continuity of tradition, nor would think that any other man of sound mind could have ever said or thought that falsehood could grow into truth.

What is false in the beginning can never become true by any length of transmission; what in the beginning is true, if safely guarded from change, remains true for ever. It is of those who refuse to believe on the evidence of legitimate authority that our Lord said, 'They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them: if they hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe if one rise again from the dead.'

Let us, then, go on.

If there be a fact of past history adequately proved by an unbroken succession of witnesses running up from our time to the time of its occurrence, and to the

evidence of those who saw and heard what they attested, it is the institution of the Christian Church by its Divine Founder, and its spread throughout the world by those to whom He gave commission and commandment for that purpose. If there be any continuous history, unbroken in its tradition, sedulously recorded in its chief events, diligently maintained in all the links of its succession, it is the history of the world-wide Episcopate of the Church. Every episcopal see became the guardian of its unwritten and written testimony. At every succession of its Bishops the rightful order and validity of every act by which its authority and witness were transmitted were guarded by the most vigilant and jealous care. What was done at Jerusalem and Antioch and Alexandria and Rome was done in every episcopal see founded in every city, however small and remote, in the album of Imperial Rome. The whole Empire became conscious that there had arisen in the midst of it an organised and universal system, absolutely one in its corporate existence, and in the mutual relations and inter-communion of its members. It was conscious also that this system did not spring from itself, nor depend on its authority; that it lived a life apart from the Empire; that its laws and its customs, its tribunals and its jurisdiction, were wholly its own and supreme within itself. The Empire legislated against it as a 'religio illicita' and as a 'societas illicita.' The Imperial power strove for three hundred years to sweep it out from its borders. But there it was. And there it is to this day. If cut down it sprang up again. If thinned by persecution it multi-

plied itself more rapidly. Its organisation, if broken, always renewed itself. The succession of its Bishops could never be cut off. When one fell another rose; and that, not here and there, but everywhere. It confronted the Prætors in the provinces and the Cæsars on the Palatine Hill. Everywhere it said the same thing. Everywhere it claimed to be independent of all civil powers, and within its Divine office supreme. And for that independence and supremacy of its spiritual office it went everywhere, and gladly, to prison and to death. If, I say, there can be found a historical fact in the world which commands the belief of rational men, it is the history of the Christian Church—a history which alone solves the phenomenon of its present visible existence, its world-wide presence, and its perfect identity in every place. The history of the Sovereigns of England is not more evidently traceable than the history of the Roman Pontiffs; the history of the Parliaments of England is not more patent than the history of the Œcumenical Councils, which for eighteen hundred years have legislated for the Catholic Church. If there be anything provable by historical evidence it is, that the Catholic Church from the beginning has claimed, and by suffering has vindicated, its spiritual independence and supremacy. This claim is not more evident, by reason of its uniform and universal assertion, than by the uniform and universal persecution it has thereby drawn upon itself in every country and in every age. And that persecution, impotent to destroy, has set its seal to the history and the prerogatives of the Christian Church.

Thus far I have treated the Christian Church as a human and historical witness attesting its own origin, constitution, powers, and jurisdiction. If its witness be not credible, human history exists no longer: there is no fact beyond our eyesight or the reach of our arm to be believed: for all beyond these are hearsay or secondhand. The whole of my arguments hitherto may be used by all Christian communions who rest their motives for believing in Christianity upon the universal testimony of the Christian world. Against Mr. Stephen's sceptical criticisms their argument is invincible. The theory of calling up the twelve Apostles in the nineteenth century for cross-examination in the Court of Queen's Bench is a theory which subverts the whole moral order of human life. Their testimony was taken and tested at the time and on the spot, and it abides for ever. And here I might close the argument, for I am arguing, not with those who reject the evidence of Christian history, but with those who profess to believe it. And I am hardly willing to continue the argument, because I foresee that what I have to add will be assailed as affording a cheap and easy diversion from the position I have hitherto defended in behalf of all who retain the Christian name.

Nevertheless I will go on, that I may fully and openly state the whole case of Christianity against Cæsarism. Hitherto I have argued upon a basis on which all Christians stand together. But the argument does not end here: I will therefore take it up again and complete it. The Catholic Church affirms all I have advanced, and more. But I have already said that I

will not argue here and now that the Catholic Church exclusively possesses the independence and supremacy of which we are treating. It will be enough for the present to show that it possesses these prerogatives *eminenter*, and for special reasons.

Some of these arguments are common in their kind to all other Christian bodies or communions—such, I mean, as rest on Scripture, tradition, and reason. There remains still one other foundation of my argument, which, though I touched it only in passing, has been copiously used as a topic to excite odium or incredulity: I mean the infallibility of the Church and of its Head. It is right therefore that I should, with all frankness, state what is our faith on this point, and that I should make the grounds of that faith as clear and explicit as I can.

I will therefore do so, and all the more willingly because Mr. Stephen has quoted a book published by me some years ago on the *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, and has twice or three times described its purport in words which either prove that he did not understand so much as the terms of the subject, or that, understanding them, he could not refrain from so representing them as to excite odium. I will therefore, partly by quotation, and partly by a summary, give the argument of the book. To do so I shall be forced into the most sacred subjects. But Mr. Stephen is responsible for the introduction of this matter into the *Contemporary Review*. Once more I must warn my readers that I proceed to this matter not as if it were necessary against Mr. Stephen's objections. Once more I repeat

that, as a reply to his arguments, the voice of Christendom and the evidence of Christian history are enough.

I have, I hope, already shown that there is no Christian nor body of Christians that does not believe in the existence of the Church, whether visible or invisible, whether indivisible or divided; and there is no Christian or body of Christians which does not claim for the Church, understood, as it may be, in various ways, a Divine authority independent and, within its sphere, supreme. The existence of a Church divinely founded and with a Divine office is a part of Christianity. It is not only manifest in the world, but recorded in the New Testament. I had therefore no need of citing Catholic witnesses to prove that Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church, for in my argument against Cæsarism I had claimed only the independence and supremacy of the Church in matter of revealed truth. Every Church, communion, and sect whatsoever makes the same identical claim. I shall therefore leave Mr. Stephen's third proposition, and proceed to the fourth, which is as follows:

'My Church is the Church so established, and as such possesses the powers in question.'

But the powers in question are precisely independence and supreme authority in matter of faith and morals. To this I will now go on. I am afraid that I shall disappoint all who desire to see a controversy among those whom I have cited as witnesses. I am indeed going to prove that the Catholic and Roman Church, as a witness, teacher, and judge of faith and morals, is

within that sphere independent of all civil powers and supreme. But I am not going to prove here and now that the Catholic and Roman Church exclusively possesses this Divine office. If I were to enter upon this controversy I should chiefly gratify those who wish to find or to make contentions in the Christian world. My desire is to rally all Christians in one common cause against the growing Antichristianism of the day. Of one thing I am confident. The people of these three kingdoms are a Christian people. They have no sympathy with infidelity, impiety, or profaneness. They retain with a tenacious belief two great traditional facts: first, that Christianity is a Divine Revelation; and secondly, that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God. They believe also in the great outlines of the Christian faith. Rationalistic infidelity is the disease of individuals among us. The people of England and Scotland would never for a moment tolerate a royal religion such as the Evangelical Church set up in Prussia, nor an imperial supremacy such as the Falck laws.

They would refuse obedience to all such violations of Christian liberty on precisely the same principles as are maintained by the Archbishop of Posen and the Archbishop of Cologne. I have already given their testimony to the constitution and office of the Christian Church as they believe it. It is enough for my argument to show that all that they claim for themselves is to be found in an eminent degree and above all in the Catholic Church. This, at least, they do not deny, and this for my present argument against their adversaries and ours is enough.

It cannot be necessary for me to enter into an historical proof that the Catholic and Roman Church reaches upwards from the present day to the mission of the Apostles, or that the great family of nations which compose it now is the lineal descendant of that family of all nations which the Apostles knit together. There has never been but one Church of all nations, and out of that one Church all separate communions or churches have sprung. But their separation, whether in the East or West, whether in ancient or modern centuries, has not diminished the identity nor the universality of the Catholic Church. It still remains in its unity and world-wide extension, with its unbroken Episcopate under one supreme Head and its nineteen Œcumenical Councils, the one chief witness both by visible presence, audible voice, and unity of testimony to the Divine fact of the Incarnation and to the revelation of Christianity. Take Rome out of Christendom, what remains? What Church can trace an unbroken line and a universal presence for the last eighteen hundred years? What Church has continuity if Rome has not? What Church has universality if Rome be taken away? What Church speaks in every language under heaven, if it be not the Church Catholic and Roman, which the other day called together the pastors of some thirty nations in the Council of the Vatican?

What other Church presents at this hour to the world the unity of the Apostles, who preached one doctrine in every place; what other has a continuous identity with itself in all successions of time? The doctrines which we preach day by day in England our forefathers

defended and suffered for three hundred years ago; and the same in all fulness and precision may be read in Bede's History of the Anglo-Saxon race. What was preached by Bede in the seventh century was preached last Sunday, and will be preached next Sunday, in England, in China, in Australia, and in Spain; and for this same faith the pastors and people of Germany are contending now, as our English forefathers contended three centuries ago. Through all this tract of time, and throughout this world-wide unity, the pastors and the people of the Catholic Church have always held as a doctrine of revealed truth that the authority of the Church in the sphere of faith and morals is by Divine institution independent of all civil power, and supreme over all authority of man. If the Church of England and the Kirk of Scotland can claim to be independent and supreme in all matter of revealed truth, *à fortiori* the Catholic and Roman Church can make good its claim. All that they possess they derive, if not from us, at least through us. Every argument that can be advanced by them has greater force when advanced by the Catholic and Roman Church. Every proof from the testimonies of Scripture tells in the first place in our behalf. Every proof drawn from tradition if it reach to them must first include, if it does not even spring from, us. This at least is certain, that if the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* is to be verified now on earth, it can be verified eminently in the One Body which has unbroken continuity, universality in extent, and identity of faith in every place.

For my present argument, then, it is enough to show

that what is claimed by every Christian communion may be shown to exist in an eminent and especial degree in the Catholic and Roman Church.

I will now go on, and I must enter upon the region of theology in which the human and historical certainty of Revelation is shown to be also Divine, and secured by a Divine provision.

It is not by accident, or by mere order of enumeration, that in the Baptismal Creed we say, 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church.' These two articles are united because the Holy Spirit is united with the Church. And this union is indissoluble. It is the source of supernatural endowments to the Church which can never be absent from it, or suspended in their operation. The Church, of all ages and of all times, is therefore immutable in its *knowledge*, *discernment*, and *enunciation* of the truth, in virtue of its indissoluble union with the Spirit of Truth, and of His perpetual guidance; whereby He directs its teaching not only from council to council, and from age to age, with an intermittent and broken utterance, but always and at all times, by the continuous enunciation of the Faith.

What I here assert is the doctrine of the Scriptures, Fathers, and Theologians, and the faith of all Catholics. I might assume that the evidence of Scripture is too obvious to need quotation, but I will give the following.

The testimonies from Scripture, being familiar to all, shall be recited as briefly as possible.

Our Lord promised that His departure should be followed by the advent of a Person like Himself—

another Paraclete—the Spirit of Truth, who proceedeth from the Father : 'I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever. The Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth Him not, nor knoweth Him : but you shall know Him, because He shall abide with you, and shall be in you.'[3]

'The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you.'[3]

'It is expedient for you that I go ; for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you ; but if I go, I will send Him to you.'[4]

'When He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, He will teach you all truth. For He shall not speak of Himself ; but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak ; and the things that are to come He shall show you. He shall glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine, and shall show it to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine. Therefore I said, He shall receive of Mine, and show it to you.'[4]

The fulfilment of this promise ten days after the Ascension was accomplished on the day of Pentecost by the personal advent of the Holy Ghost, to abide for ever as the Guide and Teacher of the faithful in the name and stead of the Incarnate Son. I forbear to quote the second chapter of the book of Acts, in which

[3] S. John xiv. 16, 17, 26.

[4] Ibid. xvi. 7, 13-16. Eph. iv. 4-16. Rom. xii. 4, 5. 1 Cor. xii. 11-14, 27. Eph. i. 19-23. S. John vii. 39.

this Divine fact is recorded by the Holy Spirit Himself.

S. Paul has traced out the events and a succession in this Divine order, connecting them with the creation and organisation of the Church, where he says, 'One body and one spirit: as you are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all. But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. Wherefore He saith, Ascending on high, He led captivity captive: He gave gifts to men. Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens, that He might fill all things. And He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors. For the perfection of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ: that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness, by which they lie in wait to deceive. But doing the truth in charity, we may in all things grow up in Him who is the Head, even Christ: from whom the whole body, being compacted and fitly joined together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation of the measure of every part, maketh

increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity.'[5]

The same delineation of the Church as the mystical body runs through the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. 'For as in one body we have many members, but all members have not the same office; so we being many are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.'[6]

Again to the Corinthians, after enumerating with great particularity the gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost, he adds that 'all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will. For as the body is one and hath many members; and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether bond or free; and in one Spirit we have all been made to drink. For the body also is not one member, but many. . . . . Now you are the body of Christ, and members of member.'[7]

These passages explicitly declare that the Church is a living body, made up of Head and members inhabited by the Spirit of Truth, who is a Divine Person; that it is complete in its organisation, indefectible in its life, always in possession of the truth, and constituted to be the channel and the organ of that truth to mankind. It is expressly described as independent of all human teachers, and dependent on God alone, itself a Divine witness and a Divine teacher. The same is the doc-

[5] Eph. iv. 4-16. [6] Rom. xii. 45.
[7] 1 Cor. xii. 11-14, 27. Eph. i. 19-23. S. John vii. 39.

trine of the Fathers. I forbear from quoting more than one or two passages. S. Augustin says:

'What the soul is to the body of man, that the Holy Ghost is to the body of Christ, which is the Church. What the Holy Ghost does in the whole Church, that the soul does in all the members of one body. . . . In the body of a man it may happen that a member—the hand, the finger, or the foot—may be cut off. Does the soul follow the severed member? While it was in the body it was alive; cut off, its life is lost. So a man is a Christian and a Catholic while he is alive in the body; cut off, he becomes a heretic. The Holy Ghost does not follow the amputated limb.'[8]

Again he says:

'The body is made up of many members, and one spirit quickens them all. . . . The offices of the members are divided severally, but one spirit holds all in one. Many are commanded, and many things are done; there is one only who commands, and one who is obeyed. What our spirit—that is, our soul—is to our members, that the Holy Ghost is to the members of Christ to the body of Christ, which is the Church.'[9]

From these principles S. Augustin declares the Church to possess a *moral personality*. He says:

'The head and the body are one man; "Christ and the Church are one man." . . . . Therefore let Christ speak, because in Christ the Church speaks, and in the Church Christ speaks, both the body in the Head and the Head in the body. . . . Our Lord Jesus Christ often speaks Himself—that is, in His own person, which is our Head—oftentimes in the person of His body, which we are—namely, His Church . . . . that we may understand the head and the body to consist by an integral unity, never to be put asunder after the manner of matrimony, of which it is said two shall be in one flesh.'

From all this he concludes:

'If there are two in one flesh, how not *two in one voice?*'

The same doctrine is copiously taught by the Greek

[8] S. Aug., *Serm. in die Pentecost.* 1, tom. v. p. 1090.

[9] Ibid. *Serm.* 2, tom. v. p. 1091.

Fathers, such as S. Gregory Nazianzen and S. Cyril of Alexandria. It is also explicitly taught by S. Gregory the Great. The quotations are given in the work quoted by Mr. Stephen, the *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, from p. 40 to p. 48.

I have said that the union between the Spirit of Truth and the mystical body of the Church is indissoluble. Before the Incarnation the Holy Spirit dwelt and wrought in the souls of men one by one, illuminating, converting, sanctifying, and perfecting those who were faithful. But the union between His presence and each individual man was *conditional* on the correspondence and fidelity of his life and will. It was a *dissoluble* union, and in the multitudes who fell from grace it was actually dissolved. In the faithful that union was sustained to the end. We also are under the same law of individual probation. If we persevere in faith and obedience, the union between us and the presence of the Holy Spirit in us remains firm. If we fail, we dissolve it. This union is *conditional*, depending upon the finite, frail, and unstable will of men. It is the error of these later days to suppose the union of the Holy Spirit with the Church to be in like manner conditional and dissoluble.

It is manifest, however, that the union of the Holy Spirit with the Church is not *conditional*, but *absolute*, depending upon *no finite will*, but upon *the Divine Will alone*. It is therefore indissoluble to all eternity. For it is constituted (1) by the union of the Holy Ghost with the Head of the Church, not only as God, but as Man, and in both these relations this union is indis-

soluble. It is constituted further (2) by the union of the Holy Spirit with the mystical body, which, as a body, is imperishable, though individuals in it may perish. There will never come a time when that body will cease to be, and therefore there will never come a time when the Holy Spirit will cease to be united to it. But that which shall be eternal is indissoluble also in time—the union, that is, of the Spirit with the body as a whole. Individuals may fall from it, as multitudes have fallen; provinces, nations, particular Churches, may fall from it; but the body still remains, its unity undivided, its life indefectible; and that because the line of the faithful is never broken.[10]

The union, therefore, of the Spirit with the body can never be dissolved. It is a Divine act analogous to the hypostatic union, whereby the two natures of God and man are eternally united in one Person. So the mystical body, the head and the members, constitute one moral person; and the Holy Ghost inhabiting that body, and diffusing His created grace throughout it, animates it as the soul quickens the body of a man.

From this flow many truths. First, the Church is not a physical, but a mystical person, and all its endowments are derived from the Divine Person who is its Head, and from the Divine Person who is its Life. As in the Incarnation there is a communication of the Divine perfections to the humanity, so in the Church the perfections of the Holy Spirit become the endowments of the body. It is imperishable, because He is God; indivisibly one, because He is numerically

[10] Eph. ii. 22.

one; holy, because He is the fountain of holiness; infallible both in believing and in teaching, because His illumination and His voice are immutable. The Church, therefore, being not a physical, but a *moral person*, depending not as we do, one by one, upon the fidelity of our *human will*, but depending as a body only on the Divine Will, *it is not on trial or probation*, but is itself the instrument of probation to mankind. The corporate existence of the Church cannot be affected by the frailty or sins of the human will, any more than the brightness of the firmament can be darkened by the dimness or the loss of human sight. It can no more be tainted by human sin than the holy sacraments, which are always immutably pure and divine, though all who come to them be impure and faithless. What the Church was in the beginning it is now and ever shall be in all the plenitude of its Divine endowments, because the union between the body and the Spirit is indissoluble, and the operations of the Spirit in the body are perpetual and absolute.

Thus the revelation of God is divinely preserved and divinely proposed to the world. A Divine revelation in human custody would be soon lost; a Divine revelation expounded by human interpreters puts off its Divine character and becomes human: as S. Jerome says of the Scriptures when perverted by men, it is no longer the Word of God. A Church likewise, if subject to man, would cease to be a Church.

But God has provided that the Church cannot teach falsehood: that what He has revealed should be for ever

preserved and enunciated by the perpetual presence and assistance of the same Spirit from whom the revelation originally came. And this gives us the basis of a Divine certainty and the rule of Divine faith.

(1) The voice of the living Church of this hour, when it declares what God has revealed, is no other than the voice of the Holy Spirit, and therefore generates Divine faith in those who believe. The Baptismal Creed represents at this day, in all the world, the preaching of the Apostles and the faith of Pentecost. It is the voice of the same Divine Teacher who spoke in the beginning, enunciating now the same truth.

(2) The Decrees of General Councils are undoubtedly the voice of the Holy Ghost, both because they are the organs of the teaching of the Church, and because they have the pledge of a special Divine assistance, according to the needs of the Church and of the Faith.

(3) The Definitions and Decrees of Pontiffs speaking *ex cathedrâ*, or as the Head of the Church and to the whole Church, whether by Bull or Apostolic Letters or Encyclical or Brief, in matter of faith and morals, to many or to one, are undoubtedly guided by the same Divine assistance, and are therefore infallible.

Now the Pontiffs, as Vicars of Jesus Christ, have a twofold relation: the one, to the Divine Head of the Church, of whom they are the visible representatives on earth; the other, to the whole body. And these two relations impart a special prerogative of grace to him that bears them. The endowments of the head, as

S. Augustin argues, are bestowed in behalf of the body. It is a small thing to say that the endowments of the body are the prerogatives of the head. The Vicar of Jesus Christ would bear no proportion to the body if, while it is infallible, he were not so. He would bear also no representative character if he were the fallible witness of an infallible Head. Though the analogy observed by S. Augustin between the head and the members cannot strictly apply to the Vicar of Christ and the members upon earth, nevertheless it invests him with a pre-eminence of guidance and direction over the whole body, which can neither be possessed by any other member of the body, nor by the whole body without him. This supreme office attaches to him personally and alone as representing to the body the prerogatives of its Divine Head. The infallibility of the Head of the Church extends to the whole matter of Revelation—that is, to the Divine truth and the Divine law as revealed to us—and to all those facts or truths which are in contact with faith and morals.

If the relation between the body and the Spirit were conditional and dissoluble, then the enunciations of the Church might be fallible and subject to human criticism.

If the relation be absolute and indissoluble, then all its enunciations by Pontiffs, Councils, Traditions, Scriptures, and by the universal consent of the Church are Divine, and its voice also is Divine, being identified with the voice of its Divine Head in heaven. 'He that heareth you heareth Me.'

But that the relation between the body and the Spirit is absolute and indissoluble, the Theologians, Fathers, Scriptures, and the universal Church declare.

And therefore the infallibility of the Church is perpetual, and the truths of Revelation are so enunciated by the Church as to anticipate all research, and to exclude from their sphere all human criticism.[11]

Having thus stated the grounds on which Catholics believe the evidence on which we receive the revelation of Christianity to be certain, not only in the order of history, but by a special provision divinely ordained for its custody and perpetuity, I will add a few words on the attempt, so sedulously made, to find or to feign a division in the Catholic Church between Ultramontanes and non-Ultramontanes, and to pretend further that the non-Ultramontanes are Old Catholics, and that the Old Catholics are the true Catholics who reject the Vatican innovations.

All Catholics believe that the Catholic Church by Divine assistance is preserved from error, both in what it teaches and in what it believes; or, in other words, that the Church is infallible. The only question among Catholics was as to the organ by which this infallibility is to be exercised, and the test by which it is to be ascertained.

All Catholics believe that the Church, whether dispersed or gathered in one Œcumenical Council, is infallible. In an Œcumenical Council the whole Church is gathered in its Bishops with their Head.

[11] *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost* (Longmans, 1865), second edition.

Every definition of faith and morals promulgated by such a Council with its Head is, in the belief of all Catholics, divinely certain, that is, infallible. And every one who shall reject such a definition is a heretic, and every one who shall deny such a Council to be Œcumenical is excommunicated.

On all these points there has never been a question among Catholics. The self-called 'Old Catholics' are therefore, *ipso facto*, heretical and excommunicate. They deny the Council of the Vatican to be Œcumenical, and the definitions made by it to be doctrines of the faith.

Such was their first position. And such was the position of Dr. Wohlmann, Professor of Religion in the Gymnasium of Braunsberg, justly excommunicated by the Bishop of Ermland. The Prussian Government, thinking that it had found its opportunity, supported Dr. Wohlmann against the Bishop, thereby putting itself visibly and irrevocably in the wrong. All its violence since that date is the transparent evidence of a will to crush those whom it had wronged.

But I leave this for the present.

The only question ever raised among Catholics as to the organ and seat of infallibility was this: Whether the Divine assistance promised to the Church as a whole, including its Head, is promised to its Head when acting in behalf of the Church out of an Œcumenical Council, or in the intervals between Council and Council. Let us take an analogy. The Crown is sovereign while Parliament is sitting; does it cease to be sovereign between Session and Session,

or between Parliament and Parliament? An opinion sprang up in France, and was fostered by the French monarchs and courtiers from the time of Louis XIV., that the Head of the Church out of Œcumenical Councils possessed indeed 'the chief authority in defining doctrines of faith,' but that such definitions were not irreformable, that is, infallible, 'until accepted by the Church.' I will not stay to point out the impossibility of this test. How is it to be applied? Who is to apply it? Who to judge of its application? What majority is to be the test of truth? What minority to be the proof of error? What is to become of definitions while the test is being applied? What is to check heresy in the mean while? What is to arrest controversy? What *ad interim* is to be believed as of faith? This is in fact the well-known theory of 'open questions.' It would need only a controversy on each of the twelve articles of the Baptismal Creed to make the whole faith an open question. And such, in fact, would be the possible state of the Christian Church if its Head could propound false doctrine for its reception. This incoherent theory existed only in France, and even there only in the theology of a school, and not of all members even of that school. It was imposed by royal mandate, but the Church in France never believed it. All theologians were bound to teach it, but only a few ever obeyed. Gallicanism here and there tainted a few Bishops, priests, and laymen, but, like the principles of 1789, it was never accepted by the Church of France. Its tradition was Catholic and Roman, or,

as men would now say, Ultramontane. It endured the theology of its kings and their servants, but in the first Œcumenical Council assembled after 1682, in union with the Catholic Episcopate, it extinguished Gallicanism for ever. If the Vatican Council had met and parted without condemning Gallicanism, it would have given to it a presumption of truth, or, at least, of probability, such as Lutheranism would have gained if the Council of Trent had spared it, or Arianism if it had been passed over in silence by the Council of Nicea.

I know nothing more dreary and hopeless than the floods of persistent misrepresentation of which the definition of the infallibility of the Head of the Church has been made the theme. It has been described as a dogma created and carried by the adulation of flatterers, the servility of sycophants, the ignorance of a packed majority, the credulity of weak minds, the superstition of bigots inspired by the ambition of courtiers, and the venality of place-hunters. Such have been the deliverances of the 'men of culture,' 'scientific historians,' 'Old Catholics,' and 'German professors.' The utterances of 'Berlin Correspondents' were still more amusing. We were told that Pius IX. had received 'Divine attributes;' that, as was well known, he had eagerly sought, and at last obtained, his 'deification;' that he had been declared to be a 'Vice-God;' all this and oceans of ribaldry, blasphemy, and trash have been poured out from abroad over England. It is an astonishment to me to see how the common sense of Englishmen has waded through this 'great Serbonian

bog' of nonsense, and come out safe on the other side. I confess that I have almost despaired at this deplorable revel of clamorous absurdity. To contradict was useless; to explain was worse. If exposed, the story was repeated next day. Now at last men begin to see that the infallibility of the Head of the Church is simply the question of how we are to ascertain the seat of the Divine certainty on which we receive Christianity. This is highly disappointing and commonplace. It is, after all, only a part of the treatise *De Locis Theologicis*. All the sensational clamour about 'Divine attributes' subsides into a dry argument about the Rule of Faith. Now the Vatican Council defined the infallibility of its Head, because to deny it is to deny a Divine fact, and to expose the infallibility of the Church as a whole to a series of logical difficulties. This I can affirm of my own personal knowledge to have been the motive which caused the Bishops to be so uncompromising and inflexible. Any man who understands the infallibility of the Church will see this at a glance. They who do not understand it must, I fear, go on talking, writing, and thinking like our 'Berlin Correspondent.'

As I was writing these words, the Berlin Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* supplied me with an example, which will save the trouble of description. In the debate on the Supplementary Ecclesiastical Laws —the effect of which is to enable the Government to 'intern,' or to exile, all ecclesiastics who shall continue, for conscience' sake, to exercise their spiritual functions after deposition from office by the Imperial Tribunal— we are told that 'one member, an ex-Excellency, qua-

lified his adversaries as a lot of tea-drinking old women;' another, a celebrated rationalistic theologian, called his opponents 'a draggletail of little-brained fanatics.' Herr von Sybel's ribaldry against the Catholic religion was interrupted by 'Shouts of Homeric laughter,' 'Roars of laughter,' 'Loud and prolonged laughter,' 'Roars of laughter.' Finally he said, 'You may be sure that if Prince Bismarck was to-morrow to resolve upon the restoration of the imperial power and the mutilation of Italy, to-morrow would Pope Pius IX. sanction the May Statutes, and confer upon the Minister of Public Worship—that is, if Dr. Falck wanted to have it—the Grand Cross of the highest Papal Order.' This, we are told, 'fairly brought the house down' for some minutes.

> 'Dixeris hæc inter varicosos centuriones
> Continuo crassum ridet Vulfenius ingens.'

Persius does not see in this gross laughter any token of culture.

The 'Homeric laughter' was so great that they seem to have forgotten what they were debating. It was the exile, for conscience' sake, of free men and Christians, who refuse to betray their Divine office at the will of a Government. The correspondent then goes on with the cool insolence of a persecutor, as follows:

'The Government does not propose to add to its powers of offence and defence until it shall be in a position to judge by a fair amount of experience whether or not the subordinate *Popish* clergy, or any considerable section of that body, will think fit to submit itself to the *secular arm*, and, by doing so, *to sever the connection existing between it and the Vatican*. The group of laws already available to the authorities for *quelling* the *disobedience* of *his Majesty's Bishops* will enable the Executive, within the next few months, to get all the prelates and their vicars-general,

besides a considerable sprinkling of the lesser clergy, *safely into prison* or across the frontier, whilst the *civil* powers will have secured the *entire* and *exclusive administration of the vacated dioceses*. A good many cures will be vacant, and every possible encouragement will be given to their congregations to appoint thereto, by election, priests of the Old Catholic or Reformed Catholic persuasion, if no Papal clergyman can be found to take the oaths and subscribe the declaration required under the new enactments. Should such congregations prove *refractory*, and *refuse* to elect ecclesiastics who may be *acceptable to the Administration*, they will *simply have to do without spiritual ministrations and functions* until such time as they may deem it wiser to yield to the stern necessities of the situation.'

We have here German Liberalism unmasked. It is a compound of Antichristian hatred, inflated contempt of conscience in other men, with the bigotry of unbelief and the despotism of intolerance. Liberty of conscience exists no longer in Prussia, and where liberty of conscience is violated all liberty perishes. Prussia has become the strongest and the least civilised country in Europe. Its civilisation is that of the world without God. Alcibiades was an orator, a soldier, a musician, a refined citizen, a free-thinker, an aristocrat, a despiser of superstitions, a mutilator of sacred things, a profligate, and a fop. This is the civilisation which is arising again, where Christianity is dying out. Such civilisation I do not deny to Prussia, but it is not the civilisation of the Christian world. There are men among us who are labouring to make Englishmen admire and adopt this civilisation. While they applaud these tyrannical persecutions, they are not worthy of the soil of England, nor of the Christian liberty which they abuse in railing at Christianity.

An Ultramontane, then, is one who believes that the

Church, in virtue of its infallibility, is independent of all civil powers, and is, in all that belongs to faith and morals, supreme over all human authority. The question as to the seat of that infallibility was once a domestic question, and is a question no longer.

We are now in a condition to appreciate the Falck laws, and, I must add, the ignoble pretence that they are directed, not against the Catholic religion, but against 'Ultramontanism.' They violate the Catholic religion by violating the spiritual independence and the Divine office of the Church. They pretend to make the sanction of the civil power a condition of determining who are and who are not Catholics, who are and who are not heretics, who are and who are not excommunicate: what is or is not the faith of the Catholic Church, who are and who are not to be put in cure of souls, how candidates for the priesthood are to be educated, and what doctrine they are to hold. Lastly, by the third law of May it is provided that all appeals are to be decided by the Imperial Tribunal within Germany, or, in other words, the Church in Germany is to be cut off from the supreme appellate jurisdiction of its Head, whom the 'Old Catholics,' with the congenital insolence of heretics, call 'the man outside of Germany.' That is to say, the Church in Germany is to be placed in a permanent schism. These are the laws which are not directed against the Catholic religion! I must use the free speech of an Englishman and the liberty of a Christian to denounce this pretence as an ignoble hypocrisy.

Mr. Stephen has complained that I have interrupted

his argument. I might with more justice complain that while I was denouncing this Prussian persecution he was endeavouring to plunge me into the bottomless pit of a controversy with scepticism. Life is short. The little that remains to me will, I hope, be given to issues that are vital, not to individuals here and there, but to Christians of every name. I have purposely elicited and laid bare the truth that the conflict now raging is between Christianity and Antichristianism. As the enemies of Christianity widen out their line against the Christian name in every country of Europe, so it is our duty to widen out our defence along the whole line of Christian faith. Those who remember the year 1848, and the universal and simultaneous rising of Antichristian revolution which threatened all Europe, will readily see in what is passing in Italy, Spain, France, Austria, and Germany at this time the same simultaneous movement grown strong and bold by success. It has ascended thrones, controlled cabinets, overthrown governments, and usurped their place. Who can fail to see that the exclusion of Christianity from education, and from laws, and from States is only the prelude of an attempt to destroy the Christian Faith and the Christian Church? The war against Christianity in Germany fell by necessity upon the Catholic Church, because it is the chief, I might say the only solid, organised, and consistent witness for Christianity in the new empire. The civil power has behind it a social revolution urging it on to persecute the Catholic Church as the price of its co-operation and support. Until this crisis, which Prince von Bismarck has created

for himself, arose, the Government of Prussia was just and equitable to all Christian confessions, including the Catholic faith. But the Antichristian revolution has pushed it into the excesses of Cæsarism, fatal to its future. The pretext that the Falck laws were necessary because of the hostility of Catholics to the empire served its purpose at the time. Nobody in Germany believed it even then; and now it is believed nowhere. Everybody now sees that if the Prussian Government had continued to deal justly with Catholics it would have detached them from all alleged foreign sympathies, and bound them to itself. But it dared not enter upon such a policy. The Antichristian revolution was at its back. It therefore entered upon a policy of extermination against the Catholic Church, to buy the political support or to buy off the enmity of an Antichristian conspiracy which is undermining every throne in Germany.

Mr. Stephen defends the proposition that a 'nation is a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatever.' I would ask, does he mean the nation as it existed in Pagan Rome; or the nation as it exists in Christian Europe? If he mean the former, I would refer him once more to his classics, or to Dr. Döllinger's work on *Gentilism and Judaism*. If he means the nation as it exists in Christian Europe, I would remind him that it is the Christian law of marriage, Christian morals, and Christian education which have recreated the nations and the civil society of the world. Nowhere but in Christianity does the law of marriage create, purify, and sustain the unity

and sanctities of domestic life; from no other source have come to us the Christian ethics, public and private, which have elevated, restrained, and matured the morality of the modern world. And yet Mr. Stephen asks whether I am to be trusted with authority over the laws of marriage and education. I have claimed no authority for myself; I have claimed it for Christianity; and I am bold to say that the people of England would at once intrust authority over marriage and education rather to Christianity than to Secularism, or Cæsarism, or Scepticism, or to a State stripped of the laws and morals of Christianity. The same may be affirmed of every country in Europe, except, perhaps, of Prussia; and there we have the reason assigned by the Prussian authorities, namely, that so large a part of the population has ceased to practise any religion that the laws of civil marriage and secular education have become inevitable. Protestant authorities tell us that not two per cent of the people of Berlin go to any place of worship, and not more than one-third of the dead are buried with religious rites. Without doubt in such a population civil laws must take the place of Christian marriage and Christian morality. That is to say, where the civil State has fallen from the Christianity which once raised it from Paganism to the civilisation of the Christian world, it must needs fall back upon itself. It has no other sanctions, laws, or ethics except those of Nature, and so much of the personal and domestic morality of its extinct Christianity as may still survive. For a while these ancient traditions will, in some degree,

linger and live on, but let nobody hold this up as the perfection and ripeness of States. The whole civil society of Europe seems to be withdrawing itself in its public life from Christianity. The formula of 'separating the School from the Church and the Church from the State' is, in truth, the separating of both School and State from Christianity. This is the ideal of those who have rejected Christianity, and are misleading Christian men by formulas into false principles fatal to their strongest and best convictions. One good effect of such a discussion as I have thus far, with much reluctance, engaged in is to bring out this fact into daylight. I hope men will be on their guard before they adopt as axioms or principles the phrases and formulas of an Antichristian movement which is separating the civil society of the world and the generations of the future from the Christian Revelation.

As I have made one digression, I cannot refrain from another, which shall be as brief as possible. I have read, with more astonishment than I can express, the studious effort of Mr. Stephen to excite odium, and to inflame his readers with animosity against those who refuse to accept his arguments. For what other purpose does he talk of inquisitions and dragonnades and massacres? This is the last refuge of Exeter Hall, when reason and fact run dry. Mr. Stephen does not forget that both Catholics and Protestants, in turn, have been guilty of persecutions. They cannot, then, be charged on Catholicism only. If he say that Catholics have been worse than Protestants, then, where both are guilty, what argument is there in measuring

degrees? If he say that these horrors are the offspring of Christianity, I ask him, as a historian, as a lawyer, and as a jurist, to say whether it was Christianity that created the penal code of the modern world? Was it the Christian Church or the civil power that invented and created the severities of the criminal law? The nations of the whole world, if any are guilty, are all guilty. The civil society of the world inherited from the Roman empire a penal code, against which Christianity has striven all along its history. The mitigations of the criminal code are due to Christian ethics and to the Christian Church. The atrocities which Mr. Stephen quotes, with a carelessness of argument into which he never would have been betrayed if he had been calm, were indeed the work of Christians and of Catholics, but neither of Christianity nor of the Catholic Church. It is almost within the memory of living men that women were burnt in England. In 1773 Elizabeth Hering was burnt alive. In 1777 Sarah Parker was burnt for counterfeiting silver coin. In 1786 Phœbe Harris was burnt for the same offence. Lord Loughborough defeated the Bill to commute this penalty to hanging.[12] It is within the memory of many of us that children might be sentenced to death in England for offences which would have been too severely punished by a whipping. Down to 1818 a child might be hanged for stealing in a shop goods worth five shillings. What would Mr. Stephen say of me if I had given this as a sample of English Christianity and the State Church?

[12] See *Annual Register*, in Phillimore's *History of George III.*, pp. 51, 65, 66, notes.

He well knows that to impute the atrocious penal codes of Europe to the Christian Church, or to imply what is not explicitly imputed, is as unjust and, I must say, as unmeaning as to say that Christianity introduced slavery among mankind, and that the State abolished it.

Mr. Stephen had no need to show that in theory the 'Lex Regia' is supposed to represent the will of the people. I fully provided for such an answer. But it is like saying that the capitular election of the Anglican bishops is free, because the Crown issues the *congé d'élire*.

But all this is beside the point.

It may be well briefly to guard against certain objections. It may be said that the Falck laws affect only Ultramontanism. No better proof can be given to show that the Falck laws are a persecution, not of Ultramontanism, but of Christianity, than the fact that the first to lead the opposition against them in the Chambers was the venerable Baron von Gerlache, a Lutheran of known fidelity to his profession. Add to this the protests and petitions of the Lutherans in Hesse and in Hanover; the support given emphatically on this ground by the Lutherans in Munich to the Ultramontane candidate, who was also a Catholic priest; and finally, the fact that a number of Lutheran ministers have been fined, or thrown into prison, for refusing to obey the new ecclesiastical laws.

Again, it may be said that the Falck laws affect only those who pretend that the Church is infallible. Surely the facts just alleged are answer enough. They are better than a score of theological replies. Never-

theless I may repeat that the claim of independence for conscience, religion, and faith may be made good by every Christian and Christian communion on the arguments of my last paper, and on the human and historical testimony of Christendom, apart from the higher and Divine certainty which the Catholic Church asserts for itself.

Lastly, it may be said that to claim for the Church the power to define its own sphere is inconsistent with the independence of the civil power. First, I would ask: Does not every Christian Church and sect define its own sphere? If the Church is not to define its own sphere, who is to do so? No one can define how far the sphere of the Church extends but one who knows how far the Revelation intrusted to it reaches. But who knows this if the Church does not? or who knows this except the Church itself? Will any one say that the State is to define the sphere of the Church? If so, the State must know the whole circumference of Revelation, and all that it contains. But no Christian ventures to be so coherent. If the State cannot claim to define the sphere of faith and morals, and if by the hypothesis the Church may not, who is to trace the circle round its jurisdiction? I have already drawn this out, in a slight degree, in the essay which has provoked so much question. It is impossible to treat the subject as it needs at the end of this paper. I can only state one or two propositions:

1. No one can define the extent of the office of the Church but one who knows the limits of the commission it has received, and the Revelation intrusted to it.

2. No one can know these things adequately except one who has received that commission and trust; for these limits are a part of the Revelation.

3. The State received neither the commission nor the trust, and therefore cannot know the limits of either.

The consequence is obvious.

It is full time to bring this paper to an end. I will therefore restate the thesis I have undertaken to prove. In the essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism I maintained that the revelation of Christianity has withdrawn the whole province of faith and conscience from all civil powers, and has intrusted it to the jurisdiction of the Church, which is separate from all civil powers, and in all matters of faith and morals supreme. I therefore condemned the Falck laws as a manifold violation of conscience and of the independence and supreme office of the Church. To this argument answer was made that I could not claim such independence and supremacy for the Church until I had first proved the existence of God, the revelation of Christianity, the foundation of the Church with such powers as I claimed for it, and the identity of the Catholic Church with the Church proved to be so founded.

In reply, I rejected Mr. Stephen's two first points as irrelevant in a debate among Christians. To no others I address myself. If I make no answer to those who disbelieve or doubt of the Christian Revelation, it is not that they are on any hypothesis 'beneath my contempt;' for I regard them with kindness and sorrow, as creatures of Him whose existence they doubt, and as redeemed by

Him whose teaching they reject. I address myself to those who have not put off the name of Christian, and to them I acknowledged myself to be bound to offer proof of the two last propositions. So far as the narrow limits of an article admit, I hope that I have done so. In the former paper I have shown that every Christian community which professes to believe in a Church believes that Church to be independent of all civil powers, and in matters of religion supreme: in the present paper I have shown that the Catholic and Roman Church holds this faith as to the constitution and liberties of the Church, and founds its faith in that truth on an order of Divine facts which renders it impossible for the Church ever to compromise, or to yield in conflicts about faith and morals with the civil powers of the world. It is one thing to offer proof of a thesis; it is another to offer proof that will satisfy certain minds. The latter is a task I have not undertaken; it is a task no sane man will undertake. The former I hope and I believe has been done. No man can deny the premises of my argument without denying the foundations of Christianity: no man can admit the premises, and deny that the Falck laws are barefaced persecution, without incoherence of reason. The only consistent and logical antagonists are Christianity and Antichristianism. They are face to face now, and God will judge our cause.

XX.

THE POPE AND MAGNA CHARTA.

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About two years ago, in speaking of the conflict of S. Edmund of Canterbury against Henry III. for the liberties of the Church, I pointed out that his contest was only one of many periods in the continuous resistance to royal excesses, in behalf of the laws and liberties of England, maintained by S. Anselm, S. Thomas, Archbishop Langton, and S. Edmund. I might have added, by Archbishop Richard, his immediate predecessor. This statement was next day met by the old taunt that the Pope condemned Magna Charta. I then shortly pointed out the distinction, here again asserted, between the *mode* in which the Great Charter was obtained, and the *contents* or *merits* of the Great Charter itself. The former, not the latter, was condemned.

Before I enter upon this point, I cannot refrain from quoting a passage from the preface of Professor Stubbs, in his volume of *Documents illustrative of English History*. And in doing so I must express my grateful sense of the service he has rendered to historical truth. His small volume stands alone for learning and discernment.

Describing the period I was speaking of, he says:

'The political situation may generally be stated thus: Since the Conquest, the political constituents of the nation had been divided into two parties, which may be called the national and the feudal. The former comprised the King, the ministerial nobility, which were created by Henry I. and Henry II., and which, if less richly endowed than that of the Conquest, was more widely spread and had more English sympathies; the other contained the great nobles of the Conquest, and the always large but varying body of lower vassals, who were intent on pursuing the policy of foreign feudalism. The national party was also generally in close alliance with the clergy, whose zeal for their own privileges extended to the defence of the classes from whom they chiefly sprang, and whose vindication of class liberties maintained in the general recollection the possibility of resisting oppression.

The clergy may be roughly divided into three schools—the secular, or statesman school; the ecclesiastical, or professional; and the devotional, or spiritual. Of these, the representative men are Roger of Salisbury, Henry of Winchester, and Anselm of Canterbury. Thomas the Martyr more or less combines the characters of the three throughout his life. The three stages through which he passed—that of Chancellor, that of Primate, and that of candidate for martyrdom (*sit venia egregio auctori*)—answer well to the three schools of the clergy. Throughout the whole period, the first of these schools was consistently on the side of the King, the last as consistently on the side of the nation; the second, when its own privileges were not in danger—as from the peace of the Church, in 1107, to the Becket quarrel, and after the conclusion of that quarrel—continuously on the same side. No division of the clergy ever sympathised with the feudal party.'[1]

Again Mr. Stubbs writes:

'From the beginning of the thirteenth century the struggle is between the Barons, clergy, and people on one side, and the King and his personal partisans, English and foreign, on the other. The Barons and prelates who drew up the Charter were the sons of the ministerial nobles of Henry II., the imitators of S. Anselm and S. Hugh, of Henry of Winchester and Thomas of Canterbury.'[2]

[1] Stubbs' *Documents*, pp. 31, 32 (Oxford, 1874). [2] Ibid. p. 33.

But does not this show that if the spiritual prelates were with the people, they were certainly with the Pope, by whom they were canonised? How, then, was not the Pope with the people and its Christian liberties?

I will now give evidence of my assertion that the Barons, and not the contents of the Charter, were condemned by Innocent III.

1. Let us first examine the antecedents of the conflict between John and the Barons, out of which the Great Charter arose.

It is simply impossible to form an adequate conception of this conflict unless we go back to the reign of our earlier kings. Mr. Stubbs, in his valuable work, the *Memorials of S. Dunstan*, gives the *Promissio Regis*, or the oath taken at his coronation by the Saxon King Edwy, which is as follows:

"This writing is written, letter by letter, after the writing that Archbishop Dunstan delivered to our lord at Kingston, on the day that they hallowed him king, and he forbade him to give any pledge except this pledge, which he laid up on Christ's altar, as the bishop directed him: "In the name of the Holy Trinity I promise three things to the Christian people my subjects: first, that God's Church and all Christian people of my dominions hold true peace; the second is that I forbid robbery, and all unrighteous things, to all orders; the third, that I promise and enjoin in all dooms justice and mercy, that the gracious and merciful God, of His everlasting mercy, may forgive us all, who liveth and reigneth."[3]

Here we have the germ of the oaths and charters of the Norman times.

It may be indeed true that there did not exist any very precise code to which the people of England, after

[3] *Memorials of S. Dunstan*, p. 355.

the Conquest, were always appealing as to 'the laws of good King Edward.' Nevertheless there was a well-known tradition of ecclesiastical and popular liberties, partly written, but chiefly unwritten, descending from the legislation and the usage of Saxon times. These liberties were frequently violated even by the Saxon kings. Edward the Confessor wielded an authority, from his known integrity and fidelity to God and his people, which enabled him to promote ecclesiastics in a way hardly consistent with the perfect freedom of elections. The electors acquiesced in what was well done, though in the doing of it a good king set a dangerous example for bad kings to quote. The laws and liberties of England were guaranteed by the coronation oaths of every sovereign. Saxon and Dane alike swore to preserve them. William the Conqueror and his successors, in like manner, bound themselves by their coronation oath to respect them.

But the conflict between traditional liberties and royal customs, which began before the Conquest, became sharper and less tolerable after the Conquest. The rule of our foreign kings was especially despotic, and under them the conflict between legal rights and royal usages brought on the conflict of S. Anselm with Henry I., and the martyrdom of S. Thomas of Canterbury under Henry II.

These laws and liberties may be divided and classed under two heads: first, the liberties of the Church, in its tribunals, goods, appeals, and elections; and secondly, the liberties of the people in respect to inheritance, taxation, military service, and the like.

We need only to take one example, which will serve as the illustration and proof of what I assert.

Henry I., at his coronation, issued a Charter of Liberties. It is, in fact, an amplification of the coronation oath, which runs as follows:

'In the name of Christ I promise to the Christian people subject to me these three things. First, that I will order, and according to my power will take care, that the Church of God and all Christian people shall enjoy true peace by our will at all times: secondly, that I will forbid rapacity and iniquity to all degrees of men: thirdly, that I will enjoin equity and mercy in all judgments, that God, who is pitiful and merciful, may grant to me His mercy.'[4]

This was the bond given by the King to his people, upon which he received the threefold sanction of election by the nation, unction by the Church, and homage from his vassals. This oath is also a limitation of the excesses of William I. and William Rufus. It is also a renunciation of the unlawful customs of the latter, and a restoration of the lawful freedom of the people. This, in fact, is what was intended by the 'laws of King Edward.' And in this outline we see exactly the causes of conflict, namely, the oppression of the Church by the royal power in the case of vacancies and elections, and the oppression of the Barons and tenants by exactions of money and taxation.[5]

The Charter of Henry I. runs as follows:

'In the year of the Incarnation of our Lord 1051, Henry, son of William the King, after the death of his brother William, by the grace of God King of the English, to all the faithful health.

1. Know ye that by the mercy of God, and common counsel of the Barons of the whole kingdom of England, I have been

[4] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 99. [5] Ibid. p. 99.

crowned king of the same kingdom; and forasmuch as the kingdom has been oppressed by unjust exactions, I, in the fear of God, and in the love I bear towards you, first set free the Holy Church of God, so that I will not sell or pledge [its goods]. Nor on the death of Archbishop, Bishop, or Abbot will I receive anything of the domain of the Church, nor of its members, until a successor shall enter upon it. And all evil customs by which the kingdom of England was unjustly oppressed I will take away, which evil customs I here in part recite.'

Then follow the articles.

The second article relates to inheritance.

The third and fourth to widows.

The fifth to coinage and false money.

The sixth to pleas and debts; the six following to dues, and sureties, and murder, and forests, and the like.

The thirteenth is, 'The law of King Edward I restore to you, with the amendments by which my father, with the advice of his Barons, amended it.'[6]

I have given this outline of the Charter of Henry I. more fully because it is in germ the Magna Charta of Runnymede. In the following reign Stephen issued two Charters in the same express terms. The first, which is the shorter, runs as follows:

'Know ye that I have granted, and by this my present Charter have confirmed, to all my Barons and men in England, all the liberties and good laws which Henry, King of the English, my uncle, gave and granted to them; and I grant to them all good laws and good customs which they had in the time of King Edward.'

Nevertheless Stephen went to war with his Barons and his Bishops. Both parties fought with foreign mercenary troops, to the great misery of the English people.[7]

[6] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 100. [7] Ibid. pp. 114, 119.

Henry II. swore, at his coronation, to respect the same laws and liberties. He also issued a Charter of Liberties; and in a parliament in London 'he renewed the peace and laws and customs which obtained from antient times throughout England.'[8] Through the whole of his reign Henry endeavoured to enforce his royal 'customs,' the 'avitas consuetudines' of his ancestors, as against the laws and liberties of England. On one occasion, when he swore by God's eyes that he would exact a certain payment from tenants of land, S. Thomas, to protect the people from an oppressive custom, withstood him, saying, 'By the eyes by which you have sworn, not a penny shall be paid from all my land.' The Constitutions of Clarendon were in direct violation of the laws and liberties to which the King had bound himself by oath and by Charter. They violated the liberties of the Church in its tribunals, appeals, elections.

In the reign of Henry II., the conflict was chiefly with S. Thomas and the Church. The Barons sided with the King. They were siding with the stronger, little knowing that they were preparing a scourge for their own back, and that their own turn would come next. In truth, the conflict is always one and the same—the King sometimes against the Barons, sometimes against the Bishops, sometimes against both: it is always the same in kind—that is, of the royal customs violating the laws and liberties, civil and ecclesiastical, of the English people.

We come now to the reign of John. Mr. Stubbs

[8] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 129.

says that the reign of Richard had separated the interests of the Crown from the interests of the people. The reign of John brought the interests of the people and those of the Barons into the closest harmony.[9] Both alike suffered from arbitrary and excessive taxation, from delay of justice, exactions of military service out of England—that is, in France—outrages of every kind, both public and domestic. Before I go into detail, I will give the picture of King John from a recent historian.

Mr. Greene, in his *History of the English People*, a book of great value, but marred by some inaccuracies, like the historical writings of Lord Macaulay, quotes in English the line of the old chronicler:

'Sordida fœdatur, fœdante Johanne, Gehenna.'

'"Foul as it is, hell itself is defiled by the fouler presence of John." The terrible verdict of the King's contemporaries has passed into the sober judgment of history. In his inner soul, John was the worst outcome of the Angevins. He united into one mass of wickedness their insolence, their selfishness, their unbridled lust, their cruelty and tyranny, their shamelessness, their superstition, their cynical indifference to honour or truth. In mere boyhood, he had torn with brutal levity the beards of the Irish chieftains who came to own him as their lord. His ingratitude and perfidy had brought down his father's hairs with sorrow to the grave. To his brother he had been the worst of traitors. All Christendom believed him to be the murderer of his nephew, Arthur of Brittany. He had abandoned one wife and was faithless to another. His punishments were refinements of cruelty—the starvation of children, the crushing old men under copes of lead. His Court was a brothel, where no woman was safe from the royal lust, and where his cynicism loved to publish the news of his victims' shame. He was as craven in his superstition as he was daring in his impiety. He scoffed at priests, and turned his back on the Mass even amidst the solemnities of his corona-

[9] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 129.

tion, but he never stirred on a journey without hanging relics round his neck.'[10]

At his coronation in 1199, John swore, in the hands of Hubert, Archbishop of Canterbury, to preserve the liberties of the Church and the laws of the land.[11]

In the year 1200, John began his career of tyranny by seizing all the possessions of the Archbishop of York.[12] The Archbishop excommunicated the officers who had seized his manors. John was enraged at this, but still more enraged because the Archbishop had forbidden the collection of a plough-tax in his diocese.

In the year 1203, the shameless vices of the King, and the loss of his castles in Normandy, caused the Barons who were with him in France to forsake the Court.[13] He then returned to England, and exacted of the Barons a seventh part of their goods: he committed also all manner of rapine by violence against the Church and convents.[14]

John had shown himself to be vicious, sensual, violent, false, tyrannical, and a violator of his coronation oath by infractions of the liberties of the Church and of the laws of the land. But hitherto the authority and statesmanship of Archbishop Hubert had in some degree restrained him. In 1205 the Archbishop died; and on hearing of his death, John said exultingly, 'Now for the first time I am King of England.'[15]

From this date opens a new chapter in John's history.

[10] Greene's *History of the English People*, p. 118.
[11] Matthew Paris, ed. Madden, London, 1866, vol. ii. p. 80.
[12] Ibid. p. 87.
[13] Ibid. pp. 96, 97.
[14] Ibid. p. 99.
[15] Ibid. p. 104.

In order to force his favourite, John de Gray, into the see of Canterbury, he overbore the freedom of the electors.

The Pope annulled the election, and chose Stephen Langton, who was already Cardinal Priest of S. Chrysogonus. This was in the year 1207. He was elected by the monks, and consecrated in Rome. John, in his fury, refused to receive the Archbishop, and drove the monks of Canterbury out of England. The Pope, after sending many envoys and writing many letters to the King without effect, threatened to lay an interdict upon the kingdom. John persisted in his obstinacy, and the interdict was promulgated on March 23, 1208. He then confiscated the property of the Bishops, abbots, priors, and clergy; and seized all their goods for his own use.[16] He inflicted all sorts of personal indignities and cruelties upon ecclesiastics. Being conscious that his enormities had alienated the Barons from him, he endeavoured to compel them to renew their homage. His despotism became minutely vexatious. He forbade the taking of birds throughout England; and commanded the hedges and ditches which protected the harvest-lands to be destroyed.[17] He exacted homage of all freeholders, even from boys of twelve years old; and compelled, for that purpose, the Welsh to come to Woodstock. He then turned his exactions and cruelties, which are well known, against the Jews, both men and women. In the year 1210 he exacted by violence, *vellent nollent*, a hundred thousand pounds sterling from the clergy, which Matthew Paris calls *exactio nefaria*.

[16] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 114. [17] Ibid. p. 119.

At the same time he starved to death the wife and son of one of his nobles.[18] The rapine and violence of John on every class of his people steadily growing more intolerable, the Pope on their appeal absolved his subjects from their allegiance, and forbade them to consort with him *in mensa, consilio et colloquio*. Geoffry of Norwich, a judge of the Exchequer, therefore resigned his office. He was thrown into prison and laden with a cope of lead, under which he soon died.[19] Many nobles, prelates, and others fled from England and died in exile. By John's command twenty-eight youths, surrendered by the Welsh as hostages, were hanged at Nottingham before he would take his food. He was then warned of the defection of his Barons, from whom, by terror, he extorted sons, nephews, and kinsmen as hostages. I have simply taken the chief points of the narrative of Matthew Paris. But it is impossible to give an adequate idea of the misery of the people of England under the tyranny of John. A perpetual cry went up from the face of the whole land. It is said that there was hardly a noble family on which John had not inflicted the indelible stain of some moral outrage. I have briefly brought these things together in order to show that it was in the cause of the whole people that the Pope had throughout exerted his authority. He protected their liberties and their laws. The whole power of Innocent had been used to restrain the violence of the King. When, therefore, nothing availed, the Archbishop, with the Bishops of London and Ely, laid before the Pope John's manifold rebellions and enormities, '*multimodas*

[18] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. pp. 119-124. [19] Ibid. p. 126.

rebelliones et enormitates.' The Pope then, with the unanimous assent of the English people, save only the partisans of John, pronounced the sentence of deposition against him.[20] In the face of this, John exacted of all the religious houses a declaration that what he had extorted from them by violence had been given by them freely. In 1213 the Archbishop and Bishops, with the concurrence of Barons and people, promulgated the sentence of deposition, and the King of France was charged with its execution. Great military preparations were made for the purpose in France. John likewise collected numerous forces in Kent. Nevertheless he knew himself to be excommunicated and deposed, detested by his people, forsaken by his Barons, except a few partisans, and threatened with invasion by a powerful enemy. In this strait two Templars found him at Dover, and told him that a way of escape was yet open; that they were sent by Pandulph, who was on the coast of France, to propose an interview; that if he would submit and obey the Church, all might yet be averted. If not, they said the King of France was at hand, with the exiled Bishops and laymen of England; and that the King of France had letters from nearly all of the nobles of England, binding themselves by fidelity to him.[21]

Matthew Paris gives the following account of these events:

'When the King had heard these things, he was humbled, though against his will, and perturbed in mind, seeing that the peril of confusion hung over him on every side. Sunk therefore

[20] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 130. [21] Ibid. p. 134.

in despair, he acquiesced, whether he would or no, in the persuasions of Pandulph, and made his peace in a form shameful to himself. . . . . The sum of which is that the King, laying aside rancour against every one, would recall all whom he had proscribed, and gave indemnity for all offences and losses.'[22]

At another interview at Dover, on May 15, 1213, John resigned his crown to the Pontiff, as a feudatory to the Holy See. At Michaelmas following, in the cathedral church of S. Paul, London, John renewed his submission to Nicholas, Cardinal Bishop of Tusculum. The words in which this act was done are as follows:

'We will that it be known, that since we have in many things offended God and our Holy Mother the Church, and therefore have great need of Divine mercy, and have nothing that we can worthily offer in satisfaction to God and the Church but ourselves and our kingdom:

We therefore being willing to humble ourselves for His sake (who for us humbled Himself even unto death), the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us, being neither led by force nor constrained by fear, but by our free good-will, and *by the common counsel of our Barons*, we offer and freely grant to God, and the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and to the Holy Roman Church . . . . the kingdom of England and Ireland,' &c.[23]

Lingard not unreasonably calls this 'a disgraceful act.'[24] It was certainly disgraceful to John, for in doing it he was insincere. It was a bid for the help of the Pope against the Barons. They had invoked the authority of the Pope against him; but he, by making the Pope his feudal suzerain, endeavoured to protect himself against them. By the same act he thought to defeat also the hopes of the King of France. It was an act of cunning, simply out of interest and fear. In this sense it may well be called a disgraceful act. But was

[22] Matt. Paris, vol. ii. p. 135. [23] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 176.
[24] Vol. ii. 331, 332.

vassalage or feudal dependence upon the Head of the Christian world a disgrace to kings? If so, John was not alone in his shame. It was the condition of most of the princes of Christendom. Nay, they were vassals one to another. The King of Scotland was vassal to the King of England; and the King of England was vassal to the King of France. Both were often seen in public on their knees, swearing fealty and doing homage to their feudal lord. John was present when William of Scotland subjected his crown to the King of England; and nine years before, Peter of Arragon voluntarily made himself vassal of Innocent III., binding himself to pay yearly 250 ounces of gold to the Holy See. John's own father, Henry, was feudatory of Pope Alexander III. Henry II. acknowledges this in a letter written to the Pope, preserved by Peter of Blois, his own secretary. In the year after his absolution he wrote thus: 'Vestræ jurisdictionis est Regnum Angliæ, et quantum ad feudatarii juris obligationem vobis duntaxat obnoxius teneor et astringor.'[25] Richard, John's brother, resigned his crown to the Emperor of Germany, and held it on the payment of a yearly rent. John simply did what all these had done before him. But the sting to Englishmen is that the King of England became vassal to an Italian priest. And the nursery tales which pass for history in England have concealed the fact that the whole of the Christian empire of Europe was founded on the same principle. The supreme civil power of Christendom was dependent on the supreme spiritual authority. The Pontiffs

[25] Lingard, vol. ii. p. 19, note.

created the Empire of the West: they conferred the imperial dignity by coronation; they were the ultimate judges of the Emperor's acts, with power of deprivation and deposition. The Christian world at that day saw nothing disgraceful in this sacred imperial jurisprudence.

Let us, however, understand what the feudal dependence involved. It did not create the liability to deposition, for John had been deposed already. All Christian princes by the jurisprudence then in force were liable to deposition. But the feudal relation is expressed in the form of oath taken by John. He promises fidelity to his liege lord, and binds himself to defend him against all conspiracy and danger of life and limb; and to reveal to him all plots, and to defend the patrimony of Peter.[26]

A *feudum* is an immovable possession, held as to its *dominium utile*, or usufruct, of a superior, who has the *dominium supremum*, or suzeranity, with the condition of fidelity and personal service.

John therefore, by surrendering his crown, bound himself to exercise his royal power in conformity with law. The Head of the Christian world became security for this obligation. But all Christian princes were bound to use their power in conformity to law. The submission of John did not deprive his people of the power of legislation, but he thereby bound himself to the Pope to observe faithfully the laws of the land as made by them. His dependence upon the Pope was for the conservation of the liberties of the people. It is

[26] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 177.

acknowledged by all historians that, down to the surrender of the crown, the Pope had supported the Archbishop, the Barons, and the people against the King. He had *multipliciter et multoties*, in a multitude of ways and seasons, as Matthew Paris says, admonished, counselled, expostulated, threatened John, to bring him to law and reason. But John persisted in spoiling, robbing, harrying, afflicting, outraging his people by private wrongs and public wars. All remedies had failed. Excommunication, interdict, deposition, all had been tried in vain. At last John surrenders himself. Innocent for the first time prevailed. He thereby became the arbiter accepted by both contending parties. The Barons, through the Archbishop, and also directly in person, had long invoked his help. John would not listen. Now, at last, he submitted himself; and the Barons were counsellors and partakers of his act of submission. The great council of the Barons united in the act. The cession of the crown was made by their advice and with their consent.[27] They had suffered under John and his ancestors until England had been wounded and torn by domestic strife, and desolated by civil wars. At last they, and the Head of the Christian world, had brought John to submission to the law of Christendom. Their object was the salvation of England. It is clear as day that Innocent's motive was the protection of the people and of the laws and of the liberties of England against the tyranny, perfidy, and personal vices of the worst of kings. A thousand marks a year, or 6000*l.*—that is, 700 from England

[27] Lingard, vol. ii. p. 333.

and 300 from Ireland—was required in acknowledgment of feudal dependence. When this sum is compared with the sum awarded to the Bishops alone as indemnity, namely, 100,000 marks, or 600,000*l.*, it is a mere quit-rent.

And here it is of great importance that the action of the Barons in this surrender of the crown should be put beyond doubt. They were the national party: they represented the people of England: they have been in all histories, great and small, represented as the partisans of the liberties of England. In them, we are told, the liberties of England were condemned at least, if not cursed, by the Pope.

Now, as I have said, we have positive evidence that they were counsellors and partakers in the act of surrender.

First, we have the evidence of William Mauclerc, John's envoy to Rome, who writes to the King describing his interview with the Pope in the Lateran, and states that after his interview four envoys of the Barons came 'deferentes litteras Magnatum Angliæ.' The substance of the letters Mauclerc gives as follows, that all the Barons of the whole of England implored the Pope to admonish, and, if need be, to compel the King to preserve inviolate their ancient liberties, confirmed by the Charters of John's ancestors and by his own oath. He added further:

'They implore the Pope to aid them in this, as it was well known to him that they had boldly opposed the King in defence of the liberty of the Church, at the bidding of the Pope, and that the annual payment which the King had granted to the Pope and the Roman Church, and the other honours which he had

given to the Church of Rome, had been granted and given, not spontaneously, nor out of devotion, but even out of fear, *and by their coercion*.'[28]

The date of this is 1214, a year after the surrender of the crown.

The act of surrender is thus given by Matthew Paris: 'On the 13th of May 1213, the King, with Pandulph, *the Earls, the Barons, and a great multitude*, met at Dover, and *unanimously* agreed in the *forma pacis*, or the engagement of peace.'[29]

Again: 'The King of the English and Pandulph, *cum proceribus Regni*, with the chief men of the kingdom, met at the house of the Knights Templars at Dover on May 15th,' and surrendered the crown.[30]

We come now to a critical period, which, if rightly understood, gives the key to the action and intention of the Pope in the condemnation of the Great Charter.

John had made peace by submission, and by a promise to observe the laws and liberties of England. He had bound himself to make restitution for his exactions and spoliations. This peace was hardly concluded before John broke it. Manifestly he had never intended to keep it. His submission was simply to steal a march upon the Barons, and to renew his conflict with fresh advantage.

After his absolution he convened a jury at S. Albans, to assess the compensation due to the clergy; but he took care to be absent, so that nothing was done.

A second meeting was held at Westminster. John

[28] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. pp. 184-5. [29] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 135.
[30] Ibid. pp. 135-136.

was again absent; again they could do nothing. Then there came up a cry from the country, Barons and people together demanding the fulfilment of his engagements.

While the council was sitting, news came that the King was advancing with an armed force. He was on his way to levy war against the Barons of Northumberland for refusing to go with him to the wars in France. Archbishop Langton met him at Nottingham, and reminded him that to make war on his liegemen was a violation of his oath of peace. With shouts of passion he at last turned back. In September—that is, three months after the peace had been made—the Cardinal Bishop of Tusculum came to adjudicate the matter still in dispute between the King and the clergy. At Michaelmas, in a council held at London, the King pretended to issue a commission to estimate the sums extorted by his officers. But once more it came to nothing. He was visibly dissembling. He then tried to detach the Bishops from the clergy, by offering a restitution to each severally. They referred the proposal to Rome; which suggestion the King caught at, both because of the delay and because he hoped to make the Pope believe the Bishops and clergy to be greedy, grasping, and exorbitant. In this he succeeded. The Cardinal Legate was gained by the King, and began, by his own authority, to fill up the vacant benefices and churches. The Archbishop and his suffragans appealed to Rome; but the Legate persisting, in January 1214 both parties sent their envoys to Rome. On July 1, 1214, the

Legate removed the interdict, which had lasted six years, three months, and fourteen days. He had hardly left S. Paul's Church before a vast multitude of every condition came, laying before him all that they had suffered in limb and property by the exactions and violence of the King's officers. In truth, the peace was no peace, and the settlement settled nothing. The King was dissembling, levying war on the Barons, and oppressing the Church and the people as before.

The Barons therefore consulted for their common safety. At this critical moment the Archbishop produced the Charter of Henry I., and the Barons at once accepted it as the basis of their demands. Thus far they acted in perfect legality. At this moment the defeat of the King's army at Bovines left John without a party in France, and deserted by the Barons of England. He then surrounded himself with mercenaries. On January 7, he went to London; and at the New Temple the Barons came to him with an ostentatious display of military preparation, to demand of him the observance of the Charter of Henry I. He met this by a double trick: the one, a postponement till Easter; the other, the assumption of the Cross of the Crusade. Once more, with a view to separate the Bishops from the Barons, and the Church from the people, John granted a Charter of Liberties to the Church in England. This Charter was sent to Rome and confirmed. The Pope was thereby led to believe that John's intentions were sincere. The Barons persevered in their demands. The King was at Wood-

stock, and the Archbishop remained with him, trying to induce him to grant the demands of the Barons. Nearly the whole baronage of the realm rose in arms, and came with their retainers to Brackley. Here was their first false step. They demanded the Charter. John answered with scorn that he would never grant liberties which would make him a slave. But they were, with one or two exceptions, the liberties he had already sworn to observe. The Barons then appealed to force, defied the King, renounced their homage, and levied war upon him. Their army was led by Robert Fitzwalter, under the name of 'The Army of God and of the Holy Church.' They then came in haste to London. They summoned every man to join them, under pain of being treated as a public enemy. Excepting the King's foreign garrisons, the whole country north of the Thames was in open rebellion. The courts of justice ceased to sit; no man would pay any dues or acknowledge the King's authority. John yielded a second time, and demanded a day for interview with the Barons. On June 18, 1215, they met at Runnymede. The Magna Charta was accepted by the King; but on the spot he sent envoys to Rome to urge its nullity, as being extorted by rebellion, and in disregard of the suzerainty of the Holy See.

It is evident that John, seeing himself helpless in all other ways, determined to bring down the spiritual authority of Innocent upon the Barons. He therefore, with great skill, deceived the Pope, and roused his indignation against them. For this end he heaped together everything that could excite his anger. He

told Innocent that the Barons made light of his letters; that the Archbishops and Bishops neglected to put them in execution; that he had told them in vain that England was the patrimony of S. Peter, and that he held of the Roman Church; that he had taken the Cross; that as a Crusader he desired to treat with them in humility and meekness; that he had offered them the abolition of all evil customs and all griefs; that they were bent on troubling the kingdom; that he had dismissed his foreign troops, though in so doing he had deprived the Crusade of most important and powerful aids, &c.[31] It is impossible to carry diplomatic craft to a higher perfection.

John simply deceived the Pope into a belief that he was sincere, and that the Barons, and even the Bishops, were rebels to him, and contumacious to the Holy See. But he went even beyond this. He forged the seals of the Bishops, and wrote everywhere abroad in their name, saying that 'the English were detestable apostates, and that the King and the Pope would confirm their possessions to whomsoever would take up arms against them.'

Again, in the month of September, after the acceptance of the Charter in June, he wrote saying that the Barons were devoted to him before he submitted to the Holy See, and from that time turned against him, and 'especially, as they publicly said, for that cause they violently rose against him.'[32] It was no wonder that the Pope was offended and incensed.

In all this the dissimulation of John outdid itself.

[31] Rymer. *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 200. [32] Ibid. p. 207.

Innocent had no choice. On the 24th of August, the envoys received apostolic letters condemning the Barons.[33]

II. We have now traced the antecedents of the Great Charter, and we may estimate its condemnation, and the motives and extent of that condemnation.

1. The event is recorded by Matthew Paris in these words: 'Then the Pope, after deliberation at his will, by a definitive sentence condemned and annulled the oft-named Charter of Liberties of the kingdom of England, though it contained things pious and just, as a careful inspector may see.'[34] The Pope nowhere denies that it contained 'pia et justa;' but things pious and just may be demanded in a way contrary both to justice and to piety; and this is my contention.

2. The Pope here explicitly declares the cause of the condemnation, namely:

(1.) That the Barons had levied war against their sovereign.

(2.) That he was a feudal vassal of the Holy See.

(3.) That he had taken the Cross.

(4.) That their cause was already in appeal before the Holy See.

(5.) That they had taken the law into their own hands.

3. There is not here so much as a single word as to the contents of the Great Charter.

4. The first part of it was the Charter of Eccle-

[33] Rymer, tom. i. p. 208.

[34] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 162.

siastical Liberties granted by John, and already confirmed by Innocent.

5. All other details, social, economical, and political, had been for centuries in use, and confirmed by successive sovereigns, in full peace and communion with the Holy See. It was in behalf of these same laws and liberties that the Pope had been for years admonishing and urging the King. They had been already embodied in successive Charters, on which no shadow of censure from Rome had ever fallen.

6. The very same laws and liberties, with only three or four exceptions, were, within a year of the condemnation of the Great Charter of John, confirmed by Gualio, Legate of the Pope, in the Charter of Henry III.; and these exceptions were not made by the Pope, but by the Barons themselves, into whose hands the government of the kingdom during the minority of the King had fallen.[35]

It would seem to me, therefore, to be proved even to demonstration, that the Pope condemned, not the Charter, but the Barons; not the laws and liberties set down in the Charter, but the way and action by which the Barons had wrung it from their sovereign. The Pope quashed and annulled the Charter as a contract, and forbade either side to plead or act upon

[35] Mr. Greene says that the articles omitted in the first Charter of Henry III. were re-inserted under the influence of Archbishop Langton. I do not find the evidence of this statement. Neither Matthew Paris nor Hovenden, so far as I can see, say so: and the *Annals of Dunstable*, quoted by Mr. Stubbs (*Documents*, &c., p. 323), expressly say that in the year 1225, when the King had attained majority: 'Libertates prius ab eo puero concessas, jam major factus, indulsit.' This does not indeed exclude, but it does not imply, any re-insertion of articles.

it; but not one word as to its contents is to be found.

The only argument that I can conceive to the contrary is that the Pope, in his letter of cassation, describes the Charter as '*turpis et vilis, illicita et iniqua*.'[36] But this, again, is evidently said of the whole action, by which the King was forced by his own liegemen into a submission and a humiliation second only to that of the surrender of his crown. There is not a shadow of evidence to show that these epithets apply to the laws or liberties as expressed in the Charter.

On all these grounds, therefore, I affirm once more that, in condemning the Charter, Innocent condemned the action of the Barons, and not the liberties of England.

In order to bring this out more clearly, we will sum up the chief contents of the Great Charter of Liberties.

It begins with a recital of the Charter of Liberties issued on January 15, 1215, and confirmed by the Pope, which begins 'Anglicana Ecclesia libera sit, et habeat jura sua integra, et libertates suas illæsas.'

This certainly was not condemned by Innocent.

Then follow sixty-two articles, relating to inheritance, taxation, common pleas, trial by peers, weights, measures, imprisonment, safe conducts, and the like.

A man must be not a little credulous who can believe that Innocent III. saw in these details the subject-matter of a Pontifical condemnation. They had been the laws and liberties of England for gene-

[36] Rymer, tom. i. p. 204.

rations; and no Pope had ever seen in them matter for his supreme cognisance. What Innocent was really dealing with was what I may call the constitutional law of Christian kingdoms, and of the jurisprudence of the Christian world. In this, authority and liberty are both sacred; despotism and rebellion both crimes against God and man. The Pope, as supreme judge, took cognisance of these *causæ majores*, these high causes of Christian civilisation; but that he should occupy himself about such matters as the details of Magna Charta could only come—as an Englishman, I take leave to say—into the head of an Englishman, and th n only if he be either innocent of history or a scientific historian. The thirty-fifth article runs:

'Let there be one measure for wine throughout all our kingdom, and one measure for beer, and one measure for oats—that is, the London quartern; and one breadth for cloth, dyed russet, and hauberk—that is, two ells within the listings; and let it be with weights as with measures.'

The pastoral vigilance of Popes is great, but it hardly reaches to the weights and measures and quarterns and ells and gallons of Christendom.

Mr. Stubbs seems to me to confirm the view I have been maintaining. He says:

'In the ecclesiastical disputes, which are the next feature of the reign, John had to contend with the greatest of all the successors of Peter, and with a spirit in the National Church which was unquestionably maintained by the knowledge of the great power and success of the Pope in other parts of Christendom. The Barons refrained from taking advantage of those peculiar difficulties, nor did their overt opposition to the King begin, until his relations with the Papacy had changed. As soon as the Papal authority begins to back the royal tyranny the Barons determine to resist; and the Church having recovered, in Archbishop

Langton, its natural leader, resumes its ordinary attitude as the supporter of freedom.'[37]

And afterwards he adds:

'The country saw that the submission of John to Innocent placed its liberty, temporally and spiritually, at his mercy; and immediately demanded safeguards.'

That is, the Charter of Henry I. And again:

'The personal hatred which John had inspired . . . . was so strong . . . . that, had it not been for the King's death, England would have most probably carried out a change in dynasty.'[38]

I would venture to slightly differ in some points from this statement.

The ecclesiastical disputes did not rally the Barons to the support of the Church in the time of John, any more than in the time of Henry II. With few exceptions, the Barons sided with Henry against S. Thomas. On the other hand, Mr. Stubbs has truly discerned that the 'spiritual and devotional' Bishops, with certain exceptions, were always on the side of popular freedom. The Barons acted with the Pope so long as he endeavoured to bring the King to reason in their own interests; but they opposed both the King and the Pope when Innocent censured their rebellion. This shows that neither before nor afterwards were they acting in co-operation with any cause of law or liberty except their own. They had appealed to the Pope as much as, if not oftener than, the King. They not only accepted the Pontifical deposition of the King, but afterwards, when he had been absolved and re-

[37] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 269. [38] Ibid. p. 270.

stored, they secretly transferred their allegiance to the King of France. Tyrant as John was, the Barons were guilty both of treason and rebellion. Their opposition to Innocent began when he told them so. The Pope gave support, not to John's tyranny, but to the King's right. He offered to hear both parties; but the Barons would not listen, and levied war. Innocent, before John's surrender, had not backed them in rebellion, but in their just demands; and he backed John afterwards, not in tyranny, but in his honour as a King. Nowhere did Innocent pronounce on the merits of either side. He expressly declared, in his condemnation of the Barons, that they had refused all proposals of judicial settlement. So much for the Barons in their relation to the Church. But, as Mr. Stubbs truly notes, 'the ordinary attitude' of the Church in England in that day, as everywhere and always, was as 'the supporter of freedom;' and the Archbishop was 'its natural leader,' a true successor of S. Anselm and S. Thomas, in its conflict for liberty. And with this notable difference from the Barons: they rarely, if ever, sided with the Church in its conflict for its own liberties. The Church always sided with them and with the people, in their conflict for the laws and liberties of England. This brings out more luminously than I could hope to do the thesis I have undertaken to defend.

Once more, it may be urged that so absolute was the condemnation of the Charter, that even Cardinal Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, was suspended *ab ingressu Ecclesiæ et a divinis* for the part he had in it.

Nothing, perhaps, will bring out more clearly the distinction I have drawn above, between the condemnation of the Barons and the condemnation of the matter of the Charter, than the suspension of the Archbishop.

Believing that the Legate had been gained over by the King and his adherents, and that the mind of the Pope had been biassed by partial informations laid before him by the Archbishop of Dublin and the Bishop of London, whom the King had sent to Rome, so as to be really deceived, the Archbishop decided on going in person to Rome. A Bull then arrived to excommunicate all the disturbers of the King and realm of England. The Archbishop was already on board ship when the Bishop of Winchester and Pandulph came and urged him to publish the Bull throughout the province of Canterbury. The Archbishop, believing the Bull to be obreptitious, and that, if he could lay before the Pope the full and true state of the case, it would be averted, would not publish it. The two commissioners then used their powers given in the Bull to suspend the Archbishop from his office. Without contention or remonstrance, he proceeded to Rome.

On his arrival he found the Pope greatly incensed, and on his petition to be released from suspension Innocent answered:

'Not so, brother; you will not so easily get absolution for all the harm you have done, not to the King of England only, but to the Roman Church. We will take full counsel with our brothers here what your punishment must be.'

The Fourth Council of Lateran was then sitting, and the Archbishop took his place in it; but he was

under suspension from November 12 to the Easter following.

On this it is to be said that there is not one word to show that the subject-matter of the Charter was condemned. The harm done to the King was the encouragement given to the Barons in their armed opposition; the harm done to the Roman Church was both the violation of the suzerainty of the Holy See and refusal to publish the excommunication. The cause of his suspension was not one of detail, but of the *alta politica* of the civil and ecclesiastical jurisprudence of Europe at that time. There is no doubt that John was a tyrant, and as little doubt that the Barons were rebels; and it cannot be denied that the Archbishop was in contumacy. Under the conditions of the law then existing, no other judgment could be formed. It is a simple stupidity to judge such questions by the laws of the nineteenth century. Before the merits of the Magna Charta could be tried, the rebellion of the Barons, and the contumacy of the Archbishop, must first be judged. And it is to this I have endeavoured to direct the attention of those who, in their endeavour to make men believe that the Catholic Church is the friend of despotism and the enemy of liberty, shut their eyes to history, and yet believe themselves to be scientific.

Let Innocent III. declare for himself the motives of his condemnation.

In his apostolic letters,[39] addressed to all whom they may concern, he first sets forth that John, King

[39] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. pp. 203-4.

of England, had grievously offended against God and the Church; that therefore he had been excommunicated, and his kingdom laid under interdict; that at last, by God's grace returning to himself, he had repented, and made satisfaction humbly to God and the Church, recompense for losses, restitution for what he had seized, and had given full liberty to the Church in England. The Pope, therefore, absolved him, and received him to the oath of fidelity and feudal dependence. After this he took the Cross of the Crusade. The Pope then narrates how the Barons rose against him, and how, after many efforts of conciliation, he had written to annul all plots and conspiracies, and to exhort the Barons to respect the royal authority, and to prefer to him their demands, not insolently, but with humility. He states, further, that he had written to the King, enjoining him to treat the Barons and Nobles with gentleness, and to concede their just petitions.

The Barons, he adds, did not wait for his messenger, but in violation of their oath of fidelity, and making themselves judges and executors in their own cause, they, being vassals, publicly conspired against their lord — soldiers against their king — and united with his enemies to make war against him; laid waste his lands, and seized by treachery the city of London, the seat of the kingdom. The Pope then recounts the proposals of the King which they had rejected; and finally that they had, by force and fear, extorted from the King a convention which was vile and base, and

moreover illicit and wicked, in derogation and diminution of the right and honour of the King.

Innocent then annuls the Charter, and forbids either side to observe it, under pain of excommunication; quashing, he says, as well the Charter as its obligations and engagements, *whatsoever they be*, and altogether depriving them of all obliging force.

Now in all this there is not a word as to the subject-matter of the Charter itself.

In the same terms he wrote also to the Barons:

'Præsertim enim in causa vestra vos judices et executores feceritis: eodem Rege parato, in curia sua, vobis per pares vestros secundum consuetudines et leges Regni, justitiæ plenitudinem exhibere: vel coram nobis, ad quos hujus causæ judicium, ratione Domini, pertinebat.'

He then adds:

'Cum igitur illa compositio (since therefore the compact), qualis qualis (of whatever kind it be), to which by force and fear you constrained him, is not only vile and base, but unlawful and wicked, so as to be reprobated by all, chiefly because of the manner in which it was made, *maxime propter modum*, we therefore,' &c.

The Pope then annuls it as before. Innocent further says:

'As we will not that the King be deprived of his right, so we will that he desist from oppressing you, lest the kingdom of England be oppressed by evil customs or unjust exactions.'

He then bids them send envoys, that in the council, where the Bishops of England were present, the disputes might be treated and terminated, 'so that the King might be content with his right and honour, and

the clergy and people at large might enjoy due peace and liberty.'[40]

Now in these, which are the governing documents of the whole question, there is not so much as a word as to the contents of Magna Charta. Indeed it is expressly excluded—'Compositio illa, qualis qualis' (whatever its quality may be). Again, there is a distinct recognition of 'gravamina, pravæ consuetudines, iniquæ exactiones.' Finally, '*maxime propter modum*' declares the chief motive to be the manner in which the Barons had enacted the Charter by force and fear.

I have thus far examined the subject as if it were incumbent upon me to prove that Innocent did not condemn the contents of the Charter. But it is for those who say that he did so to give proof of their assertion. I have not to prove a negative, and may well wait till they bring evidence. Hitherto I have heard none. And I take leave to say that none has been brought because none can be found, and none can be found because no such evidence ever existed.

I am well aware that Mr. Freeman has said:

'In the latter days of John, and through the whole reign of Henry III., we find the Pope and the King in strict alliance against the English Church and nation. The last good deed done by a Pope towards England was when Innocent III. sent us Stephen Langton. Ever afterwards we find Pope and King leagued together to back up each other's oppressions and exactions. The Papal power was always ready to step in on behalf of the Crown, always ready to hurl spiritual censures against the champions of English freedom. The Great Charter was denounced at Rome: so was its author, the patriot Primate.'[41]

[40] Rymer, tom. i. p. 205.

[41] *The Growth of the English Constitution*, pp. 76, 77.

I hope that I have set this last sentence in its true light. The rest of this quotation needs a separate treatment. If Mr. Freeman and Mr. Bryce had mastered the history of the Catholic Church with the breadth of grasp with which they have treated the Holy Roman Empire, the work of Mr. Bryce, and the review of it by Mr. Freeman, would be two historical documents of unequalled value. It is the absence of this (which is the main element in mediæval history) that disturbs the balance of their judgment. The action of the Pontiffs in sustaining the sovereignties of the Christian world was prompted, not by despotic affinities, but by the words of Holy Writ, 'Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.'[42] But on this we cannot enter now.

[42] Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

XXI.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

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Delivered at the Academia of the Catholic Religion, Manchester, January 10, 1876.

When I received the invitation of the Bishop of Salford to deliver the inaugural address at the opening of this Academia I had a special motive which made me very gladly accept it. About eleven years ago, it fell to my lot, by command of my Bishop, the late Cardinal, during his last illness, to take a foremost part in founding the Academia of the Catholic religion in London. The Cardinal himself was unable to undertake the work, and he deputed me to fulfil it. According to the best of my power I executed the task. The Cardinal published at the time an invitation to those who would become members of the Academia, from which I will read a few words. 'Next to the exercise of its purest spiritual office, the Church has in all ages bestowed its special care on the cultivation of the intellect and the advancement of science, making the Word of God the interpretation of His works, and His works the illustration of His Word, and the science of God the centre and light of the manifold and various orders of human knowledge. For this cause the Church of God has

always given special encouragement to the studies which demonstrate the connection between science and revealed religion, thereby applying the truths and laws of the intellectual and natural world to the confirmation of the faith.'[1] Cardinal Wiseman then went on to say, that at the beginning of the present century, when the sceptical and infidel literature of Germany and France penetrated throughout Europe, there was formed an Academia in Rome for the purpose of cultivating this special aspect of science; and he next affirmed that the circumstances of our day seemed to demand in England an institution of the same kind; that 'the intellectual condition of England at that moment was such as to alarm the least anxious as to the divergence of sacred and secular science, and the unnatural position in which they seemed to stand; and that rationalistic tendencies of thought in an advanced form had explicitly shown themselves in the most educated centres of England.' Such was the purpose with which the Academia was founded in the diocese of Westminster. It has endured for eleven years, I am happy to say, without flagging. Its sessions have been maintained, papers have been read which have been printed and published in three volumes, of which two lie here before me. Of their quality you must judge for yourselves. I can say that the benefit of the Academia has been very great. It has, first of all, attracted and bound together a number of Catholics of all ages; men who desire to cultivate

[1] Preface to vol. i. *Essays on Religion and Literature* (Longmans, 1865).

science and literature in relation to faith. It has enabled them to correspond, and to co-operate together, and to form what I may call a Catholic opinion outside of faith. I have observed a very perceptible growth of a solid Catholic opinion resulting, in my belief, in no small degree from the action of the Academia. These, I believe, are the motives which have made you desire to transplant, as it were, the Academia to Manchester.

1. The late Cardinal, in the instructive passage from which I have already quoted, spoke pointedly of the visible tendency which exists in England to separate off science and to oppose it to faith. The other day there fell into my hands an example of this tendency. I do not refer to it in any spirit hostile to the writer. I am under no temptation to do so, for I know him personally, and can bear testimony to his highly amiable and excellent private character. He is a man endowed with a singular facility and beauty of imagination, a strange subtilty of thought, a poetic power which seems to tinge and to pervade even his science; and when he gambols in the world of light, which is his own, and floats in the azure amidst the beauties and the glories of the empyrean, no one is more ready than I am to admire and acknowledge the singular gifts of which he is possessed. But when a spirit so ethereal clothes itself in the buff jerkin of Cromwell's Ironsides, or in the mailed coat of a Lutheran trooper, it seems to me somewhat incongruous, and I trust I may be pardoned by my friend if I regard his masquerade with some little kindly amusement. Well, the other day a letter under the

title, 'The Vatican and Physics,' appeared in that broadsheet which flies over the whole world, and therefore I may freely use it. The writer quoted a passage of singular excellence from the Bishop of Montpellier, who, addressing the Dean and Professors of Montpellier, laid down what I may call the first principles which you, as members of the Academia, are bound stoutly to affirm. The Bishop said: 'Now, gentlemen, the whole Church holds herself to be invested with the absolute right to teach mankind. She holds herself to be the depository of the truth, not a fragmentary truth, not a mixture of certainty and hesitation, but the total truth, complete from a religious point of view. Much more; she is so sure of the infallibility conferred on her by the Divine Founder as the magnificent dowry of their indissoluble alliance, that even in the natural order of things, scientific or philosophical, moral or political, she will not admit that a system can be adopted and sustained by Christians if it contradicts definite dogmas. She considers that the voluntary and obstinate denial of a single point of her doctrine involves the crime of heresy, and she holds that all formal heresy, if it be not courageously rejected prior to appearing before God, carries with it the certain loss of grace and of eternity. As defined by Pope Leo X., at the Sixth Council of the Lateran, truth cannot contradict itself; consequently every assertion contrary to a revealed verity of faith is necessarily and absolutely false. It follows from this, without entering into the examination of this or that question of physiology, that solely

by the certitude of our dogmas we are able to pronounce judgment on any hypothesis which is an Anti-christian engine of war rather than a serious conquest over the secrets and mysteries of Nature.' Then follow the words of my friend in his letter to the *Times:* 'Liberty is a fine word, tyranny a hateful one, and both have been eloquently employed of late in reference to the dealings of the secular arm with the pretensions of the Vatican. But "liberty" has two mutually exclusive meanings—the liberty of Rome to teach mankind, and the liberty of the human race. Neither reconcilement nor compromise is possible here. One "liberty" or the other must go down. This in our day is the "conflict" so impressively described by Draper, in which every thoughtful man must take a part. There is no dimness in the eyes of Rome as regards her own aims; she sees with a clearness unapproached by others that the school will be either her stay or her ruin. Hence the supreme effort she is now making to obtain the control of education; hence the assertion made by the Bishop of Montpellier of her "absolute right" to teach mankind. She has, moreover, already tasted the fruits of this control in Bavaria, where the very liberality of an enlightened king led to the fatal mistake of confiding the schools of the kingdom to the "Doctors of Rome."' Now I must answer that if the Catholic Church has the liberty to teach all mankind, this does not necessarily deprive all mankind of the liberty which mankind seems to claim of disbelieving what she teaches. The Catholic Church puts no force or

strain upon mankind further than the jurisdiction which evident truth has over the intellect and over the conscience. There is nothing 'mutually exclusive' here, except that wheresoever truth manifests its light, and the reason of man is convinced, he is bound to believe it. This is, indeed, a jurisdiction of truth which a man of science would hardly reject. Professor Tyndall went on to say, 'There is no dimness in the eyes of Rome as regards its own aims; she sees with a clearness unapproached by others that the school will be either her stay or her ruin.' Well, I will be bold to say that the school has never been the ruin of the Catholic Church yet, and never will be. Whether the school was the stay of the Church I will not stop to pronounce; but I am sure of this, that the Church has been the creator of every school, and therefore it seems to me that we have no need to fear the multiplication of schools of science—if, indeed, they are schools of science, and not schools of perverted intellect. That, and that alone, is what we fear. In order that I may more clearly bring out what is the relation of the Church and of Faith to matters of science, I will read a passage from the great Doctor on whose philosophy we rest firmly to this day—S. Thomas Aquinas—who in his book, *Contra Gentes*, says: 'Falsehood alone is contrary to truth. Whatsoever arguments may be laid down as against the teachings of faith, they cannot proceed rightly from the first principles of Nature, which are known by themselves. Therefore they have not the force of demonstration, but are either probabilities or sophistries, and there

is a way of solving them still open' (lib. i. ch. vii.). The Vatican Council says: 'But though faith be above reason, yet no true variance can ever exist between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and inspires faith implanted the light of reason in the mind of man. But God cannot contradict Himself; nor can truth ever contradict truth. Every assertion, therefore, contrary to the illumination of faith we define to be altogether false. Moreover the Church, which, together with the apostolic office of teaching, received commandment to guard the deposit of faith, has both the right and the duty of Divine commission to proscribe science falsely so called' (First Const., On Catholic Faith, chap. iv.). Once more, in the chapter on the relation of faith to reason, the Council says: 'Wherefore, so far from truth is it that the Church is opposed to the cultivation of human arts and knowledge that in many ways the Church helps and promotes that culture; for it neither ignores nor despises the benefits which flow into the life of men from such arts and knowledge, but it ever recognises them as coming from God the Lord of science, so that if rightly treated they lead by God's grace to Himself. Nor does it indeed forbid that all such arts and sciences should employ their own proper principles and their own proper method within their own limits; but, recognising this just liberty, it is carefully on its guard lest by conflicting with Divine teaching they receive error into themselves, or by going beyond their proper boundaries they invade and disturb the things which are of

faith' (ibid.). These are the principles which the Church has laid down on the relation in which it stands towards science and the physical world. I will endeavour to point out somewhat in detail what is the application of these principles, and bring it to bear upon the work of the Academia.

2. For the last three hundred years there has been an attempt continually going on to effect two things—first, to separate science and politics from revelation; and secondly, to oppose science and politics to the Church. For three hundred years this labour has been incessant. We have been told that the Church has no jurisdiction within the realms of science. We have been told that it ought to have nothing to do with politics. In fact, the world has tried to send the Church to Coventry. I am afraid that, as when the messenger came to Diogenes and told him that the Athenians had banished him, he said, 'Well, then, Diogenes banishes the Athenians,' so the Church, when she receives that courteous message from the men of science, must make a respectful bow, and say, 'We are afraid we must banish you.' But the Church does not banish science. It banishes only those who under the name of science would break up the unity of all knowledge, which, as it comes from one Source and one Author, may be distinguished, as Lord Bacon said, by rivers and boundaries like a continent, but cannot be parted; it is one indivisible whole. First of all, we have it from the Vatican Council that there is no opposition between reason, however cultivated and scientific, and faith; but that reason is made perfect by faith. For

reason is a Divine light in the order of Nature, whereby we can attain a knowledge of the world and of the physical sciences of the world by observation; together with the knowledge which lies within the ken and reach of the senses and of the intellect: and also the knowledge of ourselves. If reason be a Divine light, faith also is a Divine light, of the supernatural order, illuminating and elevating reason to a more perfect knowledge, not only of God, but of man and of morals, that is, of the relations between God and man. Then certainly there can be no discord and no conflict between reason and faith. In truth, the wreck of the world came from intellectual error, and the beginning of intellectual error was a word which I am afraid the men of science will not forgive me if I say anything to discredit. We are told by Lord Bacon that science is a 'questioning of Nature.' Well, the word which first perverted the reason was 'Why.' 'Why hath God said?' and then the contradiction, 'God hath not said:' and then it suggested a motive, 'for God doth know,' and 'ye shall be as gods.' Out of these intellectual temptations came the first intellectual perversion, and after that perversion of the intellect came the perverted act of the will. In truth, there can be no act of the will which does not pass through the intellect. There cannot be an act of the will unless the reason have first proposed to itself a motive for its action. Intellect is said in philosophy to carry the light before the will, to show the path; and therefore right knowledge has a close relation to the will, and a perverted intellect is the destruction of

the will. The will is perverted at the same moment as the intellect, for the will conforms itself to the dictates of reason, or, to put it in the formula of a wise man who used to say, one error in principle is worse than a hundred errors in practice. A hundred errors in practice may be nothing more than occasional blundering, but one error in principle is the perpetual and inexhaustible source of an indefinite number of errors. There can be no act of the will which is not preceded by an act of reason. When once the reason is perverted the will follows in that perversion.

Let us go a little further. It follows from this that the rectification or sanctification of the intellect is a vital part of the commission of the Church. 'Go ye and teach all nations;' 'Go ye and make disciples of all nations,' is the full rendering of these words. This lays down a primary truth. The teaching begins in the intellect; and the rectification of the intellect, if the will obeys, rectifies the will; and in this great commission of the Church the rectification of the intellect of the world, and the restoration of it to the true knowledge of God, the true knowledge of man, and the true knowledge of morals,—all this is a vital condition of the restoration of mankind to the image to which he was created. The Church in the Vatican Council has defined its office of guarding the knowledge of science in all its contacts with revelation. It leaves to every science, as it has expressly declared, a full and just liberty to use its own principles and methods within its own limits. It only interposes when, exceeding those limits and trespassing upon the realm of revelation, science

invades that which is not its own, and perturbs the truths of faith—that is to say, whenever science comes in contact with revelation there revelation is supreme, and there, as S. Thomas Aquinas has laid it down in the words I have read, apparent demonstrations are not demonstrations. They may be plausible, and for a time they may be treated as probabilities, but they are sophistries, and in the end they will be solved and pass away. It follows again from this that it is not possible to send the Church to Coventry, because the commission of the Church pervades in some sort all the regions of science. As we say of sovereignty, its jurisdiction runs everywhere: so we say of revelation. For instance, what would seem further from revelation than the physical science of geology and the like? and yet the words, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' enter into physical science. The creation of the world is an axiom, I may say, even in the physical science of the world, and an axiom derived from revelation. It was precisely this axiom which made the distinction between the heretics of old, who ascribed the existence of the world to the eternity of matter or to the creative power of an inferior or evil being. The creation, then, is an axiom of science, which from revelation runs into geology. Again, the descent of man from a single pair and the unity of mankind are also truths of revelation, against which a multitude of scientific men, if I may so call them, are at this moment contending, with every weapon and every instrument they can wield, to destroy our certainty. In this question revelation has its place, and no man who

believes in the revelation of God can yield a hair's breadth. Metaphysics, pure mental philosophy, would seem to lie outside of revelation, but the question arises, Is there such a thing as a soul? or does matter think? Here again revelation has something to say. Once more, is there such a thing as a moral sense, or are right and wrong mere conventional sensations arising out of the habit of attaching a sense of fear or shame to particular actions? Or again, are moral habits learnt, as I once heard a very notable and ready speaker maintain, like the tumbling of pigeons? Tumbling, he said, is only a skilful evolution which the parent bird teaches its young to make. The young ones learn to follow parental example, and under the training so acquired they form the habit of tumbling, and transmit it to posterity. So in like manner the notions of right and wrong are said to be acquired, and to have no foundation in the intrinsic distinction of things. Here again revelation has something to say. There is a soul, there is a conscience, there is a supreme Lawgiver. Thus revelation runs with its jurisdiction into mental philosophy and into metaphysics. We are told also that religion has nothing to do with politics. I would ask, what are politics but the collective morals of men living together in society? The moral laws which govern man as an individual govern him if he be the member of a community; be it the community of a household or the community of a State. I can find no distinction between morals and politics but this—that politics are morals upon a large scale, and that morals are politics upon a narrow scale. When I am told that morals and

politics are to be separated, or that politics and religion are to be separated, I answer: if you cannot separate politics from morals, and cannot separate morals from religion, then it will be very difficult to separate politics from religion. In fact they make one whole, and hence revelation and the Divine law enter into the whole range of political science. I do not mean to say that revelation has to do immediately with questions of excise or with the penalties for smuggling. I am not speaking of politics in that minute sense, but of the great constructive laws by which human society is held together.

3. If that be so, it is clear, and beyond doubt, that the Catholic Church has an all-important office in these matters, and that there is no power upon earth that can separate either science or society from revelation. The Church having a Divine liberty as the witness which God has constituted in the world to deliver His revelation, and being the sole fountain of that knowledge, has within its sphere a sovereignty, and that sovereignty is one which is exempt from all control of human authority. No authority on earth can intervene to dictate to the Church what it has to teach, or within what limits it shall teach. There is no authority to determine whether the Church shall teach or not this or that doctrine. It is therefore not only exempt, but supreme, and being supreme, there can be no appeal from it. It is the highest and final judge of what is the faith and what is the law of God, and when science and politics come into contact with that faith and that law it admits of no appeal from its own decision to any tribunal out of itself, to any judge of appeal in the past or in the future. It

stands as sole witness to the truth which God has planted in the world. If that be so, then it follows as a general conclusion that the attempt to separate theology from science and society is both contrary to faith and contrary to reason. I will go so far as to affirm that science has never yet demonstrated anything contrary to faith. When men talk of Galileo, I answer that Galileo did not demonstrate. He enunciated a hypothesis, and that hypothesis was not demonstrated for a century afterwards. Lord Bacon lived and died disbelieving the hypothesis. Sir Thomas Brown, one of the greatest literary men of the seventeenth century, also died disbelieving it. When Newton demonstrated the law of gravitation, he demonstrated nothing to touch the faith; but as soon as he proved it, the Church at once recognised it. It had carefully guarded the popular and visible interpretation of the historical words of Scripture, lest without cause the mind of man should be perturbed, and doubts should be insinuated without necessity or power of solution; but as soon as that demonstration was made the Church gave full scope to science to use its own method and its own principles within its own limits, as the Vatican Council has declared. The language of Holy Scripture in this matter is the language of men, as it is the language of sense, which we use to this very day. We still say 'the sun rises' and 'the sun sets,' in spite of Galileo and in spite of Newton. We use the language of sense, which is the only language that the mass of men can understand, and we do so because Scripture is not a revelation of science. The revelation which God has given us is in another

sphere and on another plane. It has no collision with physical science, because it is not a revelation of science. It has come into contact with the facts of the world in the points here spoken of, in the creation, in the nature of man, in his social and moral life, in his free will, in the law written upon the conscience, in his responsibility. These are matters of revelation in its proper province. The question whether or no the world moves round the sun or the sun moves round the world is a matter of science on which there is no revelation. I am bold enough to say that there never has been any demonstration of science which is in contradiction with any of the truths of revelation, and those who put that theory forward put it forward either from want of a clear knowledge of what revelation is, or from some mistaken opinion of their own which they suppose to be scientific. In like manner, I may say that society—the social and political orders of mankind—in the sense which I have been describing, has no doctrines or laws contrary to the faith. That must be self-evident, for what is society but the natural order and state of man in which he is placed by virtue of his birth and of the relations which are formed round about him? These are from God; and the authority and order and law and obedience which constitute domestic life expand into the civil order of politics. The order of Nature is from God, and is therefore Divine. The Church and revelation are likewise from Him, and the whole order and authority of the Church are in perfect harmony, the supernatural with the natural. There does not exist either a law or a truth in respect politics which is out of harmony with the law of faith.

4. If that be so, I may obviously draw another very definite conclusion: I mean that the isolation of theology from science, simply impossible as it is, in no way affects the supremacy and sovereignty of revelation, which continues to discharge its own office undiminished in light and power. But such isolation has its effect on the other side. The isolation of faith in the world is the atheism of the world. If the world banishes the Church and the revelation of God from science and from itself, then society is without God, and that is political atheism. If theology be banished from morals, then man is without God. And that is the best definition that I know of heathenism. I know of no axiom surer than this, 'Without God no society,' and for this reason: without God there is no law, and without law society cannot be. If men were to combine together in a society without law to-day, they would be disintegrated and in ruin before sunrise to-morrow. Therefore, without God there is no political society, no social order, no domestic life, no human society.

5. I may draw another conclusion from the premises I have laid down, namely, that the unity of the faith gives unity to all knowledge. As Lord Bacon said, there is a hierarchy of sciences, but above all there is one, and that one is transcendent, and its jurisdiction is universal and its sovereignty pervades all. The queen of all science is theology or the revelation of God in its scientific form; or in other words, God is in all things, whether it be science or theology. God is the Creator, and His law pervades all fields of life and light. There is no part of God's works which is not seen in the light

of God's presence. All His works are seen in the light of the sun, whether men reflect on it or no; and as it is in the light of the sun that we make our scientific observations, so, whether we recognise it or not, all science is in God. All things are in God, and God in all things. In truth, the sunlight of revelation is like the sunlight of the noonday, and I know only two classes of creatures who have any reason to quarrel with it—owls and bats. I do not see what men gain in believing that there is no God. I do not believe that science will be advanced a step by a mere negation. The regenerated reason is lifted above itself, and being elevated by a higher light it has a wider horizon, and within the circuit of that horizon it sees new truths invisible before. By diligent self-culture the man who has two lights can see farther and more widely than the man who has one alone. If he has the light of reason a man may be an Aristotle, a Whewell, or a Tyndall in philosophy; but if he has also the light of faith it is certain that the light of Nature would not be diminished, but the light of the whole man would be doubled. As the Vatican Council declares, and the Holy Father has declared again and again, both philosophers and philosophy are subject to revelation, because God is the fountain of knowledge.

And now I ask you, what reason has the Church to be afraid of the school? Where was the first school founded? In the house of the bishop. Where did it go next? Into the monastery. Where did it go afterwards but into the university? and who founded the university? Who covered the whole face of the country with the first germs of our grammar schools? Who has

been labouring in these last ages, wherever it has not had its hands tied by royal prerogatives or by legislative statutes, to educate the poor? The mother of the poor —the Catholic Church. I believe I only speak your feelings when I say that if the Catholic Church in England had no fear of being ruined except from the school, it would live a long time. I know much more active powers of ruin which seem to be at work. I could find people o. all sorts and kinds crying for the banishment of the Jesuits and the priests and the bishops. Even in the letter with which I began we are told that 'in Bavaria the liberality of an enlightened king led to the fatal mistake of confiding the schools of the kingdom to the Doctors of Rome.' I am afraid that there is no comfort for politicians so long as Catholics are allowed equal liberty with Englishmen. As long as they are left to the equal liberty of Englishmen they are in a fair race, and they will be content, and we shall see who will be foremost. The other day I read a remarkable passage from the writings of Mr. Carlyle. He was speaking of the first great French Revolution, which was a mixture of the three things—infidelity, paganism, and bloodshed. What do you think he calls it? If I had said it I should have been burned for impiety. He said it was the third and last act of the Protestant Reformation. I do not say that, but I will say that 300 years ago perverted reason attacked faith, and in the last century the Nemesis of Rationalism came to beat down perverted reason. We have come to a state on which I will add a word or two presently. It ought to make scientific men think twice before they again assail the connection of

revelation and faith. We have come to a strange pass. The mental philosophy of the day teaches that the senses are so liable to illusion that we cannot depend upon their reports. If so, the avenues of knowledge are shut up. We are further told that the reason is so liable to illusions arising from the senses that its judgment is not certain. Now God has created man with two chief criteria of knowledge in himself: the senses, whereby he can apprehend the external world; and the reason within him, whereby he passes a simultaneous judgment on the report of his senses. The common sense and common reason of mankind are infallible. Those whose senses misrepresent the objects with which they are in contact are in an abnormal and morbid state, and those who receive the reports of the senses and are not able to reason upon them are of unsound brain. The mental philosophy of the day, therefore, is reducing us to insanity and to idiotcy. This is verily a Nemesis, and I also will say that this subjective scepticism is indeed the third and last act of the Lutheran Reformation.

6. Wherefore, lastly, if there be a unity of all knowledge by reason of its consolidation round the unity of faith, I ask, what is the principle of the unity of faith? It is the infallibility of the light of Nature within its own sphere, and the infallibility of the light of faith under the guidance of the Church of God; and where there is that immutable truth as the central light of all, there is also the inflexible tradition whereby the truths of the natural order and the truths of the supernatural order, interwoven together in one whole, are handed down from age to age inviolate. All faith and science,

then, rest upon an indestructible centre, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.

Let me now apply what I have said to the Academia. It is intended to be a witness to the great truths and laws and methods of which I have spoken, and it is also intended to be a cultivator—that is to say, that the various branches of literature and science will be brought before the members of the Academia for their own cultivation. It is a very humble work. We do not profess to be a school of philosophers, nor a school of scientific men. If we did we should be laughed at, and we should deserve it. The Academia is a very humble and a very homely thing. We do not intend to soar into the empyrean or to melt into the azure. I will tell you what the Academia really is—it is an earthwork. The walls of stone and the bastions of old fortifications are now swept off the face of the earth. They are useless against modern gunnery, but nothing can prevail over an earthwork—nothing can tear it to pieces. Well, the Academia will be an earthwork thrown up for the defence of the faith, for the defence of history, and for the examination and analysis of what I was castigated the other day for calling the nursery tales that Englishmen had been reading as histories of the Church. Above all, you will analyse and examine what are called scientific histories. For my part, I believe that there is no such thing. I can understand the term science when it is applied to knowledge which is definite and certain, and can be resolved into its first principles, which are self-evident. This I believe to be the true definition of science. I can also understand science when it signifies such ex-

perimental, and therefore such tested, knowledge as the results of chemistry and the like; for though it cannot be resolved into first principles, self-evident in themselves, nevertheless it arrives at ultimate certainty. But when men tell me that a history of the Popes is scientific, because through five hundred pages the Popes are called forgers, deceivers, vicious, covetous, and I know not what besides, when all that can be raked together of the garbage and sewage of their enemies in history is collected into a muck heap, as it is within the two boards of one book called *Janus*—when I am told that this is scientific history, I say that the man who says so does not know what science is, or else, knowing it, is imposing upon his readers. I know what true history is, and what adequate history is. It is history which is true and square to the documents upon which it is founded. But that is not science; and when any man comes and talks to you about scientific history, I advise you as soon as possible to change the subject. I have been reported—I do not know by whom—to have said that the Vatican Council has 'triumphed over history.' I do not think that I need contradict such a statement; but I will tell you what I did say, have said, and always shall say so long as I have the light of reason: that if there be in the world a Church divinely guided—if there be a Divine Person dwelling in that Church, whose office it is to preserve it from error—then, when that Church has decided, defined, or decreed, any man who appeals from that decision to any human history whatsoever is guilty of rejecting a Divine Teacher, and of the sin of unbelief, of

which our Divine Lord said: 'Whosoever believeth and is baptised shall be saved, and whosoever believeth not shall be damned.' I have said that the Vatican Council gave expression to the full revealed and Divine theology of the Church of God upon earth under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, and that therefore the definitions and decrees of the Council are the voice, not of man, but of God; for that reason, whosoever appeals from them to human history commits heresy in appealing from the Divine Teacher, and treason in appealing from the ultimate Sovereign Judge.

7. This evening the Bishop has told you that there are two branches in the Academia. You will have ordinary papers read to you as we have in London, and you will have that which we in London do not possess. You will have a course of lectures on English literature, followed by lectures upon the transit of Venus by one of the highest astronomical authorities; you will have lectures upon the Sacred Scriptures and on scientific subjects, so that the Academia will afford the means of cultivating many branches of knowledge in union with the supreme light of faith. If I may suggest some few subjects for discussion and study, I would recommend the First Constitution of the Vatican Council. I believe there is a special reason why this should be carefully studied by every Catholic. The first chapter is on the existence of God. Strange it may seem that in the nineteenth century it has been necessary for a General Council to declare that the existence of God can by reason be proved. The second chapter is on the nature of revelation, the third on the nature of faith,

and the fourth on the relation of faith to reason. Any man making himself master of that one Constitution in ten or fifteen pages will have more than the substance of what I have endeavoured imperfectly to draw in outline. I would also bid you to study the Syllabus, which has caused so great a storm and outcry, and kindled all kinds of animosity. I will venture to say this outcry was raised in nine instances out of ten by those who had never read what they professed to criticise. You may gather from the intensity of opposition it has excited that it is a contradiction of the great cloud of modern errors. It has directed its condemnation to those tendencies of perverted intellect which at the present moment are making havoc in the regions of truth, from the denial of the very existence of God to the lowest forms of heresy. Again, it will be well to study the bearing of political economy on the morals of the people. I believe that at the present moment political economy and commercial theories and the passion for money are making great havoc in the morals of the people. I would also ask you carefully to examine the application of free trade to drink as a politico-economic question, and also to the labour laws as bearing on the domestic life of our people. I hold this as a primary truth, that when the homes of the people are pure the commonwealth is safe; when the homes of the people are wrecked the commonwealth comes down. Next I would mention, merely in passing, the contacts of science and revelation; and lastly, a rigorous appreciation of 'scientific history.'

Therefore, to conclude, it seems to me that the

sanctification of the intellect is the proper work of those who have the light of faith, and of men who desire the welfare of their fellows. Every century has had its special aberrations, but those of the early and of the mediæval ages were moral and spiritual errors in the form of heresy, invented by men who believed in the Christian revelation. But the aberration of the nineteenth century is the intellectual perversion of those who have rejected all revelation, and all belief in a God, and all moral conception of the nature of man. It is to rectify and to restore the intellect of our day from this monstrous and perverse aberration that we are called to labour. I may therefore congratulate the Bishop of Salford that in the city of Manchester, in which, with a vigorous and a fervent authority, he has already welded together the spiritual organisation of the Church, he has successfully founded this intellectual agency, by which the young, perpetually rising from our schools, may receive such culture in literature and science that his flock shall be abreast, at least, with the highest cultivation of this great city.

XXII.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS.

Mr. Kirkman, who was already well known as a mathematician, and as a vigorous assailant of modern Materialism, has, in a recent work on *Philosophy without Assumptions*, fairly entered the lists, and hung up his shield against all comers. As yet no lance has made it ring; nor is there any answer to his challenge. A few critics in anonymous articles, the squires in philosophy, have made a show of answering, but no champion from the ranks of the Materialist philosophers, whom Mr. Kirkman has with no little *outrecuidance* defied, has accepted the combat. And yet assuredly it is not for want of provocation; for Mr. Kirkman, I will not say has 'cursed them by all his gods,' but he has bantered them with a Socratic irony, and mocked them with an irreverence which reads like the *Clouds* of Aristophanes.

With what success the skirmishers have attacked this book may be judged from one fact. Two of the chief critics begin with saying, 'Mr. Kirkman sets out from the dictum of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum:*' which is like saying, 'Lord Bacon bases his *Novum Organum* upon the syllogism of Aristotle.' Mr. Kirkman begins by exposing the dictum of Descartes as a vicious circle. We are before we think; and our consciousness of our

own existence is not an inference, but a certainty anterior to all reasoning.

Mr. Kirkman's book has a twofold purpose. First, he has endeavoured to construct a philosophy on primary certainties which each man of sound mind may 'find for himself, and show others how to find.' He therefore assumes nothing, takes nothing for granted, and uses no postulates. So far it is synthetical and positive. And secondly, he has undertaken to destroy the modern Materialistic philosophers by analysing their methods, which he contends are based on unproved assumptions and arbitrary assertions. He further denies *in toto* our knowledge of *what* matter is, in which some place 'all the potency of terrestrial life.' So far his book is destructive. The destructive part of the book is so much more profuse than the constructive, though the constructive lines do indeed run through it, that the reader more easily follows the polemical than the positive part of the work. At first this leaves an indefinite conception of Mr. Kirkman's affirmative system on the reader's mind; but upon further examination this impression will be for the most part removed. In fact, the primary certainties and truths of philosophy in the order of natural reason are few; but the applications of them to error are manifold. There can only be one straight line, but curves may be almost without number.

We will endeavour (1) first, to get at a synopsis of Mr. Kirkman's positions; (2) secondly, to note what seems to be insufficiently worked out; (3) thirdly, to draw out the scholastic philosophy upon the same

points; and (4) lastly, to apply what has been said to the modern theories of Materialism.

The following summary of Mr. Kirkman's *Philosophy without Assumptions* is given in his own words. Lest I should misstate him, he shall speak for himself: I will therefore insert here an abstract of his book written by his own hand.

Statement of the Philosophical Propositions.

I. Mr. Kirkman begins by stating first what he declines to investigate. He will not inquire either What is? or What must be? The first question, What is?—*i.e.* What is, *per se?*—he considers to be beyond the reach of his human powers. For the second, What must be? as distinct from What must logically follow? he expresses a profound contempt. Thus we seem to have one novelty at least in philosophy—the exclusion of the *per-se-ity* and *must-be-ity*, which cut such a figure in what goes for metaphysics. He says:

'The question that I propose to myself at the beginning of philosophy is this: What do I find for myself without making unproved assumptions, and with demonstrations that I can write down, so that another thinker, if there be another who understands me, can find it, and demonstrate for himself without unproved assumptions?'[1] 'This rule of demanding proof, whenever proof may without evident absurdity be required, reduces my stock of propositions at the start of my philosophy to the fundamental one of Descartes, which I write thus: "I am, and know that I am, thinking."[2] I shall often write "I am" for the full proposition of Descartes.'[3]

He defines assumption thus:

'An *assumption* is the acceptance, without proof, of the truth

[1] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 4. [2] P. 5. [3] P. 6.

of a proposition, of which truth proof may, without a flat contradiction or a glaring absurdity, be demanded.'[4]

He defines demonstrated truth thus:

'First, the testimony of my present consciousness clear of all assumptions; or secondly, it is truth verifiable by me, the thinker, by facts in my consciousness, which I can repeat at my pleasure again and again without making any assumptions, or by logical inference from such facts.'[5]

Mr. Kirkman does not start from the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes. The *ergo* is a mistake.

'I am making no assumption, nor taking anything for granted, when I affirm that I am, and that I know that I am, thinking. For if I am really making an assumption, I can scientifically affirm that I am making it, that is, that I am thinking either right or wrong; and if I am affirming scientifically that I think, I am not making any assumption under that affirmation. Nor can any man inform me that I am assuming my "I am" without conceding and affirming my being and thinking.'[6]

Under *thinking* he includes all that Descartes comprised in his definition of *cogitatio*, 'every state or change of consciousness, every sensation, every volition, every will-effort of which I may be conscious, so that "I am thinking" includes "I will," when will is in conscious act.'[7] But 'it is never a metaphysical proposition about being.' Nor does it include any affirmation 'about my body or other bodies or other thinkers.'

In Chapter II. he proposes his 'first clear question:'

'Can I find, without assumption and with demonstration, any other thing or being besides my thinking self?'

'Let me classify as well as I can the facts of my consciousness. They appear to fall into three compartments. The *first compartment* is that of my remembered *listless indolence*.'[8]

[4] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 4.
[5] P. 7. [6] P. 11. [7] P. 6. [8] P. 21.

This state can be both remembered and verified at pleasure.

'Its marked feature, by which it is clearly known to me, is the total inaction of my will.' 'From what I can recall of such a state, nothing can be logically affirmed but my changing self.' 'The *second compartment* of "I remember" I call that of my *ill-recorded will-effort*. [The will is here active, but only with trains of thought.] There is no conscious relation to a not-me-the-thinker, nor any conflict but with pure difficulties of thought. Because these difficulties occur and are overcome, at more or less mental cost, I call the found and remembered state *effort*. . . . . I call it will-effort or will-force, because I know by ten thousand experiences that it depends upon my will. . . . . I call it my ill-recorded will-force, because I find in memory no exact measures or comparisons of it.' 'I will not undertake to find in this second compartment, any more than in the first, the demonstration sought of finite being not my own.'[9]

In Chapter III., entitled 'The Solving Relation,' the writer says:

'In my "I am" *I will* is given; that is, my will-force—when will is making effort.'[10]

It is given in that second compartment, no not-self being posited or conceived in such will-effort.

'I am still in quest of being not myself. I think I remember once moving all my fingers at once, or fancying that I did it. I think I am doing it now. Yet it is certain that the desire to do it, and the idea of the apparent movement, do form one of the sequences of nature. But stop—how is this? I cannot do it now. The will-effort is clear enough, but there is baffilement. Do they call this a sequence? I affirm that it is a steady permanence in consciousness. My state is at one moment both active and passive. I am sure that this is a relation evident and abiding of my conscious will-force to a contemporaneous correlative. Neither of the terms of this relation is before or after the other. From this found measurable and abiding relation, and from the nature of a real measurable relation, which must in logic have two congruous terms, I infer that the contemporaneous correlative to my acting will-force is another acting force not my

[9] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 24. [10] P. 36.

own. From this logical law of a relation given I have demonstrated an external world of force, and I can verify every step of the demonstration at any moment. Thus my first question is answered.'[11]

What is the use of the demonstration?

'To refute the teachers who maintain that no truth at all can be shown to follow from the mere facts of consciousness; from which, if it were true, it would follow that it is impossible to have a philosophy without assumptions, and that we ought to leave the learned who know so much about matter and law to make the right ones for us all.'[12]

How do we know that the resistance which we infer from the relation found in consciousness is not purely ideal and imaginary?

'The reply is easy: from the law of a real relation, that both its terms are real, or both imaginary. My will-force I know to be as real as my own "I am."[13] I call my *related* will-force *well-recorded*, because it is well-measured and graduated in memory of repeated experiments, and in accurate consciousness of present power.[14] Go talk of your eternal conservation, invariabilities, and indestructibilities! I can confute you, and spoil them all, within a certain sphere, whenever I please. For this I can give you all the proof that reason can require; by prediction and fulfilment: fulfilment that no other prophet nor philosopher can foretell: prediction that no other finite agent can accomplish.'[15]

In the fourth chapter, entitled 'Dynamical Foundations,' the author establishes the three following propositions:

'1. The only force which is directly given and immediately known to me is my own will-force; and all my knowledge of other forces acting in the Cosmos is mediate, and found by me by logical inference.[16]

2. My will-force is my only force-finder.[17]

3. In my every train of reasoned thought about any force or forces found in action in the Cosmos, the fundamental proposition,

[11] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 44.
[12] P. 44. [13] P. 49. [14] P. 55.
[15] P. 55. [16] P. 59. [17] P. 61.

out of which all my other propositions flow, and on the certainty of which their truth to me depends, is this: in finding force, I will in act, and I know that I will; so that if all the steps of the reasoning be written down without omission in their order, this proposition must stand written at the head of all—In first finding force in this inquiry I willed in act, and I know that I willed.'[18]

By these theories Mr. Kirkman easily reduces to a vicious circle the pretences of Materialist biology and psychology to deduce will as a resultant of other forces in action in the Cosmos.

In Chapter V., 'On the Evidence of the Presence of so-called *Matter* in the Cosmos,' the author propounds his second question:

'Where and how can I find what they call *matter* without assumption and with demonstration, so that I can show others, if there be others, how to find it?

I believe with Boscovich that the smallest locus of force is a point without parts, and I agree with the thinkers who foretell that dynamical science will eventually begin where Geometry long ago began. The starting conceptions will perhaps be stated thus —in Geometry from points which have unchanging positions and no parts; in Dynamics, from points which have changing positions and no parts. In the definition that dynamical points change their positions (the changes being referred to an adequate cause which works at the positions by laws of action depending on the number and the distances of related points, and being for all finite observation and computation continuous changes), all that we mean by force and inertia is logically included, and would be stated in definition or axioms following.'[19]

In Chapter VI., 'Something about Boscovich, Berkeley, and Kant,' the author pursues his inquiry about matter, concluding with an attack on Kant's definitions, at the opening of his *Kritik*, of the matter and form of a phenomenon.

Chapter VII. is entitled 'Continuation of the Search

[18] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 70. [19] P. 77.

for so-called Matter, with the Help of its Assertors.' He here points out how unsatisfactory and inconsistent are the notions, so far as they are expounded by leading teachers, of Materialistic philosophy concerning matter and ether.

In Chapter VIII., 'On Maxima and Minima,' he propounds his third question: Can we find or affirm the existence of a minimum finite body or force-locus?

In Chapter IX., 'The Maximum Brain and Mr. Matthew Arnold,' he handles a fourth question concerning a highest finite intelligence:

'It is the craftsmen of atheism, not we, who are the grovelling, self-magnifying anthropomorphists. Do they deny that they affirm this highest finite intelligence above which there is absolutely none in being? I will compel them to confess it. They deny that there is an Infinite Mind; wherefore it must follow, and it does follow even to them, that there is somewhere either one supreme finite intelligence, absolutely above all, or else a round table of them, all of equal brain-power, unsurpassed in all existence.'[20] 'The conclusions from the train of thought in this and the preceding chapters, which to my faculties appear inevitable, are these. First, by the absurdities inherent in the dogma of an absolutely minimum body existing in space, called *atom*, the stuff spoken of as *matter* is exploded, and disappears to scientific thought. Secondly, by the absurdities in the atheistic dogma of a finite maximum intellect now supreme in the Cosmos, the Being of God Omniscient and Almighty is confirmed. I say not, is demonstrated; for the demonstrations of logic concerning the infinite are of little value, and my belief in God rests on foundations in my soul, which are deeper and nobler than those of logic.'[21]

In Chapter X. Mr. Kirkman propounds his fifth definite question:

'Can I find and demonstrate, without assumptions unproved, the existence of any finite conscious thinker besides myself? How can I prove thou art a thinker?'

[20] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 161. [21] P. 175.

A says of B, This B is a group of indications of intelligence, thought, and will; and draws the conclusion, *ergo* B is an intelligent thinker. But two propositions cannot build a demonstration. A major is wanted, which Mr. Kirkman endeavours to assign from his certain knowledge of the conclusion. He finds it in nothing less than the general theorem—All continued and consistent phenomenal indications to me of invisible consciousness, intelligence, and will are verily to me demonstrations of the unseen verities indicated.

'If next I am required to prove this most general theorem, I answer boldly that it is a fundamental truth of reason, the denial of which is utterly absurd. Beyond that point I shall not pretend to debate. I leave it there; for, wherever it is left, the appeal must be to the consciousness of rational thinkers. I do not here claim any formal logical triumph in this difficult topic over the men who consider this old inference from intelligent design and work to a conscious designer and worker as unphilosophical. I am familiar with the style in which they contrive to amuse themselves at my expense.'[22]

It is here evident that the author expected to hear from hostile critics exactly what they have uttered. Most of them have displayed their cleverness on the shortest of his chapters, leaving all the rest untouched. In the face of the writer's disclaimer of logical triumph, one says, 'He just postulates "a fundamental truth of reason," which assumes the whole thing to be proved, and thereupon triumphantly constructs his perfect syllogism.' Another remarks, 'The major premiss of his syllogism is as neat a *petitio principii* as we ever saw.'

The question on the proof of 'Thou art' has this

[22] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 182.

peculiarity—that while it is not irrational for A, thinking alone, to ask of himself a demonstration that B is a conscious thinker, or to charge himself with an assumption if he has never demanded such proof, it is a flagrant absurdity for B to charge A with such assumption in serious debate. Mr. Kirkman's object is legitimate and useful. He says, 'It would be a useful exercise of scientific thought if they would try to construct a demonstration of this "Thou art," which will satisfy an exigent scepticism like that which they are elsewhere so forward to display.'

Mr. Kirkman might have remarked that *social instinct* gives the desire of fellowship, but it does not demonstrate it. It is easily cheated. We know one who, when in childhood he visited Madame Tussaud's exhibition, was led by his social instinct to ask a question of an old lady in a chair, the waxen double of her whom he had just seen below.

Mr. Kirkman takes the pains to inform us exactly what he means by an assumption, and has tried to do good service in insisting on the exclusion of assumptions from philosophy. To some of his critics this is an intolerable demand. They have diligently read the title-page. Some of them are evidently unable to make a distinction between an assumption and a truth, of which, from its simplicity, the demonstration cannot be written down. Such writers victoriously treat 'I am thinking' as an assumption, which makes Mr. Kirkman's title ridiculous. Others may be pardoned for fancying that he starts from the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum.* It surprised him, probably, to see it laid down:

'Correct and modify the Cartesian formula as we please, we never can vamp it up, as Mr. Kirkman seeks to do, into a true philosophic starting-point. It is an arbitrary assumption for an orthodox system of metaphysics or theology.'[23]

And again:

'Philosophy, rightly considered, is nothing else than the science of rejecting wrong assumptions and replacing them with right.'[24]

Then philosophy is impossible where there are no wrong assumptions!

One of the most useful and provoking of the theorems laid down in this book is this very simple one, that 'I am,' being the starting-point of every train of reasoned thought, can never be the conclusion of any one, for it can only complete a vicious circle. With this argument from the vicious circle the author makes havoc with the logic of the evolutionists and biologists. To his onslaughts on these philosophers none of the adverse critics have made any reply except one, whose courage is very commendable. His words are:

'He proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of conceiving the individual consciousness as a result of material evolution. The argument is exceedingly curious. . . . . Its principal step is as follows: In the order of knowledge or thought, my own existence as thinker is the starting-point—*ergo*, in the temporal order of objective existence. I cannot follow as an effect from processes outside my consciousness.'[25]

This critic, in a distinguished weekly journal, agrees with our author that '*I am*' is the starting-point; also that 'I am' cannot follow in the order of knowledge or thought, because that would be a vicious circle beginning and ending with 'I am.' 'But,' says he, '"I

[23] *Literary World*, April 28, 1876. [24] Ibid.
[25] *Examiner*, June 3, 1876.

am" may follow and does follow in another order—namely, in the order of temporal objective existence, thus closing correctly the train of thought beginning with "I am."' The critic is talking of course about what he quite understands; but unfortunately he does not inform us at what point of his sequence of propositions and train of thought he steps out of the order of knowledge into that of objective existence, nor how he manages to get hold of the 'I' in this latter order, which is quite different from that of thought and knowledge. Well may our philosophical ladies and gentlemen glory in that noble instrument of philosophy, *objective!* What is there that you cannot accomplish with it? This critic goes on to say:

'It is hardly possible to give the reader an adequate conception of the philosophic ignorance, incompetence in argument, &c., which constitute Mr. Kirkman's "refutation" of modern philosophy and science. His competence for philosophical discussion may perhaps be judged by the fact that he cannot distinguish Mill's "unconditionalness" in causation, which is as much known from experience as sequence itself, from the "necessity" of the ontologist.'[26]

This is in reference to our author's criticism (p. 209) on the following words of J. S. Mill on causation:

'This is what writers mean when they say that the notion of a cause involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is *unconditionalness*.'[27]

From these words of Mill, it is to be feared that he also could not distinguish, and must come, like Mr. Kirkman, under the critic's lash. There are many people who know sequence in the past from experience, and

[26] *Examiner*, June 3, 1876. [27] *Logic*, book iii. c. v. § 5.

some who think they know it certainly for the future; but a very choice few only can know with this deep critic unconditionalness, either in the past or in the future, from experience alone.

Such is Mr. Kirkman's abbreviation of his own book.

II. No one who has read anything either of the Scholastic or the modern metaphysics will fail to see that he has thought for himself. His method of philosophy is a vigorous creation of his own mind, upon the lines which natural reason or the light of Nature has traced upon us. It may be called the philosophy of common sense; for common sense is the witness of the human reason in its normal state as it is found in the race of mankind, save only in abnormal cases, which are exceptions, like the imperfect ear of wheat in a harvest-field.

1. First, it must not be supposed that Mr. Kirkman lays down his method as the way by which all men arrive at the knowledge of themselves or of others. His method is the way in which *we may prove the certainty of the truths which come to us by inheritance*. He does not suppose that we all have need to start like Peter the wild boy, in isolation from society and exiled from the common sense of mankind. He means, if I understand him rightly, 'that the intellectual system of the world may be verified and found by individuals for themselves, and shown to others by the method he has indicated.' Mr. Kirkman certainly does not mean that we all are required to attain the knowledge of our own existence, thought, will, and body, by dividing our

consciousness into three compartments, or that we find out the existence of others by the resistance of force-points, or the cumulus of indications of intelligence and will. In this way the greater part of men would be doomed to idiotcy. Our knowledge of our existence, thought, will, conscience, right and wrong, duty, moral relations to God and to man, comes to us as a heirloom. We inherit it, not as an assumption, though it be unproved by us, nor as a postulate, for we never ask it, but as a truth, or rather as an intellectual system of truths, known without discovery, needing no demonstration though capable of proof, learned with our mother-tongue from human society, which, as the mother and teacher of its children, guides the spontaneous processes of our intelligence *ex vi sua* in the apprehension of truth.

Nevertheless Mr Kirkman's method is of great value. It exists in the nature of things. To some individuals at all times, and to some nations at certain periods, it becomes a necessity. When men or nations have been disinherited of the truths of the natural order, it is the δεύτερος πλοῦς: if we cannot sail, we must row. It is the *tabula post naufragium*, like the Sacrament of Penance after the loss of baptismal innocence. In these last centuries men have thought, under Luther's guidance, to perfect their religion by breaking with the traditions of the Christian faith, and they have landed in rationalism. They have thought also, under the guidance of Descartes, to perfect their mental philosophy by departing from the intellectual system of the world, and they have ended in scepticism. We are now in a period of return and of verification:

men are forced to find 'a reason for the faith that is in them,' not only in the order of faith, but in the order of intellect.

By the intellectual system of the world I mean the unbroken tradition and lineage of truth which from the beginning has descended as the inheritance of mankind. In this inheritance are included the existence and moral character of God, the existence and immortality of the soul, the eternal distinction of good and evil, right and wrong; the conscience and responsibility of man to a moral Lawgiver and Judge in this life and after death. This group of truths has resided universally in the reason of man, varying in degree of clearness and completeness from its whole outline down to the verge of extinction in races and individuals: but in the lowest intellectual state it has everywhere been implicitly found. There has always been a notion of God to debase. Fetichism bears witness to natural theology. No one can read the Ethics of Aristotle, or the Tusculan Disputations of Cicero, without perceiving the outlines of this intellectual order. What they held by inheritance, with a kind of sceptical uncertainty as to the higher truths, we inherit with the confirmation and certainty of revelation. Nevertheless for them the logical analysis and demonstration was possible, and it is also possible to us. They who at this day have lapsed into Pyrrhonism and scepticism are bound to show cause why they reject the first lights of Nature, and it is for them that Mr. Kirkman writes.

2. It is a reasonable and healthy exercise of the intellect to analyse and to verify its own convictions.

There is no rationalism in a reflex examination of what we believe. It is well for us to find the limits and the outline of our natural reason, and to ask, 'What can I find or prove for myself of that group of truths which I have inherited from society and tradition?'

Now of my existence I have no need of logical proof. It is a consciousness antecedent to all other certainties. I know that I am; I know that I am myself; I know that I am the same identical being who has passed through a succession of times and states. I know that I am thinking, and I know that (putting out my will) I will or am willing. All these are facts of my internal consciousness, of a *sensus intimus* which, as even Hume declared, never deceives.[28] I do not infer my existence from my thoughts or from my will. 'Cogito ergo sum' is a 'therefore' outside of logic. There is no illation. One and the same consciousness at the same moment knows both. And yet my being and my thought are not one and the same. I cannot say, 'Ego sum cogitatio mea.' All that is in God is God, for God is His own being, His own intelligence, and His own will. But in man neither intelligence nor will is the soul, but faculties and powers of the soul. To affect to doubt whether I am thinking or willing is not reason, but unreason: it is not philosophy, but folly. There is no proof of my own existence higher than my consciousness of my own existence, and no proof of the facts of my intimate consciousness higher than the *sensus intimus* itself. S. Paul was philosophising in the order of Nature when

[28] Kirkman, p. 46.

he said, 'What man knoweth the things of man but the spirit of man that is in him?'[29] If this consciousness be not sufficient to convince any man of his own intellectual and moral nature, no logical argument *ab extra* will suffice. Such scepticism is a paralysis of the reason itself; and such appears to me to be the diagnosis of the scepticism which either denies the existence of the soul or professes Agnosticism about the existence of the soul, or, lastly and much more peremptorily, which affirms that we have no immaterial part in our composite nature, and therefore that matter thinks. I have no will to give offence; but I must say that this philosophy seems to be the result of an ossification of the highest parts of our human nature, or a loss of perception in the nerves of internal sense. If any man's intimate consciousness does not assure him of somewhat within him more subtil and lifeful than matter, a whole battery of reasons from without can hardly awaken it.

3. And here I am afraid I must part company with Mr. Kirkman, unless upon explanation we can find a solution of a difficulty he has raised in the following passage: 'Substance, substratum, matter, or *catter*, supposed finite realities to man distinct from found force arising in found locus, appear to be fictions of ignorance.'[30]

Mr. Kirkman does not deny the existence of *being*, and he affirms *being* to be *real;* but he rejects the notion of matter or stuff, and of substance in the sense of stuff or matter.

[29] 1 Cor. ii. 11. [30] Kirkman, p. 75.

And yet he says that he does not deny the existence of matter, but he denies only that we can reach to the cognisance of matter, or that we can declare what it is.

Now, from what has been said, it would appear that we have a consciousness of our own existence distinct from our thought and from our will. Thinking and willing are actions of *Me-the-Thinker* and of *Me-the-Willer*, as Mr. Kirkman has it. That is, *I am* before *I think* or *I will*. And the *I* is distinct from both *thought* and *will*.

S. Thomas teaches that the soul is known to itself only through its own operations. But that does not say that the operations of the soul are the soul, or that the soul is only the *cumulus* of its own operations. It is the *radix* of all vital operations. And the soul bears them, not they it.

In this, then, we have the idea or notion of being as distinct from operations.

What I find in myself I predicate of others. By the grasp of a man's hand I know that I am in the presence of another having power, will, and intelligence like myself. The cumulus of intelligent and moral phenomena prove to me the presence of a nature like my own. But these phenomena are no more the being who is before me than the facts of my own internal consciousness are my own being.

I am compelled to predicate will, thought, and being of the other, who is so far ascertainably like myself. All these are facts of immediate consciousness in myself: in another they are mediately and logically inferred. Cicero anticipated the argument of Bishop Berkeley in

his *Alciphron* when he said, *Nos non sumus corpora nostra, nec hoc dico corpori tuo sed tibi.*

Now I am willing with Mr. Kirkman to say that this *tibi* is not *matter*, nor *catter*, nor *stuff;* but I cannot admit that it is not *being*, and I affirm that this being is *substance*. I am not unwilling to admit that it is not an object of sense, but only of the reason, and that except by knowing what it is not, that is, *per viam remotionis*, I cannot say what it is. I can indeed say that it is neither *matter* nor *stuff*, for the soul is immaterial. Yet it is real being. But this Mr. Kirkman does not deny.

Let us go further. If I grasp, not the hand of a man, but the horn of an ox, I am soon conscious both of power and action, and if not of thought or will, at least of a purpose to get rid of me bodily. Now the cumulus of these phenomena will not warrant my predicating either an intellectual or a moral nature. But they certainly prove a living being with spontaneous agency and self-originated motion and a fixed purpose. What this agent is I do not know, but I agree with Mr. Kirkman that it is not mere matter or stuff, and yet I cannot affirm that it is a being like myself. Nevertheless the phenomena prove that something more lifeful than matter with spontaneous agency and definite purpose is demanded by our reason to account for their manifestation.

But still further. Next time I grasp, not the horn of an ox, but the bars of an iron gate. A strength greater than my own resists me. I cannot predicate thought, will, or spontaneity, but assuredly I must

predicate the existence of something which hinders my advance. If you tell me that this is a cumulus of atoms or an array of force-points, I answer I have just as much and just as little conception of your atoms or your force-points as I have of matter or substance. Matter and substance have just as much meaning to me as force-points and atoms. We are all alike in the dark, and neither a more elaborate nor a more modern theory has yet rent the veil which hangs between my reason and the nature of substance or matter. If you tell me it is resistance, I answer that resistance is the sensible effect upon me. But what resists me? You say you do not know, but you cannot deny the existence of a cause or a reason of that resistance. I call that cause substance. My reason demands it. After all it may be your atoms or force-points, or it may be *catter* or *stuff*; but resistance is an action of something, and thing and being are one and the same.

And here I must confess that between *οὔσια* and *essentia* and *being* in the abstract I can find no difference; and that between *something* and *nothing* I can find no intermediate *except potentia*, which does not mean force, but *possibility*. Mr. Kirkman freely admits *reality*; but he hesitates at *substance*. And yet if the action of the ox or the resistance of the iron gate is not a mere phenomenon, each has a *ὑποκείμενον*, or a substance which is the *radix actionis*, as our will is the cause of our actions, but our being is the *radix* of all our operations. This analogy seems to me to be a strict process of reason; but if wrong I shall be happy to be corrected.

Mr. Kirkman does not believe the external world to be merely phenomenal. He affirms it to be real. But if the real is not an object of sense, it is 'objectum rationis' by a necessity of reason.

I must acknowledge that I do not feel the difficulty which Mr. Kirkman seems to find. No one has better proved than he has that our first and surest knowledge is anterior to the reports of sense, and independent of them, inasmuch as they are the facts of our internal consciousness. But when the reports of sense are received, the reason at once predicates about them. The sense and the reason act simultaneously in the judgments of a normal intelligence. No one supposes that we *find* substance by 'an inquiring touch.' But we find the phenomena, on which the reason is taught by its own internal consciousness of being, as distinct from operations, to predicate being of external objects, in like manner, as distinct from their operations.

I do not, however, suppose that Mr. Kirkman would deny this. All he seems to say is that he does not know *what* it is, and that he cannot affirm it. And yet it appears to me that in affirming 'forces,' 'loci,' 'repulsions,' 'attractions,' 'equilibriums,' 'films of indefinite tenuity,' &c., he is affirming much more about this unknown 'being' or 'reality' than any Scholastic would venture to assert. If Mr. Kirkman plays the sceptic to the Materialist, I must play the sceptic to him in turn. I will not here take upon me to deny that the theory of Dynamism may be true, but it is far more profuse in its assertions about the unknown and the conjectural than the Scholastic philo-

sophy, which contents itself with affirming without analysis chemical or dynamical that substance and matter exist.

Thus far I have endeavoured to point out where Mr. Kirkman's philosophy seems to me to be insufficient on its positive side; but on its destructive side, as against Materialism, it appears to be decisive.

1. First, it restores to its rightful place in philosophy the reason and its consciousness. When the philosophers of sense affirmed as the first axiom of human knowledge, 'Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,' Leibnitz truly added, 'Nisi intellectus ipse.' These words are few; but they bring in a whole intellectual world with them. They contain all that Mr. Kirkman has affirmed of our consciousness of being, thought, and will, of our *sensus intimus* and all its operations and facts, which are antecedent to and independent of the reports of sense. If a Materialist tells me that this 'intellect' is only a function of matter, I would ask, how do you know that? You acknowledge that you do not know what matter is; you tell me that Berkeley has shown that matter beyond the phenomena does not exist; how then is intellect a function of matter? If you mean that it is only one of the phenomena of matter, I answer that if matter does not exist, it can have no phenomena. But, again, the phenomena of intellect and the phenomena of matter are as widely distinct as the phenomena of earth and the phenomena of light. It is a phenomenon and a function of earth to crush me. It is a phenomenon of light to touch all things with an imponderable agency.

It is a phenomenon of matter to be inert. It is a phenomenon or function of intellect to create the *Iliad*. Will you tell me that these two groups of phenomena or functions point to the same reality, or being, or entity, or that they have no entity or *radix operationum* whatsoever to which they are related?

There are harder things in this philosophy than in all the Schoolmen. This makes demand on my belief which passes my credulity. 'Incredulus odi.'

2. Next, it seems to me that Mr. Kirkman has vindicated the existence and power of an immaterial order of being and agency against the philosophy which would resolve all being and agency into 'matter and stuff.' He has turned Agnosticism against Materialism; and has shown that both they who deny the existence of an immaterial being which we call the soul, and they also who ascribe to matter the functions and agencies which we ascribe to the soul or immaterial being, are more positive and confident in their unproved assertions and their assumed knowledge than any who believe and speak in the language of ordinary men. If matter does not exist, how does it think? Even if it exist, why should thought be one of its functions? The existence of matter, if proved, does not disprove the existence of an immaterial being distinct from matter, which works in or by a material organisation. A musician is not a harp; take away the harp, the music ceases to be heard, but the musician does not cease to exist. The whole world of music which is in him is there still, and he can hear it with all its harmonies in his inward ear and write it with all its chords, though,

like Beethoven, his ear of sense be deprived of hearing. I must acknowledge that this Materialistic philosophy has always appeared to me to be at best raw thought with ragged edges, indistinct, incomplete, and inconsecutive. Mr. Kirkman throws unanswerably upon the Materialist the burden, I will not say of disproving, but even of doubting reasonably, the existence and the immortality of the immaterial being we call soul.

3. The eleventh chapter, on the will, is one of the ablest in the book. The author affirms:

'As a *scientific thinker* I know that I am, within certain limits of choice and action, absolutely free from all compulsion of the forces, vital, social, or dynamical, which I find at work in the Cosmos. As a *moral being* I know that I am justly accountable, within a sphere about whose limits I am sufficiently informed for my general duty and peace, to my Cause and Preserver (of whom more in the next chapter) for my use of my faculties of thought and action. The proof of all this I have in my verifications of "I can," "I will," and "I ought;" verifications from *consciousness and conscience*.' 'This "I am" and "I will," from which my only possible philosophy at every moment begins, is no quibble. It is a *fact* and a *force* of the Cosmos, the *first* of all given to me, and that with a *certainty transcending all deductions from it*.'

The italics are mine. Here is nothing more than the *sensus intimus* which is the source of our first knowledge, and a primary certainty of the highest kind. Modern metaphysicians or psychologists despise these simple elements of knowledge and certainty. They account for what we call the will by theories of which the terms appear to me to have no corresponding intellectual equivalents. When Mr. Kirkman says, 'My free volition can never be known or imagined by me either as an effect without a cause, or a fact without a reason. *I* there and then am both the *cause* and the

reason of it,' I understand him at once, and my consciousness responds to and confirms his assertion. My will is the cause of my own action, and my determinate thought is the reason why I so will. But when I am told by Mr. Herbert Spencer that my will is 'a group of psychical states,' and that I am led into error if I suppose that there is something distinct from the 'impulse' given by these 'psychical states' which determines my action,—when, I say, Mr. Herbert Spencer tells me this, I confess that I do not understand him. And I believe that I do not understand him through no fault of mine, but because no intellectual equivalent can be found for his terms. Are these 'psychical states' the desires or dispositions antecedent to my action? They are not myself; and I am conscious of sometimes going against them by a deliberate antagonism of my free will. Do they contain the *finis intentus* or the final cause of my actions? How does this necessitate my will if the end of my action is freely chosen? Am I deceived in thinking that my choice is free? The consciousness that I have a power to go against my strongest desires, and, under the dictate of my reason, that is, of my conscience, to select the end which is the least attractive, or rather the most repulsive, to my desire or appetite, remains both a primary and an ultimate consciousness which cannot be denied nor explained away, nor squared with 'the impulse of psychical states.' In the action of the will the strongest appetites are freely but absolutely under control of the reason. I have the strongest repugnance to pain, but I willingly go to the rack rather than turn Mussulman. Why? Because my reason tells

me that pain is to be chosen rather than apostasy. The will is accurately defined to be *appetitus rationalis*. Our desires pass under the cognisance of the reason, and by the guidance of the reason the end most opposed to natural appetite is often freely chosen. Such was the will of the martyrs; such is the risking of life by fire or water to save the life of another of whom we know nothing but his peril. Such was the will of the prisoner condemned to death who, to escape hanging, starved himself in prison. It is no answer to say these were their dominant appetites. They were not so *as appetites*, but as deliberate decisions of reason controlling the appetite by an act of the will. That there is a power of determination which is not a 'psychical state,' but a deliberate choice followed by a decisive action, is as certain as my consciousness of existence. 'I am' and 'I will' are certainties of which I have an immediate knowledge in myself. If Mr. Spencer includes all this in the 'psychical state,' why not say so? To tell me that 'I myself am only a group of psychical states which are always changing,' is contradicted by my immanent and permanent consciousness of my own identity. To tell me that my own identity is an illusion, and is only a psychical state, or a group of such states, and then to tell me that such states are always changing, while my consciousness of personal identity never changes, but is always permanent, is to me not philosophy, but a contradiction in terms. If I break my leg I have a group of psychical states arising from the pain and terror of the accident; they may pass, or vary, or return, but my consciousness that I am the

ego who broke his leg remains always without variation. To tell me that I am a group of variable psychical states is to tell me that I have no permanent or conscious identity or *ego;* and to tell me this is, I think, to try to talk me blind. I can hardly believe that any metaphysician has ever intended to hold or to say this. But to me they seem to say it, whatever they may hold. This is the only meaning I could attach to Mr. Buckle's words on personal identity and free will in his first volume on *Civilisation*, and the only sense I can attach to Mr. Herbert Spencer's words now. If this be not his meaning, I can find no intellectual equivalent to his terms. But I shall rejoice to find that I am mistaken.

4. From this we may next proceed to Cause. It is certain that I am here, and that I did not cause my own existence. How came I here? It is no answer to say that I am a consequent upon an antecedent or a group of antecedents, which only went before, but did not cause me to be here. This is to beg the question, and to dogmatise in the most arbitrary tone. If I merely follow on antecedents which are not causes, then I am uncaused. Then the whole race of man is uncaused. All existence, the whole Cosmos, is uncaused. That is, either the whole Cosmos follows after antecedents that have no productive power or efficient relation to its existence, or the Cosmos is self-existing—that is, self-caused. What we call cause Mr. Mill is pleased to call invariable sequence. This seems to me to be like changing a name to conceal identity. It is an *alias* in philosophy to hide an equivocation. Now I can conceive no antecedent to my existence, thought,

and will, but an *I am, I think, I will*, adequate to go before my I am, I think, I will. In the world around me I find others like myself in these three things; but none of them, nor all of them together, will account to me for my being here, and for my being what I am. I am certainly not eternal, nor self-caused, nor uncaused. The conclusion is inevitable by a necessity of reason, and my reason is a spontaneous act of my consciousness, which in this primary certainty cannot err. Mr. Kirkman says, 'I live, I think, I know, I work, I love: and there is a cause out of which all this springs.' Mr. Martineau, in an article on 'Modern Materialism,' has shown with peremptory reasoning that materialistic Agnosticism either deifies man, or compels the belief of an intelligence and will transcending all intelligence and will of man, which is in one word God. Mr. Kirkman appears to me to expand this argument with great amplitude and force of reason:

'Through the Infinite I cannot think; but upwards, still upwards, towards it my soul can soar, scorning the finite. That Infinite *scientifically* I cannot know; but the Infinite is my cause. Believing and adoring, I affirm Him with a boldness and a conviction surpassing all that I can feel or utter on my themes of finite science. My Cause lives—the infinite Life. My Cause thinks, knows, and works—the infinite intuition, counsel, and energy works in the full harmony of victorious science in every point and line of force, in every throb of consciousness—never absent nor forgetting, never pausing nor weary. And my Cause loves—the Infinite Love.'[31]

Mr. Kirkman expands this proof of the existence of God 'per ea quæ facta sunt'—that is, by the Cosmos around—in the following passage, which, to be appreciated, must be read entire:

[31] Kirkman, p. 262.

'*B.* Let me ask you one question more. Have you formed any clear notion what these *forces*, of whose constant presence and action you are convinced, really are in themselves?

A. Your inquiry is to me a very solemn one. What these dread forces are, I know not for certain. But I will confess to you what, every moment that I live under their untiring, unchanging, and beneficent teaching, they more and more appear to me to be. I meet them not, I have never met them, nor have been able to conceive them, but under one form, as equivalents or multiples of my own will-force. These forces never clearly speak to me, nor verify themselves to my intellect, but at the challenge of my wakeful, active will. If I had never put forth the question of my will, I should never have been able to conceive of their action as either real or possible. They play with the sportive child: they wrestle, like the veiled Seraph of Peniel, with the strenuous man; but by neither are they observed or remembered as acting, except as equivalents of will; yet every encounter of the will of either with them leaves him richer in the lore of exquisite science, and gifted with a bolder prophetic power. Now if the child, when he becomes a man, should ask himself, "What are those wondrous workings?" may he not be pardoned if, despising the dogmas of mock science, and reasoning only from what he knows, he compares these energies with the only force of which he is master—his own will-force? If this balances them here, overcomes them there, and wherever it yields to them, in lessons that are safe and profitable, can measure them on its own scale with unerring accuracy, and predict them from its own experience, and, what is more, combine itself with them in ways innumerable into one homogeneous and foretold result, is he to be blamed for superstition and unphilosophical spirit if he says, "What can balance will but will? What can be measured by will but will? What can combine and harmonise with will but will? What can have equivalence and real relation in thought and act to will but will?" When a man has dared to doubt, and, doubting, to think boldly up to this point, you might as well beseech this stone, falling freely, not to rush towards the earth's centre, as try to prevent that soul from bursting out, like the smitten unbeliever in Bethel, "Surely God is in this place, and I knew it not!" I glory in believing that all these forces are manifestations of the conscious present working will of the God in whom I live and move and have my being. F-O-R-C-E spells WILL.'[32]

[32] Kirkman, pp. 262, 263.

He adds:

'And if you try to tell them the inspiring truth, the atheist cries out, "Anthropomorphism;" whereupon a number of knowing ones reply, "Ha! ha! Anthropomorphism!" and, pleased with that long word, they find themselves philosophers.

A. Yes, truly: anthropomorphism is next akin to anthropophagy. It is unscientific to anthropomorphise. We are forbidden to imagine behind the mysterious veil of phenomena the presence and action of what has kindred with our own consciousness. And yet it is perfectly philosophical—nay, it is my bounden duty—when that queer bundle of phenomena which I call Atheist is before me, to conceive that I am verily in the presence of an invisible thinker, of a mind very like my own, but differing from mine by its superior wisdom. But in the name of all proportion and modesty have I not ten thousand million times more pregnant evidence, in this daily course of life and mercy, and in all these convincing voices within and without me, that the living God is here in the plenitude of love and wisdom, than I have that, inside that incongruous heap and patchwork of appearances yclept Atheist, there is a mind and conscience like my own?'[33]

I do not see what modern Materialism or Agnosticism has to say in reply to all this. Polemically and destructively, it seems to be complete. It is certainly the most formidable assault that has been delivered of late along the whole line of sceptical and materialistic philosophy. I only hope that the authorities so unrelentingly summoned to combat will not decline the passage of arms because of the jaunty defiance of Mr. Kirkman's trumpet. His gibes go at times undeniably as far as the courtesy of chivalry admits; but his blows are knightly, and cannot be declined without loss of victory and of honour.

III. I have thus far endeavoured to give an outline of the results of *Philosophy without Assumptions*, and

[33] Kirkman, pp. 266, 267.

to show its destructive force as against the sceptical and materialistic philosophy of this day. It would be out of place to attempt here a constructive statement of Mr. Kirkman's system, or to point out where it is incomplete. In a Catholic philosophy we should desiderate not a few points, and a more positive and confident tone on others.

1. The first certain truth in human knowledge is that of our own existence.[34] It is not a conclusion, but a consciousness, which Rothenflue calls 'spontaneitas supra proprias suas operationes quasi replicata.'[35] This spontaneous reflex action perceives simultaneously our thought, will, and existence. But this is not a perception of the essence of the soul, but of its operations, that is, of the internal facts of our intelligence and will by the *sensus intimus*, the action of which is not logical, but intuitive, and independent of all external sense. S. Thomas says:

'As to our first knowledge (of the existence of the soul) we must distinguish, because anything may be known by a *habit* or by an *act*. As to *actual* knowledge, by which a man knows that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known by its acts. For in this he perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he is, because he perceives that he feels, and understands, and exercises other vital operations of this kind, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, t. i. ix. c. ix.), "We perceive that we perceive, and know that we know: and because we perceive and know this, we know that we are." But as for the *habitual* knowledge I say that the soul sees itself by its own essence, that is, because its essence is present to itself.' 'For this the essence of the soul alone, which is present in the mind, is sufficient: for out of it proceed the acts by which it is actually perceived.'[36]

[34] Maurus, tom. iii. p. 282.
[35] *Psychologia Empirica*, tom. i. p 1.
[36] Kleutgen, *La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. i. pp. 211, 215.

2. From this flows the knowledge of the phenomena of an interior world so continuous, multitudinous, and self-evident, that the materialistic philosophy has always seemed to me to be the result of a privation of inward sight. They who believe thought to be a function of matter for the most part reject metaphysics as an intellectual illusion, and ethics as a conventional superstition. Nor is this unnatural; for the laws of the intellect and the laws of morals are phenomena of the soul, which is an intelligent and moral nature. The objects of our reason and conscience are truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and these are the subject-matter of action and of responsibility. Matter is not responsible unless it be an intelligent and moral nature. If any man would affirm it to be moral and intellectual, he is denying, not the existence of the soul, but the immateriality of the soul. Nevertheless this denial is fraught with consequences destructive of the intellectual and moral order of the world.

3. Mr. Kirkman has seemed in one place to make a concession, which I am sure he does not intend. After arguing with great force for the existence of God from the idea of will and cause, he adds, 'The answer cannot be scientific.'[37] But the answer is at least certain, and excludes all doubt.

An objector might take advantage of this, and say that he removes the proof of the existence of God from the sphere of intellect to the region of faith or of religious feeling. No doubt he meant to say that the proof of the existence of God is by the whole soul in all

[37] Kirkman, p. 262.

its intellectual, moral, spiritual powers and faculties, and is corroborated and consolidated by all the affections, aspirations, and instincts of love and experience. This is most true; but it is of vital necessity to maintain that the existence of God is a truth which may be proved by reasoning within the sphere of intellect. If this were not so, then they who know not God would not be, as the Apostle declares, 'inexcusable.'[38] The Sovereign Pontiff, in 1840, defined—'Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam cum certitudine probare valet;'[39] and the Vatican Council, in 1870, decreed—that the existence of God 'can with certainty be known by the natural light of human reason through the things that are made.'[40]

The Scholastic philosophy teaches, with a rigorous logic which has never been answered, that the existence of God may be demonstrated—first, under the conception of the First Cause; secondly, under the conception of the First Power of Motion, itself immovable; thirdly, under the conception of a Necessary Existence; and lastly, that this First Cause, First Mover, and First Necessary Existence is an Intelligence separate from all creation.[41]

The ethical arguments, and the testimony of common sense and of mankind, are distinct from this intellectual demonstration. I do not doubt that the author of *Philosophy without Assumptions* was fully conscious

[38] Rom. i. 20.
[39] Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, p. 441.
[40] Prima Constitutio, De Fide Cath. Canones, 11.
[41] S. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentes*, lib. i. cap. xiii. Maurus, *Quæst. Philosophiæ*, tom. iii. pp. 29-33.

of this, and it is to be wished that he would complete his argument in another volume of clearness and power like that now before us.

I will endeavour to draw out very briefly what the Scholastic philosophy holds and hands down on the much-disputed but indisputable reality of matter.

As to the existence of matter, I am glad to repeat that Mr. Kirkman does not deny that it exists; as to its physical nature, or *what* it is, all philosophers are more or less in the same plight.

As to its existence, I can hardly understand how any man can deny or doubt that in the metaphysical or hyper-physical order the existence of matter or substance is present to our mind by a necessity of the reason. Whether a man believe in its existence or not, this is certain, that in the physical order, if he fall upon its phenomena, he is broken; and if its phenomena fall upon him, they grind him to powder. If he be pleased to say that he was pulverised by phenomena which had no substratum, or by forces which were points having position and no parts, I will not contend with him. It would be a refined mode of extinction, worthy of heroes and philosophers—a noble scientific euthanasia. When the Scholastics describe substance or matter as *ens rationis tantum*, they intend only that it is beyond the jurisdiction of sense. They affirm it to be *ens reale*, though not cognisant by sense. When the author of *Philosophy without Assumptions* says that he 'cannot find it nor show any one else how to find it,' he seems to have slipped from the order of reason into the order of sense; for though matter eludes the

sense, it is present by an intellectual necessity to the reason.

It would seem, also, that in our modern controversies the distinction between metaphysical and physical matter has been for the most part overlooked. The existence of matter belongs primarily to metaphysics. Reason affirms that matter exists. The question, what is it? belongs to Physics.

We are told that physically it consists of atoms or of forces. Such are the theories of Atomists and Dynamists. The Atomic theory, besides other intrinsic difficulties, gives no sufficient account of the unity, cohesion, specification, and action of bodies; nevertheless Atomism affirms the existence of matter. The Dynamical theory gives an account of the action of bodies, but no reason why the force-points should aggregate themselves into species. It either reduces all things to phenomenal forces without specific laws or forms, or it supposes the Will of God to be the Force present in all forces. Nevertheless Dynamism acknowledges the presence of an active principle.

The Scholastic philosophy combines both the active principle of Dynamism in the *form* and the passive principle of Atomism in the *matter* which unite in the specific existence of all things.

I hardly know where to class those who tell us that matter thinks, or those who find in it all the promise and potency of life. But the length of this article warns me to make an end, and I cannot better do so than by adding a brief statement of the Scholastic philosophy on the points we have been treating.

The following will be, I believe, a correct statement of the Scholastic teaching:

1. By strict process of reason we demonstrate a First Existence, a First Cause, a First Mover; and that this Existence, Cause, and Mover is Intelligence and Power.

2. This Power is eternal, and from all eternity has been in its fullest amplitude; nothing in it is latent, dormant, or in germ: but its whole existence is *in actu*, that is, in actual perfection, and in complete expansion or actuality. In other words God is *Actus Purus*, in whose being nothing is potential, *in potentiâ*, but in Him all things potentially exist.

3. In the power of God, therefore, exists the original matter (*prima materia*) of all material things; but that *prima materia* is *pura potentia*, a *nihilo distincta*, a mere potentiality or possibility; nevertheless it is not a nothing, but a possible existence. When it is said that the *prima materia* of all things exists in the power of God, it does not mean that it is of the existence of God, which would involve Pantheism, but that its actual existence is possible.

4. Of things possible by the power of God, some come into actual existence, and their existence is determined by the impression of a *form* upon this *materia prima*. The form is the first act which determines the existence and the species of each, and this act is wrought by the will and power of God. By this union of form with the *materia prima*, the *materia secunda* or the *materia signata* is constituted.

5. This form is called *forma substantialis* because

it determines the being of each existence, and is the root of all its properties, and the cause of all its operations.

6. And yet the *materia prima* has no actual existence before the form is impressed. They come into existence simultaneously;[42] as the voice and articulation, to use S. Augustin's illustration, are simultaneous in speech.

7. In all existing things there are, therefore, two principles — the one active, which is the form; the other passive, which is the matter; but when united, they have a unity which determines the existence of the species. The form is that by which each is what it is.

8. It is the form that gives to each its unity of cohesion, its law, and its specific nature.[43]

When, therefore, we are asked whether matter exists

[42] Kleutgen, p. 294.

[43] The following quotations will show the definitions of S Thomas as to Matter, Existence, Act, Potentia, Form, substantial and accidental:

'Genuina notio materiæ primæ, eam scilicet esse quidem quidpiam reale et positivum, non esse tamen actu substantiam sed solum potentiam realem in omnium substantiarum species, quæ generatione fieri possunt.'—Goudin, *Philosophia Divi. Thomæ*, tom. ii p. 45.

'Concludamus igitur cum D. Thoma, 2 *Contra Gentes*, cap. xlv., in rebus tres gradus reperiri. Invenitur enim aliqua res quæ est Actus tantum, scilicet Deus Optimus Maximus: et alia res quæ est potentia tantum, scilicet *materia prima*: et demum alia res, quæ miscetur ex actis et potentiâ, cujus modi sunt omnes creaturæ inter Deum et materiam primam positæ.'—*Ibid.* p. 82.

'Existentia est extra nihilum et causas sistentia. . . . Quia vero res censetur sisti extra causas et nihilum, cum nihil ei deesse requisitum ad rationem entis, ideo metaphysici definiunt existentiam, *ultimam entis actualitatem*.'—*Ibid.* p. 89.

'Secunda sententia materiæ omnem prorsus existentiam propriam abnegat, eamque censet meram potentiam realem et positivam existentiæ capacem. Ita Thomistæ omnes plerique alii.'—*Ibid.* p. 89.

'Conclusio. Materia prima nullam ex se habet existentiam, sed

or no, we answer, It is as certain that matter exists as that form exists; but all the phenomena which fall under sense prove the existence of the unity, cohesion, species, that is, of the form of each, and this is a proof that what was once in mere possibility is now in actual existence. It *is*, and that is both form and matter.

When we are further asked *what* is matter, we answer readily, It is not God, nor the substance of God; nor the presence of God arrayed in phenomena; nor the uncreated will of God veiled in a world of illusions, deluding us with shadows into the belief of substance: much less is it *catter*, and still less is it *nothing*. It is a reality, the physical kind or nature of which is as unknown in its *quiddity* or *quality* as its existence is certainly known to the reason of man.

This may be the place to show in what way the Scholastic philosophy rejects both the Atomic and the Dynamic theories of matter as inadequate to explain the phenomena cognisable by sense, and at the same time combines both these theories in a larger and more

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existit per existentiam totius compositi quo illi competit per formam.'—*Ibid.*

'Forma substantialis recte definitur *Actus primus materiæ*. Dicitur in primis *Actus* ad differentiam materiæ, quæ est pura potentia. Dicitur *primus* ad differentiam existentiæ, quæ est *actus ultimus entis*: et ad differentiam formarum accidentalium, quæ sunt solum *actus secundarii*, præsupponentes *actum substantialem*. Additur *materiæ* ad differentiam formarum per se subsistentium, quales sunt angeli, quæ sunt actus sed non recipiuntur in materiâ.'—*Ibid.* p. 112.

'Forma informans dividitur in substantialem, et accidentalem. Substantialis est quæ dat *esse* simpliciter. . . . Sic *anima rationalis* est forma substantialis, quia dat esse humanum: . . . . at vero *scientia* est forma accidentalis quia dat solum esse secundarium et adititium esse humano.' That is to say, the rational soul constitutes man: science a learned man. But the former is the substance of humanity, the latter an accidental excellence.

adequate conception. I will draw out the treatment of this subject by Kleutgen in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, and Sanseverino in his *Filosofia Speculativa*.

Kleutgen, after stating the doctrines of Atomism and Dynamism, points out that neither can give any adequate account of the phenomena of matter determined in forms or species. He then compares these two systems with the Scholastic philosophy as follows:

'De nouvelles difficultes viennent s'ajouter à ces arguments, si l'on considère l'essence des corps; c'est que, si l'atomisme n'explique pas, mais presuppose la matière comme une substance etendue, le dynamisme cherche bien à en trouver l'explication, mais il s'entortille en tant de difficultes qu'il menace de faire disparaître la realité de la substance même aussi bien que celle de l'exten-ion.'—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 335.

'Dans la Philosophie pantheistique, les êtres individuels de la nature ne sont plus que des phenomènes de la substance qui est tout, tandis que dans le système des atomes ou de monades ils ne sont plus que des phenomènes de ces éléments.'—*Ibid.* p. 337.

'Si maintenant nous dirigeons notre regard sur la théorie de la Scholastique nous avons à remarquer avant tout que, soutenant l'unité substantielle, et la substance propre des êtres individuels qui compose la nature, elle rejette aussi bien la multiplicité infinie de substances élémentaires (atomes ou monades) que la substance unique qui se fractionne elle même pour se recueillir ou se rassembler de nouveau telle que l'admettent les Panthéistes.'—*Ibid.*

'Il prétend (dynamisme) qu'en définissant l'essence du corps on ne doit pas se contenter d'admettre simplement l'extension ou la masse étendue, mais qu'il faut chercher a concevoir cette masse et son étendue, comme dérivant d'un principe actif. Or, qu'est-ce que la forme dont parlent les Scholastiques, si ce n'est un principe sans lequel la matière n'aurait ni quantité ni extension? Toutefois, si certains Dynamistes font consister toute l'essence du corps dans les forces élémentaires aussi exclusivement que les Atomistes la cherchent dans la masse inerte, les Scholastiques la découvrent dans l'union de la matière et de la forme.'—*Ibid.* p. 338.

'L'atomisme purement mecanique considérait le corps comme

une masse étendue, sans aucune force immanente, et par conséquent sans aucune activité propre ; tandis que, au contraire, le dynamisme extrême ne découvrait l'essence du corps que dans la seule force, excluant ainsi de la substance du corps la matière comme étant un simple phénomène.

Mais comment devons-nous concevoir la relation qui existe dans le corps entre la force et la matière ?

Nous aurions ainsi à faire consister le sujet des forces dans la matière déterminée par la forme à être une essence propre, spécifique. Or, voilà ce qui forme précisement la doctrine de l'antiquité. Suivant cette doctrine, il est vrai ce n'est pas la matière mais le corps qui est ce dont les parties sont dans l'espace, les unes dehors des autres, et ce n'est pas la forme mais bien le corps qui est doué de force ; toutefois le corps est étendu parcequ'il est matériel, et il possède la force et l'activité en vertu de sa forme.'—*Ibid.* p. 339.

Kleutgen sums up his argument in these words :

'Si nous parvenions, dans cette étude, à prouver suffisamment la vérité de la théorie scholastique, il nous serait permis de dire, qu'elle réunissait en elle ce que l'atomisme et le dynamisme contiennent de vrai, mais en évitant également les erreurs et les exagérations de l'un et de l'autre système.'—*Ibid.* p. 343.

Sanseverino states very tersely in the following passage the inadequacy both of Atomism and of Dynamism :

'I dinamici dimostrano che la materia per esistere ha bisogno di un vero principio di unità e di azione, senza del quale le parti si disgregherebbero, e l'individualità e la sustanza stessa dello essere svanirebbero. Gli atomisti poi oppongono, che il principio di unità e di azione per se solo non basta per dare origine ad un esteso, che sia una vera realtà, e non una ingannevole apparenza. Adunque per cansare gli assurdi dei primi e dei secondi è giocoforza ammettare che è corpi costano di un principio passivo e di un principio attivo, del multiplo e del uno, del determinabile e del determinante ; in altri termini della materia e della forma.'—*Filos. Specul.* vol. ii. pp. 214, 215.

Mr. Kirkman repeats again and again in his book his rejection of matter as 'stuff filling space.' But the Scholastic philosophy does not speak of *matter* as *filling*

space. It teaches that *bodies having extension fill space.* But it affirms that bodies consist of form and matter, and that neither can the form exist without matter, nor the matter without form; and therefore neither matter nor form as such or separately can fill space. S. Thomas teaches that it is impossible even to the omnipotence of God that matter should exist without form, much more that it should fill space. But when united they compose a body which has extension, and an extended body fills space, and yet so that extension is not a *constituent part of the essence* of a body, but a *necessary consequence of its existence.* But extension is a phenomenon cognisable and measurable by sense, and is therefore no assumption.[44]

IV. Let us turn now for a moment to modern philosophies, which teach either that matter does not exist or that we cannot know its existence. If they said only that we do not know *what* it is, we should have no contention with them. But to deny its existence is to contradict a law of our reason: to doubt of its existence is to doubt of the certainty of our reason.

But I fear the cause lies deeper. We have already seen that the Scholastic philosophy passes at once from the immediate certainty of our own existence to the intellectual and logical certainty of the existence of God, and from that beginning it descends through all orders of existences. The modern philosophies not

[44] Kleutgen says: 'L'étendue, à la vérité, est essentielle au corps en ce sens qu'il est de sa nature d'être étendu: mais nous ne pouvons pas dire pour cela qu'elle appartienne à l'essence même du corps, car elle en est une conséquence nécessaire, mais non une partie constitutive.'—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 315.

only invert this method, which might be legitimately done, but they fail or refuse to ascend to the First Existence and the First Cause. They begin their work by sense in the midst of phenomena. All beyond this veil to them has no cognisable existence. Is not this an abdication of reason in its highest prerogatives? Is it not a suppression of one-half of the knowledge which sense and reason, acting simultaneously, convey to us? When the sense reports from without, the reason pronounces within. We are not sense only, nor reason only; both act together in every normal process of our rational nature. When the senses report phenomena the reason predicates existence, and in that existence substance, or matter, or *catter*, or *stuff*, or what you will, a being and a reality are there of which the sense can only report the apparel and the appearance. And yet the physical sciences, by anatomy and analysis and chemistry, report a great deal more than appearances. They test and superinduce changes and corruptions and transformations — of what, and into what? Of phenomena only, or atoms, or force-loci, or points having position and no parts? My sceptical mind finds this hard of digestion. When I am told that atoms or force-points, by cohesion, or attraction, or repulsion, or equilibrium, can account for all diversities of species and kinds and proportions, and operations and qualities, and extensions and dimensions, in all the unities which we call bodies, my reason demands a mind and a cause, a law and a plastic power, in which all second causes are enveloped, and from which they all come. Unless the Atomists and Dynam-

ists ascend to the Creator, and see Him in all atoms and forces and points as the sole intelligible reason of the Cosmos, they speak but half truths, which the reason rejects as inadequate.

Mr. Kirkman, as a champion of Dynamism, has challenged single-handed all Atomists and Materialists, and the victory is decisively with him in so far as neither Atomism nor Materialism can give any rational account of the unity of every several existence, nor of their action, power, or force, nor of their life and vital operations of will and thought. When they deny the freedom and power of the will they sign their own sentence of death. Not to be able to account for the will is ruin to a philosophy; to deny the self-determining power of the will is to commit a philosophical suicide. The freedom of the will is a fact of consciousness, and consciousness, as Hume affirms, never errs. In this he was still restrained by the old Philosophy, and by common sense. Sanseverino, treating of consciousness, says:

'L' uomo non solo ha le conoscenze sensitive ed intelletive, ma *sa* ed *avverte* ancora di averle. Questa consapevolezza che l' anima ha degli atti suoi è dai filosofi odierni detta *senso intimo* avvero coscienza. Noi preferiamo la seconda denominazione.'—*Filosofia Speculativa*, vol. i. p. 248.

He further defines this consciousness, 'l' avvertenza che l' anima ha degli atti suoi.'[45]

'Evidens est, quod homo est animal rationale, sentiens nimirum et intelligens: unusquisque enim experitur se sentire, videre, audire, intelligere, velle,' &c.[46]

[45] *Filosofia Speculativa*, vol. i. p. 250.
[46] *Mauri Quæst. Philosophiæ*, tom. iii. p. 282.

Deny this, and you really deny that man is a rational being; deny the certainty of this inward consciousness, and there is no certainty left even for sceptics to affirm that we can be certain of nothing.

One of Mr. Kirkman's critics says: 'It has been long ago seen that to assume the fact of consciousness —a highly complex one, and the result of a mixed state of sense-perception and inward reflection—as the starting-point of all philosophy, is to begin at the wrong end. It is to make the goal our starting-point. The man who has reached consciousness—in other words, who knows that he knows—has made a very great advance.' The primordial fact of human nature is not 'I know,' but 'I want.' But who wants? Here, even in the infant crying for food, are all the elements of consciousness in full action. The infant wants food, and knows whence to derive it. It knows when it obtains it, and when its want is satisfied. To say that this is only sense would not be true even of a calf. Instinct and sense are there together. In the child the 'I' is sentient, and the sentient 'I' is intelligent in the measure of infancy. It is not a reflective act, but a direct act. So also is consciousness. Its first intuitions precede all acts of reflection upon ourselves. There may be consciousness without reflection, but there cannot be reflection without consciousness. Consciousness knows the personal self, reflection knows that it knows. I am conscious that I am awake without reflection. To pinch myself to prove that I am awake would indeed be a reflex act. But consciousness precedes all such needless torments.

The author of *Philosophy without Assumptions*, trusting too implicitly to Boscovich, too confidingly adopts the Dynamical Philosophy, which in the last analysis can be resolved only into one of two theories —either that all existences are only forces, activities without an agent; or that the agent behind them all is God, which may be verbally, but cannot be logically, distinguished from Pantheism. Mr. Kirkman affirms the existence of God, and does not deny the existence of matter; but in page 277 he, with less than his usual precision of thought, makes light of the word and idea of *person* as applicable to God. But an impersonal God sustaining the activities of the world is hardly to be distinguished from the *Anima Mundi*, or from a cultured Pantheism. I am sure that nothing was further from Mr. Kirkman's mind, and that he would promptly show that I have not fully understood him.

I cannot close this hasty treatment of the largest subject except Theology without expressing my sorrow to see minds so great and varied and subtil and fertile as those Mr. Kirkman has criticised, describing almost every imaginable curve and deviation from the traditional philosophy and the intellectual system of the world. These are bold words, but I believe them to be true. I ascribe this lamentable waste of great gifts and powers to the complete forgetfulness and desuetude into which the old philosophies and their scientific terminology have fallen. If they had been known it would have been impossible for any mind of far less subtilty than Professor Tyndall's to have uttered the words:

'By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of experience, and discern in that matter which we in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life.'[47]

If the meaning of this proposition be that all things are potentially in the *materia prima* of the Schoolmen, it is true enough, but inadequate: if it be not this, it seems to be either a deification of matter, or an inaccurate and inadequate expression of the agency of second causes; or, if it be none of these, it is, I believe, a phrase without an intellectual equivalent.

[47] *Address at Belfast*, p. 55 (Longmans, 1874).

XXIII.

FREDERIC OZANAM.

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PERE GRATRY has said somewhere in his writings that one difference between the society of the Middle Ages and of these later centuries consists in this, 'Society then was Catholic, and sustained men above themselves; but now society is Catholic no longer, and drags men downwards with itself.' The truth of this is to be seen perhaps more clearly in France and in this century than in any other period or country. The first French Revolution decatholicised the society of France. Its Catholicism has survived in individuals, and yet they have, with exceptions indeed, shown the depressing and distorting power of the society into which they were born, and by which they were nurtured. What the Germans call the 'Time-Spirit' is powerful everywhere, but it has shown its subtilty and its supremacy nowhere more visibly than in the noble and chivalrous race of Catholics who have so powerfully urged onward the reaction towards faith in France since the year 1830.

M. de Broglie has truly said that the principles of 1789 were formulated and published, not only as a charter for France, but as a Gospel for mankind. M. Thiers said to a Bishop on his way to the Council, 'Do not attack the principles of 1789; whoso touches them touches the marrow of Frenchmen.' They have penetrated into

the intelligence and created a public opinion which affects even those who resist them. To this fact we may ascribe two phenomena strange and sad in the Catholic action of France for the last forty years: namely, that those who were labouring in the Catholic reaction to restore faith, piety, and fidelity to the Holy See were divided, and opposed to each other; and that one band of men, for whose devotion, piety, intellectual elevation, and chivalrous fidelity to the Catholic Church, every Catholic must have admiration, should have been so perceptibly, though, we believe, unconsciously, affected by the Time-Spirit created by the principles of 1789.

Frederic Ozanam was one of the most brilliant of the brilliant band of Catholic writers in whom this can be traced. We are, therefore, desirous of making unmistakably clear our judgment on these points before we go on to express our profound admiration and affectionate sympathy with him, and many of those who were associated with him, in this noble conflict for the Catholic Faith against the infidel politics and Voltairean society of Paris and of France.

The youth of France were the offspring of the infidel university of the first Napoleon. Neither under the Restoration, nor under the reign of Louis Philippe, was its destructive influence counteracted. Society was either infidel and indifferent, or Voltairean, that is, infidel and scoffing. Such a society pulled down all its members; and into such a society Frederic Ozanam was born. It might be divided into three classes. First came the non-Catholics, who believed nothing; secondly,

the Catholics who gave splendid examples of a perfect fidelity to the Church; and thirdly, those who may be called Catholics *juxta modum;* that is to say, they were in some particulars and details affected by the Time-Spirit of their age and country. Nevertheless among these were some of the noblest and most chivalrous sons of the Church, and some also of the most ardent and loving Christians and true soldiers of Jesus Christ. It seems to us that we ought to render justice to all such men. And we feel that we can do so without incurring a suspicion of our being 'liberal Catholics.' We have had our *baptismus opprobriorum* as Ultramontanes, and even as ultra-Catholic and ultra-Ultramontane. Our chief mission has been to learn of the living voice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and to repeat his utterances with a perfect fidelity. We therefore claim to ourselves the freedom of speaking generously of those who in our judgment may not in some things have followed the guidance of the Holy See, for we have bought that freedom with the great price of no little odium and no sparing censure for our extreme Ultramontanism.

It seems to us to be the duty of justice, not to speak of charity, that while we remain inflexible in our own attitude we should endeavour, as far as possible, to appreciate at its full all that is high, noble, truthful, and Catholic in them; and while we note the points in which we believe them to have come short, to render to their lives, characters, and memories the fullest recognition of what they were. We say their memories, because of those of whom we have to speak hardly one survives.

Between the years 1830 and 1850 there arose in

France a group of men whose lives have left an indelible mark upon their country. The period of De Maistre and Chateaubriand was followed by that of Lamennais, De Bonald, De Salignis, Gerbet, Lacordaire, Montalembert, Ozanam, Rio, Combalot, Cochin, and, in its later time, Gratry; and we must add, as a youthful disciple called away before he had inscribed his name by toil, Henry Perreyve.[1]

While conscious of divergencies and deviations in certain things, it was impossible not to see and to love the noble character of these men. Endowed with great natural gifts, and with wide and various cultivation, there was one thing in common with them all—a great mental beauty, and a great breadth of heart. No one can have read the writings of Gerbet, Rio, Ozanam, Montalembert, and Gratry, nobody can have known Henry Perreyve, without seeing and feeling the singular beauty of their intelligence, and the generous impulses of their character.

We have no fear in rendering this just and affectionate tribute to their memory; and if in anything we have at times strongly opposed their way of judging and speaking, we never forgot, and never shall cease to declare, that they were noble sons of France, which had marked them for its own with some of the best tokens of its less stable age. There is also another truth to be borne in mind. If we were to try the language of some of the Antenicene Fathers by the terminology fixed by

[1] With the exception of Lamennais, De Bonald, and Ozanam, it was the good fortune of the writer to know all the others, and some of them with much intimacy.

the Council of Nicæa, we should find matter for criticism. In like manner, if we were to try the writings of some of the noblest and most fervent defenders of the Catholic Faith and of the Holy See in France by the later tests of the Syllabus and of the Vatican Council, we should commit an injustice. At that period we might have been as they were, without an exact terminology, and with questions as yet undecided.

With these few words of precaution, we will give a slight sketch of the life of Frederic Ozanam, of his character, and of the work he has left behind him. But first we must very warmly commend the work of Miss O'Meara, which is written with great fulness, but with no prolixity. It would have been impossible to set before us any adequate notion of Ozanam's singularly great and fertile mind in a smaller compass. While the author sympathises with an affectionate reverence with the subject of her biography, she skilfully surrounds certain periods of it with just explanations which show a perception of what an adverse critic might incline to say.

Frederic Ozanam was born at Milan in 1813. He died at Marseilles in 1853. His whole career was therefore contained in forty years. The Ozanam family was, it appears, of Jewish origin, and of great antiquity. The name of Hozannam is said to be found in the thirty-eighth Roman legion; and a Jewish colony seems to have been planted at Bellignum, or Bouliginceux, near Lyons. They were baptised by S. Didier, and thenceforward the Christian name took the place of the old Jewish name. Benedict, the grandfather of Fre-

deric, was the first who changed the orthography to Ozanam. Antoine, father of Frederic, served four years as a conscript under the first Napoleon. But to avoid the political changes in France, he went from Lyons to Milan. Frederic was his second son. The family returned to Lyons soon after his birth. At the age of sixteen Frederic wrote a letter to a friend, which is a wonderful evidence of precocity. It is an autobiography, moral, intellectual, and spiritual, which implies an extraordinary self-knowledge, self-observation, and self-discipline. At the age of seventeen he describes his first religious doubts and his intense sufferings, which, however, ended in a complete faith. He says, 'I believed henceforward, with an assured faith, and, touched by this mercy, vowed to consecrate my days to the service of that truth which had given me peace.' He studied at Paris under Abbé Noirot, and soon reached and retained the head of his class. He was destined for the law; but, being so young, his father recalled him for two years to Lyons, where he studied in an actuary's office, but spent his pastime in learning English, German, Hebrew, and Sanscrit. At the age of eighteen he wrote a work against the Saint-Simonians. His letters at this time show a maturity and thoughtfulness more like eight-and-twenty than eighteen. He then began his legal studies in Paris; and found himself in the midst of infidels, scoffers, and blasphemers. Professors and students in this were all alike. At this date he had an interview with Chateaubriand, who asked him whether he had been to the theatre. He said no; Chateaubriand asked him whether

he intended to go. Ozanam had promised his mother, who was a fervent Catholic, that he never would; and after some hesitation, he said he had resolved not to go to a theatre. Chateaubriand said very earnestly, 'I implore you to be true to that promise to your mother. You would gain nothing at the theatre; and you might lose a great deal.'[2]

The biographer gives an interesting sketch of the state of the University of France, its schools, lycées, and of the Sorbonne, in which infidelity reigned with an absolute sway. Slowly and by chance, one or two Catholic youths found each other out in this atmosphere of unbelief, and joined themselves together for mutual support. They then began to controvert the sceptical and infidel teaching of the professors. They wrote answers, which were publicly read out. At last Professor Jouffroy[3] openly attacked revelation, and was answered by a protest, drawn up by Ozanam, and signed by fifteen Catholic students, which the Professor had to read out to a school of 200, and to declare that he never meant to ill-treat Christianity. Ozanam was then under twenty years of age. 'Let us cheer up,' he wrote to a friend; 'the work of God is advancing, and will be accomplished by the youth of this very day; who knows, perhaps, even by you and me?'[4] This knot of young men then resolved on having an organ or paper. It so happened that some of them lodged in

[2] *Life*, p. 28.

[3] M. Jouffroy died a Christian death in the unity of the faith, and with the ministrations of the Church. Who can say how much Ozanam may have contributed to this happy end?

[4] Vol. i. p. 56.

the house of a M. Bailly, who was proprietor of a printing establishment and a newspaper called the *Tribune Catholique*. A debating society was founded in his house. It was here that Ozanam first found his power of speech. He was continually harassed by the taunts that faith must be shown by good works; and out of this came the conferences of S. Vincent of Paul, of which he was the real founder at the age of twenty, though he always refused to be so regarded. They had as counsellor in their work of charity Sœur Rosalie. These conferences began in 1833, and at this time are spread throughout the Church. In 1834, Lamennais' fall had come, and Lacordaire had begun his conferences at the Collége Stanislas. Ozanam and he became intimate friends, and it was through Ozanam that Lacordaire was admitted to give his conferences in Notre Dame. Ozanam had by this time completed his legal studies, and entered on his duties as a barrister. But his drawings were strongly to literature; and at that moment the municipality of Lyons petitioned that he should be appointed to a chair of Commercial Law about to be founded in Lyons. Ozanam was then only twenty-four. He was, at that age, nominated to the chair of Commercial Law at Lyons, and at the same date M. Cousin offered to him the chair of Philosophy at Orleans. In the year 1841 he accepted the office of Assistant Professor of Foreign Literature in the Sorbonne; shortly afterwards the chair of Literature in the University of Lyons was offered to him. He had by this time only reached his twenty-eighth year. We have brought these facts together as the best way of

showing in what estimation he was held by the public men and public authorities of France. His office of Assistant Professor at the Sorbonne gave him the first full occasion of putting his powers to the proof. His biographer says:

'Ozanam possessed all the elements of the purest eloquence, a ready and retentive memory, a clear conception, a facility for rigidly sketching the outline of his subject, and filling it up in strong, brilliant, and delicate colours' (i. p. 196).

'Early next morning he would resume the interrupted chain of thought, and then, when the time came, after invoking on his knees the light and aid of the Holy Spirit, he went forth to deliver his message' (p. 197).

'His manner of lecturing was full of charm; he dispensed his vast erudition with the simplicity of a boy, and with a prodigality that belongs only to inexhaustible abundance. Every one of his lectures was a book condensed into a chapter, and he frequently compressed into a sentence an amount of thought and information which a mind less magnificently replenished would have diluted into a chapter, telling away in an hour, like the intellectual spendthrift that he was, the treasure it had taken years to accumulate. He stripped knowledge of half its difficulties by his way of imparting it. Knowledge with him was not so much an intellectual system as a mental habit, which had become a part of his being; he did not divest himself of it, as some men do, taking it up and laying it down at stated times; when the signal came for him to impart it officially, he did not seem to stand up and perform the functions of a professor so much as to avail himself of an opportunity for revealing the rich deposit of thought, scientific analysis, and observation which life-long study had left in his mind; he gave it out naturally, spontaneously, and with the real enthusiasm of a devout scholar,—devout in the sense of devoted; his devotion to science, and to his own particular branch of it—history—partook of the nature of his religion; it was to his mind what faith was to his soul. It was the spontaneity of his method, united to its finished art, which exercised such fascination on all, and possessed such an unrivalled power of attraction for the young. They were interested and enchanted even before they were convinced. If they arrived at the lecture-hall ignorant of the subject, or indifferent to it, they were quickly excited to a curiosity which put an end to indifference, and stimu-

lated to inquiry and investigation. Few minds ever possessed in a higher degree the faculty of kindling the minds of others with his own—a faculty which may be taken as the supreme test of mental and moral power. Ozanam followed the Socratic method, of which he had learned the secret from M. Noirot. Taking hold of the mind on every side, by sympathy, by the reason and the imagination, he compelled the student to work with his own brains while following the working of another's. M. Cousin once exclaimed, on coming out from a lecture of Ozanam's, "The lyceums and colleges send us distinguished professors, but the Abbé Noirot sends us men"' (p. 197).

We cannot wonder that his power over his hearers was irresistible, and that their attachment to him was a kind of devotion. But all this he used for the end to which at seventeen he had vowed his life :

'It was nearly half a century since the voice of a Christian teacher—a teacher identified with the Christian faith—had been heard in the Sorbonne, while, on the other hand, its walls had echoed unceasingly to every false and fantastic doctrine of the Voltairean and Rationalistic schools; and this absence of talent, or at least this silence amongst the Catholic men in the great seat of learning, went far to sanction the popular idea that talent, not to say genius, had utterly disappeared from the Catholic ranks. But now a new era had begun. At the age of twenty-seven Ozanam took his seat amongst the veterans of the proud old university, and electrified young and old by the splendour of his gifts and the burning ardour of his faith. It was a strange coincidence that the same audience which so lately had listened with delight while Villemain and Cousin exposed their favourite theses, should now hear, with no less favour, those same theses energetically denounced from the same rostrum by the daring new-comer. It was a rash experiment on his part. The State, as yet, held the monopoly of the university, and looked with an evil eye on the men who were leading the war against it in behalf of the rights of the Church. It was natural enough, too, that an assembly of young men, all enlisted in warm partisanship on one side or the other, but amongst whom the opponents of the Church largely predominated, should form a dangerous audience for a professor of Ozanam's ardent religious convictions. But he did not stop to calculate risks; and Fortune, who sides mostly with the brave, stood by the young champion of the Gospel. Here

was no sophist, no 'subtil philosopher striving to palliate hard sayings, or smooth down unpalatable propositions, but a dauntless knight, who rode into the lists with his drawn sword flashing in the sunlight, and, flinging down his gauntlet, dared all comers to pick it up. He dealt in no compromise, he made no concessions to the hostile susceptibilities of his hearers. The sceptics heard him in astonished admiration, the Catholics applauded with a sense of victory' (pp. 193-195).

M. Lenormant, a professor of the Sorbonne, had the courage to follow Ozanam's example; but his hearers rose in revolt with hisses and yells, with blasphemous cries. Ozanam was present, and,

'Unable to contain his indignation, leaped up beside the lecturer, and stood for a moment surveying the tumult with proud defiance. The courageous action drew forth an instantaneous salvo of applause; but Ozanam, with a scornful gesture, commanded silence, and proceeded to tell the assembly what he thought of their behaviour, and what value he set on their plaudits; he spoke with a fiery vehemence that startled all into attention; he adjured them in the name of liberty, which they so loudly invoked, to respect liberty in others, and to allow every man the freedom of his conscience. The effect of the harangue was magical; the tumult ceased, and M. Lenormant continued, or rather began, his lecture, and finished it without interruption. The next day, however, the *cours* was closed by order of the Government; authority thus yielding to violence, when by a little firmness it might so easily have taken the upper hand, and constituted itself the guardian of social peace, and the bulwark of social principles. This cowardly and cruel precedent did not daunt Ozanam, or induce him to abate one iota of his independence; he continued his lectures without mitigating in the slightest degree the out-and-out Christian tone of his teaching. The boldness of this conduct, while it heightened his prestige with his own party, increased his general popularity. His name became a power in its sphere, and was cited everywhere as an example of the energy and growing strength of the Catholics. It once happened during the noisy days of the Lenormant riots, when the learned Sorbonne was transformed into a battlefield, that some person, meaning to be witty, scratched out the words "litterature etrangere," after Ozanam's name on the door, and wrote over them "théologie.

He was informed of this as he was entering the hall. He said nothing until he had finished his lecture, and then, as he was about to descend from his chair, he observed, in a tone of great dignity, "I have not the *honour* to be a theologian, gentlemen; but I have the happiness to believe, and the ambition to place my whole soul with all my might at the service of truth." The courageous profession of faith was greeted by loud and general cheers' (pp. 220, 221).

It is not wonderful that such courageous fidelity should have the reward of popularity. Even his enemies were at peace with him:

'A man who represents the most unpopular conviction, who serves it and stands by it through thick and thin, is sure to gain influence in the long-run: undying devotion to a cause eventually conquers the respect of its enemies, though it may not make its champion popular. The qualities of the man himself must do this. He must have a heart, or he must pass for having one. Ozanam was essentially a man of heart. His genius excited admiration, his piety commanded respect, but it was his kindness that made him loved. Lacordaire says that he had a charm, "which, added to his other gifts, completed in his person the artisan of a predestined enchantment. He was gentle to all men, and just towards error"' (p. 224).

In 1844 his principal, M. Fauviel, died, and Ozanam was nominated professor for life. In the year 1846—his health and strength had been always frail, and severely taxed by incessant work—he began to give way; but he would not relax his labours. A malignant fever, however, compelled him to submit, and he was sent on a literary mission into Italy. He passed the winter of 1846-1847 in Rome. In 1848 came the Revolution, and the martyrdom, as it may well be called, of the Archbishop of Paris; for he was slain *in odium Christi*, by a spontaneous acceptance of death, for the *bonum commune Reipublicæ et Eccle-*

sic. It is not commonly known that the Archbishop went on this errand of self-oblation at the request of Ozanam and two others. But, before they had suggested it, the Archbishop had already pondered it in his heart, as if by an inspiration. The whole event is touchingly narrated in the book before us.

In 1850 Ozanam's health again began to fail. He went in search of health to Brittany, and came over to England. Lacordaire has given a characteristic account of his visit to Westminster Abbey:

'"He went in with the crowd of strangers and foreigners, and found himself presently behind the choir, in front of the tomb of S. Edward. The sight of this monument, mutilated by Protestantism, filled him with anguish, and falling on his knees before the relics, such as they are, he prayed there alone in expiation for that people that no longer knows its saints, to the great contempt, doubtless, of the lookers-on, who took him for an idolater, if not for a madman." We are not surprised to learn that the indignant beadle hunted him out of the church' (p. 352).

But these intervals of rest and change were of little avail. The intensity of his mind gave no respite to his failing frame, and in 1852 he was again dangerously ill. Then came his last appearance at the Sorbonne:

'He was still confined to his bed, suffering great pain, and consumed with fever, when one day he heard that the public were clamouring for him at the Sorbonne, accusing him of self-indulgence and neglect of duty in being so long absent from his *cours*, when he was paid by the State for giving it. The news stung him to the quick. "I will show them it is not true. I will do honour to my profession!" he cried. And, in spite of the tears of his wife, and the entreaties of his brother and another medical attendant, he had himself dressed, and drove straight to the Sorbonne, where he found the crowd still collected outside his class. When the professor, leaning on the arm of a friend, pale, worn, more like a spectre than a living man, advanced through their midst, the rioters were smitten with horror and remorse: as he ascended the chair that had witnessed so many of his triumphs,

and that he was never to ascend again, their applause broke forth, rising and falling like waves around him. He stood for some minutes gazing in silence on the thoughtless, cruel young crowd, his black dazzling eyes shining with the terrible light of fever, his long hair hanging, his whole appearance that of a man who was nearer to death than to life. When at last the tumult subsided, he spoke. His voice rang out clear as silver, more piercing from its very weakness, like a spirit imprisoned in a body too frail to bear the shock of its inspiration. "Gentlemen," he said, "our age is accused of being an age of egotism; we professors, it is said, are tainted with the general epidemic, and yet it is here that we use up our health; it is here that we wear ourselves out. I do not complain of it; our life belongs to you; we owe it to you to our last breath, and you shall have it. For my part, if I die, it will be in your service." He said truly; this last effort killed him' (p. 363).

What remains is soon told. Ozanam went to Eaux Bonnes, and into Spain, and finally into Italy. We follow him to Pisa, Genoa, Sienna, Antignano, and finally to Marseilles; and here came the end:

'His arrival at Marseilles was quickly known, and the brotherhood of S. Vincent de Paul hastened to his door with every testimony of sorrow and respect. He was too ill to see any of them, but he was greatly touched to hear of their constant visits. Nothing could surpass the serenity that his soul now enjoyed; every trace of fear, of apprehension, had vanished; all bodily suffering had likewise ceased, and he appeared like one already dwelling in the sensible presence of God; he seldom spoke, but communed still with his beloved ones by a pressure of the hand, a sign, and that smile that lay like a halo on the wasted face, touching it already with the peace that passeth all understanding. Feeling that the end was near, he himself asked for the last Sacraments, and received them with great fervour and the liveliest consciousness. When all was over, his brother, remembering how keenly he had feared the Divine judgments, urged him gently to have confidence in the great mercy of God; but Ozanam, as if he understood not the allusion, answered, with a look of sweet surprise, "Why should I fear Him? I love Him so much!" On the evening of the 8th of September, the feast of our Lady's Nativity, the summons came. His wife was beside him, and his brothers, and a few near relatives. The adjoining room was crowded with those other brothers,

the members of the Society of S. Vincent de Paul, who knelt in silence, joining in the prayers that were speeding their founder into the presence of his Judge. He had fallen into a gentle slumber, waking up at intervals to murmur a blessing, a word of love, an invocation. Suddenly, opening his dark eyes in a wide startled gaze, he lifted up his hands, and cried out in a loud voice, "My God! my God! have mercy on me." They were his last words' (pp. 453, 454).

We have thus briefly traced the dates of time in order to show in how few years a great life was lived. Ozanam's studies were completed by the age of twenty-two; and in eighteen years he accomplished all that he has left behind of finished writings, and all that he wrought into the hearts and lives of the youth of France in the widespread revival of faith, which is expanding to this day. They were eighteen years of great intellectual and spiritual intensity. One word spoken by a mind raised to the pitch of its powers does more than a thousand scattered from an unimpassioned mind. We have rarely seen clearer evidence of mental intensity than in Frederic Ozanam. It may be well believed that it was not only the energy of a mind inflamed with the love of God, but that the keen energy of a nervous system which daily consumed itself added to the intensity of the will. There can be no doubt that he accomplished the vow of his youth by spending and being spent to the last beat of his pulse for 'the truth which had given him peace.'

A kindly critic the other day closed a notice of his biography with the words, 'Dying at the age of forty, he left behind him a brilliant and a beautiful memory.'

To estimate either the character or the works of Frederic Ozanam would require more than one article.

The copious and sympathetic biography before us brings out many beautiful traits of the filial tenderness and veneration he bore to his mother, which may always be taken as the sure test of a manly and Christian heart. He had great cause to love her, for it was her fervent piety that formed his character from his earliest consciousness. He fully understood this inestimable blessing. Just after her death he writes:

'Alas, what havoc this death has made in my mind, as well as in my heart! No, I am wrong: what so crushed me was the long illness that I beheld day by day destroying her, and which—shall I say it?—seemed as if it were going to dishonour the sacrifice before consuming it, by quenching the intellectual faculties, and blunting the moral feelings. This thought was horrible, and haunted me constantly; I seemed to see her soul dying with her body! Mercifully the trial was shortened; just at the end the energy of her soul revived, and Christ, in descending into the heart of His beloved servant, left there strength for the supreme struggle. She remained for three days, calm, serene, murmuring prayers, or acknowledging our caresses and services by a few words of ineffable sweetness. At last the fatal night came; it was I who was watching. I suggested to my dear mother the acts of faith, hope, and charity, the same that she had taught me to lisp after her as a little child' (p. 161).

'Happy the man to whom God gives a holy mother! This dear memory will never forsake us. Often in my solitude now, in the midst of the anguish that weighs down my soul, the remembrance of that august scene returns to sustain and uplift me. I think of how short life is, how soon we shall be reunited with those from whom death has parted us, and then I feel all temptations of self-love, all the unworthy instincts of my nature, fade away, and my desires are concentrated in the single one of dying like my mother! O, how I rejoice now that I did not abandon that blessed deathbed to run after the vague promises of university honours! If at this trifling sacrifice I should only have earned the privilege of passing a few more months near her, of being there on that last night, I am more than paid for it' (p. 162).

And two years after her death, when less loving and

sensitive natures would have lost the vividness of their perceptions, he wrote :

'Nothing is so appalling as the growing solitude, the void that death creates around us. I have gone through it all; but this state did not last long. Then followed quickly another, when I began to feel that I was not alone, when I was conscious of something infinitely sweet in the depths of my soul; it was like an assurance that I had not been left alone; it was a benign though invisible neighbourhood; it was as if a cherished soul, passing close by, touched me with its wings. And just as formerly I used to recognise the step, the voice, the breath of my mother, so now, when a fresh breeze revived my strength, when a virtuous thought entered my mind, when a salutary impulse stirred my will, I could not but think it was still my mother. After a lapse of two years, when time might have dispelled what was merely the effect of an over-wrought imagination, I still experience the same thing. There are moments when a sudden thrill passes through me, as if she were there by my side; above all, when I most stand in need of it, there are hours of maternal and filial intercourse, and then I shed more abundant tears, perhaps, than in the first months of my bereavement, but an ineffable peace is mingled with their sadness. When I am good, when I have done anything for the poor, whom she loved so tenderly, when I am at peace with God, whom she served so well, I see her smiling on me in the distance. Sometimes, when I am praying, I fancy I hear her voice praying with me, as we used to do together at the foot of the crucifix every night' (p. 163).

The same tenderness of heart is visible in his friendships. His letters to M. Falconnet, and his grief at the death of a mutual friend, breathe an affection which can be found only in those who have grown up in the full play of filial and brotherly love. The same also is to be seen in all the notices of his domestic life. At the age of twenty-eight he married Mdlle. Soulacroix, daughter of the Rector of the Academy. She was in every way a worthy companion of his gentle and ardent mind. Her intelligence appreciated his intellectual culture and aspirations; and she had elevation of soul

to second him in enterprises in which self gives way to duty. In 1848, when the barricades were in the streets of Paris, Ozanam was under arms in the National Guard. 'Personally,' says the biography, 'he did not know what fear was. This courage was shared by his wife. "Thank God! Amélie is courageous," he says to more than one friend, whom he keeps informed of their position during the outbreak; and he constantly congratulates himself on finding a support instead of a hindrance in her presence throughout' (pp. 312, 313).

The same love and largeness of heart pervades his writings and his life whensoever he speaks of the poor. But this will fall more naturally into its place when we come to speak of his politics, or rather of his efforts as a social reformer in their behalf.

It is impossible for us to give any adequate representation of Ozanam's literary works. For eighteen years, distracted by the state of France both before and after the Revolution of 1848, with health always frail, and for the last five years sensibly giving way, it is wonderful how Ozanam could have accomplished so much. The amount of writing contributed by him to the *Tribune Catholique*, the *Ere Nouvelle*, the *Moniteur Religieux*, journals which were striving to rally the youth of France to the Catholic reaction against infidelity, or to stir up charity and zeal for the amelioration of the poor, must have demanded the time and thought and energy of any ordinary man. But with him these accessory writings never suspended his serious and systematic literary work. Even his journeys for health and rest gave rise to one or more volumes.

His journey to Italy produced *Les Poètes Franciscans*, and his short excursion into Spain *A Pilgrimage to the Land of the Cid.*

He had formed for himself an outline of a work to which he purposed to devote his life, *A History of Civilisation among the Germans.* He has left a record of what he intended to demonstrate in the following passage in a letter to M. Lallier:

'It was only at the close of my lectures that the serious interest of the subject revealed itself to me distinctly. It is a case of proving that Germany owes her genius and her whole civilisation to the Christian education she received; that her greatness was in proportion to her union with Christendom; that she drew her power, her light, her poetry from her fraternal connections with the other nations of Europe; that for her, as for others, there is, there can be, no real destiny except through Roman unity, the depository of the temporal traditions of humanity, as well as of the eternal designs of Providence. All this looks simple, natural, almost trivial in its self-evident truth this side of the Rhine; but, on the other hand, the national pride plumes itself in dreams of an autochthonous civilisation from which Christianity has, by the way, caused them to decline; in a literature which, without contact with the Latin, would have developed into unexampled splendour; in a future, in fact, which promises to be magnificent, provided it steeps itself in unmixed and unalloyed Teutonism. The German type is no longer Charlemagne, but Arminius. These doctrines pierce in divers forms through the various philosophical, historical, and literary schools, from Hegel to Goethe, from Goethe to Strauss. It seems to me advisable to attack them at home, on their own ground; to show how *alone* they were simply barbarians; how, thanks to their Bishops, their monks, to the Roman faith, the Roman language, the Roman law, they entered into possession of the religious, scientific, and political inheritance of modern nations; how, in repudiating it, they fell back gradually into barbarism. An introduction which will precede and conclusions that will follow the history of the literature of German chivalry, the principal object of my task, will, I hope, bring out this idea in strong relief' (pp. 205, 206).

Of this work two volumes exist, of which Montalem-

bert says, in a letter to Madame Ozanam, after her husband's death, 'I have a volume of the *Etudes Germaniques* always open before me.' The best known of Ozanam's works is probably *Dantè et la Philosophie Catholique au Treizième Siècle*, in which the full beauty of his mind and all the tenderness of his fervent faith were especially manifest. During the greater part of his career he would not allow his lectures at the Sorbonne to be taken down. It was not until the year 1846 that he consented. They were found to be so fit for publication that he regretted, as we must also regret, that he had not consented sooner. This has given to us two volumes called *La Civilisation au Cinquième Siècle*. To this, his last work, he prefixed an Introduction, which gives the outline of the work to which he proposed to give himself for life. He says:

'I purpose writing the literary history of the Middle Ages, from the fifth century to the close of the thirteenth, up to Dante, where I shall stop as at the point most worthy of representing that great epoch. But in the history of letters I shall make civilisation, of which they are the flower, my chief study, and in civilisation I recognise the chief work of Christianity. . . . As a layman I have no mission to deal with theological subjects, and God, moreover, who loves to be served by the eloquence of man, finds plenty in our day to vindicate our dogmas. But while Catholics were absorbed with the defence of doctrine, the unbelieving seized upon history. They laid hands upon the Middle Ages, they sat in judgment upon the Church, judging her sometimes with enmity, sometimes with the respect due to a fine ruin, often with a levity they would not have used in treating profane subjects. We must reconquer this territory, which belongs to us, since we find it cleared by the hands of our monks, our Benedictines, and our Bollandists,—those men who did not think their life ill spent in growing pale over parchments and legends. Gibbon, the historian, went to visit Rome in his youth. One day, while wandering through the Capitol, the

sound of hymns broke suddenly on his ear; he saw the doors of the basilica of the Ara Cœli open, and a long procession of Franciscan monks come forth, brushing with their sandals the pavement traversed by so many triumphs. It was then that indignation inspired him; he formed the design of avenging antiquity, outraged by Christian barbarism; he conceived the plan of the *Decline of the Roman Empire*. And I, too, have beheld the monks of Ara Cœli treading on the venerable pavement of Jupiter Capitolinus; I saw it, and I rejoiced at the victory of love over strength, and I resolved to write the history of the progress of that period where the English philosopher saw nothing but decay; the history of civilisation in the barbarous ages, the history of the human mind escaping from the shipwreck of the empire of letters, and traversing the flood of the invasions, as the Hebrews crossed the Red Sea, and under the same guidance: "forti tegente brachio." I know nothing more supernatural, nothing that proves more clearly the divinity of Christianity, than to have saved the human mind' (pp. 382-384).

Although Ozanam chose literature for his calling in life, and although he refused again and again the proposal to enter the Legislature, or to be called a politician, and that, too, with a declared purpose of working out social reforms in distinction from political, nevertheless he avowed himself explicitly to be a Republican. This we have no doubt has caused him to incur the censure of Legitimists, Royalists, Imperialists, and even to lose the perfect confidence of loyal Catholics, who associate order and obedience with monarchy, and if not anarchy, at least instability of both public and private morals with Republicanism. This was especially true in France, where the name of Republic and the reality were identified with 1793 and the Phrygian cap of revolution. We shall not be suspected of Republicanism, and our loyalty to the great English monarchy of a thousand years, founded broad and deep in the natural order of prudence and justice by our Catholic

forefathers, and subsisting to this day, the only commonwealth against which revolutions have broken themselves in vain,—we say we shall not be suspected of Republicanism, or of any uncatholic tendency in politics, if we clear Frederic Ozanam also from any such suspicion.

We have heard it said that no Republican can be a good Catholic. We would commend this dictum to the conscience of Cardinal M'Closkey and to the pastors and people of the Catholic Church of the United States; or, to come nearer home, we would commend it to the deliberation of Mgr. Mermillod, who would, we imagine, distinguish between the Helvetian republic and the gang of infidels and persecutors who now tyrannise over Geneva. But we may even go further, and remind those who censure Ozanam's politics of the republics of Venice, Florence, Pisa, and Genoa, of the Catholic chivalry which issued from them, and of the Saints who sprung from them.

Now it was precisely the mediæval Christian and Catholic republic which fascinated and filled Ozanam's mind. In it he saw the check and balance which would have saved France from the excesses of its later kings, and, therefore, from the sanguinary and anarchical reaction called the Revolution. His indignant lamentations over the state of the people of Paris; his burning zeal for the poor, whose degradation in poverty, ignorance, and depravity he, as a Brother of S. Vincent of Paul, saw with his own eyes, and relieved with his own hands,—all this made him pray and toil for a Christian equality of brotherhood such as he had read

of in the commonwealth of Israel. Perhaps the instinct of a theocratic commonwealth ran in the blood of a Hozannam by direct inheritance.

But we can find for Ozanam another plea. In the years when he was entering into the studies of his manhood there appeared in France a book which has more than almost any other, moulded and directed the political thought of the nineteenth century; we mean De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.[5] We shall better convey our own meaning by simply letting De Tocqueville express his. In his Introduction to his work he writes as follows:

'The more I studied American society the more I perceived that the equality of conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point at which all my observations constantly terminated. I then turned my thoughts to our own hemisphere, where I imagined that I discerned something analogous to the spectacle which the New World presented to me. I observed that the equality of conditions is daily progressing towards those extreme limits which it seems to have reached in the United States: and that the democracy which governs the American communities appears to be rapidly rising into power in Europe' (p. xiii.).

He ascribes this equality chiefly to the action of the Catholic Church:

'Soon [he says] the political power of the clergy was founded, and began to exert itself; the clergy opened its ranks to all classes,—to the poor and to the rich, the villain and the lord; equality penetrated into the government through the Church, and the being who, as a serf, must have vegetated in perpetual bondage, took his place as a priest in the midst of nobles, and not unfrequently above the heads of kings' (p. xv.).

After saying that every fifty years has levelled

[5] *Democracy in America*, Reeves's translation (London, 1865).

France more and more nearly after the model of America, he continues:

'Nor is this phenomenon at all peculiar to France. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, we shall witness the same continual revolution throughout the whole of Christendom. The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to the advantage of democracy. All men have aided it by their exertions; those who have intentionally laboured in its cause, and those who have served it unwittingly; those who have fought for it, and those who have declared themselves its opponents,—have all been driven along in the same track, have all laboured to one end, some ignorantly and some unwillingly; all have been blind instruments in the hands of God. The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact, and it possesses all the characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress' (pp. xix. xx.).

'The whole book which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced on the author's mind by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made' (p. xxi.).

'The Christian nations of our age seem to me to present a most alarming spectacle: the impulse which is bearing them along is so strong that it cannot be stopped, but it is not yet so rapid that it cannot be guided: their fate is in their hands; yet a little while and it may be so no longer. The first duty which is at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if that be possible; to purify its morals; to direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge of business for its inexperience, and an acquaintance with its true interests for its blind propensities; to adapt its government to time and place, and to modify it in compliance with the occurrences and the actors of the age. A new science of politics is indispensable to a new world' (p. xxii.).

'Zealous Christians may be found amongst us, whose minds are nurtured in the love and knowledge of a future life, and who readily espouse the cause of human liberty as the source of all moral greatness. Christianity, which has declared that all men are equal in the sight of God, will not refuse to acknowledge

that all citizens are equal in the sight of the law. But, by a singular concourse of events, religion is entangled in those institutions which democracy assails, and it is not unfrequently brought to reject the equality it loves, and to curse that cause of liberty as a foe, which it might hallow by its alliance' (pp. xxxi. xxxii.).

He then sums up the saddest feature of our times —the unnatural and fratricidal conflicts of those who have common interests, and are combining for the same ends. It is as if Até had come between men :

'The religionists are the enemies of liberty, and the friends of liberty attack religion : the high-minded and the noble advocate subjection, and the meanest and most servile minds preach independence ; honest and enlightened citizens are opposed to all progress, whilst men without patriotism and without principles are the apostles of civilisation and of intelligence' (pp. xxxiii. xxxiv.).

We cannot leave De Tocqueville's name without adding that he was born of a fervent Catholic Breton family ; that, like too many Frenchmen, he became practically indifferent ; but that he ended his days at Cannes with the pastoral care of the curé and the watchful service of a Sister of Charity.

Now we can hardly believe that Ozanam had not become familiar with De Tocqueville's thesis, and we might venture to assert with De Tocqueville's writings. If so, we have the key to the passages which we now add, in which Ozanam pours out his whole political creed.

His biographer, who evidently has studied all his works, has summed up his mind as follows :

'The philosophy of history, as he interpreted it, had led him to believe that there is no real meaning or character in the movement of human society unless through all its changes and con-

vulsions we can discern a steady and continual progress through Christianity to the dignity of freedom. This condition of freedom, which he held as essential to the welfare and happiness of communities, he considered equally indispensable to the Church. He was consequently intolerant of the least bondage for her, and impatient that a Christian people should tolerate it, when at the same time they were, perhaps, fighting manfully for the emancipation of their country. If the Church were free, free in the fullest sense of the word,—free to guide, to rule, and to teach mankind,—then all legitimate freedom would follow' (pp. 272, 273).

'"A struggle is preparing," he says, "between the classes, and it threatens to be terrible; let us precipitate ourselves between these hostile ranks, so as to deaden the shock, if we cannot prevent it." In 1836 he wrote to his friend Lallier: "The question which agitates the world to-day is not a question of *political forms*, but a *social* question. If it be the struggle of those who have nothing with those who have too much, if it be the violent shock of opulence and poverty which is making the ground tremble under our feet, our duty, as Christians, is to throw ourselves between these irreconcilable enemies, and to induce one side to give, in order to fulfil the law, and the other to receive, as a benefit; to make one side cease to exact, and the other to refuse; to render equality as general as it is possible amongst men; to make voluntary community of possession replace taxation and forced loans; to make charity accomplish what justice and law alone can never do." He adhered to this political creed all his life. Twelve years later, on the eve of the "violent shock" which his far-seeing sagacity foretold, he repeats, as in his student days, "It is a social question; do away with misery, Christianise the people, and you will make an end of revolutions"' (pp. 294, 295).

'The first duty of Christians now is not to be frightened; and the second is not to frighten others: but, on the contrary, to reassure the timorous, and to make them understand that the present crisis is like a storm that cannot last' (p. 308).

'Here we are in this great and opulent metropolis for the last seven weeks without a government or a regular police force, and yet we hear of no more murders, robberies, or other misdemeanours than before. Don't believe those evil-minded persons who go about spreading absurd stories; there is not a word of truth in them, and nothing is more contrary to the dispositions of the population of Paris, who on every occasion seek to show respect to religion and sympathy to the clergy. My friend, the Abbé Cherduel, who has blessed thirteen trees of liberty, has been quite

affected by the proofs of faith which he found amidst this people, where, since 1815, the priest has been taught to see only enemies of God and of the Church. Occupy yourself as much with servants as with masters, with workmen as much as with employers. This is henceforth the *only* means of salvation for the Church of France. The curés must set aside their pious parish congregations, little flocks of good sheep in the midst of an enormous population to whom the parish priest is a stranger. He must henceforth occupy himself, not only with the indigent, but with that immense class of poor who do not ask for alms, but who are, nevertheless, attracted by special preaching, by charitable associations, by the affection that is shown to them, and which teaches them more than we think. Now, more than ever, we ought to meditate on a beautiful passage in the second chapter of the Epistle of St. James, which seems as if it had been written expressly for these times' (pp. 308, 309).

Once more, in a passage which we reluctantly abridge, he brings out the profound conviction of his mind that the infidel revolution is the rotting and malaria of a land where the 'salt has lost its savour :'

'"It is within, not without, that we must seek for the sources of men's happiness and its principal enemies," he declares; "and we shall have done nothing, absolutely nothing, so long as we have not carried light and reform into those internal disorders which time does not right, which are more incurable than diseases, which last longer than the *chômage*, and go on multiplying pauperism long after the grass of the graveyard has effaced the last traces of civil war. God did not make the poor; He sends no human creatures into the chances of this world without providing them with those two sources of riches, which are the fountain of all others—intelligence and will. . . . Why should we hide from the people what they know, and flatter them like bad kings? It is human liberty that makes the poor; it is it that dries up those two primitive fountains of wealth, by allowing intelligence to be quenched in ignorance, and will to be weakened by misconduct. The working men know it better than we do. . . . God forbid that we should calumniate the poor whom the Gospel blesses, or render the suffering classes responsible for their misery; thus pandering to the hardness of those bad hearts that fancy themselves exonerated from helping the poor man when they have proved his

wrong-doing. . . . But while we have put crushing taxes on salt, meat, and all necessaries of life, we have not yet discovered in the arsenal of our fiscal laws the secret of arresting the multiplication of distilleries, of raising the price of alcoholic liquors, of restricting the sale of those detestable, adulterated, poisonous drinks that cause more sickness than all the rigours of the seasons, and make more criminals than all the injustice of men combined. What reforms have you introduced into the public amusements of this Parisian population, so infatuated about pleasure, so ready to let itself be led to the ends of the earth, not with bread, as it has been said, but with amusement? Last winter the Prefecture of Police delivered *four thousand licenses for night balls.* The State puts no limit to those unhealthy diversions, which the good sense of our fathers contracted within the six weeks of the Carnival. Every year it authorises the opening of a new theatre in some wretched haunt of the Faubourgs, where the sons and daughters of the people are fed nightly upon the scum of a literature whose cynicism would revolt the chastity of the opera pit. And when, for six months of the year, the youth of the working classes have spent their evenings and their nights in these horrible dens, where their health runs as much danger as their morals, you are surprised to see them turn out miserable puny creatures, incapable of supplying the military contingent, but supplying innumerable recruits every year to the prisons and the hospitals! Let us not imagine we have done our duty by the people when we have taught them to read and write and count. . . . When it was a question of crushing out the last embers of the insurrection, there was no need of delays and formalities to pitch twenty camps in the Boulevards of Paris, and up to the very doors of the Hôtel de Ville; and here we are, after four months, when in the 12th arrondissement alone there are 4000 children without shelter—here we are still struggling amidst adjournments, motions, and debates, fighting to overcome I know not what scruples of committees, boards, administrations, and the rest of it, who are terrified that the State will be ruined and overturned if the education of the young *ouvriers* is confided to Sisters and Brothers, to teachers capable, that is, of teaching them something more than how to spell out the syllables of the newspaper, and to scrawl the *ordre de jour* of the barricades on the walls with a piece of coal" ' (pp. 323-325).

' "The poor devils," he said, "who are beguiled to the barricades, but who are Christians at heart, are ready to melt at a word of kindness" ' (p. 267).

In all this we see a profound faith in the words of the Holy Scriptures, 'Sanabiles fecit Deus nationes super terras.' He believed the nations to be sick because their faith had almost given way under the spiritual, moral, and physical conditions of their life. But he profoundly believed in the healing power of God through the Church and the ever-renewing health of the generations of man. France, it is said, had once two-and-twenty thousand leprosy hospitals, but they have disappeared together with the leprosy which called them into existence. So he believed that the social evils of France were to be healed by the power of Christianity upon the heart of man. 'Christianise the masses:' this was his gospel and his political creed—a creed which has a higher sanction from S. Gregory the Great to Pius IX.

And the mention of this august name reminds us that we cannot better close this hearty tribute to a beautiful mind and a noble life than by the words in which Ozanam professed his filial and loving obedience to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The winter of 1846-1847 Ozanam passed in Rome. It was at the beginning of the Pontificate of Pius IX. On Easter Sunday he wrote thus:

> This is the moment to speak to you of the Papacy, now that I have just assisted at its most solemn pageants, and am still under the spell of the emotion called up by that most thrilling spectacle which is to be seen on earth, the Papal Mass and the benediction of the *Urbi et orbi*' (p. 255).

Ozanam was received by the Holy Father with the most fatherly affection, and it was returned by a filial love which inspired his whole soul with the loyalty of a

chivalrous Catholic. He says, speaking of the Holy Father:

'He has resumed, one by one, all the active functions of the Episcopacy—preaching, giving Confirmation, visiting *incognito* schools and hospitals and the poor in their garrets, going to say Mass in any obscure chapel, and distributing Communion to all who are present, as my wife and I had the happiness of receiving it from him. And, with all this, a purity of life that was the admiration of those who knew him as a young priest, and a charity so boundless that when he set out to come to the conclave he was obliged to borrow six hundred crowns for his journey. . . . But what strikes one above everything else in him are those two sentiments that have made the greatness of all great Popes,—an immovable faith in the Divine authority vested in him, and a profound conviction of his unworthiness; a trust in God that enables him to undertake everything, and a contempt for himself that enables him to suffer everything; hence the *aureola* of sanctity which illuminates his countenance, and that burning accent which pervades his discourse' (p. 259).

At a public meeting, on his return from Rome, he said:

'I believe the future has serious troubles in store for Pius IX. I believe it is for his greater glory. God does not raise up such men for ordinary difficulties. If this great Pontiff had only to cope with the over-enthusiasm, the eagerness of his people—a thing that so few princes have to complain of—his mission would be an easy one; it would fill too small a place in history; his bark would glide over tranquil waters. We must look out for the tempest. But let us not fear, like the disciples of little faith; Christ is in the boat, and He is not sleeping; never has He been more wakeful than in these present days' (pp. 269, 276).

Such was Frederic Ozanam, a pure and noble soul, on fire with charity to all men, especially to the poor; consumed by zeal in the service of truth; pious, with a filial tenderness; exemplary in every path of life; more eloquent in the supernatural beauty of his thoughts than in the loving words which fell from his

lips; more illuminated with the ardour of Christian faith than with the manifold lights of literary cultivation: such a man bore in him a Catholic heart full of all instinctive loyalty, as ready to give his life for a jot or tittle of the faith, or for a definition of the Divine authority of the Church, as he was to counsel the Archbishop of Paris to tread in the steps of the Good Shepherd, and to lay down his life for his sheep. May God raise up on every side laymen like Frederic Ozanam.

XXIV.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOLY SEE.

WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE PAPAL ALLOCUTION, OF MARCH, 1877, AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

PREFACE.

Until the last years of Lord Palmerston's life, English statesmen had a higher and juster judgment of what is now called the Roman Question. They saw its bearing upon the order, civilisation, and Christianity of Europe. The European Powers, in 1812 and in 1815, were united in restoring Pius VII. to his independence, not only as an act of justice, but as a condition of international peace.

Such was the conviction of the leaders of what is called the Liberal party in 1849.

They shall speak for themselves.

Lord Ellenborough, on June 12th, 1849, said, in the House of Lords: "It was quite true England was not a Catholic State, and might not, therefore, feel that personal interest in the position of the Pope which was felt by Catholic Powers: but we had eight millions of Roman Catholic subjects, and it was as much an object of interest to us, as it would be to any one of the Catholic Powers of Europe, that the Pope should be in a position of independence; that he should not be so situated as to be dependent upon the bounty, or upon the power of any one, or of any combination of the Powers of Europe. That was surely of as deep an interest to us as it would be to either Austria or Naples. The question was, not whether the Pope, as Sovereign of Rome, should or should not reside or rule there: but whether the person who happened to be at the head of the Roman Catholic Religion should maintain a position of independence; and that appeared to him to be a matter of the deepest importance."

Lord Lansdowne said:—"He did not say that they had no interest of a political character; on the contrary, he said that in his (the Pope's) political character they had a great interest. In that view he would repeat what he had said before—that the Government were most anxious that the Pope should be restored to Rome. He had before said, the British Government felt that it was placed in a situation quite distinct from that of the other powers as to the restoration of the Pope. He alluded of course to the religious ties which bound those Powers to the Sovereign

Pontiff and which did not bind us. But, nevertheless, the British Government had not seen with indifference the events which had expelled the Pope from his temporal dominions: but they had always been, and still were, ready to offer such suggestions as might be useful for the purpose of restoring by negotiation the power and authority of the Pope in Rome." *

Lord Brougham, on July 20th, 1849, in moving certain Resolutions on Foreign Policy, said: "And here let me say a word which may not be popular in some quarters . . . . upon the separation of the temporal and spiritual authority of the Pope. My opinion is, that it will not do to say the Pope is all very well as a spiritual prince, but we ought not to restore his temporal power. That is a short-sighted and, I think, a somewhat superficial view of the case. I do not believe it possible that the Pope could exercise beneficially his spiritual functions if he had no temporal power. For what would be the consequence? He would be stripped of all his authority. We are not now in the 8th century, when the Pope contrived to exist without much secular authority, or when, as Bishop of Rome, he exercised very extensive spiritual authority without corresponding temporal power. The progress of the one, however, went along with that of the other; and just as the Pope had extended his temporal dominions by encroachments and by gifts, like those of Pepin and Charlemagne . . . . just in proportion as his temporal authority increased, did he attain so overwhelming influence over the Councils of Europe. His temporal force increased his spiritual authority, because it made him more independent. Stripped of that secular dominion he would then become the slave now of one Power—then of another—one day the slave of Spain, another of Austria, another of France, or, worst of all, as the Pope has recently been, the slave of his own factious and rebellious subjects. His temporal power is an European question, not a local or a religious one, and the Pope's authority should be maintained for the sake of the peace and the interests of Europe. We ourselves have 7,000,000 of Roman Catholic subjects . . . . and how is it possible to suppose that, unless the Pope has enough temporal authority to keep him independent of the other European Courts, jealousies and intrigues will not arise which must reduce him to a state of depen-

* Hansard, Vol. cvi., p. 9.

dency . . . . and so enable any one country wielding the enormous influence of his spiritual authority to foster intrigues, factions, and rebellion in the dominion of her rivals ?" *

Lord Lansdowne answered as follows :—"He had no hesitation in stating that he quite agreed in the views of his noble and learned friend on the subject ; but he assured him they were by no means peculiar, inasmuch as they were precisely those laid down in Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Normanby, where he distinctly declared that the Sovereignty of the Pope was something quite peculiar, and having a relation with all the Roman Catholic States of the world, quite different from that of any other authority. The condition of the Pope's Sovereignty was quite peculiar. As a Temporal Sovereign the Pope was of a fourth or fifth rate order ; as a Spiritual Sovereign he was not only of the first honour, but enjoyed a Sovereignty unparalleled in the world, being capable of exercising over, not one, but every country in Europe an authority and an influence with which nothing could compare. There was, therefore, in respect of other States, a ground for interfering and maintaining his authority, which did not exist in any other case ; and being a sort of compound interest, the necessity was imposed on the Catholic Powers of watching, in order to see that the joint object of preserving the spiritual head of their religion was not made the means of promoting temporal ambition. But when he said that, he was not prepared to say, that we, as a Protestant State, had not to a certain extent a similar interest : there was not a country with Catholic subjects, and Catholic possessions, which had not a deep interest in the Pope being so placed as to be able to exercise his authority unfettered and unshackled by any temporal influence which might affect his Spiritual authority." †

Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Normanby was, in substance, as follows : that it is without doubt to be desired that a person, who in his spiritual character exercises vast influence in the internal affairs of the greater part of the nations of Europe, should be so independent as not to become, in the hands of any European power whatsoever, a means of embarrassing others.

Such were the principles of English statesmen until certain of them began to meddle in the Italian Revolution. I was eye-witness of the use that was made of the names of these personages,

* Hansard, Vol. cvii., p. 627. † Hansard, Vol. cvii., p. 707.

and I am sorry to say of England, in Rome, Naples, and Florence, in the year 1848.

From that day to this the pretensions of the Italian Revolution have been mistaken for the will of the people of Italy: and men who abhor infidelity and sedition have lent their names and influence to an antichristian conspiracy. Mazzini spent his life in propagating a programme subversive of Christianity and of monarchy. His autobiography will show that the monarchy of Sardinia has been used as a mask and a tool to hide and to create throughout Italy an antichristian Republic. So far as man can do, the Temporal Power of the Papacy seems overthrown. The next to fall is the Italian kingdom. No one can have watched the course of Italian Governments without noting the steady advance of the Mazzinian revolution in the successive ministries of Italy. From Cavour to Ratazzi, from Ratazzi to Ricasoli, from Ricasoli to Minghetti, from Minghetti to Depretis, the antichristian and antimonarchical revolution has revealed itself in every successive change.

The present Chamber, elected by less than a hundredth part of the Catholic Italian people, represents the Revolution, and nothing but the Revolution. The Catholic electors refuse to vote: less than two hundred and fifty thousand elect the Parliament, which Englishmen believe to represent the 26,000,000 of Italy. The whole Chamber is revolutionary, both Right and Left alike. And the Left are now in power. The present legislation against the clergy is not the work of the 26,000,000 of Italians, nor even of the 250,000, but only of a majority of those who go to the ballot-box. Revolutions are always the work of minorities. I have been asked why 26,000,000 of men passively submit to such legislation if they do not assent to it. The answer to that question is the following pages. It is enough to say here that the Italian people have no unity of race, and therefore no unity of mind or will, no political organisation, no political education, no traditional experience of public life, no real liberty of association or action. A Catholic Congress was dispersed the other day at Bologna. The army is in the hands of the Monarchy; and the Monarchy is in the hands of the minority, which has used the *Spada d'Italia* for the working out of the Republic of Mazzini.

On the 8th of September, 1870, King Victor Emmanuel wrote his well-known letter to Pius IX., announcing his intention to

seize upon Rome by force. In that letter are these words: "A tempest full of peril is threatening Europe. Under the cover of the war which is desolating the centre of the continent, the party of the Cosmopolitan Revolution is increasing its hardihood and audacity, and is preparing, especially in the provinces governed by your Holiness, to give the last blows to the Monarchy and to the Papacy." * These words were written as a pretext. They read like a prophecy. This is repeated by Pius IX. in his Allocution: "Already the spirit of disturbance and disorder threatens, like a torrent, to carry everything before it, and not a few of the authors or promoters of the Revolution look back with terror on the effects of their work." Every friend of Italy will pray that this terrible future may be averted, but the Revolution seems to have linked itself to a destiny, and destiny, like Nemesis, is inevitable. All I hope is, that English statesmen will not lend a hand to foster a work of anarchy: and that they will take as much diligent care to know accurately what they are doing in the Roman Question as they are wont to use in their public duties towards our own country. They must go deeper for their knowledge than the letters of Newspaper Correspondents, and leading articles inspired, if not written, by hands that have been united in the conspiracies of Mazzini. Englishmen have hitherto sympathised with events in Italy, believing them to be the work of the Italian people. When they come to see that they have been the work of a minority which declares itself every day more and more visibly in its antichristian and republican colours as the lineal and legitimate offspring of the French Directory, they will revert to the broader and deeper political wisdom of our earlier statesmen, and will desire to see the great Italian people deliver itself from the yoke of a minority which has broken from the Christian traditions of Italy and takes its inspirations from the Falck Laws and the Government of Berlin.

Since the following pages were sent to press, the Mancini Law, described in the third chapter, has been rejected by the Italian Senate by a majority of 105 against 92. This fact is, no doubt, of importance, as showing that there still exists, even in the party of the Revolution, a strong conservative and Catholic in-

* Samwer, Recueil des Traités, Vol. v., p. 33.

stinct which will keep alive and sustain the same spirit throughout Italy. But this fact has no great legislative importance, because all that the Mancini Laws against the clergy would have accomplished may still be effected when the *Codice Penale* comes into discussion. But more than this, the Italian Government has announced its plan of hostility to the Church and to Christianity in Italy. The *Diritto* is believed to be the Government organ at this time; it represents also the inspirations from Berlin. In its number of May 10th it gives some passages of the speech of the President of the Council, S. Depretis, with comments of its own. They are too much to our purpose to be passed over. S. Depretis, addressing his constituents at Stradella, spoke as follows:—"Italy of to-day, if it has not indeed written an immortal book, has certainly written an Immortal Decree: that is, the suppression of political clericalism, *the liberation of civil Christianity, the emancipation of religious thought, and the free worship of humanity.*" "But that this may be and may remain a grand chapter in the history of the world, it is necessary to complete the two periods that remain suspended, the one which regards *the temporal possessions of the Ecclesiastical Society*, and that which regards *the recognition of Spiritual jurisdictions in their social effects.*" And he promised on these subjects "two projects of law which will complete and correct *the Chapter of the Guarantees.*"

"The law on the Abuses of the Clergy has been defeated, but the Ministry have no lack of reasons by which to provoke a new Parliamentary vote, whereby the country will not be left under the grave anxiety in respect to such a victory as was gained the day before last *by our adversaries in the Senate.*"

"We cannot stop here. The law of the Guarantees acknowledges one Vatican only. A profound reform therefore is needed of *the Vaticans of Instruction*, that is, of the *Seminaries.*"

And here we have an open confession that the Depretis government is dependent for its ideas, if not for its existence, on Berlin.

"We have," he says, "inverted the parts" (*i.e.* with the German Falck Laws); "we have abolished the faculties of Theology while we have left the Seminaries under the exclusive power of the Roman Curia. *Friedberg*, in praising the opposite system, which prevails in the legislature of Baden and Würtemberg, is of opinion, that in a good system of the relations of Church and

State, the State ought to maintain the faculties of Theology, but at the same time *it ought to abolish the Seminaries of the Bishops.*"

After promising a law for the preservation and administration of the ecclesiastical property of the kingdom—that is, its secularization—he goes on to say :—

"The Moderate Party gave to the Church the law of the Guarantees : the State likewise is waiting to obtain its law of Guarantees, and it shall have it from the Depretis Government.

"We accept the defiance of the Vatican : we accept it in the name of our rights, and of the *liberal interests of Europe.*"* The Liberals of Europe were such men as Lord Lansdowne ; they are now Gambetta in France, Falck in Prussia, Depretis and Mancini in Italy, and those who are in sympathy and solidarity with them in England. Their avowed object is to overthrow the Vatican, their true aim is to overthrow revelation, and to "*emancipate religious thought and the free worship of humanity.*" By the former phrase is meant Rationalism, by the latter the Atheism of Comte, or "la réhabilitation de la chair" of the French infidelity.

By the thirteenth article of the Law of Guarantees the Seminaries are expressly exempted. In truth the Guarantees guarantee nothing. Pius IX. says in the Allocution, "Now, indeed, the world may clearly see the value and sincerity of the concessions or guarantees by which our enemies pretended to guard the liberty and dignity of the Roman Pontiff : guarantees which rest on no other foundation than the arbitrary and hostile will of a government in whose power it is to apply them, to interpret them, and to carry them into effect as it may choose, and solely for its own purposes and interests. In no way certainly does the Roman Pontiff possess, nor can he ever possess, full liberty or exercise his full authority, as long as he is subjected to others ruling in his City."

The speech of S. Depretis is a covert declaration of war by the revolution against the Senate and the Monarchy. *Viderint ipsi.*

It is also an open declaration of war, and we accept it without fear. The plan of the campaign is to undermine the faith of Italy by education without Christianity, to destroy the Catholic religion, the Catholic Church, and the Christian life of Italians. This is the aim of the Antichristian Revolution in all countries.

* Reported in the *Voce della Verità*, May 12, 1877.

The blasphemous laughter of the Left in the French Chamber, at the Name of our Divine Redeemer, is evidence nearer home. The labour of certain men to exclude Christianity from our English schools is evidence at our doors. And as this is the common cause of the Antichristian Revolution in all countries, so the liberty and protection of the Head of the Christian Church ought to be the common cause of all Christians everywhere. Christian England has a vital interest in the independence of Christianity. The siege is laid against the Holy See because men hope that if the Shepherd be smitten the sheep will be scattered. Pius IX. is protecting by his inflexible fortitude and fearless voice the Christianity of the whole world. And the Christians of all nations are on their trial whether they will be on the side of Christ or of His conscious or unconscious adversaries. We accept the conflict, trusting in the power of moral right, and in the "victory that overcometh the world, our faith."

MAY 15, 1877.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE HOLY SEE.

I.

THE TEMPORAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE POPE A DIVINE ORDINANCE.

The Allocution addressed to the Sacred College on the 12th of March last, treats of matter so vital to the whole Church, and to the faith of Christians in every region of the world, that I cannot regret the necessity which is laid upon me to speak upon it. All Christians believe that when our Lord sent out His Apostles, He gave to them a supreme spiritual power to govern the Church. Catholics further believe that He had already given that power in its fulness to Peter, their head and chief, the foundation of His Church: and, after He ascended into Heaven, His Vicar upon earth. We believe also that this Divine power exists in the world at this moment. It exists in the office of Peter, perpetuated in the person of his successor. In this we have the whole outline of the Allocution before us.

The successor of Peter in this Allocution has declared in clear and energetic words, and in the hearing of all the nations of Christendom, that this supreme office, entrusted to him by a Divine commission, is, at this moment, violated by the usurpation of men, by the injustice of those who have despoiled the Holy See of the sovereignty which the Providence of God has bestowed upon it, and by the in-

sidious attempt now made still further to bind its supreme authority by human and penal legislation. The Roman question, therefore, is not a merely political question. It involves the liberties of the whole Church, and the free exercise of the authority of its Head. If it touches upon the political sphere, or upon political facts, it is only because we cannot separate either religion from morals, or morals from politics.

My purpose then will be to make clear the four following points: First, What is the sovereignty or independence, or temporal power, if men like so to call it, with which God in His Providence has invested the Head of His Church upon earth. Secondly, What is the violation of that independence and sovereignty by the acts of violence which have been perpetrated in the last seven years. Thirdly, What have been and what must be the consequences of that violation. And, lastly, What is, therefore, the duty of every Catholic throughout the world. And I will go further: I will say, What is the duty of every Christian who believes that the Word of God is supreme over all human law, and that the authority of the Christian Church on earth is independent of all civil government. And in this I shall appeal to the multitudes of upright Christian hearts in these three kingdoms, who, though they be separated from us by, I am sorry to say, many points of faith, by more, I fear, than points, by many wide distances, which I would fain see closed up, nevertheless do openly, manfully, and justly defend the liberty of the truth and of the Church of God in the sense in which they understand it.

This sovereignty I cannot better explain than in these two sentences—It is the dependence of the Head of the Church upon God alone; and his consequent independence of any human authority. These two sentences include the whole subject. Now, we often hear it said, and I have heard it said within these last days, that "in the beginning the Head of the Church, or the Bishop of Rome, as men call him, had no temporal power. Why should he have now what he had not then?" Secondly, they say, "He was subject to the Roman Emperors then; why can he not be subject to any civil power now?" Thirdly, they ask, "If it had been the will of God to give him a sovereignty of his own, He would have done so; but, if He did, as you affirm, then He has taken it away." Now, these are three common objections. There is a fourth, indeed, which I may mention in passing only to dismiss it. They say, "If the temporal power be essential to the spiritual, how was it that for so many centuries the Popes exercised their spiritual power without it?" Now it must be confessed that we are a little weary of hearing these objections, for this is about the eighteenth year that, both by speaking and by writing, we have repeated over and over again in words as express as we could find, that the temporal power is not necessary to the spiritual power, because the spiritual power stands by its own strength as God has planted it. For centuries it exercised its full sway and authority before, as yet, it was clothed with any temporal prerogative. The temporal power is necessary, not to the spiritual power in itself, but to the free, independent, and peaceful exercise of that spiritual power which had been, nevertheless, fully

exercised for many hundred years through persecution and martyrdom, imprisonment and bonds. I hope, then, that this will clear away, once for all, an error which, with an extraordinary tenacity, seems to cleave to the minds of men, as if they could not apprehend the proposition that the temporal power is not necessary to the spiritual, but is necessary to the free, independent, and peaceful exercise of that spiritual power: or, in other words, the spiritual power of the Church can be exercised in two ways—in the fires of persecution if need be, and in the peace of the Church if it may. In order to make this subject clear, let us distinguish the three periods in which the head of the Christian Church has exercised his office.

The first period was one of persecution; the second period was one of liberation from all civil sovereignty, at first partial, and finally complete; the third period was one in which the Pontiff was, first, partially invested with temporal power, and, finally, completely invested with the sovereignty which for a thousand years he possessed until the other day.

1. Now, of the first period. In the first three hundred years there were thirty Roman pontiffs, of whom it is said in history that nine-and-twenty died by martyrdom, that is, they exercised their supreme power in Rome, in the face of a pagan Empire, and with inflexible fortitude they laid down their lives in succession for a testimony of the Faith. Throughout the whole of that time they wielded the full and complete primacy of S. Peter in all its spiritual prerogatives of faith and jurisdiction over the whole flock on earth. Every part and particle of that primacy is exercised by Pius IX. at this day. People ask, "Why

was there at that time no vestige of temporal power?" For this reason, there was then no Christian world. There was only a pagan world; and in that pagan world all that they could do was to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to suffer for it. In the midst of the heathen empire of Rome the Christians obeyed in all lawful things, and the head of the Church himself never contested any point whatsoever of the public law except in that which was contrary to the law of God. Why, then, were they martyred? They were called upon to sacrifice to the heathen gods, and they refused. They were called upon to burn incense upon the altar of an idol, and they refused. For this they were tortured, or they were cast into the Tiber. By the Imperial law no society could exist except a society incorporated by the laws of the Empire. Now, the Christian Church is a perfect society complete in itself, incorporated by its Divine Head. It existed in the heart of that heathen empire in despite of all prohibitory law. It broke through the Imperial law by the very fact of its existence. It was an illicit society. Secondly, by the Imperial law it was forbidden that any religion, or any worship, should be practised except the religions and the worships recognised by the Imperial authority. The worship of every heathen deity, and of every nation that Rome had conquered—these were all recognised by the Roman law; there was but one worship forbidden, one worship not known to the law, and that was the worship of the only true God. The Christians, therefore, practised what was called an illicit religion, in spite of the law, in defiance of the law, and laid down their lives for disobedience to the Imperial will. Thirdly, the Imperial

law forbade that any society, even if the society were lawful, should possess property or goods without the sanction or faculty of the Imperial law. The faithful sold their lands and houses and laid the price of them at the Apostles' feet. The Apostles possessed the property, which was devoted to the service of the Church, and held it by a higher right than that of any Imperial law, that is, by a Divine right; for that which was given to the Church was given to God and belonged to it by this higher title and by a more indefeasible possession than that of any human law. We find, therefore, that this spiritual authority of the Church from the beginning was exercised in its full extent during the times of persecution, and in the face of the prohibitions of the Imperial law, and of the hostile might of the Empire. This, then, was the first period. It may be said, "There is no sign of temporal power thus far." Certainly not. What temporal power could the head of the Christian Church exercise in a world which did not believe the Incarnation of Jesus Christ? What temporal power could exist in a period when the world did not believe even in the spiritual power of the Church itself? Surely they who make this objection must be hard driven.

2. The Church then entered into a second period—the period in which the head of the Church was liberated from all subjection or obedience to any civil authority. The Roman Empire, which had spread itself far into the East, had Byzantium—the modern Constantinople—as its second chief seat of Imperial power. The Empire was divided in its administration, so that there were two Emperors in one Empire. The Empire of Rome had a Western and an Eastern

division—and there were two Emperors reigning at one and the same time as colleagues together in one Imperial authority, as two Consuls had governed the Republic of Rome before.

Constantine became Christian while his colleague, Licinius, was still pagan. Maxentius, at the head of a powerful heathen army, barred the way to Rome. Constantine, with his legions, which were full of Christian soldiers, obtained a complete and final victory over the pagan armies of the West. The effect of that victory was decisive. Within a year, he and his colleague, Licinius, united in the decree of Milan, to the effect that the profession and practice of the Christian Faith was free throughout the Empire. From that day Constantine began to legislate in favor of Christianity. First of all, he liberated all bishops, priests, and ecclesiastical persons from civil and military service. Secondly, he exempted them from the payment of the civil taxes. Thirdly, he confirmed the judicial power of the bishops, who had already exercised the office of judges from the earliest times. Once more, he gave to them the power of manumitting or enfranchising slaves. Further, he began to build Christian churches. He then appointed priests to go with the army, and gave them a tent for Divine worship. Beyond this, again, he made laws for the observance of the Sunday, and many other practices of the Christian religion became laws of the Empire. While this was going on in the West, Licinius, still pagan, in the East, became jealous and fearful lest the authority of Constantine should overbalance his own. He therefore began to persecute the Christians, and to remove them from all offices in

the State or about his own person. This ended in a war which may be called distinctly a war of Christians against pagans; in which Constantine completely destroyed the army of Licinius, and Licinius was slain. The effect of this victory was the fall of paganism in the East. Constantine found himself in the city of Rome face to face with a Senate of which a great part was pagan still. The city of Byzantium was new and independent, so that he could fill it with a Christian Court. He made Byzantium Constantinople, giving to it his own name; he created there an Imperial city entirely Christian, with Christian laws, in the place of the old Rome. The Imperial law says that this was done by "the command" or inspiration of God. It was recognised to be an act so pregnant with meaning and with consequence that it could be ascribed to nothing but to a Divine Providence.

From the day when Constantine translated the seat of Empire from the Old Rome to the New, there never resided within the walls of Rome Emperor or King permanently exercising an authority over the Roman Pontiffs. There were delegates, and dukes, and representatives of Constantinople who were shadows of a distant authority; but the one sole, real, governing power from that day onwards, which preserved Rome again and again from destruction, was the unbroken line of the Roman Pontiffs. Let us take an example. S. Leo the Great twice over preserved the city of Rome from sack and ruin. When Attila, "the scourge of God," with his army, menaced Italy and Rome, S. Leo went out, and by his personal moral power prevailed over him and turned him back. Again, when Genseric, in like manner,

advanced against Rome, and Rome was in his grasp, S. Leo once more, by the majesty of his presence and by his Apostolic authority, prevailed on him to leave the Holy City untouched. It was not the Emperors of Constantinople, it was not the legions of the Empire that preserved Rome from the ravage of the hordes that came down upon Italy. The Heruli, the Goths, the Visigoths, the Huns, and the Lombards poured over Italy, and again and again surrounded Rome, and Rome was protected and saved from age to age, not by Constantinople, but by the Roman Pontiffs. During this time the authority of Constantinople over the Roman Pontiffs became so shadowy as to be imperceptible. Nevertheless, the Roman Pontiffs never rebelled, never assumed royalty; they followed the example of their Master, who, when He knew "that they were coming to take Him and make Him King, fled into the mountain alone;" they withdrew whenever power was offered to them; they never stretched out a hand to possess themselves of it. S. Leo wrote to the Emperor acknowledging him to be the Sovereign of the Empire. S. Gregory, in like manner, wrote to the Emperor Maurice acknowledging him to be the Emperor wielding the supreme civil power; but in that very letter in which he acknowledged him as such he censured the Imperial law. He told him that his law was at variance with the law of God; that is to say, in the very moment of acknowledging him as Emperor he declared the Imperial law to be null because it was contrary to the law of God. Thus far was a partial liberation from civil power, but there was a complete liberation yet to come.

I cannot better illustrate what I mean than by this

example. There was a time when Britain was a province of the Roman Empire, but when the last Roman legion left its shores Britain fell from the Roman Empire. From that day to this it has been independent. There was a time when the Kings of England claimed to be Kings over a large part of the North of France. Has the Crown of England, or does it claim to have at this day, a right over the North of France? What has extinguished the right of the Roman Empire over Britain? The extinction of the Roman Empire. And what extinguished the right of the Crown of England over the North of France? The extinction of the English power in the North of France. In like manner, the successive invasions of barbaric hordes, and, above all, the invasion of the Lombards, extinguished utterly and destroyed the last vestige of the Roman Empire in Italy: it was utterly swept away, it existed no longer. Where, thenceforward, was the subjection of the Roman Pontiff to an Emperor whose empire had ceased to be? Italy was left, from the Alps to the sea, without a civil master. There was no one to possess, no one to defend it, no one had a right to claim it as his own. There was no one able to exercise the office of protector over that which had once been the seat of empire. But, further, the barbarian hordes acquired no right by their invasion—they were aggressors and usurpers, and their conquest conferred no title of sovereignty; they were there, occupying provinces not their own, and they executed upon a corrupt empire the just sentence of God. The Roman Empire in Italy was extinguished by the judgment of God, and the throne of Rome was vacant by the visitation

of God. And when the last vestige of civil authority had perished, there remained in Rome one sole person, who had been Father, Pastor, Lawgiver, Protector, the Head of the People, to whom they turned as their supreme spiritual authority, around whom they had gathered in all their perils. The line of the Roman Pontiffs alone was left. The Providence of God thus liberated the Head of the Church completely and altogether from any civil authority whatsoever.

3 As S. Leo, in the fifth century, had twice preserved Rome from sack and ruin, so, in the eighth century, Pope Zachary twice preserved Rome from destruction at the hands of the Lombards. When the Greek Emperor Leo became a heretic and a persecutor, he conspired against the life of Pope Sergius. The people of Rome rallied round Sergius and protected him. They then renounced the last remnant of visionary authority and of theoretical submission which bound the Commonwealth of Rome to Constantinople. From that day onwards the Roman Pontiffs remained the sole and only governors of Rome. And in the years 790, and 799, when Rome was again threatened, first Pepin, and afterwards Charlemagne, was invited to come and protect Rome against the Lombards. With their armies they did so, and they were created Patricians, that is, defenders and protectors of Rome. Charlemagne was then consecrated Emperor.

By that act an Empire was created afresh in the West, but by what authority? By S. Leo III., by the Roman Pontiff. But he who confers authority is not a subject. He did not create a master or a sovereign ruler of Rome, but a protector and defender of

the city which had been preserved for centuries by his predecessors and by himself. It was on Christmas Day, in the year 800, that S. Leo III., in the Basilica of S. Peter, consecrated the first Emperor of the West, and from that day to the year 1870 the Roman Pontiffs continued in rightful possession of Rome, and of the supreme civil power over it, not by human donations, but by the Providence of God.

After England had ceased to be a Roman province, after the invasions of Angles, and Jutes, and Danes, and Saxons had rent the country with wars, and civil feuds, it at last grew up into a rightful monarchy, and from nearly the same date of 800, a thousand years ago, it has continued to be a monarchy never overthrown, never interrupted, except by its own transient intestine contentions; so, in like manner, the sovereignty of the Roman Pontiffs over Rome has continued to run down through the history of Christian Europe. They were assailed again and again by German Emperors, by Counts of the Marches, by factions in Rome, by invaders of every kind and name, for I do not say that their possession has been peaceful; on the contrary, it has been a perpetual warfare, but the line of their sovereignty has never been broken. I know not how many Pontiffs either never set their foot in Rome or were driven out of it; counting from the beginning it would be some five-and-forty. S. Gregory VII., whose name, as Hildebrand, is in the mouth of Englishmen, died in exile. Almost in our own day, Pius VI. died in exile. Pius VII. was carried away and was six years in captivity. Pius IX., in our own memory, was driven into exile, and yet in him was continued the line of

the sovereignty of Rome down to the year 1870, or rather is to this day.

Thus far, my object is only to lay a foundation for what I have to say hereafter. Therefore I will not enter into any points by anticipation. Let us fix our thoughts on this one fact, that the authority which God has given to the head of the Christian Church is made up of two elements. The one element is spiritual, which was *directly* given by our Divine Master Himself to his chief Apostle upon earth; the other is temporal, which was *indirectly* given by Divine Providence, and has been combined with the spiritual authority for a thousand years. We may affirm, therefore, that both come from Divine authority, the one directly and the other indirectly; and we may affirm more, I mean that the sovereignty of Pius IX., given indirectly by Divine Providence, is as full and complete in the devolution of its right as that of our own Sovereign who reigns over us, and that in the direct spiritual authority with which he is invested he exceeds immeasurably any temporal Sovereign that ever reigned on earth. He is equal to them all in the sovereignty given by Divine Providence. He exceeds them all by his spiritual authority of which the temporal sovereignty is but the earthly clothing. Nay, we may go further, and say that when the Christian world came into existence it could not be otherwise. I have already said that it was impossible that the head of the Christian Church should exercise temporal power over a pagan world. Surely the man that makes this objection must be unreasonable, and he also who asks why there was no temporal authority in the pagan world. It was because there was no man among the

pagans who believed that he was the Vicar of Jesus Christ; but when the world had once recognised in the person of the head of the Church on earth the Vicar of the Divine Head of the Church who reigns in Heaven, no man ventured to claim him as a subject. So long as the light of faith governed the nations of the Christian world, no man ever pretended to set up the claim of sovereignty over the head of the Christian Church. The relations in which Christian men and Christian princes stand to the Church, and to its head, rendered such a claim impossible. We shall hereafter have reason to enter into this more fully. It is enough for our purpose at this moment to have drawn out the three periods of which I have spoken: the period of persecution in the pagan world, which gives us no principles, and lays down no precedents for our present subject; the second period, during which there was a progressive liberation of the Head of the Church from civil authority; and the period in which there was a progressive formation of a true sovereignty vested in the person of the Roman Pontiff. From that day to this, for a thousand years, such has been the condition of Christian Europe. Surely in the Christian world it could not be otherwise; and if the Christian world is still to continue, so it will be; and what is happening now is but one more of those manifold transient perturbations which have come through the period of these thousand years, driving into exile or imprisoning the Pontiffs, or even worse, and usurping the rightful sovereignty of Rome. And as they have passed so will this, unless the political order of the Christian world itself has passed away.

The mission of the Apostles united all nations into one family, so that all national distinctions should be lost in the supernatural unity of the Faith. All nationalities were merged, in so far as faith and religion, in the spiritual jurisdiction of the one Church. All nations were joined together in a fraternal unity under one Chief Head, the common Father, and Teacher, and Pastor of all—the Vicar of Jesus Christ. National Churches did not exist. The separate existence of National Churches, established by law, is a theory and a practice three hundred years old.

S. Paul foretells that, before the end, there shall be a revolt, or *discessio*, as the word is; and that departure would seem to be not only of individuals, one by one, but of nations; that is to say, that the world-wide foundation of the Apostles on which the nations were consolidated together in one universal society, shall be dissolved, disintegrated, and broken up. What do we see at this moment? Nation after nation has withdrawn itself from the Vicar of Jesus Christ. We see too not only the non-Catholic nations, but the nations of which the great multitude, though not the Governments, are still Catholic, hiding their faces from the head of the Church, and consenting together in an international diplomacy, which deprives him of the providential sovereignty and temporal power on which his independence and his liberty depend. Rome is said now to be an Italian question; the nations now seem to be united at least in a tacit connivance and in closing round about the See of Peter, and consenting that the successor of Peter shall be a Sovereign no longer. If this shall last, if this be permanent, then the political order of the Christian

world will be dissolved. But I do not believe the order of the Christian world to be dissolved. I believe that the period of revolution, which began at the end of the last century in reaction from the despotisms that went before it, has, for a time, submerged and carried away the Christian order of Europe; but it will not be for ever. If it were for ever, then I know of nothing to describe that state, except the words, "We have no King but Cæsar," and "we will not have this man to reign over us." These words were spoken in the rejection of Jesus Himself, and they are now, by implication, spoken of His Vicar upon earth. This, then, is our first point, that the sovereignty of the head of the Church is one which God Himself has created. Pius IX. does not heed it as the possession of territories, or cities, or revenues, much less of royal titles; but he cherishes it, and he knows its full price, as we have seen in his own words, because it is the providential condition for the full exercise, and peaceful liberty, and rightful independence of the supreme spiritual authority committed to him as the Pastor of the whole flock of Jesus Christ on earth.

II.

THE TEMPORAL SOVEREIGNTY, A PROVISION FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SPIRITUAL POWER.

I HAVE hitherto affirmed that the office committed by our Divine Saviour to the head of His Church was a spiritual Primacy, containing a supreme jurisdiction over the whole Church on earth, and that this

supreme spiritual jurisdiction in due time was liberated from the dominion of all civil powers. After passing through 300 years of persecution, after being exercised with a heroic constancy even unto death, it was set free from the dominion of any civil superior, first partially, next altogether. The Head of the Christian Church was then invested, first partially, and next altogether, with a true and proper sovereignty, over the city of Rome. This is the sum of what has been hitherto said. Now, I know well that, in making these assertions, I shall seem to many who are not of the unity of the Catholic Church to be speaking parables; nay, more than this, to be reciting fables.

For three hundred years Englishmen have been born into a state of unconsciousness; nay, more, of conscious unbelief, if not into a state of hostile and perpetual controversy against these truths. Therefore, I am well aware that in affirming these things many will say to themselves, "Surely this cannot be proved by history: this must be a mere imagination and the like." For that reason, before I proceed further, I will refer the reader to some works that are within the reach of all. I will not refer you to any Catholic writer: if I were, it might at once raise a suspicion that the work was biassed, and that it could not be trusted. If anyone desires to consult a Catholic writer, let him read the work of Orsi on the sovereignty of the Pontiff; or, I would refer him to the writings of the present Bishop of Orleans, which have been translated into English. But I will select rather two other works, which may be said not to be the works of Catholics.

The first would be the pernicious and virulent pages of Gibbon, who became an infidel and a bitter enemy, not of the Catholic Church alone, but of Christianity. In "The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," the facts and the premises that I have used, and all that I require for the proof of my assertion, may be found.

Speaking of Rome, and the Romans in the eighth century, when, as he says, the sovereignty of the Greek Emperors was extinguished, Gibbon adds: "The want of laws could only be supplied by the influence of religion, and their foreign and domestic counsels were moderated by the authority of the bishop. His alms, his sermons, his correspondence with the kings and prelates of the West, his recent services, their gratitude and oath, accustomed the Romans to consider him as the first magistrate, or Prince of the city. The Christian humility of the Pope was not offended by the name of *Dominus*, or Lord; and their face and inscription are still apparent on the most ancient coins. Their Temporal Dominion is now confirmed by the reverence of a thousand years, and their noblest title is the free choice of a people whom they had redeemed from slavery."—Gibbon, &c., vol. vi., pp. 151, 152. Murray, 1862.

Secondly, I will refer to a work, of which I must say that it is both learned and accurate, written by one who spent two-thirds of his long life in the faithful service of the Church, and for whom I heartily pray that he may not end that long life in the midst of the degradations of the "Old Catholic" heresy—I mean Professor Döllinger, of Munich, a man of whom, as a philosopher and a theologian, we cannot speak with

high commendation, but of whom, as an historian, I am bound to bear the testimony that he was both learned and accurate. In his "Ecclesiastical History" will be found every assertion that I have made, if not contained textually, at least in the premises upon which I have rested.

Professor Döllinger says: "By their (the Byzantine Emperors) perfect inability to guard them (the Romans), and to protect them against the attacks of the Lombards, they had forfeited their claims to those provinces; and over Rome and the Roman Dukedom, the sovereignty of the Pope had been established during the course of the eighth century . . . . The imperial supremacy (of Charlemagne) was naturally extended over the States of the Church, but without any trespass on the authority of the Pontiff. The Pope continued to be what he had been, Lord of Rome, and of the Dukedom, &c. . . . . The Pope was not, therefore, subject to the Emperor; the Romans, indeed, swore to him an oath of fidelity, but they pledged themselves with an express reservation of the fidelity due by them to the Roman Pontiff, their Sovereign." — Döllinger, "History of the Church," vol. iii., pp. 118, 119; see Appendix, 894.

We will now go onward with our subject. The result of what I said in the last chapter is this, that for 1,000 years, dating from the year 800, the time of S. Leo III. and the creation of the Western Empire in Charlemagne, the Pontiffs have held a true and proper civil sovereignty over the city of Rome, interrupted, harassed, as, indeed, as they have been in its exercise, driven to and fro, for forty years at Avignon, for thirty years moving from city to city. All this I

know, all of this strengthens what I have asserted—namely, that this sovereignty has received into itself all that the power of the world could do against it, and has survived all assaults, and has again and again restored itself, in spite of all that human power could do.

And from this may be drawn these three conclusions:—First, that this sovereignty is an extra-national sovereignty. It is not national, it has a nature, entirely exceptional and distinct from all other sovereignties. The Head of the religion of many nations cannot be under the civil sovereignty of any nation. If he were, all other nations save that one would justly stand in an attitude of suspicion and jealousy, knowing that so vast a power over the consciences and souls of men, if it were in any degree biassed, or under the influence of the temporal sovereignty of any nation, might become to all others a dangerous element of domestic strife and of hostile designs. The Providence of God, therefore, for the unity of the Christian Church, and for the peace of the Christian world, has ordained that the head of the Christian Church, who is the Head of the religion of all nations, should be the subject of no nation, should be, that is, exceptional and extra-national, and, if extra-national, therefore independent, and if independent, Sovereign, for between independence and sovereignty there can be drawn no line. Secondly, that this sovereignty is supernational, that is, above all nationalities; it has nothing to do with nationalities as such. If it had nationality in it, nationality would be a stain, and a taint, and a disease. National Churches and national religions were abolished when the national religion of Judaism was

extinguished; and the revival of nationalism in churches or in religions under the faith and unity of Jesus Christ is the source of heresy and schism. Lastly, though it is not national, it is international in the highest and purest sense of the word; that is, it inter-penetrates into every nation and it belongs to every nation so that all nations are bound together by it, for all nations have a share it, because it is the bond of union which passes through the national life of every Catholic people in the world. I will only say in passing, if it is not national, and if it is in this sense universal, it cannot be Italian. We will now take up what I broke off in the last chapter. My last assertion was this—so long as the Christian world exists, the Head of the Christian Church will be independent of all civil power, and if ever the time shall come when any civil power shall claim him as a subject, and the other powers of the world shall look on, and, even by their silence, countenance that extravagant claim, the political order of the Christian world will be dissolved.

To explain this I will quote again what I have often quoted before, for I hardly know in what words this wide subject could be better condensed than in a passage of a great Spanish writer of our time. Donoso Cortez says in one of his works:—"The history of civilisation is the history of Christianity; in writing the one you write the other. The history of Christianity is the history of the Christian Church; the history of the Christian Church is the history of the Pontiffs, for they have been the creators, the legislators, and the sustainers of the Christian world." I believe these propositions may be justified by the most

ample and abundant historical proof. I will endeavour to trace, at least, the outline of that proof.

1. And, first, what was the germ of the Christian civilisation of which we are a part? It was Christian Rome and what were called the patrimonies of the Church. Does anyone imagine that the Christian civilisation of Europe is the civilisation of the Roman Empire? The civilisation of the Roman Empire was pagan, corrupt to its roots, prolific in corruption—public, private, social, domestic, personal—to such an extent that Rome did not perish more by the fire and sword of barbarian hordes than by the deadly dissolving virus of its own internal rottenness. The pagan civilisation of Rome was entirely swept away, and if it had not died by the law of its own dissolution—for that which is rank and rotten in itself cannot subsist—it would have been swept away by the invasion of horde after horde, race after race of the subject nations over whom the Roman Empire had exercised its iron sway. They came up in the hour of its weakness and wreaked their vengeance upon it. Its civilisation was utterly wrecked. But this is not the civilisation of which we are the offspring. The Christian civilisation was created first of all, and above all, by the Christian faith, by the Christian law, and by the Sacrament of Christian Marriage, by the unity and indissolubility of the domestic life of man, by Christian education, perpetuated with Christian faith, and law, and Christian marriage from generation to generation. This is the root of the Christian civilisation of Europe. The authors of this civilisation were the Apostles, and, above all, their Head. And where did that Christian civilisation first find its maturity? It was

found in Rome, where the head of the Christian Church planted his See, in the city which was the Head of the nations of the world. There round about the See of Peter were gathered, as time went on, the extending patrimonies of the Church. The word patrimony was used to show that it was an inheritance, not a kingdom or an empire acquired by conquest, but a gift of God to the Christian family, to be held and handed on as an heirloom.

Between the conversion of Constantine and the time of St. Gregory the Great, or about the year 600, the Roman Pontiffs held twenty-three patrimonies. They possessed Rome and the country round about it; they possessed also many districts of Northern and Central Italy, including Ravenna, parts of the South of Italy, the coasts of the Mediterranean, including Genoa; parts of the South of France, the coasts of the Adriatic, Sardinia, Sicily, and parts of the North of Africa: these portions of the old Roman Empire, abandoned, as Britain was abandoned, fell under the sole tutelage of the Roman Pontiffs, who exercised a civilising influence, while, at the same time, they Christianised the populations who inhabited those lands. In this way were gradually laid the seeds of the Christian civilisation which spread afterwards throughout Europe. This was the first Christian civilisation in existence. I will not attempt even to sketch the subject; but I would only once more recall your thoughts to what must have been the effect upon the state of men of the Sacrament of Christian Marriage, and of the indissoluble bond of the domestic life with all the sanctities and purities founded upon that sacrament of grace; how a whole population, accepting

that one law of faith, and holding it sacred, at once rose from the corruptions of paganism to the level of the Christian life. Slavery was steadily abolished; wheresoever the Pontiffs were able they immediately manumitted slaves. And Christian households at once arose among the most outcast populations of the world. It was this leaven in the meal, working from Rome as its centre, that afterwards spread itself throughout Christian Europe.

When this Christian civilisation, which already fully existed within the walls of Rome, was spreading through the twenty-three patrimonies of the Church, where was the Christian Europe of to-day? In the time of S. Gregory I., England, which once had been Christian, had become Pagan again. The Saxons had extinguished our Christianity. Gaul, which had not even the name of France, was rent and torn by perpetual wars of races. Portions of it, indeed, were Christian, but there was no Christian France. Germany was heathen. The Scandinavian races were heathen. Russia had not even a name upon the map; it was a far east unknown, barbarous, and pagan. Prussia, even to the thirteenth century, was heathen. Hungary was heathen till the tenth century. Spain was overrun by Goths, who were partly heathen and partly Arian. Where was Christian Europe then? It had no existence. Marshes, and forests, and paganism, and warfare overspread the face of that which we now call Christian Europe. Nevertheless at that time a ripe and a mature civilisation existed in Rome and in the patrimonies of the Church. Perhaps the earliest of all Christian states sprang up in the little commonwealth of Venice. The next was the great

Frankish Empire, which was consecrated by S. Leo III., and which in time parted itself asunder into Germany and France. England was recovered by the missionaries sent by S. Gregory the Great, and became Christian England. Spain was recovered from the Arianism of the Goths, and became Christian and Catholic Spain. But all these were subsequent. And from what source came the influence that wrought this change? Where was the meal and where was the leaven? The whole face of Europe was the unleavened mass. It was the Christian civilisation of the Roman Pontiffs which spread throughout it and created the Christian Europe of to-day.

3. But to go on; it is evident, thirdly, that what they created they sustained. It stands to common sense, that if the Christian faith and the Christian law created the Christian civilisation of Europe, they who maintained and spread the Christian faith and the Christian law, with inflexible constancy, I mean the Roman Pontiffs, the head of the Christian Church, have sustained that civilisation. I will here mention only one fact, which proves that the existence of Christian civilisation has been saved by the Roman Pontiffs: and I will, again, quote not our own writers, lest any should suspect the evidence. There is a book, written by a clergyman of the Church of England more than fifty years ago, called "Mahometanism Unveiled." That book, I am sorry to say, is disfigured by what I must call the childish interpretations of prophecy, especially of the Book of Daniel and of the Apocalypse, in a controversial sense. Certainly the book itself is a witness beyond suspicion. What does he say? Tracing the rise and career of

Mahometanism, he points out this undeniable fact, that all the Oriental Churches which fell into heresy, the Nestorian, the Eutychian, the Monothelite, and the Monophysite, and all the Patriarchates in the East, which separated themselves with the Greek schism—that is, Jerusalem, Antioch, in Alexandria and Constantinople—all these Churches were swept and scourged by Mahometanism. Mahometanism came in and conquered, irresistibly, in every place, till, finally, in Constantinople, the Crescent was raised upon S. Sophia, and all the Churches of that Christian city, which had been once filled by the voices of S. John Chrysostom, and S. Basil, and S. Gregory, became mosques of the Mahometan worship. The author says that Mahometanism was the scourge of God upon their superstition. Be it so. I will not enter into the question now. They were both heretical and schismatical, and every one of them being in separation from that which sustains the Christian world—I mean the See of Peter, the Head and Centre of the Christian Church—were, all alike, submerged, and are to this day submerged, by the Mahometan power.

But the same writer goes on to say more than this, and it is to that point I would call special attention. He says, whensoever the Mahometan power, even in the plenitude of its strength, came into conflict with Catholic Christendom, it was hurled back in defeat.[1]

[1] "The threefold warfare carried on by Mahometanism against idolatry, Judaism, and heretical Christianity." . . . . "Heretical Asia was swallowed up as in a moment by the Unitarian deluge, bu Catholic Europe, safe under the shadow of her golden candlestick, sustained the Moslem storm uninjured and unmoved." . . . . "It swept, without a pause, along the continent of Africa: laid in ruins its altars, long polluted by the schism of the Donatists, and by the Vandal heretics, and crossed impetuously these confines

Again and again it strove to enter into Catholic lands; for awhile it penetrated, and, at times, it menaced the entire coasts of the Mediterranean, but it was invariably thrown back as from a rock. And he has the honesty to say, history must acknowledge that the unanimity of the Christian nations was the work of the Popes of Rome. When the Mahometan power threatened Vienna, again and again it was conquered by the Catholic armies. We record these victories every year in an act of thanksgiving. When the Mahometans penetrated into Spain, and, through Spain, even into the heart of France, they were routed and driven back in confusion by the armies of the Catholic unity. They were at last utterly driven from Spain. When the fleets of the Mahometan power, which had harassed all seas, at last concentrated their strength in the Gulf of Lepanto, it was Pius V. who called together the navies of the Christian powers, and, by the final crush of the maritime ascendancy of the Turks, liberated, from that day to this, the whole Catholic world from all terror of the Mahometan name. This is the testimony of a man who has no good will to speak a word in favour of the subject for which I am pleading now.

4. Fourthly, this must be added, that it has been in the city of Rome, and in the sacred sovereignty of Rome, that God in His Providence has manifested to the world the true idea of Christian monarchy. The true idea of Christian monarchy is not the absolute power of pagan Cæsars; it is not the Emperor and

to overwhelm Arian Spain. But from the adamantine frontier of Catholic Europe it receded as from a rock."—Foster's "Mahometanism Unveiled," vol. i., pp. 84, 85, and vol. ii., p. 248. London, 1829.

the Pontifex Maximus in one person; it is not supreme power in all things civil and spiritual in one hand. That was the despotism which had degraded the soul of man before Christianity came with all its liberties. The same despotism has been in part revived again under the form of royal supremacies, which are the faint and feeble imitation of Cæsarism in the attempt to unite again in the hand of one and the same person all power, civil and ecclesiastical. There is one, indeed, who is both Priest and King, but he is at the right hand of God. All priesthood and all royalty belongs to Jesus Christ our Lord; and He has ordained that His priesthood on earth, in all its supremacy, shall be vested in His Vicar, who personally represents Him. He has ordained also in His Providence that Kings shall bear rule in the natural and civil order: but that the royalty which belongs to the natural and civil order shall be exercised by civil rulers subject to His law. He has invested His Vicar upon earth alone with the reflection of the twofold power which he possesses Himself. He invested him, whom He created to be the Supreme head of His Church, with all spiritual jurisdiction, and in due time with a sovereign power in civil things, so as to make him independent of all civil superiors.

And, therefore, in Rome for a thousand years the Pontiff has been the ruler over the city where he dwells, and the legislator in things that belong to this world. If He committed to him the supreme authority in spiritual things, is it a great thing that He should also commit to him the supreme authority in temporal things? Is the man who is capable of supreme spiritual legislation and judicial power over the

whole world incompetent to make laws, or to execute laws, for the lower welfare of this world? The world, in its mind and its judgment, in this is turned upside down. A man that is competent to legislate in civil and temporal things may indeed be incompetent to legislate and to govern in spiritual things; but any man who has not only the commission, but the adequate knowledge and skill to execute that which is the highest office upon earth—I mean the spiritual office, thereby, as the greater contains the less—is surely competent to legislate also in matters of a lower nature.

The sovereignty wherewith the Vicar of our Lord was clothed was for this purpose, that those two powers might be united in one independent person, in one place, that they might be divided throughout the world in all other places; that throughout the world the civil ruler might be full and perfect in his own sphere, and the spiritual power free and independent of his authority in all spiritual things; that in all things belonging to the faith, the conscience, and the salvation of man, no civil power in the world should have right to cast so much as a shadow over men. Our Divine Lord liberated the souls and the consciences of men from all temporal rulers in all things belonging to faith and to salvation, and thereby limited the exercise of civil power, and drew a circumference round about all temporal dominion beyond which civil rulers should have no sovereignty. He forbade that any civil ruler whatsoever should enter into the domain of spiritual things. These two powers, then, throughout the world are divided; and from this division has come the limitation of absolute

civil power and the creation of the temperate rule of Christian monarchy. It has curbed also the license which breaks out into rebellion, and has created those fruitful and temperate liberties of which the Church, and the Church alone, is the mother—"The Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our Mother." All the liberties of man, personal, domestic, spiritual, and civil, all flow from one source—the Precious Blood of Jesus Christ; and the Church, therefore, is the Guardian and the Protector of all true freedom.

5. Lastly, the only other point upon which I would touch is this. In every arch there must be a key-stone; and if that key-stone be struck out no arch can stand. In Christian Europe the key-stone has been that power by which it was created, and by which it is sustained. Strike out that key-stone and it would be by miracle alone if the arch could stand. Again and again that key-stone has been struck out for a moment, but the Providence of God has always restored it. And yet never in the history of Christian Europe, since the year 800, has the sovereignty of Rome been violated by force, but throughout the whole of Christian Europe there has been spread a perturbation which has only been redressed through sanguinary wars. The tranquillity and the order of Europe has never returned until that key-stone has been dropped once more into its place.

I need not go back into mediæval history, I may refer to the time not only of our forefathers, but of men who are living now. In the year 1796 the first Napoleon carried away Pius VI., and in 1809 he carried away Pius VII., and from 1796 to 1815 Europe waded through blood to rescue itself from the

disorders of an infidel revolution, and from the miseries of imperial wars, in which millions of men perished. When the flood subsided, and the ancient landmarks reappeared, in that moment the Vicar of Christ was restored to his See.

May God in His mercy avert such a future from Christian Europe now. But I must affirm my profound belief that never will Europe return from the watch and ward of an armed camp in which it is seen to-day, with some ten millions of men ready to destroy each other, until it has recognised the supremacy of the moral order over material power. And in the day in which the supremacy of that moral power is recognised, the Vicar of Jesus Christ will sit once more upon the pacific throne from which he and his predecessors have created and sustained the Christian civilisation of the world.

When Jerusalem was destroyed, and the Christian Church was spread into all the nations of the world, the imperial city of the Gentiles was providentially chosen to be the Jerusalem of the New Law. It was in that new Jerusalem—the shadow upon earth of the Jerusalem above—that the See of Peter was planted, and the See of Peter is the source of all spiritual jurisdiction to govern the Christian nations of the world. From that See of Peter has gone forth in all ages the steadfast light of the immutable truth; in that one See has been preserved without change or diminution the fulness of the Revelation of the Day of Pentecost. It is, therefore, the mother of all Churches; and for that cause it is also the mother of all nations. It was from Rome that S. Augustine came to England, from Rome that S. Patrick went to

Ireland, from Rome that S. Methodius went to Slavonia, from Rome that S. Boniface went to Germany. Rome is the mother of all Churches, either by foundation, or if here be in the East Churches founded by other missionaries, all Churches in Catholic unity are daughters by adoption, and Rome is the mother of all. But Rome is the mother, also, of the Christian nations, for it is the Christian peoples which have created the national unities, and all national civilisation has been the offspring of Christianity. It is not the world, or its statesmen, or its philosophers, or its legislators; it is the fishermen of Galilee, and the Christian Faith, and the Christian Church, that have not only converted mankind, but have civilised the world.

Christian Rome itself was the creation of the Bishops of Rome. Men talk as if the City of Rome were the City of the Cæsars. Do they believe that when they walk up and down the Corso, they are walking up and down the street of the Imperial Rome? I hardly think any educated man has so little history as to imagine that the Rome of to-day is the Rome of the Cæsars. The Rome of the Cæsars has again and again been wrecked to the ground. S. Gregory the Great said, after the invasion of the Lombards, "After the men were dead, the walls fell down." There is a Rome threefold deep under the present Rome—Rome upon Rome, Rome destroyed, Rome rebuilt, Rome destroyed again, and rebuilt once more. The Pontiffs may be said to have rebuilt it twice. In the time of Belisarius, Rome was so wrecked, that for eight days there was not a breathing inhabitant in it; the foxes ran over the Aventine

Hill, and the whole of Rome was a desolation. Rome rose again, under the tutelage and fostering care of its Bishops. For there was left no other authority that cared to stir a finger for its rebuilding. Rome has been rebuilt from its foundation, and surrounded again by walls by the Pontiffs, and by them alone. The basilicas were the work of the Pontiffs. The churches, of which there are more than 300 in Rome, were raised either by the Pontiffs or by the Christian nations of the world. Many nations built each for themselves a church in Rome. Who enriched Rome with all manner of gifts from the East and from the West? The Christian princes and the Christian nations of the world. Rome has been the great treasure-house of Christian piety and devotion. The whole of Christendom has offered up to the service of Almighty God in the chief sanctuary of the world all its most precious gifts in memorial of its fidelity. And round about all these works, which were not raised by an Italian monarchy, nor by an Italian revolution, the Pontiffs created all the institutes of charity, all the homes of learning, all the religious Orders, all the missionary colleges, all the spiritual resources of power and action, whereby in every age Rome has wrought upon the face of the earth for the salvation and civilisation of men. Therefore, let no man lay claim to Rome but the Pontiff and his successors, for no man has a right to that which he has neither created nor made his own either by lawful acquisition, or by gift.

Rome stood and stands to this day as a witness and rebuke to many a Christian Government. If there were on the face of the earth a representative of the

commonwealth of Israel, if there were to be found a city in which the inequality of classes hardly existed, where men with the freedom of manhood bore to each other a respectful carriage without either rudeness or servility, it was in the city of Rome. And there were almost no gradations created by the social tradition of class and class; there were, it may be, a few titled families indeed, but the mass of the people were all upon one footing; there were none of the galling inequalities of wealth and poverty, which are at this time the great peril of our English commonwealth. There was one law for the rich and for the poor; the Sovereign was a man who was elected; and there was not a poor peasant's boy born in Rome, nay, born throughout the Catholic unity, who might not be elected to be Vicar of Jesus Christ. There never existed on the face of the earth any approach to the commonwealth of Israel so near as the sovereignty of Rome. I believe this to be the reason why there is nothing on the face of the earth against which the anti-Christian revolution has a greater animosity, for there is nothing that is in more perfect antagonism to it. More than this, it is a Government which was just in all its exercise. It may ask, in the words of the faithful Judge of Israel, "If I have wronged any man, if I have oppressed any man." (1 Kings xii. 3.) Has it taken a shoe's latchet from any nation on the face of the earth, or from any one of its subjects? Has it acquired a territory by a war of conquest, or by usurpation? Its hands are pure from these things. It has been a peaceful sovereignty, always suffering, always weak, always under the blows and the scorn of the world, subsisting always, not by its military power,

but by the Divine Life that is in it, and by the Divine Providence that has encompassed it.

I may therefore sum up the whole argument in these few words: Rome belongs to the Pontiffs because the Providence of God gave that city to them. Rome belongs to all Catholic nations, and it is the head of the whole Catholic world. Rome is their home; and when they are within its walls, they are not in a foreign land. Rome belongs not to a nation, not to Italy, not to the Italian revolution, but to the whole of Christendom. And it is the duty of Christendom to protect that which is the heirloom of the Christian Church, especially in this time of peril. It will surely end in triumph; but when I know not. We may go to our graves, but those who come after us will see it. Rome belongs also to the Pontiffs because it belongs to our Divine Master. It is the City of the Word Incarnate, pervaded from end to end, throughout the circuit of its walls, with the presence of our Divine Lord in the Mystery of the Holy Eucharist. In those 300 churches, whose doors were open every day, and all day long, there was the witness of the Divine Presence. Whensoever a Catholic set his foot within those walls he felt himself at once within a sanctuary. And when those who were Christian, but not Catholic (and I have known many such) have entered Rome, they have said to me, "I never yet entered any place that exercised over me so great a fascination, or in which I have felt a sense of such attraction as I have here." It is not hard to say why. Rome was, until the other day, the most Christian city in the world. Therefore all Christian instincts turned to it, and, therefore, all the enmity of the

anti-Christian revolution turned against it. It was what our sanctuaries are after the sacred rites are over; the sweetness of the incense still hangs in the air. There was a fragrance throughout Rome which came from the presence of our Divine Lord, its true Sovereign. Those who had faith to believe it, like Thomas, openly said, "My Lord and my God;" and those who had not faith to interpret it, nevertheless acknowledged their consciousness of a power they could not understand. This, then, is the sovereignty, the violation of which I have to describe hereafter. There was never a sovereignty in the world that was so strong in its right, strong in every human right—by possession, by tradition, by prescription, by the recognition of the world. There was never any sovereignty in the world so strong in Divine right. The Providence of God has declared over and over again in most emphatic and almost audible voices that Rome has been given to the head of the Christian Church, and therefore to Christendom at large. But there was never a sovereignty so weak in armaments and in military power; and, therefore, it has always been, as it was six years ago, the prey of the spoiler.

III.

THE VIOLATION OF THE PROVIDENTIAL ORDER OF THE CHRISTIAN WORLD.

I HAVE thus far endeavoured to make clear that the present order of Christendom, whereby the Head of the Church on earth has been liberated from all civil sovereignty whatsoever, and has been invested with a

civil sovereignty of his own, is an ordinance of God. Some one may ask perhaps "If it be an ordinance of God, how is it that it is now under the power of men?" My answer would be this—Our Divine Lord was delivered into the power of men; and in that hour He declared, "Thou shouldst have no power against me except it were given thee from above;" that is, it was a Divine permission for some end not yet revealed, it was a step ordained in the progress and unfolding of the wisdom and the will of God. So now in His Church.

The subject we have to examine is the violation of that Divine order of the Christian world. Before we do this it is of absolute necessity that we should recall to mind the conclusions of the last chapter. We have, I think, seen reason enough to believe that by a distinct Divine Providence, and that for the last thousand years, the head of the Church has been free, independent, and sovereign in the city of Rome, and that his independence is the condition and provision made for the free exercise of his spiritual authority. Do not let anybody be misled by the notion that the importance of this sovereignty is to be estimated by revenues, or titles, or possession of any earthly thing. It is a means to an end, and that end is the free exercise of spiritual authority; the sovereignty of the head of the Church is the means to that end. I also showed that this ordinance or Divine provision is sacred, that is consecrated to the Divine Head of the Church; that it has also become a possession confirmed by every human right, by the long prescription and by an actual possession of a thousand years. Every right, therefore, human and Divine, meets in the sovereignty ex-

ercised, until the other day, by Pius IX. I further showed that this ordinance of God was not only for the sake of the head of the Church, but of the whole Church; that it was a provision for the liberty, the independence, and the protection of the conscience and of the faith of all men: and that all nations have a share, a right, and an inheritance in the possession of Christian Rome, where the See of Peter has been providentially founded. Such, then, is the outline of the last chapter.

Our present subject is the violation of that providential order, and, therefore, the violation of those rights, human and Divine. I need not dwell upon the historical fact—it is fresh in memory, and known to every one—that in the year 1870, on the 20th September, an overwhelming army breached the feeble walls of Rome, and took possession of the city. Now, what was the character of that act? If what I have hitherto said be true, and if there be still unrepealed in the great code that rules the world, and on which all legislation is founded, these two chapters—"Thou shalt not steal" and "Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmarks," then, at once, I must declare the seizure of Rome to be an open robbery. And if the stealing of anything consecrated to God has a twofold guilt, if the stealing of a chalice which has been consecrated to Divine worship, be a crime twofold in its guilt as compared with stealing the same weight of silver in any other vessel, then I must declare that act to be a sacrilege. And, further, if to take possession of the right and authority given by Divine Providence to another, to exclude him from its exercise, and to assume it to ourselves, be an act of usurpa-

tion, then I must declare the seizure of Rome to be a sacrilegious usurpation. And, lastly, if all the Christian nations of the world have a share in that inheritance, then I must declare that act to be a high crime against the whole of Christendom. These are legitimate and inevitable conclusions following from what I have before laid down. If any man has the will to deny them, he must deny, and more, he must refute my premises. If they stand, the conclusions cannot be assailed.

I have now to describe that violation. My first point is this. When the Italian monarchy was about to enter Rome it gave royal pledges for the entire preservation and perpetuity of the dignity and independence of the Sovereign Pontiff.

Here are the very words in which those solemn pledges were given. On September the eighth, that is twelve days before this act of violence was done, King Victor Emmanuel wrote in these words to Pius IX. :—"The Government of the King will protect the interest which the whole Catholic world possesses in the entire independence of the Sovereign Pontiff."[1] We have here a proof of what we have already seen, namely, that the whole world is acknowledged to have an interest in that independence. "The Government of the King is firm in assuring the guarantees necessary to the spiritual independence of the Holy See, and that the head of Catholicity [which is the express term in the original] shall preserve on the banks of the Tiber a place (or seat) honourable and independent of all human sovereignty."[2] Here is, in this

[1] Samwer, Recueil des Traités, Tom. v. p. 33.
[2] Recueil des Traités, Vol. v., p. 41.

one passage, the recognition and confirmation of the whole of what I have hitherto said to you. On October 9 a decree was signed in the following terms, by which Rome was annexed to the Italian Kingdom. This decree declares that:—"The Supreme Pontiff preserves the dignity and inviolability and all the personal prerogatives of sovereignty by a law for this purpose which will be sanctioned, and all conditions required to guarantee it, together with its territorial liberties and the free exercise of the authority of the Holy See." In the following year, that is on the 13th of May, 1871, the law on the relations between the Pope and the Italian Government was passed. The first chapter of it runs as follows:—"Prerogatives of the Sovereign Pontiff and the Holy See.—Article 1. The person of the Sovereign Pontiff is sacred and inviolable. Article 2. Any attempt against the person of the Sovereign Pontiff and of provocation to commit the same shall be punished with the same penalties as any attempts against the person of the King. The offences and insults publicly committed directly against the person of the Pontiff by speeches or acts, or by the means indicated by the first article of the law concerning the Press, to be punished with the same penalties fixed by the 19th Article of the same law. Article 3. The Italian Government pays to the Sovereign Pontiff within the territory of the kingdom the sovereign honours and pre-eminences accorded to him by Catholic Sovereigns. Article 12. The Sovereign Pontiff may correspond freely with the Episcopate and the whole of the Catholic world without any interference on the part of the Italian Government. Article 13.

In the city of Rome and the six suburbicarian bishopries [that is the sees or dioceses round about the walls of Rome], the seminaries, the academies, the schools, and the other Catholic institutes founded for the education and culture of ecclesiastics, shall continue to depend solely on the Holy See without any interference of the scholastic authorities of the kingdom." [3] Never was a sovereignty more utterly mocking offered to any man.

In order to justify this assertion, I will briefly recite the acts of legislation which have taken place since that date.

The first was the entire seizure of all property whatsoever belonging to all ecclesiastical bodies and foundations, excepting only a few that were exempted by name, and these were left, as they are stated here, to be for the *enjoyment* of the Sovereign Pontiff. It does not even say left in his possession: neither the Vatican, nor the Lateran Palace, nor any portion of them are said to belong to him or to be his by possession. He is to have the enjoyment of them, just as I might say to any man, "You may have the enjoyment of my house and garden." But the claim of possession is implicitly reserved in this very act. Next the Government seized property to the value of 800,000,000 Italian lire, or francs. After this came the suppression of all religious Orders. It is sometimes said there is a distinction between the Church and a religious Order; the Church is of Divine foundation; a religious Order is only founded by the Church; human laws cannot abolish the Church, but human laws may abolish a religious Order. Well, I know that Eng-

[3] Recueil des Traités, Vol. v., p. 41-46.

lishmen are so entirely accustomed to the history of Henry VIII. that they take it as a matter of course that any government may abolish religious Orders. But a religious Order is a spiritual corporation created by the Church, and cannot be abolished by any authority less than that by which it was created. It is a distinct violation of the spiritual authority of the Holy See to suppress a religious Order; and, therefore, the article that I have quoted, in which the free exercise of the spiritual authority of the Holy See was guaranteed, was violated in that suppression. Four thousand houses of such religious Orders were suppressed, and 50,000 persons—men and women who had spent their whole life in prayer and good works, in the service of their Divine Master, and in the saving of souls—were turned out without the means of subsistence. They were to receive daily a sum equivalent to—I hardly know how to express it by any English coin; and that, so I am told, has never been given; but, if it had been given, it would not have been sufficient for necessary food. The hardship inflicted upon these 50,000 persons was a cruelty, but when that cruelty was inflicted through the suppression of the religious Orders, as they were spiritual bodies, it was both a cruelty and a violation of the express guarantee already quoted, and a flagrant violation of the spiritual authority of the Holy See. But, further than this, the religious Orders of men contained in themselves those who were the counsellors of the Holy Father, of the Sacred College of Cardinals, and of the congregations and departments by which the Church is administered. The theologians, the canonists, the men whose lives were spent

in literary leisure in keeping alive the tradition of sacred learning in the Church were to be found to a great extent in the religious Orders. That act, therefore, has deprived the Holy See and the Head of the Church of the counsellors and officers upon whose labours it depended. It would be like the scattering, I may say, of those who labour in our Civil Service and for the departments of State in this country. Once more, from these religious bodies went forth missionaries into heathen lands. The suppression of these bodies then has at once dried up so many sources of missionary life.

I would ask: Can any man say that this is a mere temporal question, or that the suppression of these bodies falls within the competence of a temporal power? They were created and could be created alone by a spiritual authority, and they were created for a spiritual purpose and for spiritual ends. Even if they had only been stripped of their possessions, if their houses had been taken, if they had been turned out homeless, that would have been a cruel robbery, yet to suppress those corporations was to touch distinctly a spiritual creation, and so to violate the authority of the Holy See. But, to go further, the next thing was a law to introduce civil marriage. Now, I do not deny that in a country like our own, where, unhappily, men are split and divided in religion, where it is impossible that the religious ceremony of marriage can be one and the same for all, the State has a high interest, and, indeed, is bound, for the protection of society, to ensure that marriages shall be valid, legal, and recognised; and, therefore, I do not for a moment deny that it is necessary in such a

country as our own that there should be a law regulating the civil relations of marriage, so as to leave perfect and entire freedom to all as to the religious and sacramental contract. But what is this law in Italy? It is founded upon the assumption that marriage is a civil contract, and that the civil contract must be made before the civil authority before the parties can go before the altar for the benediction of the Church. The Catholic Church teaches that matrimony is a sacrament of our Lord Jesus Christ. That sacramental contract is, indeed, civil in one aspect, because whatever is done by Christians in a civil commonwealth is done also by them as citizens. But that is a lower aspect altogether. The true aspect of Christian matrimony is that it is a sacramental act; and that the contract creates one of the highest of human obligations. It is an indissoluble contract, which can be dissolved only by death. Such is the true and only faith of the Italian people, a people wholly and altogether Catholic; so that unless here and there be found a handful who of late years have called themselves Protestants or Waldenses, or whatever it be, there is no appreciable number in the population for whose sake civil marriage needs to be introduced. It was done, as I will show you presently, out of the conscious, deliberate, and systematic revolutionary movement, which has passed over the greater part of Europe, and is now extending itself into Italy.

Once more, on these revolutionary changes, followed laws on education. The first act was to abolish the teaching of theology, that is, the higher and scientific knowledge of religion, in all Universities. We are, I am sorry to say, very nearly doing it in our

own country; as yet, happily, we still retain chairs of theology, though no one is bound to go to them. But in Italy they are abolished in the heart of a Catholic country, and in the midst of a Catholic population. The schools of Italy, from the highest to the lowest, are now dechristianised; the education of the Italian people is robbed of its Christian element. We reap as we sow, and if the education of a people be deprived of Christianity, what will the next generation be? We are in the midst of this conflict ourselves in England, and there is no one who is not familiar with the obvious reasons which would make clear at once how great a violation is this of the rights of the Christian Church.

But, still further, if there be anything vital to the spiritual life and authority of the Church, it is the training of the priesthood. In every Christian country the youth are left free, and if they choose to give themselves to become priests for the service of the altar (or in this land of ours to become ministers of religion in any form whatsoever), the law of the land gives them perfect liberty to do so. What is now the law in Italy? Every man, from 17 to his 40th year, is liable to the conscription, and, if called on, is bound to serve; and that not only if he be a layman, but a priest already ordained, and not only a priest, but a bishop already governing a diocese. If priest or bishop be under the prescribed age of 39, he is bound to serve; that is to say, priests may be taken from the altar, and bishops from their dioceses, and compelled to put on the Italian uniform and to serve in the ranks. Such is the state of the law. We shall not be surprised, therefore, even when we read the words

of one who had a great share in passing that law. It will show in what esteem he held the office of a priest. He said—"There is no stuff better to make a soldier than a novice out of a convent, or a seminarist, or a clerk in orders. The statistics of Italy show," he went on to say, "that by the exemptions which are necessary on account of physical imperfections, two-fifths of the male population are excluded from the army. This great population is more than sufficient as a seminary for the priesthood." The scorn and contempt of the priesthood of Jesus Christ expressed in those words is beyond any terms of indignation that I can find.

Next, we come to the laws relating to the Press. We have already seen in the "Law of Guarantees" that any speech insulting to the Sovereign Pontiff is open to the prosecution of the law. Here is the report of a speech made the other day in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, followed by *Benissimo*, or, as we should say, "Loud cheers." But first I may say that I have carefully examined the debates that have passed since the month of January last in the Italian Chamber; and, if I were to quote here a small portion of that which I have marked, I believe that every man who has a sense of Christian dignity would abhor it. I will, however, give one passage:—One of the foremost members said—"From this our Vatican of 'Monte Cittorio' (the palace seized from the Holy See to be converted into a Parliament House) where is justice, law, and liberty, let us say to the Caliph of the West that, like thy predecessor, S. Peter, 'thou liest, thou liest, thou liest! S. Peter denied his Master; thou hast denied thy country; be thou anathe-

ma.'"[4] I need hardly give the name of this speaker. Four or five years ago I printed some of his words; they were extravagant blasphemy; and I thought that he was one of a class which, both out of Parliament and in Parliament, has existed among ourselves—men who, every now and then, show a disordered mind when they speak about the Catholic Church. But that is not the fact. This man is a man of cultivation of mind; he is a man of wide, though, I must say, confused and chaotic information. I have read two of his speeches, which show me that these words of blasphemous insult are not the outbreak of an idiot, but are the weighed malignity of a man who knows what he says.

We shall now be able to appreciate more fully the subject which called forth the Allocution of the Holy Father the other day. We are aware that there has lately been introduced a law for (as it is called) "The Repression of the Abuses of the Clergy;" and it is upon this law that the appeal of the Holy Father to the whole Christian world has been made. Now, that law was introduced by the Keeper of the Seals; when it was introduced it was referred to a commission; that commission has reported upon it. I will give one or two passages from the text of the law as given in the report. But I must first say that any document more full of a malignant animosity, not only against the Catholic Church and the Holy See, but even against the Christian faith, a document showing more of the spirit of Voltaire, and a more servile imitation of the Falck laws of Germany, I have never read. Nor is this wonderful, for the reporter of that

[4] Atti Parlamentari, 18 Genu: 1877, p. 662.

commission is the very man whose words respecting the priesthood of Jesus Christ have been already quoted.

We will judge of that law by the law itself. It runs thus: "The minister of religion who, abusing the office of his ministry, disturbs the *public conscience* or the *peace of families* shall be punished with imprisonment from four months to two years; and with a fine of a thousand lire"—that is forty pounds. Secondly, "The minister of religion who, abusing his ministry by any discourse, spoken or written, in any public meeting, or by writings otherwise published, expressly censures, or by any other public act outrages the institutions and laws of the State, any royal decree, or other *act of the public authority whatsoever*, shall be punished with imprisonment for three months, and a fine of a thousand lire (or forty pounds); if any resistance to Government shall follow such discourse the author shall be punished by imprisonment for two years, and a fine of from two to three thousand lire (that is to say eighty or one hundred and twenty pounds), and they who publish or diffuse the said writings or discourses shall be punished with the same penalties."[5] Now, note this fact. The text of the law introduced by the Government ran as here given. The Commission added to the last clause these words—"*From whatsoever ecclesiastical authority, and from whatsoever place they may emanate;*"[6] that is to say, however high or exalted. And this reveals that the one person against whom

[5] "*Relazione della Commissione sopra gli Abusi dei Ministri dei Culti*," &c. &c., Dec. 18, 1876, p. 45.

[6] *Ibid.*

that law was chiefly directed was not the poor parish priest—who is capable, indeed, of stirring the little pool of his own parish, but whose agitation reaches no further—it was directed against the Head of the Universal Church himself, whose words go out to the ends of the world, and who, by one Allocution, has made the whole Christian world to ring with the knowledge of the sacrileges that have been committed in Rome. Against him this persecuting law is evidently directed. But in what a covert way. The "Law of Guarantees" protects his person; he, therefore, cannot be prosecuted; but every man who reprints the Allocution is liable to prosecution. It was a matter of deliberation whether those who published the Allocution should be prosecuted or not. A majority of the Ministers, we were told, were of opinion they ought to be prosecuted, but wiser counsels prevailed. They were restrained from an act that would have stultified themselves. It was, therefore, declared that the mere publication of the text should not expose any publisher to prosecution; but, if he should add a comment, if he should say so much as "I adhere to the matter of this Allocution," he might be at once prosecuted; and I am told, upon authority I cannot doubt, that in Naples newspapers were sequestrated for simply declaring their adhesion to the matter of this Allocution. Now, see what is the equal justice of this law. If the Catholic editor of a newspaper, in publishing that Allocution, says, "I adhere to it," he may be prosecuted; but there is not a paper in all Italy, from the most cultivated to the most impious (and there are many such), that may not assail, blacken, pervert, denounce, blaspheme the words of the head of the

Church, and that with impunity. This has gone on day after day, and week after week, since the publication of the Allocution; from north to south it has been assailed by every form of virulent animosity. No prosecution against those who assail the head of the Christian Church; instant prosecution upon those who, by a single epithet, shall declare that Allocution to be true, just, or necessary.

But who is to determine what is the abuse of the ministry of a priest? A man cannot know what is crooked unless he knows what is straight; a man cannot know what is the abuse unless he knows what is the use of a thing. Then, who, I will ask, knows what is the use of the Christian priesthood? The Keeper of the Seals perhaps, or the Minister of Finance, or the magistrates in the country towns—they are the men to lay down the law as to what is the duty of a Christian priest. If the Nonconformists of England look calmly on, if their heart does not rise with indignation at this penal law, then, I do not know how they are worthy of their forefathers. The Nonconformists of England would not suffer the civil magistrate to prescribe to them the limits of their ministry; and can they tamely and in silence look on when a law is proposed by which every priest in Catholic Italy—and, alas! because Catholic, it has scant sympathy from Englishmen—is threatened with fine and with imprisonment for abusing his ministry, not in the eyes of his Divine Master, not in the light of his own conscience, not by the laws of the Catholic Church, but by the judgment of a revolutionary Minister or the decision of a magistrate appointed by some revolutionary Government? I cannot but be-

lieve that when Englishmen look into this they will turn from it with a feeling of indignation. Let me put an example. Let me suppose that a man who has been a member of a secret revolutionary society—and, as you know, all members of such societies are excommunicate by the law of the Catholic Church—let me suppose such a man to be dying. On his death-bed the priest has done all in his power to induce him to renounce his state of rebellion against the Church; he refuses to do it; the man dies; he dies without absolution, for the priest cannot give it without sacrilege. If a priest, by the side of a death-bed, were to give absolution to a man who refused to separate himself from a secret society condemned by the Church, that absolution would be null and void in the sight of God, and it would be a sacrilege and a mortal sin in the priest who gave it. Let me suppose that this man, be he the son or the father of a family, dies impenitent and without absolution. This is, perhaps, a disturbing of the peace of families? and who is to be the judge whether the priest has done his duty or not? The magistrate of a country town, or the Minister of a revolutionary Government? Let me take another example. I have read to you the laws by which the property of the Holy See was taken away, by which the religious Orders were suppressed, by which civil marriage was forced upon a Catholic people, by which Christianity was banished from universities and schools, by which all men, whether priest or bishop, are liable to be required to enter military service, though they are forbidden to sit in the legislature—they are disfranchised on the one hand and compelled to military service on the

other—let me suppose any man having in him a just heart and the true instincts of a Catholic openly to say, "I look upon these laws as unjust; they are violations of the spiritual office of the Church," that man would be liable to prosecution. Englishmen speak openly of the laws of their country; and why can we do so? Because the laws of England are the laws in which the majority of Englishmen agree. Why, then, is this gagging law necessary in Italy? Because a minority is in power who are conscious that they are opposed by a great majority who disapprove their acts. They know, and are afraid, that if men speak openly with their neighbours, the public opinion of Catholic Italy would become so strong and spread so wide as to endanger their power. And this is called *disturbing the public conscience*. The public conscience of Italy is not revolutionary, but Catholic: the true disturbers of the *public* conscience of Italy are the authors of these Italian Falck Laws.

I need give no more examples, if those I have given are not enough. I will only add further, that, in this law, there is a tacit assumption of the supremacy of the civil power over the spiritual, and a complete inversion of the whole providential order of which I have hitherto spoken. By the ordinance of God, the spiritual authority is supreme in judging of its own limits. This law is the assertion that the power of man, and of the civil state, is to be supreme over the exercise of spiritual offices, and is to determine what is use and what abuse, what is legitimate and what illegitimate, and to sit in Episcopal judgment, as a bishop does over his priests, upon the whole body of the priesthood and Episcopate of Italy.

My belief is that this legislation is not the work of the Italian people. I believe it to be the work of the Italian revolution. And, between the Italian people and the Italian revolution, there is a great gulf fixed. My reason is this—Italy has had this twofold affliction: first, it has been under the dominant influence of the revolution of France; and, second, it has now fallen under the influence of what I must call the revolution of Germany. In 1796, France with all its revolutionary impieties and disorders inundated Italy, annexed the North of Italy to the French Republic; in 1808, France again overran Italy, and occupied Rome with its revolutionary armies. It destroyed the old municipal government of Rome. The Roman State had municipal governments like our own. The great cities in the patrimony of the Church were almost autonomous—that is, independent, governing themselves as Manchester and Liverpool and the like. They held an allegiance to their Sovereign; but it was an allegiance so light that they governed their own internal affairs. The whole of that free and local administration, which descended from the Middle Ages, was abolished, and the feeblest and most unstable of all forms of government was introduced—I mean the centralisation of the Code Napoléon. From that one fact has come, as I have been assured by some of the most experienced statesmen in Rome, a perpetual discontent among the subjects of the Holy See.

Once more, in 1823, a man, whose name is glorified by the Italian revolution, and a man whose name, I believe, will be written in the annals of Italy in the tears of Italians hereafter, laid the beginning of that

revolution which is called "Young Italy," founded upon a denial of Christianity and a rejection of all government except a chimerical republic. We have seen that kings and priests represent the two authorities of the Christian world, and that the anti-Christian revolution of this day is directed especially against both priestly and royal authority. Such was the teaching of Mazzini. He taught Italians to conspire in secret, and to unite in a clandestine society, which was to spread like a network over the whole face of Italy. He taught that the revolution should have these three degrees: first, what he called education, which signifies, indeed, the perversion of little children in the school; it signifies, also, the propagation of revolutionary doctrines by word and by writing; secondly, insurrection—a guerilla warfare in all parts simultaneously; lastly, a combined rising, or a rebellion to overthrow the established order of Government. This from the year 1823 has been perpetually spreading, and that which we see at this moment in Rome is nothing but the arrival in power of that revolution which has been so long clandestinely working.

If any man will study the history of the pontificate of Pius IX. he will see that he began the first days of his authority by setting free every political prisoner, giving a perfect amnesty; he acted like the Good Shepherd, trusting the flock and calling them to him to inspire in them, if it were possible, confidence and fidelity. The secret revolution thought that they had found their occasion and their leader. They believed that Pius IX. might be induced, by the ambitious vision of extending his rule over Italy, to par-

take in their movement. They tempted him as Satan tempted his Master in the wilderness—"All these things will I give thee if thou, falling down, wilt adore me." Pius IX. said, "No; I will rule according to the power which the Divine law gives me; I will lay hand upon no other sovereignty; and I will not make war upon any of my children." From that moment they turned against him, and sought another who would undertake the task. They found him to his undoing. He was the King of Sardinia. From that hour to this there has been in Italy a conflict of three powers. There has been the Church, in the plenitude of its spiritual authority, and in unswerving fidelity to its head; there has been the Italian Monarchy headed by the ancient house of Catholic Savoy; there has been underneath the Throne the anti-Christian revolution mining its base; and, at this moment, the conflict of the revolution is hardly more against Pius IX. than against Victor Emmanuel. What the future will be it is not for me to predict. But I say once more that the work which we see in Italy is not the work of the Italian people; it is the work of the Italian revolution, which openly proclaims itself to be rationalistic. In the discussions to which I have referred, the proposers and the supporters of the persecuting law all openly cast off even the mere mask of religion; and those, a few good men excepted, who opposed the law for political reasons, openly declared themselves to be rationalists—that is to say, both sides alike rejected belief in Christianity.[7]

I will add further, that as this war against the Holy

[7] Atti Parlamentari, 9 Maggio, 1877, p. 1930.

See is not the work of the Italian people, so neither is it the will of the Italian people. The proof I will give of this assertion is as follows:—The Italian people are twenty-six millions; the revolution has certainly not possessed itself of more than three or four millions at the most; therefore, there remain some two-and-twenty millions of the Italian people who are still steadfast in their old Christian and Catholic traditions. They have never renounced their fidelity to the faith of their fathers. Moreover, the whole electoral body in Italy does not exceed half a million of men: in twenty-six millions there is not so much as a fiftieth part who possess the electoral fran chise. The other day I read in a paper, written with much ability and with too great confidence, that because the last Italian Ministry had manifested a disposition in favour of the Church, the people of Italy had indignantly turned it out, and had put in power those that would express their will. Now, those 500,000 men do not represent the will of Italy. And of those 500,000 men 250,000, that is one-half, never go to the poll or record a vote. They are Catholics who for conscience' sake have from the beginning refrained from voting. They have never voted at all; and that upon these grounds: that if they were to vote they would recognise the law, they would accept the constitution, they would be partakers in the present state of Rome, and sanction its usurpation. Moreover, any man whom they might elect could not sit in the Chamber without taking the oath that binds him to the revolution which now holds Italy down, and to the violation of the sovereignty of the head of the Church. Therefore, 250,000 electors are at this

time the whole body of men who return the Italian Parliament. Those 250,000 men are but one-half of the electoral body, and less than one-hundredth part of the Italian people. I ask you whether we are to accept any vote of that Chamber as representing the people of Italy? What should we say to such a Parliament in England, or in Canada, or in Australia? An Englishman knows too well what representation is to be for a moment deceived. Moreover, when in 1870 the *plébiscite* or public vote was taken in Rome, it was taken in the presence of an invading army. Such was the freedom of voting. Next it was taken under a prohibition which bound every Catholic to abstain from voting; and, thirdly, it was ascertained that not more that 14,000 of the Roman people voted at all out of the population of 200,000. Add to these 3,000 or 4,000 who were the paid officials of the Government. I know of nothing which has imposed upon the simplicity and the good will of the English people more than to suppose that the present state of Italy is the expression of the will of the Italian people. They are a divided people without cohesion, without organisation, Lombards and Neapolitans, Tuscans and Sardinians, without political education or experience. The army is in the hands of the monarchy, and the monarchy in the hands of the Revolution.

You are not surprised, then, that when Pius IX. was invited to reconcile himself to "progress and modern civilisation," he said, "No, it is not for me to reconcile myself to an anti-Christian revolution; I cannot, as head of the Christian Church, reconcile myself to an education which is not Christian, nor to a marriage law which converts a sacrament into a civil

contract. I cannot reconcile myself to a progress which has violated the Divine rights of the Holy See, and has usurped upon the providential order of the Christian world." There is one hope for Italy. It is this—that Italy should reconcile itself to the old traditions of the Faith of its fathers, and should return once more to the only principle of unity and authority which created it. *Deus nationes sanabiles fecit super terram*—God has made the nations of the world capable of healing. Italy may be healed of its wounds, and, if it return to its past glories, Italy will be healed of its afflictions. No revolution is capable of being healed except by repentance. A revolution is a rebellion, and this is an anti-Christian rebellion. For Italy there may be days of peace and unity in store; but for the Italian revolution there is no future. It is reserved for the just judgment of God.

IV.

THE REVOLT AND ITS NEMESIS.

I HAVE said that nations may be healed, but that revolutions cannot be healed. Nations are the works of the Creator, but revolutions are the works of man, and of man in rebellion against the ordinance of God. Nations may be healed by returning from their momentary aberrations to the first principles of their life and order; but revolutions can never be healed: they are the dissolution of order, and must cease to exist.

The application of these words is clear. The great Christian, Catholic, cultivated, civilized, Italian na-

tion may have a happy future before it; but the revolution which has troubled and stained Italy has no future, it must cease to be. Its deeds are manifest, "going before to judgment," and whether all its agents will be overtaken and visibly chastised it matters not. No sin goes without its chastisement, and the secret sins of men the judgment of God follows after.

If these words sound severe in the ears of any, let them call to mind what has been laid before them. I have affirmed, and, I hope, have given reason for my affirmation, that God in his Divine Providence has committed to the head of His Church on earth a true and proper sovereignty, in order that he might freely and in peace exercise his supreme spiritual power; next, that that sovereignty was for a thousand years in full and perfect possession, confirmed by every right, human and Divine, by all that can consecrate a sovereignty among men; further, I have proved that those truths and principles which have been shown by the evidence of facts drawn from Christian history were acknowledged, accepted, and proclaimed even by those who now have violated that sovereignty; that in the letter of the King of Italy, in the decree of the Government, and in the acts of the Legislature the title of "Sovereign" was still given to Pius IX., and his dignity and his independence of all civil powers were guaranteed. And all this was done because it was acknowledged to be his right, and that all the Catholic world had a share in the tranquil possession of his freedom and independence. Out of the mouths of those then who have done this deed I have shown all this; and that not

from the chance words of men, but from royal declarations, from authoritative decrees, from legislative acts: these are the confirmation of that which I had affirmed before. I then proceeded to show, point by point, how the acts of the Italian Legislature in the last six years have violated those pledges, engagements, and promises. It now remains for me to point out the consequences which flow from that violation.

It is impossible that the head of the Christian Church can be disturbed from his seat without causing a perturbation throughout the whole Christian world. It never has been otherwise, and, so long as the Christian world exists, it never will be. There is one man on the face of the earth whose words when he speaks reach from sunrise to sunset; there is one man who is the most loved of all men, who is the centre of more hearts than any other among men. That man is the Vicar of Jesus Christ. So also there is one man who is the most hated of all men. No man on the face of the earth has conspiring against him a more ardent and a more concentrated hatred than the head of the Christian Church. The whole crowd of anti-Christian sects, of men that have apostatised from their faith, that have drowned themselves in the perdition of sin, all of them alike regard with an intense animosity the person who most nearly represents the Divine Lord of all. And I may add that therefore there is no man whose word causes throughout the world so great an agitation. Why is it that this Allocution of Pius IX. has caused such a tremulous fear and such an outcry of hostility, not only throughout Italy, but throughout Germany and throughout France—I am glad to say, for the honour of our

country, not throughout England. Englishmen and those who speak through the public voice of our newspapers have recognised what Christian liberty means, and what the independence of the Church of Jesus Christ demands; they have acknowledged to an extent I dared not hope—though not, indeed, to the full of what I could desire—the violations of the rights and the breach of the promises which were solemnly engaged between the Government of Italy and Pius IX. Now, what I have further to show is the consequence of that act.

I have said that the head of the Christian Church can never be disturbed from his rightful seat without causing perturbation throughout the Christian world. Perhaps you may think that this is either a rhetorical exaggeration or a pious sentiment traditional among Catholics. Once more I will prove what I have said out of the mouths of witnesses that cannot be suspected of being biassed in our favour. Take a passage written by a well-known writer on international law of this century, and no true friend to the supremacy of Rome. His words are these: "The spoliations of the Pope are as repugnant to decency as to justice; they wound both the intellect and the heart."[1] He argues that the Papal States are the common possession of the Christian world, which desires to see its head invested with the attributes that are most venerated by men. The Pope ought to be at Rome, the inviolable Sovereign of his States, put beyond all political controversy and contest, under the safeguard of the morality of the world. In the year 1849, a historical leader of that which is called the Liberal Party,

[1] De Pradt. De Congrès de Vienne, tom. ii. p. 46.

gave expression, in Parliament, to these principles: "I do not believe that the Pope can exercise his spiritual authority if he have not the Temporal Power. The Temporal Power is a European and a political question as well as a local and a religious."[2] In passing, let me say, if the Governments of Europe now treat it not as a European question, but as an Italian question, it must either be that, being non-Catholic Governments, their national religions have engendered what I must call a parochial mind, or, being Catholic Governments, they have apostatised from their fidelity. The next witness I will call is an Italian, a name that will be remembered in the history of Italy, one who took part in the revolutionary movement which Italians believed to be the liberation of their country. Massimo Azeglio said: "Italy ought to be accounted happy for possessing many capitals, and the question of Rome as capital is a fantastical idea of visionaries and of rhetoricians. The Eternal City belongs to Italy but on condition of preserving the Pope there. Neither King nor State ought there to set up its seat."

We will go on to see in detail what have been the consequences of the violation of the sovereignty of Pius IX. These consequences have been threefold—first, to Italy itself; secondly, to Europe at large; and thirdly, to the Catholic Church.

First, as to Italy, the effect of it has been this, that the revolution, which, as I said before, came from France, and poured through the Alps, has deluged Italy. It was a revolution which began in the ghastly masquerade of the French infidelity of the

[2] See Preface, p. 784.

last century. It had two principles—a twofold antagonism, to Thrones and to Altars, to kings and to priests. It was an atheistic and a republican revolution; and that revolution, entering into Italy, received a mitigated form thus far, that it no longer professed atheism, but only deism; that is it is *un*-Christian and *anti*-Christian, but Mazzini still retained the profession of a belief in God. The result was the same: it was an anti-Christian revolution subverting both the Christian Church and the monarchies of Italy.

The direct effect of it has been to break up the political unity of Italy. There are now in conflict a conspiracy, a revolution, and a monarchy. The old governments fell one after another. There is now a monarchy, but under the foundation of that monarchy are moving at this moment the agencies of the same anti-Christian and republican revolution. We have only to look at the noble and Catholic people of France to see what has been the consequence of the revolution of the last century. It has so undermined the foundations of political and social order, that, from 1789 to this day, no stable government of any form—republican, monarchical, or imperial, has been able to endure. The instability of that great people—parcelled out and morselled into six conflicting political parties, is a spectacle that must make every one who loves France, be he of French or of English blood, to mourn. What has happened in France is now happening in Italy; and, unless the Providence of God heal the Italian people, and turn it back upon its old traditions, its future will be what the present of France is now.

But, further, the revolution in Italy began not by working through the principle of its unity—that to which Italy owes all its greatness, that to which England owes its unity at this hour—it began by a direct conflict, and the antagonism of incessant war against the first principle of all unity, without which unity cannot exist—I mean the one common faith, the one common authority which reigns over the conscience and the wills of men. The first object of the hostility of the Italian revolution was the Holy See and the head of the Church. Besides this, all nations have their progress, and the progress of a nation is like the growth of a tree, bearing its fruit in due season; if the trunk of the tree be wounded, the vigour of the tree is stayed. Anything which crosses the healthy development and growth, be it of a tree or of human society, is fatal to its perfection. This has happened to the progress of Italy. Progress is the development of order; there can be no progress where order has been broken up. If the structure of the tree be wounded there can be no healthy growth. The revolution has introduced disorder throughout the whole nation, and, therefore, the progress of the nation is stayed.

But besides this, it has broken up, so far as it was possible, even its Catholic and religious unity. I say, so far as was possible, because I thank God that, as yet, the introduction of the laws of civil marriage and of education without Christianity have taken but little root. Nevertheless, in a people wholly united, where there was but one faith, one Church, one common worship—as it were out of the wanton desire to destroy the unity of this supernatural fabric—"liber-

ty" of worship, "liberty" of religious teaching, education without Christianity, and civil marriage were introduced for no other discoverable cause than out of animosity against the order of the Christian world. I have said before that, where a people are divided in religion, it is of absolute necessity that the civil laws should conform themselves to and take cognisance of those irreconcileable diversities; but, where a people is absolutely united there exists no reason, and, I will add, there can be no justification for the introduction of such laws. Lastly, the youth and the children of Italy at this moment are being indoctrinated in schools without religion—and by newspapers which flood the country, by, I am sorry to say, fly-leaves, and pamphlets, and engravings, and songs, and ribaldry in every form—with the principles of the revolution, and of animosity against religion, and against the civil order.

How would it have been with England if such a revolution had crossed our progress? England was once divided into many conflicting kingdoms perpetually at war with one another, divided in everything, as to their worldly interests, and united only in one thing, and that was in their faith. Because they were united in one faith, and in the unity of one Church, and in one communion, because they worshipped together, and were of one mind and one will in all things above this world, there was a power of unity and a principle of assimilation which gradually drew the Heptarchy into the one great English monarchy which stands to this day. The principle of unity in England was the Catholic Church; the principle of unity in Italy is the Catholic Church, with the intense focus of its unity, the head of the

Church and the Holy See. If there had been in those early times before England grew up into a monarchy, or while it was only forming its unity, a propaganda of division preached up and down by the apostles of anti-Christian revolution, clamouring in the market-places, and whispering into the ears of men, sowing everywhere principles contrary to the Christian and Catholic order of England, what should we have been at this hour? Should we now be a monarchy and an empire spreading throughout the world? Our progress and our growth would have been fatally wounded at the root, and when the root is wounded the tree withers. And so I must prophesy of the future of Italy. If the revolution, which now coils round about it, shall not be steadily and wisely untwisted from the root, certain it is that the progress, and the unity, and the future of the great Italian people is doomed to disaster.

An Italian of whom Italians are proud, and to whom, some twenty years ago, they erected a public statue in gratitude in the city of Turin, has left this judgment in his writings: he said that modern civilisation has committed two great aberrations: the one was to expel the theology of Revelation from the field of science, and the other was to exclude the Catholic clergy from the field of politics. And he added: "Every scientific reform is vain if it do not make chief account of religion, and every scheme of Italian renovation is null if it have not for its base the corner-stone of Catholicism." This was a man whom Italians, the other day, inscribed in their annals as one of the greatest of their patriots. He went on further to say: "And the evil will last as

long as men persist in substituting a heathen or chimerical Italy in the place of a real and a Christian Italy which God and a life of eighteen hundred years has created; that is to say, a French or a German Italy in the place of an Italy of the Italians"[3]—an Italy, that is, of its old Catholic traditions, an Italy of the Pontiffs who have saved it again and again, and protected its liberty and its independence from all foreign nations—Greeks, Germans, Normans, and Spaniards, and from worse enemies still, its own domestic factions. As then, so now, the unity of its faith alone can redeem it from the anti-Christian revolution which has invaded Rome.

2. But, secondly, what are the consequences of the violation of this rightful sovereignty upon Europe? In the last six weeks we have seen that every civilised country in Europe has been stirred by this Allocution. The newspapers that are opposed to the Holy See, in all countries, have sufficiently manifested their anxiety lest there should arise an agitation. Most assuredly these are indications of something which is not transient. The anti-Christian revolution in all countries feels itself ill at ease. Why is it that all Europe is moved by this subject? It is because Christian Europe does not consist of separated and isolated nations. Christian Europe was one fair fabric, in which a family of nations was united together, culminating in the supreme authority of the Chief Pastor of the Christian world; and he was clothed providentially with a Temporal power, which gave him freedom, and enabled him to act as the counsellor, the arbitrator, and the guide of the unity of Christian

[3] Gioberti, "Primato degli Italiani," vol ii., pp. 66, 67.

nations. It was a Christian confederation having a high and supreme authority ruling in the moral order. But this violation of the sovereignty of Rome has cut the bond which bound the family of nations together.

Next, it has broken down also the moral order which governed the nations of Christendom. Europe was a Christian commonwealth; it was bound together by the laws of Faith, by the laws of a common Christianity, and in great part by the laws of Catholic unity. These have been broken, and what was substituted in their place? The laws of diplomacy, and the laws of international compacts. Where, at this day, is the international law which once bound Europe together? The Apostle, in describing the character of the men of the latter days, says precisely this, They shall be "truce-breakers,"[4] men who enter into contracts, and treaties, and engagements, and violate them; men who cannot be bound by fidelity or truth. The usurpation of Rome and the acts of the Italian Government are a masterpiece of violation, a sacrilegious breach of express promises, pledges, and engagements, written by a royal hand: and while the ink was not yet dry. This is a supreme example of the sacredness and of the worth of the moral obligations which are supposed to bind the nations of Europe to each other. But we have not to look far, we have not to strain our memory. What has been happening in the last five or six years to the treaties which once bound Europe together and gave us the hope of peace in the East? Is there a treaty, however solemnly engaged

[4] 1 Tim. iii. 3, "ἄσπονδοι."

in, which has not been violated? Is there, at this moment, a treaty binding nations together in Europe which the contracting nations are ready to execute? For the last years, or even months, the whole book of treaties has been trampled under foot.

The moral order which governed Europe has been relaxed and weakened until there remains for Europe no other government than the government of armies, the government that can send into the field millions of men in arms, and can hurl the greatest weight against its antagonist. To this the Christian world has been reduced. But, again, throughout Europe, at this moment, there is a sense that wrong has been done. There are two powers that have been forcing themselves to an almost unendurable strain to multiply and maintain their excessive armaments. Why? Of what are they afraid? I will not enter into this part of the subject further than to answer my question. They have both done evil. The one is afraid of a war of revenge, and the other is afraid of an armed intervention.

The usurpation of the Sovereignty of Rome is morally a rejection of God. Do not suppose that I mean that every man in every nation is consciously guilty of this rejection; neither suppose that I mean that the governments who have done these things have deliberately written down the proposition: "We will not have this man to reign over us." Nevertheless I affirm, that if Christian history be true, Christendom was a creation of Almighty God through the power of Christianity and through faith in His Divine Son; and that this creation had for its Head, and as the chief representative of His Divine Son,

the person who was chosen to be His Vicar upon earth; and that the whole of Catholic Christendom recognised him to be the Chief Arbiter and the Chief Pastor of all Catholic nations; and that even those Christian nations that are separated from the unity of the Catholic Church still regard him—as the English people, when they think calmly, do—as the Chief Bishop, the Head, and the oldest authority of the Christian world. Well, if the world, then, the duration of which counts, as we are wont to write, from the year of our Lord's Incarnation, if it was once a Christian world, and if in that fact be fulfilled the prophecy of the Book Apocalypse, that the kingdom of this world had become the "kingdom of God and of Christ," I would ask whether that which we see now is not the disintegration and the downfall of that Christian world by the deliberate act of an anti-Christian revolution, accomplished by the violence of some, and by the connivance of others, by the silence, at least, whether from fear or from assent, of the nations of Europe.

3. And then, lastly, what has been the effect of these last years, including this violation of the sovereignty of the head of the Church, upon the Catholic Church itself? It is a relief to me to be able to turn and to see on the other side, not the gloomy lowering clouds of which I have been speaking, but the bright lights which are streaming up the sky, the harbingers of a happier future. The violence of men is overruled by the power of God. What was intended for destruction has wrought for our strength and safety. The Catholic Church has been, throughout the whole pontificate of Pius IX., the object of

an anti-Christian conspiracy in every country. And there has been since the year 1848 a perpetual development and spread in every place of the rebellion which in that year strove to overturn the thrones of Europe. The King of Piedmont fell, the throne of France fell, Pius IX. was driven out of Rome, the Emperor of Austria hardly kept his seat, the King of Prussia, in like manner, stood only by military force: the whole of Europe was threatened with the overthrow of all civil power; but, finding the civil power too strong, the revolution turned itself upon the Church; and in every country it found its way by stealth into that which has been miscalled by a gentle term, to the deceiving of many, the Liberal Party, and Liberal Government, and Liberal Legislation. This has been, in fact, the covert under which anti-Christian education, the separation of the school from the Church, the separation of the Church from the State, the exclusion of Christianity from science, and the expulsion of all influence of religion and of the authority of the Church from the acts of legislation have been steadily accomplished. This conflict has been spreading everywhere, not only in Europe, not only in North America, but even in the South.

What has been the effect of all this upon the Church? Never since the Church was founded was it so widespread as it is at this hour. Never since the unity of the Apostles was the church more solid in its unity. Never in the history of the Episcopate were the Bishops of the whole Church so closely united to their Head and so inseparably united to one another. Never in Christian history can we find a time when the priesthood of the Church was so united

to their bishops. Never, at any time, in all the records of the Church, can it be found that the people were so united to their pastors. The unity of the Church, without and within, the unity of faith, the unity of fidelity, is greater at this hour than it was ever yet before. The blows of the hammer which were aimed to disintegrate and to destroy have only welded together in a more indissoluble mass the unity of the Catholic Church.

We are, at this moment, described as the great conspiracy, and, as a deputy of the Italian Parliament said the other day, we are "the Black International." Whether we are black or not I will not enquire, but that we are international I have affirmed before. The Catholic Church refuses to be a national Church; it is the unity of all nations in the Kingdom of God. National Churches are schisms. We are international because we pervade all nations, and, therefore, the charge is true. We are the International, the only one worthy of the name. But next, I will affirm, without fear, there never was a time when the Church was purer. There have been ages when it cannot be denied that prelates and pastors of the Church were often worldly, secular, covetous, loving honour, and ambitious of obtaining it. There were times when the Episcopate of the Church was, in some countries, national, and, therefore, was often in conflict with the Holy See or coldly attached to it. But persecution has done us these two great benefits—it has so stripped and despoiled the Church everywhere, Head and members, that there is no temptation to greed and to covetousness now. We have no benefices, we have no revenues, we have no domains, and men do not enter

the priesthood of Jesus Christ at this day for lands and incomes; neither do they enter into the priesthood for the ambition of rising to the Courts of Kings. More than this, the national spirit has been exorcised and cast out of the Church. In every nation the Church has been rejected by the civil powers. The Catholic Church has been excluded from political offices, and that act threw it upon its own centre, and every church of every nation in the world became more and more closely united to its Head and to the See from which its Head rules the Catholic unity. Therefore, ambition, secularity, covetousness, and nationalism, four of the deepest diseases that in other ages afflicted the Church, have been expelled by the searching and hostile action of the revolution without, which has restored the health of the Church within.

Once more, in these years the sympathy of the whole Christian world has been drawn to Pius IX. with a filial love and a fervent devotion which, in the whole history of the Pontiffs, I can find nothing to equal. Throughout the world all Catholics cherish in their heart I may say a loyalty for the head of the Church. The person, the countenance, the sorrows, the persecutions, the fortunes, the vicissitudes of Pius IX. are familiar thoughts with them, awakening in their heart the response of affection and of sympathy. Nay, I will go further, and I will ask whether any upright, honourable man who loves Christian liberty, and who believes that Christianity has an authority of its own, and that it ought to be independent of all worldly masters, whether his sympathy has not been drawn, with a great closeness, to the majestic presence

of the Chief Pastor of the world, who has borne upon himself for thirty years the unrelenting brunt of force and fraud. And why has he been so assailed? Because he would not betray his trust. He is the guardian of the liberty and the independence of the Christian world. I believe that there never was a pontiff in history round whom the sympathies of Catholics and of those who, unhappily, are not of our unity—and I would to God they were—have been drawn with such a closeness.

Moreover, the events of this pontificate, rising to the full in the violation of the other day, have revealed to the whole world this divine fact that the Catholic Church is independent of the world. It does not rest upon it; it will not set so much as a foot upon it; it will not lean upon it with one hand; it stands off from it; it stands opposed to it; and it will bear the brunt of all that it can do. But there is one thing it will never do; it will never be dependent upon any earthly power. And, as its universality and its unity have been revealed by the events of the last thirty years, so, I will say, its liberty and independence have been revealed in a way that no man can deny. We see around about us religious bodies appealing to supreme civil tribunals, going from court to court to contest points of ritual, and even of doctrine. Look at the Catholic Church at this hour. Can the world deliver a judgment the authority of which the Catholic Church would acknowledge even upon the fringe of a vestment?

Some years ago, in order to make the liberty of the Holy See clear to the minds of Englishmen, I appealed to the example of our great martyr, S. Thomas

of Canterbury. I affirmed then, what I affirm now, that he laid down his life for the liberty of conscience. I remember appealing to the Free Kirk of Scotland, and to the Nonconformists of England. I then declared to them, what I declare again, that their cause and our cause in this is essentially the same. They believe that the conscience and the faith of men are liberated from all civil authority. So do we. They believe that the channel through which the faith and the conscience of men are to be guided is the written Word of God. We believe that the faith and the conscience of men are guided by the Word of God, written and unwritten, guarded and delivered by the Church of God, guided by the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth. We and they differ as to the medium or the channel through which the guidance of faith and conscience flows, but we are identical in this principle—that the faith and the conscience of men are liberated from all civil authority. And, therefore, I appeal to them at this moment. If they have the heart in them to be sincere and true to the profession which they have inherited from their fathers, they ought to stand side by side with the Catholics of all countries at this hour, as in times past they went to the prisons of England side by side with our Catholic fathers for the liberty of conscience and of truth.

So much for the consequences of these events; and now a very few words upon the duties which flow from them. First of all, it must be the duty of a Catholic to speak out openly as Pius IX. has spoken. Englishmen, like all honest men, hate half truths; the man who speaks with a bated breath suggests to an Englishman a doubt of his sincerity. As Catholics,

speak out kindly, calmly, without offence, but without hesitation, and avow your principles. Next, they who possess any power to influence the actions of the other men, as all have when they decide who shall represent them in the Legislature of this kingdom, will do well to ask, "Will you ever use your influence against that which is dearer to me than life—I mean the liberty of the Catholic Church?" Once more, Pius IX., despoiled of everything that he possessed, as I have told you, dwells under a roof the "enjoyment" of which is permitted to him, but the possession of which is claimed by another. He lives, at this time, as the Apostles lived, upon the offerings of the faithful. I believe that there are many around us whose hearts secretly feel with us and with Pius IX. in this great cause, who join with us in this act of homage to one whom they venerate. Lastly, our confidence is in prayer. The world despises prayer; it cannot be calculated on the Stock Exchange, and in Parliament it is of little account; but prayer moves an arm that is almighty, and that arm governs the world.

Let us sum up all that has been said. I believe that I have laid before you sufficient evidence that a distinct Providence of God invested the successor of Peter with a proper sovereignty of his own, that his temporal sovereignty is not needed for the existence, or even for the exercise of his spiritual power, but only that he may exercise it in peace. I have also, I think, given you proof that this power and sovereignty has been sacrilegiously violated and usurped. I hope I have given evidence by which we may judge what are the consequences of that violation. Peace

to Christian Europe I do not believe we shall see, except concurrently with the restoration of that providential order of the world.

In the Allocution, the topics of which I have followed, there is one passage of which, as yet, I have said nothing. Pius IX. shall speak in his own words. After recounting all the sorrows, afflictions, and sufferings of his Pontificate, and especially of the last six years, he goes on thus:—"But do not think, Venerable Brethren, that in these hardships and sufferings our courage is broken, or that we have lost confidence in the decrees of the Eternal and Almighty God. Ever since, after the seizure of our territory, We resolved to keep guard at the tomb of blessed Peter over the interests of the Catholic Church, and therefore to stay in Rome rather than to seek a quiet resting-place in other lands, We have not ceased, with God's help, to strive for the advance of his cause; and still We persevere, defending, step by step, against the usurpation of the revolution, the little that remains. When all other help has failed us for the protection of the Church and of religion, We have raised our voice in expostulation, as you who have shared all our dangers and our grief, bear witness, for We have often publicly addressed you, either in condemnation of fresh outrages and in protest against the increasing violence of our enemies, or to warn the faithful against the seductions and pretended goodness of the wicked, and against the noxious teaching of false brethren." I remember when the question hanging in the balance was whether Pius IX. should withdraw from Rome on the entrance of a usurping authority, or whether he should abide there firm, in

the place where God had put him. I remember the reasons to and fro were many and weighty; but at last the decision was this—I do not pretend to recite the words of Pius IX., but only to interpret his acts: —"Here God has placed me; here I abide. I am here as the Head of the Universal Church; I am here as the centre of the Universal Episcopate. The courage of the bishops throughout the world rests on me; I will give the example. The courage of the faithful also throughout the world rests on me; I will, under God, sustain it. I must support all that is loyal in Rome, all that is good in Italy. All that is faithful, all that is true will look to me for the example of an immutable firmness. Here I abide, that I may set that example to all my children." Events have justified the wisdom of Pius IX.

On the 6th of July, in the year 1809, French soldiers broke into the Quirinal Palace, and in the great hall of that palace there stood Pius VII. Around him were a few of his household; before him was General Radet, the leader of those troops. For the moment they stood gazing in silence. Afterwards some one asked the leader of that outrage, "Why did you not speak?" He answered: "I felt to be myself as long as I was ascending the stairs, and was in the midst of the Swiss and the soldiers. When I came to stand in the presence of the Vicar of Jesus Christ my first communion rose up before me." After a while, he recovered his self-control, and said: "Holy Father, by the command of the Emperor, I must call on you either to abdicate your temporal dominion or to go with me to prison." Pius VII. answered: "You have done right to fulfil the command of your

master the Emperor, because you have sworn fidelity to him; and I must do my duty which binds me to my Master. He has committed to me the Temporal Power of the Holy See as a trust, in behalf of the Universal Church, and resign it we ought not, we will not, we cannot." The violence of the world changes its form, but the voice of the Church never changes.

APPENDIX I.

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI PII DIVINA PROVIDENTIA PAPAE IX.

ALLOCVTIO.

Habita Die xii. Martii MDCCCLXXVII. ad S. R. E. Cardinales in Ædibvs Vaticanis.

Venerabiles Fratres,—

Luctuosis exagitati Nostri Pontificatus temporibus pluries vestrum amplissimum ordinem in has aedes advocavimus, ea mente ut gravia mala apud Vos deploraremus quibus Ecclesia indigne affligitur, et contra ea quae sive in Italia sive in aliis regionibus in perniciem Ecclesiae ac Sedis Apostolicae patrata sunt, Nostras protestationes ederemus. Novissimis vero hisce annis novos et violentiores usque impetus atque iniurias spectare debuimus, quas Ecclesia Dei in variis Orbis catholici partibus pertulit ab infensis hostibus, qui opportunam satis occasionem Iesu Christi sponsam oppugnandi reputaverunt calamitosam conditionem rerum nostrarum, et solitudinem eam in qua Nos omni humana ope destituti versamur. Optassemus quidem hodierna die Venerabiles Fratres menti et cogitationi vestrae proponere immanem hanc lateque diffusam persecutionem, quae in pluribus Europae regionibus contra Ecclesiam saevit, sed habentes in animo acerbam hanc descriptionem alio Vobis tempore exhibere, interim facere non possumus, quin Ecclesiae in hac Italia labores et vexationes in dies asperiores Vobis commemoremus, ac pericula quae quotidie maiora Nobis et huic Apostolicae Sedi impendere conspicimus, aperiamus.

Septimus iam procedit annus, ex quo invasores civilis Nostri Principatus omnibus divinis ac humanis iuribus proculcatis, solemnium pactionum fide violata, et calamitates illustris Nationis catholicae opportunitatem suam reputantes, vi atque armis provincias quae in nostra potestate adhuc erant occuparunt, hanc sanctam civitatem expugnavere, ac tantae iniquitatis

opere Ecclesiam universam luctu ac dolore compleverunt. Simulatae atque infidae promissiones, quas iis funestis diebus ipsi super rebus nostris, Gubernüis exteris obtulere, declarantes se velle obsequium et honorem reddere libertati Ecclesiae, et liberam ac plenam esse velle Romani Pontificis potestatem, efficere non potuerunt ut Nos vana spe illecti non penitus praeciperemus animo, quae luctuosa ac misera Nos sub eorum dominatione manerent ; quin probe conscii consiliorum impiorum quae propria sunt hominum quos novarum rerum studia et sceleratum foedus consociat, aperte praenunciavimus eam sacrilegam invasionem non tantum spectare ad civilem Nostrum Principatum opprimendum, quantum ad destruendas facilius, temporali nostra dominatione oppressa, institutiones omnes Ecclesiae, ad evertendam Sanctae Sedis auctoritatem, ad vicariam Christi potestatem quam licet immerentes gerimus in terris, omnino labefactandam.

Iamvero hoc opus demolitionis et eversionis omnium rerum quae pertinent ad ecclesiasticum aedificium atque ordinem, si non quoad consilia ac odium persecutorum, quoad gravissimas tamen ruinas quas usque ad hanc diem congesserunt pene consummatum dici potest; ac satis est oculos convertere ad leges et decreta ab initio novae dominationis huc usque edita, ut luculenter perspiciatur Nobis singillatim ac sensim alia ex aliis in dies media et praesidia fuisse sublata, quibus ad catholicam Ecclesiam ut par est regendam et gubernandam omnino indigemus. Enimvero iniquitas quae completa est supprimendis ordinibus religiosis, Nos strenuis ac utilibus adiutoribus damnose spoliavit, quorum opera in expediendis ecclesiasticarum Congregationum negotiis, in tot partibus ministerii Nostri exercendis Nobis omnino necessaria est, ac eodem tempore hic in urbe nostra tot domicilia delevit quae religiosos viros ex exteris nationibus excipiebant, qui statis temporibus in hanc metropolim convenire consueverant ad roborandum spiritum, ad rationes de suo ministerio reddendas, atque ab ipsis radicibus crudeliter abscidit tot utiles et feraces plantas, quae fructus benedictionis et pacis in omnes terrae plagas afferebant. Eadem autem suppressionis iniuria quae Collegia perculit pro sacris missionibus in urbe constituta ad dignos operarios efformandos, qui Evangelii lucem in dissitas etiam et inhospitas terras animose proferrent, ea misere subduxit tot populis tam salutare pietatis et caritatis auxilium magno cum detrimento ipsius civilis humani-

tatis et cultus, qui a Religionis nostrae sanctitate doctrina virtute dimanat. Huiusmodi vero leges per se acerbissimae et non solum Religionis, sed ipsius humanae societatis utilitati perquam adversae, maiorem etiam acerbitatem deinde accepere ex novis ordinationibus rei publicae ministrorum, quibus religiosarum familiarum communi in domo consociationes, et novae admissiones pro regularibus utriusque sexus sub severis sanctionibus prohibentur. Disiectis Ordinibus religiosis Clero saeculari destruendo consilia et opera conversa sunt, ac funesta ea lex lata fuit qua Nos et Pastores italici populi magno cum luctu videre debuimus iuvenes clericos, Ecclesiae spem, a sanctuario nequiter avulsos, et coactos aetate ipsa qua se Deo solemniter consecraturi sunt, saccularis militiae balteum accipere, ac vitae genus perferre, quod ab institutis et a spiritu vocationis eorum longissime abhorret. Quid plura? Subsecutae sunt aliae iniustae leges quibus universum patrimonium, quod Ecclesia sacris diuturnis inviolabilibus titulis possidebat magna ex parte fuit ereptum, substitutis eius loco ac ex parte tantum exiguis reditibus, qui ancipitibus temporum vicibus, et voluntati ac arbitrio publicae potestatis penitus subiiciuntur. Deplorare etiam coacti fuimus, magno numero aedificia quae pietas fidelium gravibus admodum sumptibus toleratis erexerat, quae christianis Romae temporibus digna erant, quaeque pacatum hospitium praebebant virginibus Deo devotis aut Regularium familiis, indiscriminatim legitimis possessoribus electis occupata fuisse, et in profanos usus destinata. Adempta insuper fuerunt potestati Nostrae, et sacrorum ministrorum curationi, tot pia opera et instituta caritati ac beneficentiae exercendae consecrata, quorum nonnulla egestati aliisque miseriis et necessitatibus sublevandis mira munificentia ipsi Romani Pontifices Praedecessores Nostri et exterarum gentium pia liberalitas condiderant; ac si qua ex iis publicae caritatis operibus adhuc sub Ecclesiae vigilantia manent, lex quaedam non serius roganda esse fertur, qua illa a Nobis subtrahantur aut funditus aboleantur, veluti publica documenta non dubie nec obscure praenunciant. Vidimus praeterea, idque anima Nostra supra omnem modum dolore perculsa commemoramus, Ecclesiae auctoritati et moderationi subductum publicum ac privatum doctrinarum et artium magisterium, et docendi munus concreditum hominibus suspectae fidei, aut apertis Ecclesiae inimicis et qui non dubitarunt atheismi impietatem publice profiteri.

Occupatis hac ratione et eversis tot religiosis magnique momenti institutionibus, id non satis visum est filiis Ecclesiae desertoribus nisi etiam impedimenta ponerent sanctuarii Ministris ne suum spirituale ministerium valeant libere exercere; atque huc etiam nefarie perventum est ea lege in aula oratorum legibus ferendis novissime approbata, quae de *Cleri abusibus* inscribitur, cuius vigore crimini et noxae vertuntur Episcopis itemque sacerdotibus, ac gravibus poenarum sanctionibus multantur ii actus, quos sub insidioso nomine perturbationis conscientiae quam dicunt publicae, aut pacis familiarum predictae legis auctores complectuntur. Eius porro quam innuimus legis iussu, verba ac scripta omnis generis quibus Religionis administri decreta leges aut alium quemque publicae auctoritatis actum vel rei sacrae iuribus, vel Dei aut Ecclesiae legibus adversantem, pro sui officii ratione notandum ac improbandum censeant, animadversioni et poenis perinde subiiciuntur, ac opera illorum qui praedicta scripta ediderint aut diffuderint, quocumque ex ordine ecclesiasticae auctoritatis, aut ex loco ipsa manaverint Ubi haec lex perlata et promulgata fuerit integrum erit laico tribunali iudicium ferre, utrum ac quomodo sacerdos in sacramentis administrandis in divini verbi praedicatione conscientiam publicam et domesticam tranquillitatem perturbaverit, ac episcopalis et sacerdotalis vocis ea erit conditio ut ea comprimatur aut obstruatur, non minus quam vox ipsa Iesu Christi Vicarii, qui quamvis in se ipso nulli animadversioni obnoxius dicatur ob rerum politicarum rationes, in persona tamen eorum qui eius noxae affines fuerint puniendus esse censetur, uti publicus regni administer in conventu legumlatorum palam significare non dubitavit, cum respectu ad Nos habito aperte profiteretur nec novum aut insolitum esse in legibus, nec a iuris criminalis ratione scientia ac usu absonum, poenis subiici participes criminis, ubi praecipuus auctor puniri non possit. Ex quo intelligitur ad Nos etiam ex dominantium sententia huius legis telum spectare, ita ut ubi nostra verba aut acta in offensionem eius legis incidant, Episcopi aut sacerdotes qui nostros sermones et monita aut evulgarint aut executi fuerint poenas luturi sint eius praetensi criminis, cuius reatum et culpam Nos uti praecipuus auctor sustinere iudicabimur.

En Venerabiles Fratres quemadmodum non solum tot praesidia tot instituta roborata saeculis, invicta tempestatibus, Ecclesiae administrationi necessaria hostili violentia ac demolitione apud

Nos eversa sunt, sed eo etiam progressum est, ut sublime illud munus docendi vigilandi animarum saluti prospiciendi quod Ecclesia a suo divino conditore accepit, nefario modo impediatur, severissimis poenis indictis, ad obstruendum os ministrorum eius, qui dum docent populos servare omnia quae Christus mandavit, dum instant opportune importune arguunt obsecrant increpant in omni patientia et doctrina, illud agunt quod divina eis et apostolica auctoritate praecipitur. Alias autem tenebrosas molitiones oppugnatorum Ecclesiae silentio praeterimus, a quibus nonnullorum etiam ex publicis administris consilia et incitamenta non abesse cognoscimus, quae eo spectant ut maiorum tribulationum dies Ecclesiae ipsi adducantur, vel promovendis schismatis occasionibus ubi futuri Pontificis electio inciderit, vel Episcoporum qui Ecclesiis Italiae praesunt spiritualis auctoritatis usu impediendo, cuius rei causa Nos novissime declarare coacti fuimus, tolerari posse ut acta canonicae institutionis eorumdem Episcoporum laicae potestati exhibeantur. ad occurrendum quantum in Nobis est, funestissimis rerum adiunctis, in quibus non amplius agebatur de temporalium bonorum possessione, sed ipsa fidelium conscientiae, earum pax, animarum procuratio et salus, quae suprema Nobis lex est, in apertum discrimen vocabantur. Verum in hoc quod egimus ad gravissima pericula removenda, palam ac iterum agnosci volumus, Nos iniustam eam legem quae *regium placitum* vocatur omnino improbare ac detestari, aperte declarantes per ipsam laedi divinam Ecclesiae auctoritatem, eiusque libertatem violari.

Post haec autem quae hactenus exposuimus, omittentes plura alia, ad quae deploranda sermonem nostrum producere possemus illud petimus, qua ratione fieri possit ut Ecclesiam gubernare valeamus sub dominatione eiusmodi potestatis, quae omnia Nobis media et praesidia ad Apostolatum nostrum exercendum continenter adimit, omnem viam obstruit, nova in dies impedimenta novas difficultates interponit, novos usque laqueos insidiasque molitur? Profecto Nos satis mirari non possumus eos homines reperiri, quorum nescimus utrum levitas an malitia maior sit, qui sive per publicas ephemerides, sive peculiaribus scriptis sive impudentibus sermonibus plurium occasione conventuum habitis, obtrudere et persuadere populis conantur, praesentem summi Pontificis in urbe conditionem talem esse, ut etiam sub alterius potestatis dominatione constitutus plena libertate fruatur, ac tranquille et plene possit suo supremo spirituali primatu per-

fungi. Ad quam opinionem publice confirmandam nullam elabi occasionem sinunt sive cum Episcopi et fideles ex exteris plagis ad Nos visendos accedunt, sive cum eorum pios coetus in conspectum nostrum admittimus, sive cum impios ausus contra Ecclesiam Nostris ad eos sermonibus deploramus, quin de industria et callide incautis insinuare studeant, Nos reipsa plena potestate et libertate frui tum loquendi tum excipiendi fideles tum Ecclesiam universam administrandi. Mirum Nobis est quod talia impudenter iactari possint, quasi exercitium illorum actuum qui recensentur plene et omnino esset in nostra potestate, et quasi in iis tota gubernationis Ecclesiae ratio quae ad munus Nostrum pertinet, contineretur. Quis enim nescit non sub Nostra sed sub dominantium potestate esse actus eius libertatis quam tantopere extollunt, ita ut eatenus et tamdiu eosdem actus exercere possimus, quatenus et quamdiu hoc ab iis non impediatur? Quae tamen nostrorum actuum libertas quantum sub eorum potestate sit, etsi alia argumenta deessent, satis innuit ac docet novissima ea lex quam nuper deploravimus, qua liberum exercitium spiritualis nostrae potestatis, et ministerii ecclesiastici ordinis nova et intolerabili oppressione constringitur. Quod si nonnullos actus Nos posse exercere permiserint, ea de causa quod agnoscant quantopere eorum intersit Nos sub eorum dominatione liberos existimari, quam multa tamen gravissima pernecessaria summique momenti sunt quae ad formidanda onera ministerii Nostri pertinent, quibus reipsa ac rite perficiendis, Nos dominantium iugo subiecti omni necessaria facultate et libertate caremus? Vellemus quidem illos qui ea quae retulimus scribunt aut loquuntur, oculos suos ad ea quae circa Nos accidunt coniicerent, ac alieno paullisper a partibus animo diiudicarent, utrum vere dici possit Ecclesiae regendae potestatem Nobis diviuitus commissam, cum eo statu ad quem Nos adegit invasorum dominatus posse componi. Vellemus eos agnoscere convicia iniurias contumelias quae etiam in aula Oratorum Populi continenter contra humilitatem Nostram effunduntur, convicia in quibus Nos quidem ignoscimus miseris qui ea promunt, sed tamen in offensionem maximam fidelium cedunt quorum communis Pater violatur, et eo tendunt ut imminuatur apud eos existimatio auctoritas veneratio, quam Vicariatus Christi quem indigni sustinemus, suprema dignitas et sanctitas postulat. Vellemus eos testes esse probrorum et calumniarum quibus tum amplissimus ordo vester, tum sacri Ecclesiae Magistratus omni-

bus modis impetuntur, tanto cum administrationis eorum detrimento ; testes esse irrisus ac ludibrii quo augusti ritus ac institutiones catholicae Ecclesiae dehonestantur, petulantiae qua sanctissima religionis mysteria profanantur, ac conspicere publicis honoris significationibus et pompis decoratam impietatem et atheos homines, dum contra religiosae supplicationes et pompae vetantur, quas avita italorum pietas libere semper celebrare solemnibus temporibus consuevit. Vellemus etiam ipsis notas esse blasphemias, quae impune, auctoritate publica dissimulante, contra Ecclesiam in legumlatorum conventu coniiciuntur, in quo Ecclesiae ipsi subvertendi et aggrediendi criminatio est illata, libertas eius nefarium ac fatale principium vocatum est, doctrinae eius perversae, ac societati et moribus adversantes appellatae sunt, vis et auctoritas eius tamquam civili consortio perniciosa incusata fuit. Neque possent iidem confictae nostrae libertatis praecones inficiari tot multiplices continuas graves occasiones in id comparatas ut incauta iuventus inflammatis cupiditatibus corrumpatur, ac ex eius animo catholica fides radicitus extirpetur. Si ipsi demum vias huius urbis, quae per B. Petri cathedram religionis sedes et caput est obirent, iudicare percommode possent utrum templa acatholici cultus his temporibus excitata, scholae corruptionis quaquaversus diffusae, tot domus perditionis passim constituae, obscena et foeda spectacula quae oculis populi offeruntur, talem rerum conditionem faciant, quae tolerabilis sit ei qui pro sui apostolatus officio debet quidem et vellet tot malis occurrere, at contra omnibus mediis et rationibus, omni potestatis exercitio privatur, quo possit vel uni tantum ex tot malis necessaria remedia adhibere, et animabus in exitium ruentibus opem ferre. Hic tandem est Venerabiles Fratres status cui subesse cogimur opera eius Gubernii quod in hac urbe dominatur, haec est illa libertas et potestas exercendi ministerii nostri cuius nomine abutuntur et qua Nos potiri impudenter iactitant : libertas scilicet videndi demolitionem in dies deteriorem ordinis et constitutionis ecclesiasticarum rerum, videndi exitium animarum, quin operam nostram ad tot damna opportune reparanda impendere et navare possimus. His ita se habentibus nonne nova amarulenta irrisio et ludibrium existimandum est illud quod saepe dicitur, nempe debere Nos conciliationis et concordiae consilia cum novis dominatoribus inire, cum haec conciliationis ratio non aliud ex parte nostra esset, nisi omnino prodere non modo summa Sanctae huius Sedis iura, quae tamquam sacrum et

inviolabile depositum ad hanc supremam cathedram evecti custodiendi ac tuenda recepimus, sed etiam et praecipue prodere divinum ministerium Nobis pro salute animarum commissum, tradere hereditatem Christi in manus auctoritatis huiusmodi, cuius opera ad ipsum catholicae religionis nomen, si fieri posset, delendum, diriguntur? Nunc profecto terrarum orbi claro in lumine omnique ex parte conspicienda praebetur vis vigor fides earum concessionum, quibus ad fidelium illusionem hostes nostri libertatem et dignitatem Romani Pontificis tueri se velle ostentarunt, quae fundamentum suum positum habent in arbitrio ac hostili voluntate reipublicae moderatorum, quorum in potestate est iuxta sua consilia et rationes, ac pro lubitu eas aptare, servare, interpretari, atque executioni mandare. Haudquaquam certe, haudquaquam Romanus Pontifex est aut erit unquam plenae libertatis compos, ac suae plenae potestatis, donec aliis in urbe sua dominantibus subiiciatur. Alia eius sors Romae esse non potest nisi aut supremi Principis aut captivi: nec unquam catholicae Ecclesiae universae pax securitas tranquillitas constare poterit, donec exercitium supremi apostolici ministerii obnoxium fuerit studiis partium, arbitrio dominantium, vicibus politicarum electionum, consiliis et operibus hominum callidorum ac utilitatem iustitiae praeferentium.

At in tantis malis quels laboramus et premimur ne putetis Venerabiles Fratres aut animum Nostrum fractum concidere, aut illam in Nobis fiduciam deficere qua Omnipotentis et Aeterni decreta expectamus. Nos quidem consilium cum iniissemus post occupationem ditionis Nostrae Romae potius manendi quam quaerendi alienis in terris tranquillum hospitium, idque ea mente ut penes Beati Petri sepulcrum pro re catholica vigiles excubias ageremus, numquam destitimus auxiliante Deo pro causa Eius tuenda certare, et quotidie certamus nullibi loco cedentes hosti nisi vi depulsi, ut perpauca illa quae adhuc reliqua sunt ab impetu diripientium et pervertere omnia conantium vindicemus. Ubi autem caetera Nos defecerunt praesidia quibus Ecclesiae et religionis rationes tueremur, Nos nostrae vocis et nostrarum expostulationum officio usi sumus; cuius rei testes estis ipsi quibus communia pericula communis Nobiscum dolor fuit: saepe namque verba excepistis publice a Nobis prolata sive ut nova facinora reprobaremus et contra invalescentem hostium violentiam protestaremur, sive ut aptis monitis fideles instrueremus ne insidiis improborum et simulatae religionis

specie, neu noxiis falsorum fratrum doctrinis deciperentur. Utinam vocibus Nostris tandem admoveant aures animumque adiiciant illi quorum ad officium pertinet et maxime interest, auctoritatem Nostram sustentare, et causam qua nulla iustior et sanctior, viriliter tueri! Nam qui fieri potest ut illorum prudentiam fugiat, frustra solidam ac veram prosperitatem in nationibus, tranquillitatem ac ordinem in populis, stabilitatem potestatis in iis qui sceptra tenent expectari, si Ecclesiae auctoritas quae societates omnes recte constitutas vinculo religionis continet, impune contemnatur et violetur, eiusque Caput supremum in suo ministerio obeundo plena libertate uti nequeat, et potestatis alterius sit obnoxius arbitrio?

Illud sane feliciter accidisse lactamur, ut voces Nostrae ab universo catholico Populo filiali pietate Nobis obstricto, libentissime magnoque cum fructu exceptae fuerint; talia enim sunt quae ab ipsis accepimus dilectionis assidua et iterata testimonia, ut et ipsis et Ecclesiae summam gloriam conferant, et bene sperare Nos iubeant laetiores dies eidem Ecclesiae et huic Apostolicae Sedi orituros. Ac profecto vix verbis aequare possumus iucunditatem solatii quod percepimus validis licet auxiliis undique destituti, intuentes egregios animorum motus et generosa studia quae sponte excitata latius in dies propagantur inter gentes etiam remotissimas, ut Romani Pontificatus et humilitatis Nostrae causam suscipiant, dignitatem tueantur. Liberalia subsidia quae ex omni terrarum parte ad Nos perveniunt ut urgentibus necessitatibus Sanctae huius Sedis prospiciamus, et frequentia tot filiorum nostrorum qui ad has Vaticanas aedes ex omni gente confluunt ut visibili Ecclesiae capiti devotam voluntatem suam testentur, eiusmodi pignora animorum fidelium sunt, pro quibus pares agere gratias divinae bonitati omnino nequeamus. Vellemus tamen ab omnibus intelligi, quod salutaris documenti loco esset, intimam vim et significationem veram peregrinationum istarum, quas hoc tempore crebro iterari videmus, quo Romanus Pontificatus teterrimum bellum experitur. Scilicet illae non eo valent tantum ut amorem et observantiam fidelium prodant erga humilitatem Nostram, sed manifestum praebent indicium sollicitudinis et anxietatum quae eorum corda perturbant, quod communis Parens in abnormi prorsus ac incongrua conditione versatur. Neque haec anxietas et sollicitudo conquiesceret, imo augeatur oportet, donec in possessionem plenae et verae libertatis Pastor universae Ecclesiae restituatur.

Interea nihil magis optamus Venerabiles Fratres quam ut voces Nostrae ex hoc parietum septo ad ultimos terrarum fines manent, ut totius orbis fidelibus pro illustribus quae continenter ipsi exhibent filialis dilectionis et obsequii argumentis, sensus gratissimi animi nostri testentur. Optamus enim iis gratias agere pro pia liberalitate, qua etiam interdum difficultatis rerum suarum obliti Nobis opitulantur, agnoscentes Deo offerri quidquid Ecclesiae tribuitur, gratulari pro magnanimitate et virtute qua impiorum iras et irrisiones despiciunt, Nosque iis devinctos profiteri pro alacritate qua significationes sui amoris Nobis offerre student ad celebrandam anniversariam diei illius memoriam, quo ante quinquaginta annos Episcopalis consecrationis munus, licet indigni suscepimus. Nec minus Nobis in votis est, ut omnes etiam Ecclesiarum quae late per orbem diffusae sunt Pastores, voces has Nostras excipientes ex iis incitamentum sumant, ut significent fidelibus suis pericula, oppugnationes et incommoda quotidie graviora, quibus premimur, eosque simul certiores faciant, Nos quidem nunquam destituros quicumque rerum exitus futurus sit, ab improbandis iniquitatibus quae coram Nobis patrantur ; verum fieri posse aliquando cum propter leges nuper rogatas, tum propter alias quae praenunciantur etiam saeviores, ut vox Nostra usque ad eos nonnisi rarius, et aegre admodum per interpositas difficultates possit afferri. In his tamen rerum adiunctis Pastores ipsos excitamus, ut greges suos praemoneant, ne fallacibus capiantur artibus quels homines fraudulenti veram rerum conditionem in qua positi sumus verbis invertere et deformare nituntur, sive celantes acerbitatem eius, sive libertatem Nostram extollentes, et potestatem nostram nemini obnoxiam esse affirmantes, dum vere rem totam sic paucis complecti possumus : scilicet Ecclesiam Dei in Italia vim et persecutionem pati : Christi Vicarium neque libertate, neque expedito plenoque usu suae potestatis frui.

Cum res hoc loco sint, nihil opportunius ducimus, nihil cupimus impensius, quam ut iidem omnes Sacrorum Antistites qui miram concordiam in tuendis Ecclesiae iuribus et egregiam in Apostolicam Sedem voluntatem suam multiplici indicio Nobis constanter probarunt, fideles quibus praesunt excitent, ut ea ratione ac ope quam iura sinunt cuiusque regionis, sedulo agant apud eos qui summam rei publicae tenent, quo accuratius gravis conditio perpendatur in qua Caput catholicae Ecclesiae degit, atque efficacia adhibeantur consilia obstaculis amoliendis, quae

veram ac plenam *independentiam* eius impediunt. Quoniam autem Dei omnipotentis est mentibus lumen immittere et flectere hominum corda, non solum Vos rogamus Venerabiles Fratres ut fervidis apud Eum precibus hoc maxime tempore utamini, sed et ipsos catholicorum omnium populorum Pastores vehementer hortamur, ut fideles sibi concreditos in sacra templa convenire curent, ubi pro Ecclesiae matris salute, pro inimicorum nostrorum conversione, et fine malorum tam gravium lateque patentium humiles preces ex intimo animo effundant. Excipiet ut firmiter confidimus, orationem populi ad se clamantis Deus, cui beneplacitum est super timentes Eum, et in eis qui sperant super misericordia Eius.

Caeterum Venerabiles Fratres confortemur in Domino et in potentia virtutis Eius, atque induti armaturam Dei, loricam iustitiae et scutum fidei, praeliemur strenue ac fortiter adversus potestatem tenebrarum, et nequitiam huius saeculi. Iam certe studium omnia miscendi perturbandique eo devenit, ut torrentis instar omnia se in praeceps tracturum minitetur, nec pauci ex iis qui novarum rerum auctores aut fautores extiterunt respectant conterriti, operis ipsi sui formidantes effectus. At Deus Nobiscum est, eritque usque ad consummationem saeculi. Timendum est iis de quibus scriptum est "Vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem et seminant dolores et metunt eos flante Deo periisse, et spiritu irae Eius esse consumptos." At Deum timentibus et certantibus in nomine Ipsius ac in Eius potentia sperantibus misericordia et praesidium reservatum est, neque dubitandum quin cum Eius sit causa, Eius sit pugna, Ipse certantes adiuvet ad victoriam.

APPENDIX II.

[*Translation.*]

ALLOCUTION OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS THE NINTH.

Addressed to the Cardinals in the Consistory of March 12th, 1877,

ON THE PERSECUTION OF THE HOLY SEE AND OF THE CHURCH IN ITALY.

VENERABLE BRETHREN,—

We have many times in the sorrowful years of our troubled Pontificate assembled you here around us, to deplore with you the evils by which the Church has been undeservedly afflicted, and to protest against the efforts made in Italy and elsewhere for the ruin of the Church and of the Apostolic See. But in these last years We have had to witness new and more violent attacks and outrages, which the Church of God has suffered in various parts of the Catholic world, from enemies who thought that in our calamitous position, left as We were without human aid, there was a fit opportunity for assailing the Spouse of Jesus Christ. We should indeed have wished, Venerable Brethren, to describe to you to-day the cruel and widespread persecution to which the Church is subjected in many parts of Europe; but, reserving this description for another time, We will speak to you now of the daily increasing hardships and sufferings of the Church in Italy, and of the dangers with which We and this Apostolic See are more and more threatened.

It is now the seventh year since the usurpers of our Civil Power, trampling under foot every Divine and human right, and in violation of solemn treaties, took advantage of the misfortunes of an illustrious Catholic nation to seize by force of arms what remained of our provinces, and, storming this Holy City, filled the whole Church with sorrow for so great a crime. In spite of the hypocritical and false promises which the usurpers then made to Foreign Governments, declaring that they would respect and honour the liberty of the Church, and give full and

perfect freedom to the Roman Pontiff, We did not fail to foresee what would be our condition under their rule. Knowing well the designs of men whom the spirit of revolution and iniquitous ties have bound together, We publicly declared that the object of the sacrilegious invasion was not merely to destroy our Civil Power; but, by its destruction, to destroy afterwards more easily the institutions of the Church, to subvert the authority of the Holy See, and to overthrow the power which, notwithstanding our unworthiness, We hold as Vicar of Christ on earth.

This destruction and overthrow of whatever belongs to the structure and organisation of the Church may be said to be almost complete; if not to the extent desired by our persecutors, at least so far as to have brought about great ruin: for We have only to look at the laws and decrees that have been made since the beginning of the usurpation, to see clearly that, one by one, and day after day, the means and safeguards which are needed for the proper administration and government of the Church have been withdrawn.

The suppression of Religious Orders has, in fact, deprived us of strenuous and useful fellow-labourers, whose work in carrying on the business of the ecclesiastical Congregations was necessary for many parts of our ministry; it has also closed many houses in which the religious men were received who came here at stated times from foreign countries, to recruit their spiritual strength or to give an account of their office; and it has uprooted many fruitful plants from which blessings and peace were borne to all parts of the earth. The same act of suppression, affecting the Colleges established in this City for the training of worthy missionaries to carry the light of the Gospel into distant and also barbarous lands, has deprived many peoples of pious and charitable help; and has hindered even the civilisation and culture which result from the teaching and practice of our holy religion. And to these laws, severe in themselves, and adverse to religion and society, still greater severity has been added by the ministerial regulations which, under heavy penalties, forbid Religious to live together in common or to receive new subjects.

After the breaking up of the Religious Orders, the destruction of the Secular Clergy was next attempted; and the law was passed which has caused us and the Pastors of the Italian people to see with grief many young ecclesiastics, who were the hope

of the Church, torn from the Sanctuary, and, at the age when they were about to consecrate themselves to God, forced to take up arms, and to lead a life at variance with their training and with the spirit of their sacred calling.

Then came other unjust laws, which seized upon a great part of the patrimony that the Church had long held by sacred and inviolable right; and substituted for it a partial and scanty income, subject to the eventualities of the times and to the will and caprice of the Government.

We have had also to deplore the seizure of a large number of buildings, erected at great cost by the piety of the faithful, and worthy of the Christian days of Rome, where religious communities or virgins consecrated to God had a happy abode, but which have been taken from their rightful owners and turned to worldly uses.

Again, many pious works and institutions of charity and beneficence, of which some were founded by the munificence of our Predecessors or by the pious liberality of foreign nations, for the relief of poverty and of other miseries and necessities, have been withdrawn from our control and from the management of sacred ministers; and, although a few of these works of public charity are still left under the care of the Church, it is said that a law will soon be proposed either for their suppression or to exclude us from their government.

Moreover, and with great sorrow We speak of it, We have seen both public and private education withdrawn from the authority and direction of the Church; and the office of teacher entrusted to men of doubtful orthodoxy, and even to declared enemies of the Church who had made public profession of atheism.

But the seizure and overthrow of so many important religious institutions, it was thought, would not suffice, unless also the ministers of the sanctuary could be prevented from freely exercising their spiritual office. This is the object of the law lately passed in the Chamber of Deputies, entitled "On the Abuses of the Clergy;" by which all acts that may be brought under the vague term of disturbance of the public conscience, or of the peace of families, are, both in Bishops and in priests, declared criminal and to be severely punished. According to this law, all words and writings of whatsoever kind, by which ministers of religion may feel it their duty to censure or disapprove any

decrees, laws, or other acts of the civil power, as being adverse either to sacred authority, or to the laws of God or of the Church, are liable to prosecution and punishment; and so are all persons who publish or circulate any such writings, of whatsoever ecclesiastical rank they may be, or from whatsoever place such writings may be issued. When this law is in force, it will be in the power of a lay tribunal to determine whether and how a priest, in administering the Sacraments or in preaching the word of God, has disturbed the public conscience or the peace of families, and the voice of both Bishops and priests will be silenced; nay, even the very voice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, who, although for political reasons he is said not to be personally liable to prosecution, will nevertheless be regarded as punished in the person of his accomplices; and this has been stated in Parliament by one of the ministers, who declared that it was neither new nor unfrequent, nor opposed to the theory or practice of criminal law, to punish accomplices when the author of a crime was beyond reach. From this it is seen that, in the intention of our rulers, the said law strikes at ourself; so that, when our words or acts offend against the law, the Bishops and priests who publish our words or give effect to our injunctions will bear the punishment of the alleged crime, but to us will be attributed its guilt.

Behold, Venerable Brethren, how the safeguards and institutions which had been strengthened by ages and had withstood every storm, and which are necessary for the administration of the Church, have now been overturned; how even the office which the Church has received from her Divine Founder, to teach, and to guard, and to provide for the salvation of souls, is wickedly obstructed; how the mouths of her ministers are closed by threat of heavy punishment: and yet, when they teach their people to observe all things that Christ has commanded, and are instant in season and out of season, arguing, beseeching, and reproving in all patience and doctrine, they do only that which Divine and Apostolic authority has enjoined. Other secret designs there are against the Church, of which We will not now speak; designs in which the counsels and instigations of certain public officials have not been wanting, and which have for their object to bring days of greater tribulation upon the Church, either by causing a schism at the election of the next Pontiff, or by obstructing the Bishops of Italy in the exer-

cise of their spiritual power. To meet this last difficulty We have lately permitted the acts of canonical institution of Bishops to be presented to the civil authority, in order thereby to provide for a state of things in which there is no longer a question as to the possession of temporalities, but in which the consciences of the faithful, their peace, and the care and salvation of their souls are manifestly in danger. But in doing this for the removal of most grave perils, We wish it to be clearly understood that We disapprove and condemn the unjust law of the *regium placitum*, as it is called, and declare it to be a violation of the Divine authority and liberty of the Church.

After what We have shown, and omitting many other evils of which We might speak, how, We ask, can We govern the Church under the rule of a power which deprives us of all means and safeguards for the exercise of our Apostolate, which interferes with us in every way, which daily interposes fresh obstacles and difficulties, and tries more and more to put restraint upon us? We cannot understand how there can be men who, in the public papers, in pamphlets, or at public meetings, should endeavour, either thoughtlessly or in malice, to persuade people that the present condition of the Sovereign Pontiff in Rome is such that, though living under another's rule, he enjoys complete liberty, and is able peacefully and fully to discharge the duties of his spiritual primacy. In support of this assertion, when the Bishops or faithful of other countries come to visit us, and We admit them into our presence, and speak to them of the attacks upon the Church, these men neglect no opportunity of insinuating that We have full power and liberty both to receive the faithful and to address them, and to govern the whole Church: as if the exercise of these acts were fully and completely within our power, or as if in these things the whole duty of governing the Church consisted. Who is ignorant that, not in our own power, but under the control of our rulers, are those very acts of liberty of which they so much boast; and that those acts can be exercised only so far and so long as our rulers permit? What liberty of action We have, and to what extent We are controlled by our rulers, is sufficiently shown, even if there were no other proofs, by the last act of legislation which We have described to you, and in which the free exercise of our spiritual power and ecclesiastical ministry is subjected to a new and intolerable oppression. If they permit us to perform certain

acts because it is for their interest that We should be thought to be free under their rule, how many weighty and necessary and most important matters are there, belonging to the grave duties of our ministry, for which, as long as We are subject to them, We have neither liberty nor power? Would that they who speak or write these things would look at what is happening around us; and, judging for a moment impartially, would say whether the duty that God has laid upon us of governing the Church can really be discharged in the condition to which We have been reduced by our invaders. Would that they could hear the reproaches, outrages, and insults that are uttered in Parliament against us; and which, while We pardon the men who utter them, are nevertheless most offensive to the faithful whose common Father is outraged, and tend to lessen the esteem, authority and veneration, which are due to the holy and high office of Vicar of Christ. Would that they could be witnesses of the insults and calumnies by which the Sacred College and other high dignitaries of the Church are in every way assailed, to the great injury of their authority. Would that they could see how the august rites and institutions of the Catholic Church are derided and ridiculed; the most sacred mysteries of religion profaned; impiety and atheism honoured with public demonstrations and processions, while religious processions, which the good Catholics of Italy have always been accustomed to hold on solemn festivals, are forbidden. Would that they were aware of the blasphemies which, with perfect impunity and without any protest on the part of the authorities, are uttered against the Church in Parliament; where the Church herself is accused as subversive and aggressive—her liberty called a wicked and fatal principle—her teaching perverse, and hostile to society and morality—and her power and authority assailed as hurtful to civil life. Even those who boast of our liberty would be unable to deny the manifold, constant, and grave occasions that are prepared for the demoralisation and corruption of incautious youth, and for uprooting Catholic faith from their minds. And if they walked through the streets of this City which, as being the See of Blessed Peter, is the seat and centre of religion, they could easily judge whether the temples of heretical worship, the schools of error everywhere established, the houses of ill-fame set up in many places, and the obscene and loathsome sights presented to the eyes of the people, constitute a state of things

which is tolerable for him whose duty and wish it is, by reason of his Apostolic office, to destroy these many evils, but who is unable to apply a remedy to even one of them, or to help the souls that are perishing. Such, Venerable Brethren, is the condition to which We are reduced by the government that rules in this City; this is the so-called liberty and power which they impudently assert that We enjoy: the liberty, forsooth, of witnessing the gradual destruction of the order and constitution of the Church, and of seeing souls perish, while We are unable in any way to repair these evils.

After all this, is it not mockery to say, as it is often said, that We ought to come to a reconciliation and agreement with our new masters? Such a reconciliation would on our side be a betrayal of the highest rights of the Holy See, which We have received as a sacred and inviolable trust to guard and to defend; it would, above all, be a betrayal of the sacred ministry which We have received from God for the salvation of souls, and a surrender of the inheritance of Christ into the hands of an authority whose efforts are directed to the destruction, if it were possible, of the very name of the Catholic religion. Now, indeed, the world may clearly see the value and sincerity of the concessions or guarantees by which our enemies pretended to guard the liberty and dignity of the Roman Pontiff: guarantees which rest on no other foundation than the arbitrary and hostile will of a Government in whose power it is to apply them, to interpret them, and to carry them into effect as it may choose, and solely for its own purposes and interests. In no way, certainly, in no way does the Roman Pontiff possess, nor can he ever possess full liberty, or exercise his full authority, as long as he is subject to others ruling in his City. In Rome he must be either a sovereign or a captive; and never will there be peace, security, and tranquillity throughout the Catholic Church, so long as the exercise of the supreme Apostolic ministry is left exposed to the agitation of parties, the arbitrary power of rulers, the vicissitudes of political elections, and the designs and actions of men who prefer their own interest to what is just.

But do not think, Venerable Brethren, that in these hardships and sufferings our courage is broken, or that We have lost confidence in the decrees of the Eternal and Almighty God. Ever since, on the seizure of our territory, We resolved to keep guard at the tomb of Blessed Peter over the interests of the Catholic

Church, and therefore to stay in Rome rather than to seek a quiet resting-place in other lands, We have ceased not, with God's help, to strive for the defence of His cause; and still We persevere, defending, step by step, against the usurpation of the Revolution, the little that remains. When all other help has failed us for the protection of the Church and of religion, We have raised our voice in expostulation, as you who have shared our dangers and our grief bear witness; for We have often publicly addressed you, either in condemnation of fresh outrages and in protest against the increasing violence of our enemies, or to warn the faithful against the seductions and pretended goodness of the wicked, and against the noxious teaching of false brethren. Would that those would listen to our words whose duty and interest it is to support our authority, and stoutly to defend a cause than which there is none more just and more holy. How can it escape their notice that in vain will they look for solid and true prosperity among nations, for tranquillity and order among the people, and for firmness of power in those who hold the sceptre, if the authority of the Church, which unites all rightly formed societies in the bond of religion, is despised and violated with impunity; and if its supreme Head, instead of having full liberty for the exercise of his ministry, is subject to the arbitrary will of another?

We rejoice, indeed, that the whole Catholic people have, with filial piety, so readily and fruitfully received our words. Their earnest and repeated proofs of affection are an honour to themselves and to the Church, and encourage us to hope for more joyful days for the Church and for this Apostolic See. We cannot, in fact, adequately describe our joy and consolation when, having no powerful help on any side, We see, even in distant countries, noble and generous hearts become more and more earnest in taking up our cause and in defending the dignity of the Roman Pontiff. The liberal aid which reaches us from all parts of the world to supply the urgent needs of the Holy See, and the visits of our children of all nations, who come to testify their devotion to the visible Head of the Church, are pledges of affection for which We can never sufficiently thank the Divine goodness. We would wish, however—and it would be a useful lesson—that all should understand the real value and true significance of the pilgrimages which have been so frequent during the war that has been waged against the Roman Pontificate.

They are valuable, not merely as a demonstration of the love and reverence of the faithful for our humble person, but as a proof of the solicitude and anxiety they feel at the abnormal and incongruous condition of their common Father—an anxiety which will not cease, but will go on increasing, until the Pastor of the Universal Church shall be restored to the possession of his full and real liberty.

There is nothing, Venerable Brethren, that We more desire than that our words should go forth from these walls to the ends of the earth, in testimony to all the faithful of our gratitude for their continual proofs of affection and reverence: for We wish to thank them for the pious generosity they have shown in helping us, forgetful at times of their own needs, and remembering that to God is given what is given to the Church; We wish also to congratulate them upon the magnanimity and courage with which they have met the anger and scorn of the wicked; and lastly, We wish to express our gratitude for the alacrity with which they are preparing to offer to us fresh tokens of their love in the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of our Episcopal Consecration. No less do We wish that all the Pastors of the Church throughout the world should, on receiving these words, point out to the faithful the dangers, and assaults, and daily increasing troubles to which We are exposed; and should make known to them that, whatever may be the end, We will never cease from denouncing the crimes that are perpetrated before us,—although, by reason of the laws already passed, and of other and severer laws in preparation, it may happen after a time that our words will reach them less frequently and not without much difficulty. Meanwhile We urge all Pastors to see that their flocks are not misled by the crafty artifices of those who endeavour to misrepresent our real condition, either by concealing its gravity, by extolling our liberty, or by affirming that our authority is subject to no one: for, to sum up all in a few words, the Church of God in Italy is suffering violence and persecution, and the Vicar of Christ has neither liberty nor the free and full use of his power.

We therefore think it opportune, and We greatly desire, that the Bishops, who in many ways have constantly shown their union in the defence of the rights of the Church, and their devotedness to this Apostolic See, should call upon the faithful under their jurisdiction to make every effort, as far as the laws

of each country may permit, to induce their Governments not only to examine carefully the serious condition of the Head of the Catholic Church, but also to take such measures as may ensure the removal of the obstacles which restrict his true and perfect *independence*. But as Almighty God alone can enlighten the minds and move the hearts of men, We beseech you, Venerable Brethren, to pray to Him fervently at this time ; and We earnestly exhort the Pastors of all Catholic peoples to assemble the faithful in the sacred temples, there to pray humbly and fervently for the safety of the Church, for the conversion of our enemies, and for the cessation of such great and widespread evils. And God, Who is well pleased with those who fear Him and hope in His mercy, will, We firmly believe, hear the prayer of His people when they cry to Him.

Let us, Venerable Brethren, be strengthened in the Lord and in the might of His power ; and putting on the armour of God, the breast-plate of justice, and the shield of faith, let us fight strenuously and bravely against the power of darkness and the wickedness of this world. Already the spirit of disturbance and disorder threatens, like a torrent, to carry everything before it ; and not a few of the authors or promoters of the Revolution look back with terror on the effects of their work. God is with us, and will be with us till the end of the world. Let those fear of whom it is written :[1] "I have seen those who work iniquity, and sow sorrows and reap them, perishing by the blast of God, and consumed by the spirit of His wrath." But the mercy and the help of God are with those who fear Him, and who fight in His name, and hope in His power ; and it is not to be doubted that, when the cause is His and the battle is His, He will lead the combatants to victory.

[1] Job iv. 8, 9.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE APOSTOLIC NUNCIOS

By CARDINAL SIMEONI, *Secretary of State to His Holiness,*

ON THE ACTION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLOCUTION OF MARCH 12TH, 1877.

MY LORD,—

You will not fail to notice the Circular on the late Allocution of the Holy Father, addressed by the Keeper of the Seals to the Procurators-General of the Courts of Appeal, and published yesterday by the Ministerial press in Rome. In that Circular it is ordered that journals shall not be sequestered for publishing the said Pontifical document, if in so doing they abstain from all expressions of approval: and this order is represented as a convincing proof of the liberty secured to the Sovereign Pontiff in the exercise of his ministry, inasmuch as, so states the Minister above named, the Allocution has gone beyond every limit that could have been foreseen, and has given fresh evidence of the ingratitude of His Holiness towards a Government which has been so liberal and so generous to the Church.

The truth is, that, if any further proof were wanting of the sad state of things which the Allocution describes, it would be found manifestly in the Circular of which I speak: for, from the moment when the publication of the Pontiff's words is subjected to the will of any Keeper of the Seals whatsoever, his liberty of speech becomes, and can be only, an illusion. The Minister himself to-day tells us that, notwithstanding the motives which he would have had for rigorously enforcing the laws, he has wished rather to forbear; but to-morrow the same Minister, or his successor, instead of yielding to these pretended feelings of forbearance, might with equal reason become a severe enforcer of laws that can be easily applied: and, for want of other motives, he might have recourse to the usual and groundless pretext which is put forward in the Circular,—namely, that the Roman Pontiff has passed beyond the limits of what is spiritual into the region of politics.

Such a pretext, I say, is, now especially, groundless. Whoever has read the Allocution of March 12th must have seen that the statement of facts therein contained relates entirely to religious interests, and above all to a vindication of full and real independence in the exercise of the Apostolic ministry. The wounds inflicted on the Church, against which His Holiness protests and has never failed to protest, are—whatever the author of the Circular may say—the lamentable effects of a policy that has entered upon a region which does not belong to it; but this is no reason for saying that the limits of his proper sphere have been transgressed by him whose right and obligation it is to protest until reparation be made.

The nature, however, of the liberty generously granted to the Sovereign Pontiff is still further shown in the Circular. It is a liberty which permits all papers hostile to the Church to assail in every way the Holy Father's words, by insult, by blasphemy, and even by falsifying their sense; but which, at the same time, forbids all Catholic papers to give any confirmation of the facts of which His Holiness complains, or to show any respect for the voice, the counsels or the teaching, of the august Head of the Church: a prohibition of which several Catholic journals of the provinces have already experienced the effect, by being sequestered for no other reason than that they had expressed their admiration of the Allocution. As to the Clergy in particular, the liberty which is announced to them is expressed with new and more stringent menaces, so that, if the ministers of religion, in obedience to the voice of their High Priest, preach his doctrines and exhort the people to observe them, they will find themselves confronted by a law which will pronounce that this is an intolerable abuse, punishable with imprisonment and heavy fines. And it is in the presence of such enactments that people are asked to believe in the absolute independence of the Sovereign Pontiff, and to set value on the concessions which, it is pretended, have been made to the Catholic Church by the Italian Parliament. The Keeper of the Seals appeals to the good sense of the public; but, in truth, with but little confidence: for, by his permitting only attack and forbidding all defence, his appeal becomes a mockery.

The mere fact that a Minister, after reading a discourse pronounced by the most august Authority upon earth, should pass over the injuries of which that Authority has declared itself the

victim,—and, summoning the Authority, so to speak, before him, should endeavour with captious words to accuse it of violence and of incitement to revolt ; and should go so far even as to reproach it with ingratitude for having uttered complaints instead of expressing thankfulness : this fact alone, I say, would suffice to show what confidence can be placed in the frequent declarations that have been made of respect and reverence for the spiritual jurisdiction of the Head of the Church. The conscience of Catholics, it may be truly said, will not fail to estimate such boldness as it deserves, and especially to see where the alleged ingratitude is to be found : whether in him who has ever loved Italy and sought its welfare, and who even now is its support, its splendour, and its brightest ornament ; or in him whose endeavour is to root up from our country its greatest glories—which are those of the Papacy—and to fill the soul of our august Pontiff with bitterness and sorrow.

Your Lordship will not fail to call the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the Government to which you are accredited, to the language of the Keeper of the Seals, and to the reflections to which that language gives rise : and you will especially invite him to consider that,—while there is just ground of complaint for the Catholics of Italy, who, in spite of the oppression they suffer, and notwithstanding certain notorious *plébiscites* mentioned in the Circular, have shown spontaneously, in many ways, and on all possible occasions, their adherence to the Sovereign Pontiff,—the Catholics also of other nations have no less reason of complaint ; and that, therefore, it is for the interest of the respective Governments to give their serious attention to this condition of things, in accordance with the advice offered by the Holy Father in the late Allocution. This also, as you will explain, is of still greater importance, because, by referring to the present diplomatic relations of Italy, the significance of which is purposely exaggerated, an attempt is made to throw upon Foreign Governments a part of the responsibility for the evils which the Sovereign Pontiff has described ; and because, moreover, when the Holy Father, unable in his present position rightly to govern the Church, calls upon the faithful to bring these matters before their Governments, he expressly wishes—a point on which the Keeper of the Seals has artfully been silent—that their action should be in conformity with the laws of their respective countries.

Authorising you to leave a copy of this Despatch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he should desire it,

I remain, etc.

ROME, *March* 21*st*. 1877.

From "DÖLLINGER'S HISTORY OF THE CHURCH."

(Vol. iii. pp. 117—119.)

"On the following festival of Christmas, the Pope crowned Charles as Roman Emperor, amidst the acclamations of the people, whilst he knelt before the altar of St. Peter, and anointed him and his son Pepin. Thus, after an interval of three hundred and twenty-five years, was the dignity of Roman emperor renewed; not transferred from the Greeks to the Franks; for the Byzantine emperors were still acknowledged as such by the popes and by the emperors of the west. But the empire of Constantinople, which had oftentimes been the prey of a fortunate adventurer or rude soldier, which had oppressed and persecuted rather than defended the Church, possessed now no more authority in the west. The Greeks themselves had long looked upon the Italian provinces, not as component parts of the empire, but as foreign conquered lands. By their perfect inability to guard them and protect them against the attacks of the Lombards, they had forfeited their claims to these provinces; and over Rome and the Roman dukedom, the sovereignty of the popes had been established during the course of the eighth century. The popes had recognised the superiority of the Greek emperors only by the insertion of their names and the years of their reign in public records, and by the coining of money bearing their effigies—a practice which had been observed also by the kings of the Franks. Now, therefore, Charles was raised above all the princes and kings of the west; his rank was no longer inferior but equal to that of the emperor of Constantinople; he, who as a patrician, had hitherto been the guardian of the Church of Rome, was now, as emperor, the protector and advocate of the entire Church; and as this was destined by its founder to be extended to all mankind, there was comprised in his power, not only the idea of a pre-emi-

nence above all other princes, but the empire of the world (imperium mundi), in virtue of which it was his duty to promote the propagation of Christianity even amongst barbarous infidel nations, and to provide in general for the welfare of the Christian Church. The imperial supremacy was naturally extended over the States of the Church, but without any trespass on the authority of the pontiff. The pope continued to be what he had been, lord of Rome, and of the dukedom, and chief of the exarchate. But recent events had proved that, in the troubled state of those countries, and in the unceasing conflicts of powerful parties, the temporal power of the pope could not stand, and that the personal safety of the pontiff called for the assistance of a powerful arm. For this end was instituted the rank of patrician ; and if Charles as patrician could exercise his power of guardian in Rome, and its surrounding territory, to his former was now added the imperial dignity, by which Rome was subjected to his imperium. But the pope was not, therefore, a subject of the emperor ; the Romans, indeed, swore to him an oath of fidelity, that he might continue to possess his advocacy and the jurisdiction connected with it ; but they pledged themselves with an express reservation of the fidelity due by them to the Roman Pontiff, their sovereign. Neither is it to be supposed that the pope, before independent and free, wished to give to himself and his successors a lord and master, by this restoration of the imperial dignity. Both, however, the pope and the emperor, entered into a state of mutual dependence ; each swore to the other an oath of fidelity, that is, of reverence and respect : the emperor acquired his dignity only by the coronation and anointing performed by the pope ; whilst the pope, who now stood in need of the assistance of the emperor, as he had before of the patrician, was, as a temporal prince, under the universal imperial dominion, and could not ascend to his high rank without the consent and approbation of the emperor."

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MANNING, H. E.
AUTHOR

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